Rhetoric and
Revolution
Kenneth Goodman's "Psycholinguistic Guessing Game"
Martin
A. Kozloff
Watson School
of Education
University of North Carolina at Wilmington
February, 2002
Introduction
Erect your schemes with as much method and skill
as you please;
yet if the materials be nothing but dirt, spun out of your own entrails
(the guts of modern brains), the edifice will conclude at last in a cobweb,
the duration of which, like that of other spiders' webs, may be imputed to
their being forgotten, or neglected, or hid in a corner. [Jonathan Swift.
The battle of the books. 1704]
Promoters and teachers of whole language argue that:
1. Whole language is more effective than other forms of reading
instruction.
2. This alleged superiority reflects specific features of whole language;
e.g.,
a. "Implicit" instruction that is less focused on precise
learning objectives, involves less teacher direction, and requires students to
construct knowledge of phonic and spelling rules (Goodman, 1986).
b. Much instruction on specific skills (e.g., phonics)
is given as-needed, during mini-lessons.
c. There is an emphasis on learning in what are called "authentic
contexts"; e.g., learning phonics (which sounds go with which letters) and
vocabulary during independent reading and when watching and listening to the
teacher read books (Smith, 1985).
3. These design features are said to flow from a more adequate understanding
of language and reading (Daniels, Zemelman, & Bizar, 2000; Powell & Hornsby, 1993).
However, recent research on reading, and experimental assessments of whole language
challenge the claim of greater effectiveness.
Specifically,
1. Controlled longitudinal experimental research shows that instruction on
phonemic awareness, decoding, reading fluency, spelling, and comprehension that
focuses on specific skills, involves explicit communication of rules and
strategies by the teacher, precisely and logically sequenced, and
provides systematic distributed practice is reliably superior for a wider
range of students than implicit (less focused) instruction that requires
students to construct their own knowledge (Foorman et
al., 1998; Fletcher & Lyon, 1998; Gough, 1993; Liberman,
1999; National Reading Panel, 2000).
2. Evaluation research at state and county levels shows that achievement of
students taught with whole language and Reading Recovery--the remedial branch
of whole language—is not as high as claimed by whole language proponents
and is less reliably effective than instruction provided by field tested
curricula involving focused, teacher-directed instruction (Chapman, Tunmer, & Prochnow, 1999; Heibert, 1995; San Diego Unified School District, 1999;
Stahl, McKenna, & Miller, 1994).
It is important as well to
examine the conceptual apparatus of whole language. What assumptions
are made? How is reading understood? How are methods of
assessment and instruction derived from the conceptualization of reading?
If the assumptions and/or conceptualization of reading are flawed, then whole
language assessment and instruction derived from a flawed foundation are likely
themselves to be flawed. If so, this may help to explain the (at best)
uneven effectiveness of whole language.
Goodman's Guessing Game
...when a man's fancy gets astride on his reason,
when imagination is at cuffs with his senses,
and common understanding as well as common sense, is kicked out of doors, the
first proselyte
he makes is himself... [Jonathan Swift. A tale of a tub.
1704]
Whole language proponents cite Kenneth Goodman's 1967 paper ("Reading: A
psycholinguistic guessing game") as one of the first in their canon--the
paper that fostered the whole language movement, or revolution (Goodman, 1976)
and continues to guide and legitimize whole language activities (Pappas & Pettegrew, 1998). Goodman clearly saw the paper the
same way--as offering "a more viable scientific alternative" to what
he dubbed "pre-existing, naive, common sense notions" about reading
that "interfere with the application of modern scientific concepts of
language and thought to research on reading" (Goodman, 1967, p.
126). Let us take Goodman at his word. Let us examine his "more
viable scientific alternative" to see how he crafted a new foundation for
reading research and instruction; to determine whether it satisfies the
criteria for a viable or even scientific alternative; and to understand better
how his ideas were so easily accepted and spawned the whole language movement.
In simplest terms, Goodman presents a
conception of reading as a guessing game. He provides no logical,
empirical, or commonsensical support for this conception. He then
presents a highly selective set of passage misreadings
by a child. ONE CHILD. These misreadings
are not called errors; they are "miscues." These misreadings are interpreted
in a way that fits Goodman's guessing-game formulation (although other
interpretations--from the phonic and word centered approaches he disparages--are
more obvious and more reasonable). Goodman then uses the misreading
examples as verification of his
conception of reading--although the only credible use of the examples would be
a demonstration that it is possible to misinterpret
misreadings that way. The paper ends by
suggesting that the implication for instruction is teaching children to
play the guessing game more skillfully. Following is a closer
examination of the logical structure of Goodman's paper.
