Annexation, Consolidation,
and The Politics of Government Reform
by
Milan J. Dluhy, Ph.D.
Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science,
University of North Carolina at Wilmington
Lee Johnston, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Political Science
University of North Carolina at Wilmington
With the assistance of Professor Roger Lowery and Mike Jenkins, Political Science Major, University of North Carolina at Wilmington
Prepared for Presentation
American Society for Public
Administration Annual Meeting
March 26, 2002
Introduction
Reflecting
on the last three decades of government reform literature, it is clear that
there is more than one path to regional governance (Feiock, 2002). As suburban sprawl spilled into the areas
surrounding our major cities since WWII,
there has been an urgent call from many for metropolitan or region wide
governmental structures to deal with metropolitan wide problems (Peirce,
1993). There have been at least three
different approaches to regional governance in the U.S. First, some reformers pushed successfully
for consolidation of city and county governments most notably in Baton Rouge
(1947), Nashville (1962), Jacksonville (1967), and Indianapolis (1969). A recent analysis indicates more failures
then successes but nevertheless 31 communities have adopted this approach. A second approach has been to set up special
(single) purpose taxing districts like transportation, water and sewer, and law
and enforcement to grabble with regional issues. A third approach has been to strive for functional consolidation
in a region where through cooperation the counties deliver some regional
services and the cities deliver others.
In this way both governments survive and endure both agree to deliver
their respective services on a region wide basis. Charlotte-Mecklenburg exemplifies a community that has used the
functional consolidation approach successfully (Mead, 2000).
Rather than retreating from regionalism, communities have tried to tailor their approach to fit the political, economic, and social environment. While early reformers advocated most strongly for city/consolidation, this approach has had limited success. Not only have attempts at consolidation largely failed (80%) but also there has been little evidence generated from the successful attempts that there are substantial cost savings that can be achieved by using this approach (Campbell and Durning, 2000). On the other hand, post consolidation analyses do indicate that there are other benefits besides cost savings that can be realized by communities who chose to go this root (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000).
The major theory for explaining why some communities are successful in adopting consolidation while other fail has been posed by Rosenbaum and Kammerer, 1974). According to these authors successful consolidation proceeds through a set of stages or events before consolidation is successful. Of particular interest for the purposes of this paper is that crises climates always precipitate successful consolidation. While the dramatic events set the stage and mobilize public support, the consolidation effort also needs the development of a strong “good government” coalition of citizens, business and civic groups, and community leaders to make something happen.
Although post hoc analysis indicates that cost savings and other benefits are not substantial from consolidation (Feiock, 2002), other writers reflecting on the major consolidations (Baton Rouge, Nashville, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis), indicate that consolidation can result in :
· A strong mayor who is a policy leader in the region ;
· District elections which can provide more balanced elections and access for minority and other groups ;
· The promotion of orderly growth and development through the region through comprehensive planning, strong building codes, and strong zoning ;
· The provision of uniform services in the region ;
· And promoting the image of a progressive region interested in the growth of the economy and jobs (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000).
Today consolidation as an approach to regional governance is therefore mixed since the evidence about actual or perceived benefits has so far been inconclusive. Nevertheless, the major theory in this field developed over 25 years ago still provides insight into success and failure.
This paper examines in depth one metropolitan area in the Southeastern U.S. , Wilmington, North Carolina in order to further refine the original hypotheses/theory about what leads to successful governmental reform. On the issue of the need for a major crisis or dramatic event to spur governmental reform, we will argue that aggressive annexation by the city of Wilmington in the last decade has been the driving force for reform efforts directed at government consolidation. Although the Wilmington area tried unsuccessfully to consolidate or merge the city of Wilmington and New Hanover County in 1973, 1987, and 1995, there is current empirical information from local surveys and voting analysis that the community may now be ready to make a fourth and this time successful attempt to consolidate. The current environment, in our judgment, now has the crisis issue/event to drive the process of governmental reform.
Table 1 summarizes why consolidation was tried three times in the last 25 years and more importantly why it failed. Our reading of history is that the perceived crisis/ event has not been present until now, that the traditional coalition of business and good government groups have not coalesced before, and that there has been no single individual leader or champion of consolidation willing to step forward and lead the efforts. We now think that the preconditions for a successful consolidation effort are now in place and the remaining sections of the paper detail the argument for optimism this time around.
