SECTION 1: INTRODUCTORY. This sets the scene. Gorgias has just given an "exhibition," i.e. professional display of his rhetorical art. Socrates and his student Chaerophon arrive, and Callicles invites them in to meet the great man. Before long, Socrates has entered into his examination of Gorgias and his "art" or "expertise" (techne). At a critical point, Socrates asks the question whether Gorgias should not be responsible for the misuse of his art by his students, e.g. where they use the power of their persuasive art to immoral ends. Gorgias thinks not, but Socrates argues otherwise. Eventually, Socrates argues that rhetoric is no "art" (techne) at all, but a mere "knack" (empirike), and indicates what he thinks a true art (techne) must be.

Callicles. The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast.
Socr. And are we late for a feast?
Cal. Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to us many fine things.
Socr. It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.
Chaerephon. Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other time.
Cal. What is the matter, Chaerephon—does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?
Chaer. Yes, that was our intention in coming.
Cal. Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he shall exhibit to you.
Socr. Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes and teaches; he may, as you [Chaerephon] suggest, defer the exhibition to some other time.
Cal. There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer.

Chaerophon, Gorgias and Polus, Gorgias' student, engage in a brief exchange. Socrates intervenes, to try to get Gorgias to define his art and say what he is.
Gor. Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
Soc. Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
Gor. Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, "I boast myself to be."
Soc. And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?
Gor. Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.
Soc. Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments? - Yes.
Soc. And music is concerned with the composition of melodies? - It is.
Soc. With what is rhetoric concerned? - With discourse.
Soc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias? - such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well? - No.
Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse? - Certainly not.
Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak? - Yes.
Soc. And to understand that about which they speak? - Of course.
Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick? - Certainly.
Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body? - Very true.
Soc. And all the other arts treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do. - Clearly.
Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?
Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse. ....
Soc. But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts? - True.
Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; ...And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: to what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate? - Gor. To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.
Soc. That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honesty obtained. -- Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
Soc. I mean to say, that the producers of those things, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: "O Socrates, my art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his, for is not health the greatest good? And after him the trainer will come and say, "I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show of mine, for my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body." When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he will ask, "whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth." Now I
want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.

Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, **being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others** in their several states.

Soc. And what would you consider this to be?

Gor. What is there greater than **rhetoric, the power over the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting**? --if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that **rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion**, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?

Gor. No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.

Soc. Then hear me, Gorgias, ...for I am going to ask-- what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? ...--is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say: Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?

Gor. He persuades, Socrates, there can be no mistake about that.

Soc. Again, does the art of arithmetic and do the arithme...Certainly.

Soc. And therefore persuade us of them? --Yes.

Soc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion? -- Clearly.

Soc. And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what, we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what. -- Very true.

Soc. Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? -- True.

Soc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what?-is not that a fair way of putting the question? -- I answer, Socrates, that **rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.**

Having gotten Gorgias to define his art, Socrates now seeks to examine what it means to "persuade" people to believe things and to consider the moral aspects of persuasion and conviction. In the process, Gorgias explains how rhetoric, conceived broadly, is an enormous power in human affairs, and also suggests that rhetoricians should not be held accountable if their students misuse the skill they have been taught.

Soc. Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as "having learned"? -- Yes.

Soc. And there is also "having believed"? -- Yes.
Soc. And is the "having learned" the same "having believed," and are learning and belief the same things? -- In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.
Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way: If a person were to say to you, "Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?" -you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is. -- Yes.
Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true? -- No.
Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ. --Very true.
Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded? -- Just so.
Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,-one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge? --By all means.
Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge? --Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.
Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them? --True.
Soc. And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters in a short time? -- Certainly not.

. Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbors or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a proposition taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of the young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. "What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias? they will say about what will you teach us to advise the state?--about the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned? How will you answer them?
Gor. I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavor to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbor were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders.
Soc. Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.
Gor. And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win their point.
Soc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.
Gor. A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply a knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody--the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a boxer or wrestler or other master of fence; because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the gymnasium and to be a skilful boxer--he in the fullness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the city-surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defense not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject—in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or banished or he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.

