Political Society, Parties, and Democracy

 

Paige Johnson Tan·

 

 

 

Introduction

 

East Timor’s double transition includes the attempted consolidation of democracy simultaneous with independence.  The double transition, then, can be seen as similar to the situation from the 1940s to the 1970s as territories throughout Asia and Africa (including East Timor itself) emerged from Western colonial rule.  Many leaders of national independence movements made their case for independence based on arguments about democracy and human rights.  However, democracy was only infrequently the result.  In most cases, democracy failed, and authoritarian regimes consolidated themselves instead.  The people of many newly independent countries had merely exchanged rule by one non-elected group (Western colonialists) for rule by another (albeit a home-grown one).

 

East Timor became independent in 2002.  Will its fate be the same?  Will enthusiasm over democracy and entering the community of world nations turn to frustration with unrealized expectations and elite politics?  Certainly, the verdict is not yet in.  East Timorese are proud of their victory over Indonesia and grateful for the assistance of the United Nations (UN), but they are also frustrated in aspects of their new democracy.  By examining the country’s embryonic political institutions, we can seek to understand better the degree to which democracy is taking hold in the country.

 

Surely, there are some important differences between East Timor’s independence in 2002 and that achieved by other countries a generation or two earlier.  For one, East Timor has the experience of having watched democracy fail in many countries of the developing world earlier.  It has seen, too, the demise of many Marxist/Communist regimes, a strong pole in its politics thirty years ago when the territory was invaded and annexed by Indonesia.  It has also witnessed the “Third Wave” of democratization and the rise of a global ideological hegemony favoring democratic regimes, the zeitgeist of the contemporary world.

 

In addition to changing times globally, East Timor also had a massive UN presence intended to support its security and its democratic birthing process that distinguishes it from many countries engaged in the double transition earlier.  According to Kofi Annan, visiting Dili in 2000, the aim of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is “to help you [the East Timorese] to take the reins of power.  We want to help you establish a peaceful, stable, democratic, independent state.”[1]  Despite the nobility of its aims, the UN operation in East Timor faced numerous criticisms that it was yet another colonizer in East Timor’s long history of colonization and that the mission was too slow in transferring authority and responsibility to the Timorese.[2]  While acknowledging these criticisms, this piece, with its focus on the country’s political institutions, finds much to appreciate in the UN operation in East Timor.  In contrast to many earlier decolonizations, a surer, but by no means certain, democratic footing has been achieved. 

 

While some criticized the UN for retaining power too long in East Timor, others criticized the world body for being too eager to leave the new nation, rushing it through elections and towards independence.  Still, the successful Constituent Assembly elections in August 2001 and presidential elections in April 2002 have provided the country with a government recognized as legitimate both within and without East Timor.  The germs of a defense force, a national police, a justice system, and a state bureaucracy have also been developed.  The United Nations supported the dissemination of democratic norms of participation and fair play through political education and the crafting of electoral laws, particularly for the Constituent Assembly elections held in 2001.  Importantly, too, the UN operation helped to mobilize support for massive international assistance to East Timor which has been used to support democracy and also to satisfy basic needs and to resuscitate the country’s heavily damaged infrastructure.[3] 

 

It is certain that the United Nations alone cannot be credited with East Timor’s successful transition.  East Timorese of many stripes strongly engaged with the United Nations and supported the crafting of peaceful norms of political competition (though some anti-system elements will be considered later).  Of critical importance in East Timor were Xanana Gusmao, leader of the resistance to Indonesia, President of the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT[4]), and independent East Timor’s first president; Jose Ramos Horta, diplomat-in-chief of the resistance to Indonesia, Vice-President of the CNRT, and independent East Timor’s Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; and Catholic Bishop of Dili Carlos Ximenes Belo, who, with Ramos Horta, shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996.  All three of these individuals played important roles in crafting norms of fair play and peaceful competition and socializing the value of multi-party democracy.  Beyond being non-partisan, Xanana Gusmao verges toward being anti-party in orientation;  this has implications for East Timor’s fledgling political parties that will be considered later.

 

The Consolidation of Democracy, Political Society, and Political Parties

 

Changing times, the UN role, and the hard work of the East Timorese in creating new modes of political competition go far in explaining the success East Timor has experienced since 1999 in attaining its independence and laying the groundwork for a democratic system.  Now that the country is independent, it faces further hard work if democracy is to be consolidated.  Scholars Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan state that democracy is consolidated when it has become “the only game in town.” [5]  But, according to the authors, consolidation involves complex tasks occurring in five different “arenas.”  The arenas of consolidation include civil society, political society, rule of law, economic society, and a workable state apparatus.[6]  East Timor’s political society is the focus of this chapter. 

 

But how can one examine an evolving political society?  Political society is the realm in which competition for political power is organized.  It includes the political parties, parliament, and president as well as the rules of political competition—the Constitution, the electoral law, and the elections themselves.  In order for political society to contribute to the consolidation of democracy, competition among different political forces must be peaceful, rule-based, and relatively stable.  Groups involved in the political process must acquire stability and legitimacy as well.

 

The focus of this chapter is East Timor’s political parties as a key element of the country’s evolving political society.  Beyond important individuals, such as President Xanana Gusmao, who have played vitally important roles in East Timor’s transition, it is to the parties that one must look for the longer-term prospects of East Timor’s democracy.  Individuals will pass from the political scene;  institutions will remain—at least they will if democracy is consolidating itself.  One of the key tasks of any transition is the institutionalization of peaceful, relatively stable competition among the political parties. 