At crux of the matter is that aggressive annexation by the city of Wilmington over the last decade has so alienated many voters (who live in areas recently annexed or soon to be annexed) that they are now ready to support consolidation and remove the uncertainty of annexation and higher taxes in the future. In turn, city residents now see consolidation as a way to end the in fighting with the suburbs and move on to the agenda of better services and solving regional problems. Particularly onerous in the debate about annexation is that North Carolina annexation law allows cities to annex contiguous areas without the consent of the voters living in the unincorporated areas. Thus, recently incorporated or soon to be incorporated areas are angry and will support candidates who offer a solution to this conflict laden issue.
History also shows that Nashville exercising aggressive policies when they annexed 50 square miles and 87,000 people just prior to the successful vote on consolidation. Although Jacksonville failed twice to annex 66 square miles and 130,000 people just prior to the successful consolidation vote, the aggressive approach had a major impact on the consolidation campaign (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000). The same factors are currently at work in Wilmington and therefore we turn to a brief review of the rationale for consolidation and the history of consolidation efforts in Wilmington. This will set the stage for the final section, which focuses on the empirical analysis of the current political environment surrounding consolidation.
Review of Rationales for
Consolidation
Consolidation of city-county governments in the past half-century has been one several organizational models employed to respond to suburban sprawl and fragmented governments. If one were to place the various forms of metro consolidation along a continuum from most comprehensive to least, they would range from annexation to city-county consolidation to special districts. Interjurisdictional districts and COGs are not formal governmental integrations methods but are often discussed as psuedo attempts at urban-suburban integration. Actually, city-county consolidation can be conceptually viewed as a mid-point of integration of political structures and processes between annexation and special district, much in the manner which Constitutionalist place federalism as a mid-ground between unitary and confederation forms of government.
The arguments for city-county consolidation have focused on: 1) improved public services (i.e. economics of scale and specialization of services; (Dye, Thomas, Politics in States and Communities. 10th ed, Prentice Hall, 2000, p. 379-384); 2) significantly improved cooperation in specific public services; especially transportation (i.e. areas-wide mass transit) and in crime, fire, air and water pollution; 3) addressing the economic disequilibrium between core cities with lower tax bases (i.e. poor) and more costly programs (i.e. public health/welfare, crime and fire protection) while the economic advantaged escape to unincorporated areas. Therefore, an inequality of needs and resources exist thanks to the “exist option” for those persons, business, and industries able to relocate outside the incorporate city. Lastly, centralization of authority will focus policy making and responsibility on one entity so the potential for accountability will be more focused. (Hirschman, Albert O, Exit, voice, and loyalty; responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states, Harvard Univ. Press, 1970, p.2)
Where annexation is untenable or at best political suicide for its advocates, consolidation of city and county governments is often sought as a compromise solution to growth and tax issues. Nevertheless, consolidation is often stymied by social, economic and racial patterns of living that differ between cities and their surroundings. (V. L. Marando and C. Whitley, “City-County Consolidation…” Urban Affairs Quarterly, 8 (Dec. 1972), 181-203). Without major failures and problems in the city or suburban government, the history of consolidation has been generally unsuccessful. (T.A. Henderson and W. A. Rosenbaum, “The Prospects for Consolidating Local Governments…” American Journal of Political Science, 17 (Nov. 1973), 695-720).
Often the first step toward consolidation is the creation of a study commission composed of members of the city and county elected officials and some lay-citizens to add the legitimacy of popular sovereignty to the commission. Establishing a study commission is fairly common practice for government when legislative and executive bodies at all levels lack the political will to legislate or administer. It also adds the force of the “popular will” to their actions or the lack there of. North Carolina’s legal pattern regarding consolidation requires a “double majority” vote, similar to the double veto in the UN Security Council. The double majority means that in North Carolina, there are never going to be any city-county consolidation. As long as their political, social, economic interests and values differ there will be no positive vote in both the city and the county.
Reform “do-gooder” groups often organize consolidation campaigns; they usually rely on media campaign rather than grass roots, retail politics to advocate consolidation. Generally, voter turnout is slightly above turnout in municipal elections (i.e. 30-60%). Just as with bond referendum, the higher the turnout the more likely a negative vote.