The Opening Gambit
Goodman's paper begins with a common rhetorical device--caricature of a
self-created adversary. Specifically, he creates a false binary
opposition of then current conceptions of reading and their associated
methods of teaching: "phonic centered" and "word
centered." He reduces these approaches to a few statements that
would lead readers to agree with Goodman that these conceptions are simplistic
and must be wrong. For example,
...the common sense notion I seek here to refute is
this: 'Reading is
a precise process. It involves exact, detailed, sequential perception and
identification of letters, words, spelling patterns and larger language units.' In phonic centered approaches to
reading, the preoccupation is with precise letter identification. In
word centered approaches, the focus is on word identification... (p. 126).
Goodman then writes, "In place of this misconception, I
offer this..."--his allegedly "more viable scientific
alternative" foreshadowed in the paper's abstract.
Note the artful way that Goodman sets up the reader.
1. He labels in a disparaging way the phonic and word centered approaches
"common sense notions," despite the great deal of scientific research
done in support of each one--especially the approach that advocated teaching
phonics in a systematic way during beginning reading. Yet, he does not
cite this research or even hint that there was any. These approaches are
not presented as bodies of knowledge that may have some flaws. Rather, in
contrast to his self-valorized "scientific alternative," readers are simply
to take Goodman's unsupported word and consider them mere common sense notions.
2. In contrast to standard practice in science, Goodman presents no data that the phonic and word centered approaches do
not work. He conducts no experiments--indeed, he cites no research at
all--showing that whole language instruction (derived from his guessing game
formulation of reading) is more effective than the phonic centered and
word centered approaches he wishes to replace. And, although he calls
them "misconceptions," he does not analyze the intellectual apparatus
behind the phonic centered and word centered approaches (e.g., their theories
of reading) to show they are logically flawed.
In other words, Goodman does nothing to (in his own words) "refute"
these common sense notions. His only claim to readers' attention--and the
only warrant for his "scientific" alternative—is an unsubstantiated opening pitch that
there are two pre-existing alternatives; that these alternatives are merely
common sense notions; and that they are misconceptions.
The New Model
Goodman then presents his "scientific" alternative.
...I offer this: "Reading is
a selective process. It involves partial use of available minimal
language cues [Notice that he does not call them "reading"
cues. This makes it possible to falsely conflate reading and language, so
that he can argue for teaching reading the same--incidental,
"natural"--way that language is ordinarily learned. MK] selected
from perceptual input on the basis of the reader's expectation. As this
partial information is processed, tentative decisions are made to be
confirmed, rejected, or refined as reading progresses." More simply
stated, reading is a
psycholinguistic guessing game. It involves an interaction between
thought and language. Efficient reading does not result from precise
perception and identification of all the elements, but from skill in selecting
the fewest, most productive cues necessary to produce guesses which are right
the first time. The ability to anticipate that which will be seen, of
course, is vital in reading, just as the ability to anticipate what has
not yet been heard is vital in listening (pp. 127-8).
Notice that there are at least three logical errors in
Goodman's opening presentation of his new and "scientific" approach
to reading. First, Goodman's new view
of reading rests on the fallacy of reification. He transforms
what is merely a metaphor into a concrete reality. Goodman does not
say that reading can (metaphorically) be seen (for purposes of analysis)
as if it were a psycholinguistic guessing game. Rather,
reading is a psycholinguistic guessing game. It is not
as if readers are guessing at what words say. Readers actually are
guessing. [The author--MK--asks readers of this document to consider whether
they are in fact guessing at every word on this page.] However, treating
a metaphor as a concrete reality is a useful trick. It means that
whole language rests on a fantasy--a dreamy way of thinking--in which
there is no boundary between how we think about things and how things actually
are. Once new teachers are seduced into this dream world, almost any
bizarre and baseless statements can be taken as sage wisdom. [See http://people.uncw.edu/kozloffm/wlquotes.html
for examples of whole language statements that have no basis in reality.]