 

How can one examine the degree to which the political parties are contributing to a democratic political society?  Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully focus on the institutionalization of the party system as a key difference between new democracies in Latin America and the former Communist states and more established democracies in the West.[7]  Party systems in advanced democracies experience change, but this change is often gradual.  Parties’ shares of the vote and the nature and number of parties in the system are relatively stable.  Continuity in the parties undergirds stability in the wider political system and expectations of future stability.  In less institutionalized party systems, in contrast, parties rise and fall from election to election, roots in the population are often shallow, charismatic parties flourish, and party organizations and the legitimacy of parties are weak.  Lack of institutionalization of the party system is often associated with pathologies in governance.  Low levels of party system institutionalization can be associated with high turnover in political office, inability to legislate, gridlock between different branches of government, inability to hold politicians accountable for public policy, and, potentially, the delegitimation of parties and democracy. 

 

Mainwaring and Scully do not explicitly link their examination of party systems to the consideration of parties in the immediate aftermath of a transition from authoritarian rule or a transition to independence.  Working alone, though, Mainwaring makes an interesting comment about party systems in Brazil.  Mainwaring mentions that “[f]rom the perspective of party building, the first seven or eight years of democracy [the administrations of Sarney and Collor] could hardly have been worse.”[8]  Certainly, if what happened in those first few years could hardly have been worse, then it could have been better.  This chapter looks at the first years of East Timor’s political society and asks to what degree the party system is institutionalizing.  The chapter acknowledges that, as President of East Timor Xanana Gusmao has said, the country is in an “embryonic state;” however, patterns of competition, roots, norms, legitimacy, and organizations are all being established now.[9]  The shape of possible futures is being written today.

 

Table 1.  Criteria for Examining Party System Institutionalization

 

Source: Modified from Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions:  Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1995). 

 

As set out by Mainwaring and Scully, four criteria are most important in the examination of party system institutionalization;  these are laid out in Table 1, above.  First, institutionalized systems are associated with stable inter-party competition.  This is often indicated by low volatility in the vote.  Competition between parties is rule based and, for the most part, peaceful.  Second, parties in institutionalized systems have stable roots in society.  This provides a durable structure to the party system by allowing parties groups of supporters on which they can rely from one election to the next, feeding back into stability in inter-party competition above.  Parties with strong roots in society are also unlikely to disappear from one election to the next (they age), providing stability in expectations about the future political constellation as well.  Third, in institutionalized systems, parties and elections are considered the legitimate means to determine who governs.  Acceptance of parties’ roles and performance should be relatively high (though even in advanced democracies frustrations with parties occur, this is generally of a different scale when one compares institutionalized and relatively uninstitutionalized systems).  Further, elections should be administered fairly and accepted as being so.  Lastly, parties in institutionalized systems have relatively stable rules and structures.  Internal leadership contests are rule based.  Discipline is high and factionalization low to enable the party to act efficiently and as a unit.  Parties are independent of any sponsoring organizations and have varied and regular sources of funding.  Finally, parties should span the entire territory of their expected vote base (this may be national, regional, or on some other basis).

 

It will not be the task of this paper to find East Timor’s political parties to be entirely institutionalized or wholly uninstitutionalized.  Institutionalization is a more fluid concept;  it occurs in degrees.  Examining the criteria for institutionalization in regard to East Timor’s parties will provide us insight into the degree to which democracy is being consolidated within East Timor’s political society.  What we find is that, even in a highly challenging context, the parties have made significant strides in institutionalization.  Weaknesses, of course, exist, and these will be explored further below.

 

The East Timorese Context

 

East Timor is the poorest country in Asia, according to the United Nations Development Program.[10]  Forty-four percent of the population survives on less than US$ 0.55 per day.  The economy contracted by 38% in 1999, and though it has rebounded in 2000 and 2001 due to the presence of the United Nations as well as international assistance, an unsustainable two-tier economy (the upper-tier servicing the UN mission) has been created and much criticized. 

 

The population, 794,000 in 2002, has experienced severe trauma through successive waves of violence.  Civil war in 1975 between Fretilin (Independent East Timor Revolutionary Front—Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente)

and UDT (Timorese Democratic Union—Uniao Democratica Timorense) resulted in the deaths of hundreds, perhaps even several thousand East Timorese.  The Indonesian occupation, which began with an invasion in December 1975, resulted in the deaths of anywhere from 100,000-200,000 more East Timorese, perhaps one-fourth of the population, through slaughter, hunger, and disease.  Later, violence leading up to and following the independence referendum in 1999 killed another one thousand or more, in addition to resulting in the wanton destruction of the country’s infrastructure (telecommunications, water, and electricity, for example) and many homes and shops.  A further 250,000 residents of East Timor fled or were forced over the border to Indonesian West Timor following the ballot (this included many of the territory’s civil servants and teachers, a blow to the new nation’s stock of human capital).[11]  It is little wonder that East Timorese began the double transition with a general sense that politics equals violence, and political disagreements often result in death. 