Often, the county voters defeat city-county consolidation; they fear higher taxes. However, they also want their own governmental officials, their own identity, and they do not want the city’s problems and complexity. In fact, they reject the professional governmental structures more often than they do the multiple-level elected representatives and directly chosen public administrators (i.e. sheriffs, tax collectors and assessors). Since most consolidation efforts has occurred in the South’s urban areas, and since these areas are generally covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its 1982 amendments and court implementations, the issue of race has been of critical importance in city-county consolidation efforts. Race has been and continues to be a double-edged sword. City leaders often orchestrate a whisper campaign that consolidation is necessary to save the city from minority control, yet county residents may oppose joining the city for that very reason. African-American city voters often support consolidation to add the suburban property value to the city’s tax base, yet they oppose the transfer of political power to the newly joined members of the consolidated community. As a former mayor of Wilmington advised one of the authors during a recent consolidation debate, “we want your brains not your taxes, because the city has been losing its middle-class civic-minded citizens to the suburbs.”
Generally, the progressive-reform desire for consolidation comes from business leaders, civic groups, and the media especially the printed media. Their arguments are straight out of introductory public administration text: 1) more efficient and economical service delivery, 2) improved coordination of programs and policies, 3) equity in economic resources based on “ability to pay,” 4) improved accountability and responsibility of elected and appointed officials. (V. Ostrom, C. Tiebout, R. Warren, “The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas,” American Political Science Review 55 (Dec. 1961):831-42.
The most extensive analysis of the
proposition that consolidation “improves services while cutting spending”
concluded that no quantifiable influence existed. This research studied two Florida cities and their counties
between 1955 and 1981. Jacksonville-Duval
County consolidated and Tampa-Hillsborough County attempt. (J. E. Bentin,
“City-County Consolidation and Economics of Scale,” Social Science Quarterly,
65 (March, 1985), 190-98. Approximately
three-fourths of all city-county consolidation movements are unsuccessful due
to the voter’s rejections. Successful
consolidations appear to occur in single counties in smaller to medium size
cities in the South and West. Usually,
some unique issues or crisis are involved, often the sheriff’s position and
responsibilities and a separate police force are both kept and as are similarly
separate school systems most important in securing voters approval of
consolidation. (V. L. Marardo “City-County Consolidation Reform…” Western
Political Quarterly, 32 (Dec, 1979), 409-21).
5) consolidation is a practical solution to the county’s water and sewage problem. (Consolidation Means Better Government and Attention Citizens Consolidation: Q&A)
On February 27, 1973 the
electorate, by a 3 to 1 vote rejected Wilmington/New Hanover
consolidation. This vote ended the
almost four years of debate between the city council (pro) and county
commissioner (con) forces. Opponents waged
their campaign on the issues of “big
government”, and “high taxes.” Minorities
thought that “at large” representation would decrease their representation in
the consolidated government (James Hefner, “Light Vote” Wilmington Star
2/28/73, p. 2)
(Table 1 Here)
The county commissioners wanted the county’s
eleven precincts to vote against consolidation, and they did. Only three of Wilmington’s precincts
supported consolidation. Overall, the
turnout was light. In the county 1,228
voted no; 111 yes; in the city 9, 494 voted no; 3,859 voted yes; the totals
were 11,722 against and 4,040 for. The
vote in Wilmington’s minority precincts was light and opposed to
consolidation. Just as
Charlotte/Mecklenburg had done in 1971, Wilmington defeated consolidation two
years later.
As
soon as consolidation was defeated at the polls, the other alternative to urban
problems resolving from an institutional perspective reared its prophetic
head. Since the Development Standard
and Service Act of 1959, annexation has been North Carolina’s municipality’s easiest
and favored method of growth. The
development standards of: 1) adjacent or contiguous area, and 2) urban
development of 2 person per acre are very minimal. The service requirements of providing: 1) police, fire, garbage
collection, and street maintenance on annexation date and 2) extending water
and sewer mains into annexed areas with contracts and construction to begin
within 12 months of annexation date and identify method of financing for these
services are also quite minimal. (Gen. Stat. 160A – 47)
In
light of the defeated consolidation vote, several officials blamed the defeat
of consolidation on supporter’s arguments that county residents face either
“consolidation or annexation;” however this slogan was too simplistic to
capture the complexity of the problems at hand. (John Randt, “Rural Areas need Services” Wilmington Star
3/1/73, p. 3)
Wilmington
manager, J. A. Jones, stated that the extension of water and sewer services
were an immediate health necessity in many areas of the county. However the old adage that cities can’t learn
seems somewhat inaccurate when applied in Wilmington’s recent growth, The 1964
annexation approximately doubled Wilmington’s size, and Wilmington extended the
most costly of services, water and sewer, at no direct cost to the annexed
property owners. It took the city over
nine years to repay this indebtedness, only completing it in 1973 with $285,000
federal revenue sharing funds. Next,
Wilmington requested approval of a satellite annexation from the General Assembly
and then annexed the 670-acre Echo Farms Golf course and subdivision project
south of Wilmington on Carolina Beach Road.
By extending utility lines substantially larger than required for the
satellite annexation, Wilmington prepared for additional annexations along the
highway and in the adjacent residential and commercial areas. (Randt, “Rural” Wilmington Star)
As
the city and county began to revive their consolidation discussion in
1977-1978, a city-county consolidation committee was formed. Its first goal was to ascertain why the consolidation
vote failed in 1973, and its second responsibility was to identify the
advantages and disadvantages associated with a new projected
consolidation. Dr. James Finger,
director of the health department, identified certain areas of the county with
potential septic tank health hazards to the community. In April, 1978 a series of six hearings were
conducted to receive public input. (John Meyer, “Consolidation Committee” Wilmington
Star 4/11/78; p. 1-B.)
In
1984, former county commissioner and progressive leader of one faction of the
local Democratic Party, Karen Gottovi, chaired the movement for
consolidation. The 15-member citizen
commission hired UNC-W pollsters Richard Dixon and Roger Lowery to gauge public
opinion on the consolidation issues. In
their survey conducted in mid-March 1985, they concluded that 58.8% of their
respondents would support consolidation if they could elect public officials in
the manner they wished. The sampling
error of the survey was 4.5%. The
Wilmington sample supported consolidation by 64.7%; but 58% of the total
sampled felt taxes would increase under consolidation, and 76% believed that if
consolidation failed, Wilmington would continue forced annexations of its
surroundings. (Kevin Cox, “Survey Backs Consolidation” Wilmington Star,
4/5/85; p. A1).
As
the debate over consolidation intensified in 1987, Sheriff Joe McQueen
announced that he opposed consolidation, since it would dilute his powers. McQueen stated that the proponents were
focusing on law enforcement in order to hide the main issue: money. He asked, “how much is it going to
cost” (Kelvin Hart, “Sheriff is against
charter,” Wilmington Star 5/10/87; p. 1C) In late May 1987, the city
council and county commissioner approved a much revised consolidation charter. McQueen’s duties in law enforcement were
compromised with the phrase, “…the sheriff coordinates with the police chief,
the administration of law enforcement…” (James Drew, “Kinks Worked-out” Wilmington
Star 5/23/1987 p. 1A).
As
the charter was accepted, the key question about taxes was left
unanswered. County Commissioner Noland
O’Neil’s said, “It’s anybody’s guess what will happen to the tax rates.” (James
Drew, “Don’t Look for Answers” Wilmington Star 9/23/1987; p. 2C). The plan provided for General Service
Districts funded by property taxes to pay Health Dept, sheriff, and social
services. The current city would become
an urban service district with police, fire, water, and trash pickup provided
by an additional tax. Lastly, a rural
fire tax district would cover the non-urban areas of the county and a special
tax would be levied here. (Drew, “Don’t” Wilmington Star)
The
second popular vote on consolidation, (10/7/1987) had similar results to the
first. Consolidation carried
Wilmington, but it lost decidedly in the unincorporated areas (57% to 43%).
(Table 2 Here)
The defeat of the
consolidation on October 7, 1987 can be laid to fear of higher taxes and loss
of autonomy by the sheriff and volunteer fire departments. Opponents focused on the uncertainty of the
tax structure under the proposed consolidation. (Tricia Robertson, “Voters’
Fear Change”, Wilmington Star 10/8/1987 p. 1A). In the mayoral election of 1987, the A&B
areas mayor, elected in 1985, Berry Williams, was handily defeated by the more
polished and younger Don Betz. Based
one this one term experience for the anti-annexation mayoral candidate city
politics seemed to return to some type of normalcy. Betz, the moderate progressive, won reelection in ’89, ’91, ’93,
and ’95. He lost in 1997 in a run-off,
in part, due to the annexation plan of 1995.