Second, Goodman commits the fallacy of hyperbole, or over-generalization.
He does not say that reading is a psycholinguistic guessing game
for certain aspects of reading, for some readers, at some
point in their learning to read. Rather, all of reading is
a guessing game for all readers all the time. This rhetorical device
enables Goodman to lay claim to all of reading and reading instruction
(word recognition, spelling, writing)--and to call it whole language.
Third, Goodman's definition of reading commits the fallacy of tautology.
After stating (above) that reading is a psycholinguistic guessing game,
Goodman states, "It involves an interaction between thought and
language." [It is interesting that Goodman's definition of
reading does not even have the word print in it.] Apparently, the
statement ("It involves an interaction between thought and
language.") is supposed to support the idea that reading is a
psycholinguistic guessing game. However, interaction between thought and
language means exactly the same thing as psycholinguistic.
Therefore, all Goodman is saying that
reading is a guessing game that involves interaction between thought and
language. [Again, nothing about print.] However, all
thinking uses language. Thinking means talking to yourself--in
a language. So, what could an interaction between thinking (which
means talking to yourself) and language mean? In
summary, Goodman's new definition of reading is empty. It means nothing
at all, and it certainly has nothing to do with interacting with the printed
word--the ordinary conception of reading.
Goodman's full conception consists of the following propositions--taken from
his initial statement (above) and from the summary of his "model" at
the end of the paper.
1. "Efficient reading does not result from precise perception and
identification of all the elements."
2. Reading
"involves an interaction between thought and language."
3. "Reading is
a selective process."
4. This selecting process "involves partial use of available minimal
language cues..."
5. Efficient reading results "from skill in selecting the fewest, most
productive cues..."
6. These cues are at first graphic cues (p. 135).
7. These cues are "selected from perceptual input on the basis of the
reader's expectation." They are "guided by constraints set up
through prior choices, his language knowledge, his cognitive styles and
strategies he has learned" (p. 135).
8. These cues provide "partial information."
9. The reader "forms a perceptual image using these cues and his
anticipated cues" (p. 135).
10. The reader "searches his memory for related syntactic, semantic,
and phonological cues."
11. This memory search "may lead to selection of more graphic cues and
to reforming the perceptual image" (p. 135).
12. These cues are "necessary to produce guesses which are right the
first time."
13. The reader then "makes a guess or tentative choice consistent with
graphic cues. Semantic analysis leads to partial
decoding as far as possible" (p. 135).
14. This partial information " is processed, tentative decisions are
made to be confirmed, rejected, or refined as reading progresses."
15. "If no guess is possible, he checks the recalled
perceptual input and tries again" (p. 135).
16. "If a guess is still not possible,
he takes another look at the text to gather more graphic cues" (p. 135).
17. "If the tentative choice is not acceptable semantically or
syntactically, then he regresses, scanning from right to left along the line
and up the page to locate a point of semantic or syntactic inconsistency"
(p. 135).
18. "When such a point (semantic or syntactic
inconsistency. MK) is found, he starts over
at that point" (p. 135).
19. "If no inconsistency can be identified, he reads on seeking some
cue which will make it possible to reconcile the anamolous
(sic) situation" (p. 135).
20. "If the choice is acceptable, decoding is extended,
meaning is assimilated with prior meaning and prior meaning is
accommodated, if necessary" (p. 135).
21. "Then the cycle continues" (p. 135).
22. The above propositions enable one to see reading as a
"psycholinguistic guessing game."
Rhetorical Devices and More
Logical Fallacies in Goodman's Guessing Game
Goodman's new conception of reading is unsatisfactory in several ways.
It is speculation, not science.
A defining feature of science (in
contrast to metaphysics, opinion, fantasy, and madness) is that
propositions, arguments, theories, and conceptual schemes are judged viable and
scientific not because proponents say so, but on the basic of empirical
evidence and sound reasoning. Science also requires that writers define
terms--especially when terms are new or may be misunderstood. However, Goodman's
version of science--at least in his article--appears not to require any
empirical evidence or effort at clear definition. He offers no data
whatever to support his assertions that, for example,
1. Reading
does not result from "precise perception and identification of all
the elements."
2. Readers "select" "productive cues," and then guess at
what words say and mean.
3. "Readers utilize not one, but three kinds of information
simultaneously" (p. 131).
Nor does he explicate the meaning of "cue," "guess,"
"thought," "language," or even "reading."
The absence of evidence and
clear definition weakens Goodman's claim that he offers a viable scientific
alternative conception of reading. Still, Goodman managed to help
fashion a new definition of science--a science with neither data nor reasoning
nor defined concepts, a science indistinguishable from speculation and wishful
thinking. However, this revisionist science well-served later whole
language teachers, writers, researchers, and advocates who (guided by Goodman)
no longer felt obliged to abide by--or even accept the legitimacy
of--traditional scientific rules about external verification of claims via
tests available to other persons (Moats, 2000). In the absence of empirical
evidence, we can only assess the adequacy of Goodman's new guessing game
conception of reading by examining the logical adequacy of his propositions, as
shown below.
Goodman's conception of reading commits the fallacy of hasty generalization, or converse accident.
Goodman’s paper implies that
his new conception embraces all of reading. He does not say that
only certain elements of reading, at some times, for some readers are part of a
guessing game. Rather, "(R)eading is
a psycholinguistic guessing game." It is for all readers a process of
selecting cues, and then guessing, confirming, rejecting, or refining tentative
decisions about what sounds letters make, what a word says and means, what a
period and comma imply, how words are spelled. However, such guessing,
cue selecting, and decision making arguably apply only to (1) beginning
readers; (2) older readers who have not been taught to read and understand text
based on solid knowledge (and the automatic application) of sound/symbol
correspondence, punctuation, spelling, subject/predicate, cause/effect, and so
forth; or (3) skilled readers who have run into a new and difficult word.
Consider propositions 13-21. Is it reasonable to assert that these
activities apply to all readers? Is there any evidence that skilled
readers guess at every word--as if reading (fluent reading) were a series of
tentative choices?
Another example of hasty generalization Goodman's use of reading
errors--called "miscues"--as the only evidence that all
reading is guessing. Goodman’s paper does not provide samples
of fluent reading to substantiate his propositions about selecting and
guessing. This may be because fluent reading provides no evidence of
guessing. In summary, it is likely that Goodman's guessing
game conception of reading applies only to poor readers, beginning readers, or
good readers who are decoding unfamiliar words. In other words, all
that is new in Goodman’s new conception is the unwarranted
generalization that all readers guess all the time.
The massive irony, here, is that Goodman's followers created a method
of reading instruction--whole language--that reversed the polarity of
guessing. Rather than something to be overcome because it signified
lack of skill, guessing was now considered a natural and good thing, and
therefore was to be encouraged. Systematic instruction on phonemic
awareness, sound/symbol relationships (m says mmm),
word attack, and spelling was now unnatural--a bad thing to be
discouraged. Whole language teachers therefore explicitly and systematically
taught new readers the guessing strategy used by poor readers for making
errors, and called it fine.
Goodman's conception of reading as a guessing game commits the fallacy of
reification, or hypostatization.
In other words, Goodman treats
abstract terms ("reconcile the anamolous [sic]
situation," assimilation, accommodation) and metaphoric fictions
("searches his memory for cues," "he checks the recalled
perceptual input") as if they were concrete objects or events (Thompson,
1995). Recall that Goodman's new formulation hinges on rejection of the
"common sense" notions that (1) reading involves an almost
instantaneous recognition of whole words, or (2) reading involves an almost
automatic "perception and identification of letters, words..."
Note that whole word and phonic processes are ordinary, readily observable,
mundane actions. The reader sees and properly or improperly identifies
letters and words. Most observable identification errors have
straightforward, ordinary, mundane implications for instruction; e.g., at
sounding out words. But Goodman will offer nothing attractive to
potential followers unless he conjures a radical shift of reading from the
mundane to the esoteric. Something as commonsensical as mere
skill instruction will not do. Henceforth, reading processes and reading
instruction will no longer be easily seeable and teachable. Instead,
reading processes will be located in the mind: reading will involve "an
interaction between thought and language." Goodman now invents a
mental apparatus to account for reading skill and error--the psycholinguistic
guessing game--and it consists of selecting, deciding, guessing, confirming,
rejecting, and refining.