 

Political Parties in East Timor

 

It would be a mistake to see East Timor’s contemporary political organizations as entirely new.  Individuals and parties prominent in politics span the end of Portuguese colonial rule, the imposition of Indonesian rule, the UN-sponsored referendum, and independence.  Candidates for president in 2002 included Xanana Gusmao, leader of the resistance to Indonesian rule, and Francisco Xavier do Amaral, first president of the Democratic Republic of East Timor which was founded in November 1975 (and lasted mere days before the Indonesian invasion).  The big winner in East Timor’s Constituent Assembly elections in August 2001 was Fretilin, the party which declared independence in 1975 and spearheaded the internal guerrilla struggle against Indonesia’s occupation.  Xanana Gusmao was Fretilin leader and head of the party’s armed wing Falintil, the Armed Forces of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao Nacional de Timor Leste), before becoming head of the multi-party resistance coalition, the National Council of the Maubere Resistance (CNRM, Conselho Nacional de Resistancia Maubere, later CNRT, Timorense/Timorese) in 1987.  In order to understand the parties’ present, it is necessary to return to the past, to 1974 and the birth of the first East Timorese party system.

 

The Party System of 1974-1975

 

Political organization by East Timorese was minimal before 1974.  In that year, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal paved the way for the decolonization of the country’s overseas territories.  Rapidly, several major parties appeared in East Timor;  these parties reflected genuine differences of interest and opinion among the East Timorese (between the left and the right and between those favoring immediate or more gradual independence, for example) as well as different perceptions of the reality of the small territory’s international position (whether Indonesia would allow an independent East Timor to exist).

 

Fretilin was formed in 1974, originally as the ASDT, the Timorese Social Democratic Association (Associacao Social Democrata Timorense).  In keeping with the spirit of the times, Fretilin drifted increasingly to the left and associated itself with other Marxist national liberation movements around the world.  Its supporters were predominantly young and urban, and the party’s agenda hewed closely to the standard Marxist, revolutionary line (Marxism-Leninism was adopted officially by the party only in 1977).  As the party radicalized, inter-party cooperation was rendered more difficult.  Fretilin would go on to claim that it was the “only legitimate representative of the people of Timor.”[12]  Other parties were, by extension, not.  In 1975, as mentioned above, the party unilaterally declared the territory’s short-lived independence. 

 

UDT, the other major political party of the mid-1970s, was a party of the right.  Led by Joao Carrascalao, UDT drew its support from among civil servants and landowners.  The party was more gradual in its approach to independence and favored continuing close links with Portugal.  Fearing Fretilin’s radical agenda, UDT members launched a coup in August 1975 but lost the ensuing civil war to Fretilin. 

 

The major pro-Indonesian party of the pre-1975 period was Apodeti, the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor).  It is unknown how large pro-Indonesia sentiment in East Timor actually was, but it is well established that Apodeti was funded by the Indonesians and guided by that nation’s military/security apparatus.  The leading pro-integrationist of the time was Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo.  Two smaller parties rounded out the 1974-1975 party system;  these were KOTA, the Association of Timorese Heroes or Sons of the Mountain Warriors (Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain), a monarchist grouping of traditional leaders, and Trabalhista, a small workers’ party. 

 

Fretilin’s Marxism frightened UDT, Apodeti, KOTA, and Trabalhista.  Leaders from all these groups participated in the Balibo Declaration in 1975 which blamed the inability to find a peaceful solution in East Timor on Fretilin’s “criminal actions.”[13]  Balibo called for East Timor’s integration with Indonesia, seeing this as the territory’s only salvation from Fretilin’s “terror and Fascism.”  Fretilin’s Democratic Republic of East Timor collapsed under an Indonesian assault, but resistance to the Indonesian occupation continued in the mountainous hinterland.  By the 1990s, student-led resistance in the urban areas and in Indonesia itself was also increasingly prominent. 

 

Party Politics under Indonesian Rule: Inside and Outside of East Timor

 

Inside East Timor, the party system quickly took on a more Indonesian hue after Indonesia’s annexation of the territory.  Political activity was strongly controlled by the Indonesians to prevent the use of the territory’s political institutions to promote the independence agenda.  Beginning in January 1976, just one month after the Indonesian invasion, East Timor’s openly operating political parties were amalgamated into a single “non-partisan” body similar to Golkar, Indonesia’s ruling party. 

 

East Timor did not participate in Indonesian national elections until 1982.[14]  When those elections were held, the degree of military domination in East Timor was apparent as Golkar received more than 99% of the vote.  Indonesia’s other two parties, the Muslim United Development Party (PPP) and the nationalist-secularist Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI), were allowed some participation in East Timor’s politics.  Still, Golkar’s vote in East Timor was always above 82%, high by the standard of the Java provinces but par for some of the Eastern Indonesian provinces.  In 1997, Golkar took 85% of the East Timorese vote, while just two years later, pro-independence forces would win the referendum with 78.5% of the vote, compared to the integrationists’ (pro-Indonesian or frightened) vote of 21.5%.  Because of East Timor’s predominantly Catholic population, the Muslim PPP never ran well in the territory, its vote ranging from just 0.22% to 1.82%.  The PDI did somewhat better, attaining a high of almost 16% in 1992. 

 

Both inside and outside East Timor, Fretilin continued to operate, and it did so against tremendous odds.  The Fretilin-dominated Falintil was the main military force opposing Indonesian rule within East Timor.  Outside the territory, Fretilin leaders in exile as well as those from UDT and other organizations gradually developed a unified coalition of opposition.  Some officials working with the Indonesians inside East Timor quietly collaborated with outside resistance forces as well, developing contacts and increasing trust among different East Timorese groups.  As Marxism declined around the world, Fretilin’s leftism, too, became more muted, facilitating the cooperation of the party with other representatives of the East Timorese diaspora;  this was important.  Previously, Fretilin had considered itself “the sole legitimate representative of the East Timorese people.”  This view had to be moderated to allow room for other East Timorese groups to participate jointly in the independence struggle.  The gradual coming together of the resistance was symbolized in the creation of the umbrella resistance coalition, CNRM in 1987.  The resistance leadership board set in 1998 included Xanana Gusmao as President and Jose Ramos Horta and Mario Carrascalao (then representing UDT) as vice presidents.  Members of the National Political Commission, a wider leadership body, and representatives both inside and outside East Timor featured many individuals who would later be prominent in the new political parties, as well as figures from the Catholic Church.