In 1998, the revised ’95 annexation plan became effective and the
anti-annexation candidate of 1999 – David Jones of Landfall won. Within the next year, the 1998 Annexation
plan was operational and the new city residents of “Between the Creeks” helped
elect Harper Peterson, the consolidation candidate for mayor in a run-off
against Charlie Rivenbark, the annexation proponent. The twelve years following the consolidation vote of 1987 have
been most important years in the growth of Wilmington. Inter-state 40 was finished in late 1990
tying Wilmington and southeastern North Carolina to the nation for the first
time in over thirty years. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad left Wilmington in 1959 when it merged with Seaboard Coast
Line Railroad, almost causing Wilmington to implode. Community and state efforts for industrial recruitment,
developing a port, and modernizing an airport were only marginally
successful. Wilmington’s population actually
decline by approximately 1,000 people between 1950 and 1960. (Table 3 & 4 Here) However, its
pro-active annexation policies of the 1990’s, the completion of I-40, the
Clinton economic boom 1993-99, combined with the warm waters of the Atlantic
(June through September) stimulate growth.
Wilmington grew from 55,530 in 1990 to 90,400 after it last annexation
in 2000. This growth was in spite of
port problems (narrow and shallow channel), airport limits (serviced by only
one national carrier), and nature’s God picking Wilmington as the bull’s eye
for his hurricane furry (i.e. Bertha ’96, Fran ’96; Bonnie ’98 and Floyd ’99).
Nevertheless, Wilmington and
New Hanover debated consolidation and again voted on it in 1995. On Wednesday,
October 11, 1995 the headline of the Wilmington Star was “Consolidation lost
big … annexation is a sure thing” (Bettie Fennell, “No” Wilmington Star
p. 1A; October 11, 1995). Wilmington
had announced that it was going to annex 27, 000 people and 27 sq. miles. Therefore, the strongest support for
consolidation (55%) came from the areas identified as the first to be annexed
(i.e. College Acres and Landfall). In
the city the vote was 54% for, but in the beach cities consolidation was rejected by 86%.
(Table 5 Here)
Wilmington,
minority areas and the most affluent neighborhoods supported
consolidation. Outside
incorporated Wilmington, only those
precincts under direct threat of annexation voted yes. The no votes were highest in the precinct
furtherest from city limits. Specifically, Cape Fear (on the North side
of the county), Federal Point (on the South end of the county), and parts of
Harnett on the north side of the city were the areas with the highest no votes.
Still
in 1995, the county and city elected leaders Commissioner Bobby Greer and Mayor
Don Betz were saying that consolidation would mean lower taxes and smaller
government. The disconnect between
office holders and professional public servants and scholars studying efficiency
and economy seems to be widening rather than narrowing at least that appears as
the case in this community. City
council member Katherine Moore may have been closer to the actual facts of the
situation when she posed the following choice to the voters, “consolidation or
annexation”. (Wilmington Star
9/20/95 p. 1A)
The Star’s
editorial on election day was damning for consolidation; it warned the voters
not to, “buy a pig in a poke” by “giving local officials and the state
legislature total power to make radical changes in local government and taxes.”
(“Editorial” Wilmington Star 10/10/95. p6A) A post election poll conducted by noted pollster, Walter DeVries,
reported that the vote was “no” because the consolidation proposal lacked
specifics. (Wilmington Star 11/7/95; p. 2-B). The “specificity argument” had been part of the rational for the
defeat of consolidation in the 1987 vote (i.e. In ’87 the proposal was too
detailed.) The opponents of
consolidation were successful in winning the information campaign. Their ads and slogans were simple and
direct, for example:
·
consolidation is more
government not less
·
cost factors: “no
guarantee tax rate”, “trust me”, “maybe”, “we will work it out later”
·
Lacked specifics
·
consolidation laws are
very unspecific
·
no merged law
enforcement
(“The Real Facts
Are: publication of anti-forces,” Wilmington Star Ad. 10/9/95; p. 5B)
Aggressive
Annexation and the Backlash
The decade of the 1990’s was a period of aggressive
annexation by the city of Wilmington.
As Table 2 indicates the city in square miles grew from 29.7 to 54.3 or
82.8%. In terms of population, the city
grew by 35,350 people or 63.7%. The
city planning department for the city estimates that there are approximately
10,000 people living in the areas annexed during the 1990’s. The candidate for Mayor in 1999, David
Jones, ran on a platform opposed to annexation and carried the four precincts
eventually annexed by margins of 78.8%, 67.3%, 55.6%, and 66.0%. Clearly newly annexed areas wanted to
support candidates opposed to further annexation.