There are two logical problems with Goodman's reified mental guessing game
apparatus. First, in contrast to what we ordinarily expect of a
viable scientific account, there is no way to test whether
Goodman's hypothesized mental apparatus exists at all---i.e., whether readers
in fact perform the elaborate guessing routine--or whether the hypothesized
apparatus operates just as Goodman proposes. After all, many models of
thought processes can be generated to account for the same reading behavior--just as demonic possession once provided a
coherent account of psychiatric symptoms.
Second, Goodman transforms similes and metaphors (as-if) into
objects--thought processes. However, all anyone (with a scientific
orientation) can reasonably say about a fluent reader's performance is,
"Her eyes scan the words and she speaks them as written." And
all anyone can say about a struggling reader's halting, error-filled
performance is , "It as if she
guessing." Yet, Goodman's "scientific" formulation would
have us believe that readers (skilled and unskilled) actually see words, select
cues, make a guess, check the guess, reject the guess, make another guess,
confirm the guess, and then say the word correctly or incorrectly. If the
guessing game is not a convenient fiction enabling Goodman to make sense
of reading, but is considered a reality--something really happening--then
a reader enacting the psycholinguistic guessing algorithm (propositions 5-20
above) would be carrying on an internal dialogue, as follows.
"James said...Hmmm, that t h looks like it might be
there. Okay, I'll say there....There lion...Wait... That doesn't
work. Okay, I'll try them...Them lion.... Nope...Maybe it’s
this...This lion...Yeah, that sounds right. This
lion..."
But we rarely see anything like this guessing process.
Even when readers make a high rate of errors, reading is so fast it hard to imagine that somewhere in their subvocal thinking they perform the mental guess work.
The only thing available to the observer of the above reading sample is
the reader saying, "James said, (three-second pause) This
lion." Which is the more reasonable account of the three-second
gap between "said" and "This" (and every other error or
pause in a passage)? (1) The reader naturally (with no instruction)
repeatedly enacts multi-step guessing routines in milli-seconds,
or (2) The reader simply needs someone to tell her, "That word
this...Spell this.... t h i s...What word?....
this.. Good. Start the line again...James said, This lion is big."
In other words, Goodman's psycholinguistic apparatus (which, for science,
would be considered reified fictions, or hypothetical constructs) either: (1) incapable of any sort of test; and/or (2)
simply impossible as an actual activity in real time. At best, his
psycholinguistic guessing game can only be treated as a metaphor---in which
case one asks if a metaphor is the right foundation for actual reading
assessment and instruction.
Whole language and upward mobility
Goodman's hypothetical multi-step
mental guessing apparatus had and continues to have strong appeal. As
mentioned, Goodman helped to move reading and reading instruction out of the
mundane world of common, observable skills and into the world of esoterica. Even simple decoding of text was now a
complex mental activity involving higher order thought processes such as
selecting, testing, confirming, and revising. Reading instruction would
now require special skills giving teachers access to the realm of thought where
the hypothesized higher order guessing game was played. Special courses,
textbooks, conferences, and education professors would be needed.
In other words, Goodman was not merely offering an alternative to the phonic
centered and word centered approaches. He was creating an invidious
status distinction. He was offering prestige. This may have
been appealing to education professors long known to occupy positions of low
status and prestige in the university community, and to school teachers whose
long hours, lack of appreciation, and low salary also connoted low status and
prestige. By making reading and reading instruction esoteric processes,
Goodman's paper helped foster the idea that traditional reading instruction was
only for commonsense-minded technicians interested in observable skill.
Whole language teachers and professors would be much more than this; they would
be theoreticians--certainly a higher class of people. This
clarifies the facile denigration of systematic instruction, planned practice,
teaching formats, field tested materials, scripted lesson plans, mastery tests,
and in general accountability by whole language teachers and education
professors. Reading instruction was to be an art; and the reading
teacher an artiste.
I do not like the agitators dressed up as heroes
who wear the magic cap of ideals
on their straw heads; I do not like these ambitious artists who like to pose as
ascetics and priests but who are at bottom only tragic buffoons…
[Nietzsche. The genealogy of morals. Third essay,
section 26]
Miscue analysis and the quasi-therapeutic
As noted earlier, the only empirical
evidence that Goodman presents in support of (as examples of) his guessing-game
model are reading errors made by children. Goodman calls these errors
"miscues in order to avoid value implications" (p. 127). For
example, the story text reads,
"So, education was good! I opened the dictionary
and picked out a word that sounded good. 'Philosophical'. I
yelled. Might as well study word meanings first. 'Philosophical:
showing calmness and courage in the face of ill fortune. "
What the child read was,
" So, education was
good! I hoped a dictionary and picked out a word that sounds good.