 

Contemporary Political Parties

 

Table 2.  East Timor’s Political Parties and the Results of the 2001 Elections

 

TABLE 2—CLICK HERE

 

Table 2, above, introduces East Timor’s contemporary political parties and breaks down party performance in the August 2001 Constituent Assembly elections (after drafting the country’s first constitution, the assembly transformed itself into the national parliament).  Sixteen parties and a smattering of independents competed in the elections.  Twelve parties attained seats in the Constituent Assembly via the proportional representation (PR) portion of the race (which was held for 75 of 88 seats), as did one party and one independent candidate competing in the district races (13 of 88 seats).  Only four parties attained more than 7% of the national vote in the PR races, demonstrating a greater concentration of the vote than is apparent from a first glance at the wide party field. 

 

Fretilin dominated the 2001 elections, receiving 57% of the vote in the PR portion of the election, taking 43 of 75 seats up for grabs, and 66% in the district races, where it won 12 of 13 seats.  Fretilin’s 55 seats towered over its next closest rival, which had just seven seats.  The party’s total was enough, notionally, to form a government on its own but not enough to unilaterally draft and pass a Constitution.  That meant some inter-party cooperation would be necessary.

 

Finishing second in the elections was a new party, founded only in June 2001, the Democratic Party (PD, Partido Democratico), which won 8.7% of the vote and 7 of 88 seats.  Party head Fernando de Araujo was a prominent leader of student resistance to Indonesian rule in RENETIL, the National Resistance of East Timorese Students (Resistencia Nacional dos Estudiantes de Timor-Leste); he was jailed for his activities during the 1990s.  PD can be seen as a splinter from the Fretilin party, arising from the frustration of younger Fretilin members with the domination of the party by “the seniors.”  According to party head de Araujo: “The seniors are considered to have more rights or know more.  This is a very paternalistic attitude unwanted by the PDs.”[15]  The fact that many seniors spent the struggle in exile from East Timor may have increased frustration on the part of young student activists who see their role in carrying the resistance struggle into Indonesia in the 1990s as important in eventually bringing East Timor its independence. 

 

Finishing third in 2001 was another new party, the Timor Lorosae Social Democratic Party (PSD, Partido Social Democrata Timor Lorosae) led by Mario Carrascalao.  PSD garnered 8.2% of the vote in the PR portion of the elections and 6 of 88 seats.  PSD is a centrist party which has attracted both prominent former Fretilin and UDT officials.  The party emphasizes its technocratic abilities as well as its moderation.  According to a profile of the party in Cidadaun, a publication of East Timorese Rights Foundation (Yayasan Hak), PSD aims to “spur the creation of a dominant middle class, without the need to marginalize the rich or disregard the poor,” a classic middle approach.[16]

 

Last among the “big four” parties was a revived ASDT.  One will remember that ASDT, the Timorese Social Democratic Association, was the original name of Fretilin.  Francisco Xavier do Amaral, President of the Fretilin-declared Democratic Republic of East Timor in the 1970s, founded ASDT in April 2001, and just months later the party secured 7.8% of the vote in the PR races and 6 of 88 seats in parliament.  Do Amaral is particularly popular among Mambae-speaking East Timorese, and the ASDT vote was concentrated in these Mambae areas, particularly the districts of Ainaro, Aileu, and Manufahi.

 

In addition to Fretilin, PD, PSD, and ASDT, twelve other parties competed in the elections.  A revived UDT contested but finished poorly, with just 2.4% of the vote and two seats.  KOTA, the monarchist party of the 1970s, reappeared as well, taking a little over 2% of the national PR vote and two seats.  Two Christian-Democratic parties (PDC and UDC-PDC) competed in the elections, jointly taking 2.6% of the vote and three seats in the assembly.  On the left, the Socialist Party of Timor (PST, Partido Socialista de Timor) earned 1.8% of the vote and one seat.  Several formerly pro-Indonesian groups (favoring autonomy in the 1999 referendum) accepted East Timor’s independence and participated in the 2001 elections.  Apodeti earned just 0.6% of the vote and no seats.  The Nationalist Party of Timor (PNT, Partido Nacionalista Timorense) took 2.2% of the vote and two seats.  PPT, the Timorese People’s Party (Partido do Povo de Timor), garnered 2% of the vote and two seats.  Rounding out the field were the East Timor National Republican Party (PARENTIL, Partido Republika Nacional Timor Leste—no seats); PDM, the Maubere Democratic Party (Partido Democratica Maubere—no seats); the Liberal Party (PL--Partai Liberal—one seat); and another historical party, Trabalhista (PTT—no seats).