In the 2001 Mayoral election, the eventual winner of
the race (Harper Peterson) ran a campaign of pro-consolidation and against
further annexation. As Tables 3 and 4
indicate, the winner of the Mayoral election (Harper Peterson) did exceedingly
well in precincts newly annexed even though he was clearly the more liberal of
the two candidates running in a very conservative set of precincts (newly
annexed). In fact, Peterson actually
lost the recently annexed precincts two years before in the 1999 Mayoral election. Thus, in 2001 a liberal Mayor who runs well
in the Black precincts but who lost two years ago in the recently annexed areas
now wins overwhelmingly in the same conservative precincts because he runs on
an anti-annexation, pro-consolidation platform.
Additional data from a survey completed in 2001
(random sample of 358 registered voters completed by the Survey Research Lab at
University of North Carolina at Wilmington) adds further support for the
hypothesis that the issues of annexation and consolidation are dominant in the
election and very important to the voter.
The survey found that 58.8% of the voters were opposed to the annexation
policies of the city and 55.6% were supportive of consolidation. There was also
overlap in these two views. The Gamma
for the relationship between these two views was .104 and it was significant at
the .000 level (the correlation coefficient was .187).
The cross tabulation is indicated below:
Connection Between Annexation and
Consolidation Views
|
|
Favor Annexation |
Oppose Annexation |
Depends |
|
For Consolidation |
60.8% |
51.1% |
100.0% |
|
Against Consolidation |
29.4% |
34.0% |
|
|
Depends |
2.0% |
8.5% |
|
|
Not Sure |
7.8% |
6.4% |
|
|
Totals |
100.0% |
100.0% |
100.0% |
This survey question helps to reinforce the linkage
between the anti-annexation and pro-consolidation position of the voter. Further demographic analysis of the survey
shows that certain factors are closely linked with attitudes toward annexation
and consolidation. For example, as
shown below, older white voters who have lived longer in the community, who
have lower educational levels, and who are currently living in un-incorporated
areas are more likely to oppose the annexation policies of the cities.
Attitudes toward Annexation
|
Factors |
Significance |
Gamma |
Explanation |
|
Age |
.000 |
.226 |
Older, more opposed to annexation |
|
Length in Community |
.000 |
-.051 |
Longer in community opposed to annexation |
|
Education |
.000 |
-.017 |
Less education, more opposed to annexation |
|
Income |
n.s. |
-.088 |
|
|
Where live |
.000 |
.183 |
Live in unincorporated area, more opposed to annexation |
|
Race |
.000 |
.084 |
Whites more opposed to annexation |
With regards to attitudes toward consolidation, the picture is somewhat
changed but still illustrative of the broader trends. Highly educated, whites living in the city are very supportive of
consolidation and older people and long time residents are moderate supporters
of consolidation.
Attitudes Toward Consolidation
|
Factors |
Significance |
Gamma |
Explanation |
|
Age |
.000 |
.097 |
Older more support for consolidation |
|
Length in Community |
.000 |
-.001 |
Longer in community more support for consolidation |
|
Education |
.000 |
-.270 |
More education more support for consolidation |
|
Income |
n.s. |
-.144 |
|
|
Where Live |
.000 |
.135 |
Live in city more support |
|
Race |
.000 |
-.308 |
Whites more support for consolidation |
Conclusion
The
aggressive annexation policy of the city of Wilmington in the 1990s has now
begun to have a direct impact on local politics and particularly the support
for government consolidation. Three
previous attempts at consolidation were unsuccessful either because of poorly
organized coalitions of support or the lack of a crisis issue or critical event
that could mobilize support for consolidation.
The two most recent Mayoral elections show certain areas of the city
supporting candidates based on their views of annexation and
consolidation. The traditional highly
educated, white voter living in the city is predisposed toward consolidation
anyway and now another group of alienated older, long time residents who are
also white and living in the unincorporated areas of the county are now showing
more support for consolidation. If we
add the residents of the most recently annexed areas (see Tables 3 and 4) to
this coalition of support for consolidation, the prospects for a successful
vote on consolidation are higher than at any time in the past.
What is clearly
different than before in Wilmington is the presence of a critical event or
issue. In this case, aggressive
annexation without the political consent of voters may lead to a structural
change that might otherwise not otherwise even be considered. It is true that the Wilmington area could
pursue other regional strategies like functional consolidation and the use of
special districts but the momentum toward the more traditional
city-consolidation seems just as plausible.
This case study of
Wilmington breathes new life into the Rosenbaum and Kammerer thesis discussed
earlier. Instead of avoiding regional
solutions, Wilmington one of the fastest
growing metropolitan areas in North Carolina and the U.S., may be able
establish itself as premier regional government just like Indianapolis,
Nashville, and Jacksonville.