PH He yelled. Might as well study what
it means. Phizo
Phiso/soophical
: showing calmness and courage in his face of ill fort
future futshion."
Goodman states, "His expected (i.e.,
correct. MK) responses mask the process of their attainment (That is,
how he read correctly. MK), but his unexpected responses (i.e.,
errors, or miscues MK) have been achieved
through the same process, albeit less successfully applied" (p.
127). This is a very interesting statement. Goodman is
saying that when readers are fluent, we do not see how they do it; i.e., we do
not see any guessing game. It is only when
they err that we can make a case for guessing. And then, with no
rationale at all, Goodman states that reading well and making errors are done
via the same process. How could he possibly know that?
But as to incorrect reading itself, Goodman still has no direct,
empirical evidence of guessing or any other activity in the elaborate guessing
game apparatus. He does not ask readers to, for example, say outloud what they are doing as
they try to read. All he has are interpretations of alleged covert
guessing processes. Goodman's interpretations (miscue analysis) reveal
that he is willing to avoid the most obvious interpretation of errors in
favor of the guessing hypothesis. For example, Goodman says, "The
substitution of hoped for opened could again be regarded as
careless or imprecise identification of letters. But if
we dig beyond (emphasis mine. MK) this common sense
explanation, we find (a) both are verbs (b) the words have key graphic
similarities. Further, there may be evidence of the reader's bilingual
French-Canadian background here, as there is in subsequent miscues (harms
for arms; shuckled for chuckled,
shoose for choose, shair for chair)" (p. 128).
It clear that despite what Goodman makes of them, these errors are
by definition examples of the "imprecise identification of
letters"--and this imprecision rests very much on the child's lack of sufficient
instruction on how to sound out familiar and unfamiliar words based on
knowledge of sound/symbol correspondence. It seems that Goodman goes
out of his way to avoid the obvious account of reading errors--the child has
not been taught word attack skills--so that Goodman can "dig beyond"
the obvious and provide a more interesting guessing game interpretation for
which there is not a shred of direct evidence--not when persons read well
and not even when they make errors.
In summary, Goodman uses miscues as a resource for making interpretations
about thought processes in a way that suits his guessing game model. There is
nothing in the miscues themselves that suggests anything about thought
processes. But there is everything in the miscues that points directly
at poor instruction. Ironically, if Goodman's approach were in fact
scientific, he would provide a panel of impartial observers with a set of
miscue examples and ask the panel to make sense of each error or miscue, and
then compare his interpretation with theirs. In this way he could
determine the reliability of his interpretations.
Goodman's entire guessing game model commits the fallacy of affirming the
consequent.
Goodman began his paper with the
claim that his model would be an example of science--not mere common
sense. However, his argument commits perhaps the most fundamental error
that the scientific method is devised to avoid; namely, the fallacy of
affirming the consequent. This fallacy can be depicted as follows.
If P happens, then Q will happen.
Q happened.
(Affirming the consequent)
_____________________________
Therefore P happened.
For example,
If there is
frustration, then there will be aggression.
There is
aggression.
____________________________
Therefore, there is
frustration.
The logical problem is that aggression may be the result of many
things besides frustration. That is why scientific researchers
try to identify alternative explanations (e.g., models of aggressive
behavior, reinforcement for aggressive behavior, a history of physical abuse)
and see if these alternatives can be disproved--leaving the
original proposition (If frustration, then aggression) intact for the time
being.
Goodman's argument can be summarized as follows.
If reading is a psycholinguistic guessing game, then readers
will make certain kinds of errors--miscues.
Readers do make
these kinds of errors--miscues.
_____________________________________________
Therefore, reading is
a psycholinguistic guessing game.