 

One significant anti-system pressure group has been included in the party table by way of introduction.  The CPD-RDTL, the Popular Council for the Defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (Conselho Popular pela Defesa de Republica Democratica Timor Leste), headed by Antonio “Ai Tahan” Matak, was founded in 1999.  The group did not compete in the 2001 elections and is not officially a political party.  It is, however, supported by prominent individuals from the political parties, including Francisco Xavier do Amaral of ASDT and Abilio de Araujo of the Nationalist Party of Timor (PNT).  Allegations have swirled around the group that it has been funded and supported by the Indonesian military to create chaos in East Timor.  It has also engaged in sporadic scuffles with Fretilin and other CNRT parties.  Several of its members were even accused in a plot to assassinate Xanana Gusmao and other top officials in March 2001.  CPD-RDTIL was also associated with letters, though authorship was not proven, which circulated in East Timor prior to the Constituent Assembly elections promising that blood would flow.  The group’s policy line has been to support the reinstatement of the government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor declared in 1975.  CPD-RDTL opposes the UN role in East Timor, claiming that the country already has a rightful government proclaimed decades ago (this view echoes lack of acceptance of the UN role in East Timor by many hard-core elements in Indonesia).  The UN is also denounced by the CPD-RDTL for engaging in “neo-colonialism” in East Timor.[17]  Supporters of CPD-RDTL are believed to include the young, frustrated with the dominance of the new country’s politics by returning Portuguese-favoring exiles, as well as former members of Indonesian-sponsored anti-independence militia groups.  Some frustrated former members of the Falintil resistance may be involved as well, proving the truism that politics indeed makes strange bedfellows.

 

Party System Institutionalization

 

Stability In Inter-Party Competition

 

With the parties of the contemporary party system introduced, party system institutionalization may be considered.  The first criterion is stability in inter-party competition. 

 

In order to analyze stability in inter-party competition, political scientists often use volatility, an index which measures change in levels of party support from one election to another.  High levels of volatility are associated with instability in the party system since levels of party support are shown to fluctuate from one election to the next.  Unfortunately, East Timor has few elections by which to measure volatility in party support.  

 

Elections were held district-by-district in East Timor in 1975, while the territory was still under Portuguese colonial rule.  These elections were never completed, however, due to the outbreak of the UDT coup in August 1975.  Results were in for about half the districts, though, and for the areas in which voting was completed, Fretilin’s result was 55%, tantalizingly close to the party’s 57% in 2001.  Unfortunately, the incomplete nature of the vote results, the massive demographic change in East Timor since the 1970s, and the rise of significant new parties in 2001 render this similarity in result intriguing but far from conclusive.

 

It is also impossible to look for continuities in the vote between the August 2001 Constituent Assembly elections and the April 2002 presidential elections.  Xanana Gusmao’s position as the favorite to win the elections caused ten parties to line up behind his candidacy, which was then conducted on a personal rather than a party basis (we will return to this issue later).  It is impossible to measure consistency in the vote between a 16-party, 5-independent Constituent Assembly election and a two-individual presidential race.

 

Absent data on volatility, one must find alternate means of considering stability in inter-party competition.  To that end, this chapter considers the nature of evolving competition as a substitute variable.  These two concepts are not freely interchangeable.  However, healthy competition among the parties is more likely to lead to stable inter-party competition than unhealthy (collusive or combative) competition is.  For this reason, healthy competition serves as a “pre” variable for stability in inter-party competition.[18]  In order to examine the nature of inter-party competition, I examine polarization, the dominant position of Fretilin in the party system, and evolving norms and patterns of inter-party competition. 

 

Ideological polarization in the political system can often contribute to turbulent inter-party relations, as is evidenced by severe disruptions in East Timor’s politics in the 1974-75 period.  Despite occasional cooperation between UDT and Fretilin in 1974-1975, polarization drove the two parties apart, leading eventually to brief civil war between them and Indonesian intervention.  Over the years, however, Fretilin’s views have moderated dramatically, as have opinions of Fretilin among other political actors, making inter-party cooperation easier.

 

Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and some other top Fretilin leaders spent their time in exile in Mozambique, where they witnessed first-hand the weaknesses of Frelimo, the Marxist-revolutionary-movement-turned-governing party.  Changing times internationally have also played a role in moderating views inside Fretilin.  It is little surprising that cooperation among different parties in the resistance increased simultaneous with the weakening and then collapse of international Communism beginning in the late 1980s.  In 1987, the multi-party resistance coalition, CNRM, was born.  According to Xanana Gusmao, when Mikhail Gorbachev was originating his glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union, East Timor’s Marxists were “proud of having . . . decid[ed] on a similar path.”[19]  Today, Mari Alkatiri refuses “to be labeled” a socialist.  He says he is not “against the rich,” but what he is “really against” is poverty.[20]  A milestone in Fretilin’s changing worldview was the 1998 party congress (held in exile).  In that year, too, CNRM became CNRT.  The dropping of Maubere, referring to the East Timorese masses, from the organization’s name, and its substitution with the generic “Timorese” reflected Fretilin’s declining radicalism.

 

FIGURE 1—CLICK HERE

 

Figure 1 is a depiction of party ideology and polarization in the East Timorese political system (the size of each party’s oval reflects its relative size in parliament).  It must be remembered that this is a tentative, first impression.  Parties were not highly specific about their policies in the run-up to the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections.  Many parties supported “peace,” “democracy,” and “human rights,” for example.  Also, issues dividing the population are not easily summarized on a standard left-right spectrum, which prioritizes approaches toward state intervention in the economy.  Key issues in East Timor in 2001 included the dominance of older returned exiles or former guerrillas from Fretilin in the new country’s politics and the politics of which language(s) to adopt in a newly independent East Timor.  These types of issues are not easily captured on a left-right scale.