Socrates now conducts his "examination" of Gorgias' last claim, that the rhetorician is not responsible for his students' misuse of rhetoric, and sets out to refute Gorgias, showing that, given other things that Gorgias agrees to, the rhetorician should be held accountable if his students misuse his art. First he states in eloquent fashion his own philosophy with respect to seeking the truth, even if it means he is himself refuted.

Soc. You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise—somebody says that another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite vexed at
themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute—I for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter—let us make an end of it.

Gor. I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we, may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else.

The audience demands that Gorgias and Socrates continue.

Gor. After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with the wishes of the company, them, do you begin. and ask of me any question which you like.

Soc. Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have understood your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician?—Yes.

Soc. Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?—Quite so.

Soc. You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have, greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health?—Yes, with the multitude—that is.

Soc. You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion. —Very true.

Soc. But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?—Certainly.

Soc. Although he is not a physician:—is he?—No.

Soc. And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what the physician knows.—Clearly.

Soc. Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?—In the case supposed:—Yes.

Soc. And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?
Gor. Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?-not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?
Soc. Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honorable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some. one else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him-it is not your business; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would.
Gor. Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.
Soc. Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he must be taught by you. --Certainly.
Soc. Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter? --Yes.
Soc. And he who has learned music a musician? --Yes.
Soc. And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him. --Certainly.
Soc. And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just? --To be sure.
Soc. And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just? --Yes.
Soc. And must not the just man always desire to do what is just? --That is clearly the inference.
Soc. Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice? --Certainly not.
Soc. And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man? --Yes.
Soc. And will therefore never be willing to do injustice? --Clearly not.
Soc. But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric-he is to be banished-was not that said? --Yes, it was.
Soc. But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never have done injustice at all? --True.
Soc. And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of discourse, not like arithmetic about odd and even, but about just and unjust? Was not this said? --Yes.
Soc. I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I
would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

Polus intervenes, complaining that Socrates has used a logical trick to make Gorgias contradict himself, and demands that Socrates answer himself the question, what is rhetoric? Socrates goes on to explain that in his view, rhetoric is not a techne ("expertise") at all, but a mere empeiria ("knack").

Polus. And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the beautiful and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction—the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious questions—[do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?] For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice?

Soc. Illustrious Polus... if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen—I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows—would you not?—Yes.

Pol. I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates: What is rhetoric?

Soc. Do you mean what sort of an art?—Yes.

Soc. To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion. —Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?

Soc. I should say a sort of knack. —Pol. A knack in what?

Soc. An knack in producing a sort of delight and gratification. —And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?

Soc. What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?

Pol. Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of knack?

Soc. Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me?—I will.

Soc. Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?—What sort of an art is cookery?

Soc. Not an art at all, Polus. —What then?

Soc. I should say an knack. —In what? I wish that you would explain to me.

Soc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, Polus. —Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?

Soc. No, they are only different parts of the same profession. —Of what profession?

Soc. In my opinion then, Gorgias and Polus, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word "flattery"; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I
had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, "What is rhetoric?" For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Pol. I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Soc. Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the counterfeit of a part of politics. -- And noble or ignoble?

Soc. Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what is bad ignoble. Gor. Socrates, I cannot say that I understand.

Soc. I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away.

Gor. Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.

Socrates explains his theory of the genuine and counterfeit arts of the body and the soul, according to which rhetoric, together with sophistry, are the counterfeit arts of the soul.

Soc. I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls? --. Of course.

Soc. You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them? -Yes.

Soc. Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health.

Gor. True.

Soc. And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality?

Gor. Yes, certainly.

Soc. And now I will try to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but
only a knack, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defense of them.

Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine; and cosmetics, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and colors, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic. I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow)

- cosmetics: gymnastic :: cookery : medicine; or rather, cosmetics: gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation; and as cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.

And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide: "Chaos" would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer.