GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
from B. C. Johnson, The Atheist Debater's Handbook

BABY-BURNING ANALOGY
        Here is a common problem: a house catches on fire and a six-month old baby burns to death. Could we describe as "good" any person who had the power to save this child and yet refused to do so? God undoubtedly has this power, and yet in many cases does not help. Can we call this God "good"?
        It will not do to claim this baby will go to heaven. Why should it have had to suffer this way? If it was necessary, there must be a compelling reason why it was necessary. The "heaven" argument will not cover up the fact that the baby burned to death. Was this nothing? Is such evil, then, a mere mirage?
        Nor is it enough to say that this painful death will in the long run have good results. For one thing, how can we be so sure? What will those results be? Unless we know what they will be, it is hardly a valid argument to assume there will be some such results. For another, what could possibly justify such terrible "means" to that end, whatever it was. Whatever 'people' might eventually learn, that baby died in agony, and its parents have lost their child. Suppose you say the 'lesson' is that the mother learn to take better care of her children. How could that benefit justify burning a child to death? No human being would be as cruel as you make God out to be.

REJECTION OF THE "VIRTUE-BUILDING" THEODICY
        Sometimes theists argue that it is better for humans to face disasters without assistance, in order to promote our self-reliance, virtue, souls, etc. But should we then abolish modern medical care or do away with efficient fire departments? These diminish our need for self-reliance, virtue, etc., at least on the part of most people. If "outside assistance" is not good for us as humans, perhaps we should abolish it everywhere. But no one thinks that that is true. So there is nothing wrong with assistance, and whoever can provide it, should.
        Other times theists argue that without disasters, suffering, etc. there would not be enough "moral urgency" to push people to make things right, and to promote "virtue-building" (or "soul-making"). This suggests that perhaps God should create more suffering than we already have--or if humans, through their efforts, diminish the amount of suffering in the world, then He should create more for us. If we cure polio, then create more cancer, or aids. If we find a way to predict and protect against hurricanes, create more earthquakes.

IS THIS THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS?
        Then there are the theists who, like Leibniz, argue that this must be the "best of all possible worlds," for otherwise God would need to diminish or increase the amount of evil--but how could he not choose to create it with exactly the right amount? Well, let it be so: does anybody believe this is true of our world? Isn't it obvious that there is too much suffering in the world? that God might very easily create a world with much less suffering, which would still stimulate people to develop their minds and characters? Who would not trade in even just some of the starvation that children suffer, rather than 'learn' that lesson about food and overpopulation?

DOES GOD HAVE A "HIGHER MORALITY"?
        Theists argue, "God has a higher morality by which his actions are to be judged--we cannot understand him." But what does it mean to claim that what we believe is wrong or bad is now--somehow--good? If someone says, "God cannot do 'wrong'; He defines what is right and wrong," does that mean that whatever He does is right? Surely, if we can say that it is morally wrong to be a sadist, and if God is all-good He cannot be a sadist, then similarly, we can say that it is morally wrong not to prevent evil if you can, and if God can prevent evil and does not do so it is morally wrong. These people just don't think through what they mean, when they speak of "God's wisdom" as being something we cannot comprehend. If that is so, then how can we presume to call him just, or righteous, or good? Then God is no more worthy of worship than a King, whose laws we cannot comprehend.

TRUST IN GOD--OR ADMISSION OF FAILURE?
        As a last resort, theists often say, "I trust God anyway--He must have his reasons." But this is not an argument; it is just an admission of rational failure. It is not a virtue to be stubborn. This is like the snake-handler, who said that "Because I am righteous, God will not allow me to be bitten." But then when he was bitten, and was asked, did this mean he really wasn't righteous, he denied it, saying instead, "No, God did not allow me to be bitten for that reason; but He must have his reasons, whatever they are." You see: when reason fails, turn to mysticism. But that is really what religion is, anyway; mysticism in a fancy dress.

THE THREE POSSIBILITIES
        In the end, there are only three possibilities concerning God's moral character: (1) God is more likely to be all evil than all good; (2) God is more likely to be all good than all evil; and (3) God is equally likely to be all evil as He is to be all good. If (1) is true, then there is no all-good, all-powerful God. I have just shown that (2) cannot be true. But if (3) is true, then again we have to reject all the theodices that defend God. Thus the problem of evil triumphs over traditional theism. There cannot be an all-good, all-powerful God.