 

Still, what can be said of East Timor is that polarization is far less severe than it was during the 1970s and modes of cooperation among the parties, particularly of the center and right are being developed (the hard left being numerically less significant).  A glance at the ideology map does give a sense that moderate/center parties were among those performing best in the elections of 2001. 

 

Fretilin’s strength in the political system, 57% of the vote in the PR races and 55 of 88 seats in the assembly, has caused serious concern among many both inside and outside the political parties in East Timor (Fretilin excepted, of course).  Could Fretilin learn to cooperate with other parties in spite of its strength?  Was the cooperation achieved among leaders of the resistance and during the transition now a thing of the past?  Would Fretilin attempt to go it alone?  Fretilin leaders caused repeated concern by pushing hard during the election campaign for 60 or more seats in the Constituent Assembly;  this would have given the party the ability to pass a constitution on its own.  Xanana Gusmao, head of the unified resistance, broke strongly with Fretilin, even encouraging and patronizing the founding of new political parties like the PD and the PSD, likely in an attempt to offset Fretilin’s power.  Mari Alkatiri, Secretary-General of Fretilin, while on the campaign trail, guaranteed that the party would secure 80% of the vote and declared 100% to be his true goal.  With these aspirations, some wondered whether Fretilin’s goal was a new dictatorship.  In the end, Fretilin came up short of the super-majority required for adoption of the constitution.  Cooperation with other parties was necessary, and, while there was dissatisfaction with the constitution-writing process and Fretilin’s assertive role, at the least, lines of accountability for the new government are more clear than in many multi-party systems. 

 

As Figure 2, below, makes clear, in putting together East Timor’s first cabinet government after the August 2001 elections, Fretilin remained open to outsiders, despite the fact that, by the numbers, the party could have formed a cabinet on its own.  Throughout the campaign, Mari Alkatiri had promised just such a “government of inclusion.”  Alkatiri distinguished the government of inclusion from a traditional coalition government.  “Naturally if we choose Joao Carrascalao [to be in the cabinet] it will not be because he is president of UDT, we will choose according to the individual’s abilities. This is what we want.”[21]  In the end, the cabinet announced in September 2001 was composed of ten representatives of Fretilin, twelve independents, and three members of the Democratic Party (PD).[22]

 

Figure 2.  Cabinet, September 2001

 

Post	Occupant	Party
Chief Minister (Prime Minister after independence) and Economy and Development	Mari Alkatiri	Fretilin
Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation	Jose Ramos Horta	Independent
Justice	Ana Maria Pessoa Pereira da Silva Pinto	Fretilin
Finance Minister	Fernanda Mesquita Borges	Independent
Internal Administration	Antoninho Bianco	Fretilin
Health	Rui Maria de Araujo	Independent
Water and Public Works	Cesar Vital Moreira	Fretilin
Transport and Communications	Ovidio de Jesus Amaral	Fretilin
Education, Culture, and Youth	Armindo Maia	Independent
Agriculture and Fisheries	Estanislau Aleixo da Silva	Fretilin
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation	Fernando de Araujo	Partido Democratico
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation	Jorge da Conceicao Teme	Fretilin
Vice Minister for Internal Administration	Ilda Maria da Conceicao	Independent (former Fretilin)
Vice Minister for Health	Joao Soares Martins	Partido Democratico
Vice Minister for Education, Culture, and Youth	Felix de Jesus Rodrigues	Independent
Vice Minister for Justice	Domingos Maria Sarmento	Independent
Vice Minister for Finance	Arlindo Rangel da Cruz	Fretilin
Secretary of State of the Council of Ministers	Gregorio Jose da Conceicao Ferreira de Sousa	Fretilin
Secretary of State for Natural and Mineral Resources	Egidio Jesus	Fretilin
Secretary of State for Labor and Solidarity	Arsenio Paixao Bano	Independent
Inspector General	Mariano Jose Lopes da Cruz	Independent
Secretary of the Commission on Planning	Emilia Maria Valeria Pires	Independent
Advisor on Human Rights	Isabel da Costa Ferreira	Independent (former UDT)
Advisor on the Promotion of Equality	Maria Domingas Fernandes	Independent
Advisor on the Development of the Commission on Planning	Antonio da Conceicao	Partido Democratico

 

Sources: Christine Tjandraningsih, “E. Timor Announces Cabinet Lineup,” Kyodo (Japan), September 20, 2001 [ONLINE] http://www.etan.org/et2001c/september/16-22/20etanno.htm [accessed October 14, 2002].  UNTAET Press Office, “Fact Sheet 3: Second Transitional Government,” April 2002.

 

Speaking of the political process during the 2000 CNRT Congress, Joao Carrascalao mentioned that East Timorese leaders were “making it up as [they went] along.”[23]  Despite the seat-of-the-pants evolution of politics, strong support for the creation of norms of peaceful competition by the United Nations, East Timorese leaders, the domestic media, and international and domestic NGOs went far in making East Timor’s first elections, the Constituent Assembly elections of 2001 and the presidential elections of 2002, a success.

 

UNTAET supported the July 2001 adoption of a Pact of National Unity (Pacto Unidade Nacional) by East Timor’s political parties.  Through the pact, the parties committed themselves to respecting unconditionally the results of the August 2001 Constituent Assembly elections as representing the will of the East Timorese people.  The pact encouraged non-violence and sought to forestall all types of aggression (both physical and verbal) in the parties’ election campaigns.   The pact defended multi-party democracy, dialogue, equal rights, and non-discrimination.  Via the pact, the political parties vowed to refuse the infusion of foreign funds (and presumably foreign interference) in the East Timorese political process.  The parties even vowed to support the East Timorese Constitution which had not yet at that time been written!  The National Unity Pact was signed by UNTAET head Sergio Vieira de Mello, Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos Horta, and all the main political parties contesting in the August 2001 elections, with the exception of the Nationalist Party of Timor (PNT), which later proved a marginal competitor (2.2%). 