I have pointed out that miscues themselves are not direct evidence of any
mental guessing game activity. Goodman has simply interpreted them
that way. And there is no way to "dig" into anyone's
thought processes to determine whether Goodman right
or wrong. Even so, there are other explanations for these miscues besides
an hypothesized mental guessing game. The
strongest candidate alternative is poor
instruction. At least that is a plausible rival explanation (Hempenstall, 1999). A student makes half a dozen
errors trying to sound out "philosophical" because he was not taught
exactly how to sound it out. He is not firm on each letter/sound
combination; he is not firm on sounding out a letter or blend, holding the
sound and scanning the word for the next letter or blend. He says
"hoped" instead of "opened" because, again, he is not firm
on the sounding out strategy, and because he has not had a teacher who
systematically juxtaposed similar looking words--hoped/opened--and demonstrated
again and again that they are sounded out differently.
In summary, it may be that many reading errors are not the
result of guessing--as some sort of natural process--but are taught.
A student reads a passage and says "fort" rather than "fortune."
The teacher or tutor simply (and improperly) tells the student,
"fortune." The student repeats "fortune" and goes on
with the passage--never really learning to sound out the difficult word.
Predictably, when the student sees "fortune" again, she says
"fort"--because that is what she has "practiced" so
many times before. Or, when the student says "fort" rather than
"fortune," the whole language teacher tells the student to think of a
word that might go there--in other words, the teacher encourages guessing.
The student casts about and tries "future" and "futshion." Predictably, when the student runs
into "philosophical," the student will not sound out the word, but
will do as she was taught--she will cast about for likely possibilities--"phizzo," "physical," "physicacol." In other words, the student's
errors do not reflect a natural guessing game apparatus. They are direct
effects of explicit (mal)instruction on guessing and
failure to receive proper instruction on how to sound out words.
The scientific test of the above rival hypothesis--Errors represent how
students are mistaught; they do not represent an
innate guessing game--is relatively easy to perform. Identify the sorts
of errors made by students taught with whole language vs. the sorts of errors
made by students taught with more focused instruction in each reading skill, in
which errors are not corrected by having students guess but by firming up the
sound-it-out strategy. The prediction is that students who are
taught to guess (and who do not know when a guess is correct), will make
many more errors.
Summary
Kenneth Goodman's 1967 article helped to foster the whole language movement,
which for several decades was the predominant approach to reading instruction
in many schools of education, school districts, and states. However,
recent experimental research has shown that many of the defining (and
allegedly revolutionary) design features of whole language (e.g.,
attempting to teach elemental reading skills--such as phonemic awareness,
sound/symbol correspondence, word identification, and spelling--in the context
of complex reading and writing activities that require these very
skills) are at odds with what is known about effective instruction.
In addition, evaluation research shows that whole language is often less
effective than its advocates claim, and is specifically less effective
than field-tested curricula that provide systematic, explicit, comprehensive,
precisely planned and logically progressive instruction on all of the elemental
and complex skills in reading.
This paper examined the "viable" and "scientific" model
of reading proposed by Kenneth Goodman--a model that has guided both the methods
used in whole language (e.g., implicit, as-needed instruction; miscue analysis)
and the ways whole language advocates legitimize and valorize their
actions. The examination of Goodman's "psycholinguistic guessing
game" model revealed that Goodman:
1. Provides no data that adequately support his presumption that there is
any such guessing game apparatus. This may be because the guessing
game is merely a metaphor.
2. Uses a small and selective sample of reading behavior (errors, or
"miscues") as evidence that readers use the psycholinguistic guessing
game.
3. Interprets these errors in a way that supports the guessing game model,
but fails to consider plausible alternative interpretations and offers no
evidence of inter-observer reliability of his interpretations. [See Hempenstall (1999) for a reasoned and extensive critique of
miscue analysis.]
4. Commits the fallacy of hasty generalization by asserting that his
interpretations of some readers' guessing errors imply that all readers
use the guessing apparatus.
5. Commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent when he reasons that
errors signify the existence of a psycholinguistic guessing apparatus, when
(and more reasonably) errors signify poor instruction.
In summary, it appears that the whole language movement--with all of its
publications, assessment instruments and devices, conferences and organizations,
college courses, classroom methods, and consequences for young readers--rests
on a mere metaphor (the psycholinguistic guessing game) supported by assorted
logical fallacies. An interesting sociological question is, What cultural circumstances disposed so many education
students, administrators, college professors, boards of education, and veteran
teachers to so easily and so thoroughly accept Goodman's psycholinguistic guess
game as a premise for their reading curricula?
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