 

UN Administrator Sergio Vieira de Mello regularly reinforced the types of message put forth in the pact.  According to Vieira de Mello, it had become time in East Timor “for the political parties to challenge each other with ideas, not with machetes.”[24]  The United Nations engaged in public education in East Timor, stressing norms of fair play, freedom of choice, and UN neutrality. 

 

Non-partisan East Timorese leaders reinforced the norms of peaceful competition.  Xanana Gusmao, speaking before the Constituent Assembly race, said: “Each party must promote, through their structures at the grassroots level, the policy of tolerance and of mutual respect in the democratic spirit which we are all engaged in developing.”[25]  Gusmao promised also to adhere to the rule-based application of political power.  During the presidential election in this predominantly Catholic country, Xanana said: “The Constitution will be my bible.”[26]  Ramos Horta, moderator of the first debate among contestants for the Constituent Assembly elections in 2001, prodded and poked at party leaders to “find the nuances necessary to explain the differences to voters.”[27]  With a friendly and sometimes humorous demeanor, Ramos Horta showed that differences among the parties were important but that they could also be peacefully contained within the country’s new political institutions.  Bishop Belo, too, helped to craft the country’s new norms of peaceful political competition.  In a pastoral letter before the August 2001 Constituent Assembly elections, Belo encouraged East Timorese to vote according to party program.  He encouraged voters only to choose parties or candidates whose programs supported “peace, justice, and development.”[28] 

 

Candidates for elective office also reinforced the “fair play” message through their behavior during the campaign.  Before the August 2001 Constituent Assembly vote, candidates from the various parties joined in sporting events with one another to demonstrate their good-natured and friendly competition.  On the day of the presidential elections in April 2002, Xanana Gusmao and Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the two candidates, cast their votes together to bring home the same message.

 

There were small outbreaks of violence during the August 2001 campaign.  Of perhaps greatest seriousness was the issue of intimidation;  this impacts directly on the “healthiness” of inter-party competition and thus merits consideration here (we will return to the fairness of the elections when we consider the topic of legitimacy, below).  During the campaign, Fretilin was repeatedly criticized for threatening voters by suggesting what might happen after the election, when Fretilin had been returned as the supreme power in the country, to those who had not supported the party in the elections.  Using the language of post-election “sweeping” (dasa rai), Fretilin campaigners scared many East Timorese, who recalled this same language as having been used during Indonesian military campaigns, as well as by the pro-Indonesian militia in 1999, threatening retribution for those failing to support integration.  Officially, Fretilin maintained that its “sweeping” referred simply to the idea that a Fretilin victory would allow the country to start fresh and sweep the streets clean.  Even after Fretilin apologized and explained that this was all a misunderstanding, some international observers found that the damage was “already done.”[29]  Post-election National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) focus groups indeed found that some residents of western parts of the country did not feel free to cast their votes because of Fretilin threats.[30] 

 

The sweeping issue aside, there were also other cases of Fretilin intimidation.  At a rally in Suai, Mari Alkatiri was quoted as saying: “”Who will be the government of an independent East Timor?  Fretilin.  There is no other.  So be careful.”[31]  This is clearly at odds with Alkatiri’s claim that Fretilin’s speeches always support “peace and stability and clearly reject . . . violence.”[32]  Despite these cases of intimidation, most election observers did, in the end, accept the results as representing the wishes of the East Timorese people.

 

Aside from these cases of intimidation, on the whole, East Timorese have embraced peaceful, rule-based inter-party competition.  Party competition has been emotional, but it has not been combative to a destructive degree.  Anti-system groups such as CPD-RDTL and an assortment of groups inside Indonesian West Timor do exist.  According to Pat Walsh, however, “the overwhelming majority of parties and political leaders in East Timor are not only very conscious of their historic calling but are strongly committed to building a new political culture of tolerance and respect for human rights, including those of political opponents.”[33]  Fears of widespread violence in the elections were completely misplaced.

 

Stable Roots

 

Political organization in East Timor does not have a long lineage.  Political awakening next door in Indonesia which spawned the formation of numbers of organizations in the early 20^th century largely by-passed East Timor. [34]  It was only in 1974 that political organizations began to form in the territory, with Portugal’s decision to move toward speedy decolonization.   Still, many prominent political figures and several of the political parties today trace their history to the 1974-1975 period when East Timor experienced its first, unsuccessful double transition.

 

To party system scholars, the stability of party roots in society is particularly important for it speaks to the parties’ staying power and to their representativeness of lasting social groups.  Seymour Martin Lipset notes that “in new electoral democracies [parties] will be inherently unstable unless they become linked to deep-rooted sources of cleavage, as parties in the older, institutionalized Western democracies have been.”[35]  While party institutionalization scholars Mainwaring and Scully recognize that there is a great deal of diversity across nations in the degree to which parties are rooted to society, they argue that the key difference is the absence or weakness of such linkages in the inchoate, fluid or relatively uninstitutionalized, party systems they examine.[36] 

 

One way of examining party roots is to calculate the average age of parties winning at least ten percent of the vote in national elections.  This is, unfortunately, not too helpful in East Timor, as the only party with more than ten percent of the vote was Fretilin.  And, Fretilin is, of course, one of East Timor’s historical parties, 27 years old at the time of the Constituent Assembly elections in 2001.  Clearly an “average” age of 27 years would give a misleading figure for the age of parties in East Timor’s new democratic system.

 

Four parties did distinguish themselves from the pack in the 2001 elections, all earning more than 7% of the vote.  In the PR portion of the race, Fretilin earned 57.4% of the vote; PD, 8.7%; PSD, 8.2%; and ASDT, 7.8%.  Beyond these “big four,” the next highest party finished with just a little over two percent of the vote.  Looking at just the “big four” parties, we find a wide array of ages.  Fretilin is, of course, the oldest party at 27 years.  PSD was the next oldest, at just under one year at the time of the Constituent Assembly elections.  Both PD and ASDT were just several months old in August 2001.  The average age of the parties, then, was 7.1 years.  It is clear from this “average” that Fretilin continues to bear the weight of age for the whole system.  Three of the top four parties in 2001 were brand new.  Among the 16 parties contesting in 2001, most had been formed only in the few months prior to the elections. 

 

Another window into the stability of party roots is party-line voting.  This is logical.  If parties are well-rooted in the population, voters might be expected to choose the same party in different types of elections.  In East Timor, as mentioned above, it is impossible to look for party-line voting between the Constituent Assembly and presidential elections, due to the party nature of the former and the individual nature of the latter.  However, two types of elections were held during the Constituent Assembly elections in August 2001: proportional representation races (for 75 seats) and district races (for 13 seats).  Table 3, below, compares results in the PR and district races.  Data are available only for the big four parties.

 

Table 3.  “Big Four” Party Performance in PR and District Races, August 2001

Party	Result in PR Races (percentage)	Result in District Races (percentage)
Fretilin	57.4	66
PD	8.7	5.8
PSD	8.2	4.7
ASDT	7.8	10.7

Source: UN, “Final Election Results Announced Today in East Timor,” September 6, 2001 [ONLINE] http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db060901/htm [accessed August 11, 2002].

 

Unsurprisingly, there are problems with these data.  First, all parties cannot be considered, potentially obscuring patterns in voting behavior.  Further, some parties fielded more candidates for district election than others.  Still, preliminary data do suggest that East Timorese did not vote exclusively along party lines in 2001.  So, both party youth and lack of party line voting suggest a relatively unrooted party system.

 

One last window into party roots is party identification.  As one of the older political parties and one that continued to struggle against Indonesian occupation, Fretilin might be expected to be the beneficiary of great numbers of voters’ party identification.  Anecdotal evidence suggests this is the case.  According to Jose Ramos Horta, the Indonesians facilitated the identification of citizens with Fretilin through their tactics during the occupation.  By identifying some East Timorese as “enemies” and “Fretilin,” Ramos Horta says, whole villages came to feel as if they were indeed “Fretilin.”[37]  In contrast, identification with the newer political parties could be expected to be less widespread.  Unfortunately, more systematic data on party identification are not available.  Polling in East Timor during 2001 and 2002 by the Asia Foundation, discussed further below, took up neither the issue of party identification nor party preference.

 

As can be surmised from the above treatment of party roots, data at this time are too tentative for a conclusive answer.  Party roots appear to be shallow, as many of the parties are new.  Fretilin is clearly the exception to this observation.  The party is older, has consistently operated in East Timor since the 1970s, was seen as the champion of the resistance by many, and was rewarded by a large swathe of the electorate on election day 2001.  Detailed vote results by province, complete results of district races, and public opinion polling focused on party identification and party preference would all help to clarify patterns in party roots.

 

Legitimacy of Parties and Elections

 

Why is legitimacy important in considering the institutionalization of the party system?   While legitimacy deals directly neither with the parties themselves as organizations, nor with their roots in society, nor with the way that the parties compete with one another, it can be a by-product of all those factors, considered in Mainwaring and Scully’s treatment of party system institutionalization—so much so that legitimacy itself becomes important in understanding the degree to which the party system has become institutionalized.  If parties and the system of party competition are viewed as legitimate, people will structure their behavior on that basis;  this can be a virtuous circle for institutionalization of the party system.

 

Parties that are shallow (immature organizationally), disconnected from the population (with no roots), or parties that compete unfairly by buying votes or intimidating opponents (engage in unfair or unhealthy inter-party competition) can be complicit in destroying the legitimacy of the party system, the legitimacy of elections as a means to determine who governs, and, more comprehensively, the legitimacy of the entire democratic system.  

 

First evidence of the legitimacy of elections in East Timor is the high level of voter turnout observed since 1999’s referendum on independence.  Voter turnout in 1999 was 98% of registered voters.  Two years to the day later, 91% turned out to select the country’s constitution-drafting Constituent Assembly.  In the presidential elections of April 2002, 86% of registered voters participated, despite the fact that Xanana Gusmao’s victory was a foregone conclusion.[38]  Reports from journalists and election observers suggest that voting is taken as a serious duty by the East Timorese, many of who make a ceremonious occasion of voting day by dressing up, going to Church, and casting votes as a family.

 

The 2001 Constituent Assembly elections and the 2002 presidential elections were also generally viewed as free and fair, despite the intimidation allegedly engaged in by Fretilin’s threats of post-election “sweeping.”  On the Constituent Assembly elections, the Carter Center found the elections met “international standards of freeness and fairness.”[39]  The Carter Center also reported that “political activity, including campaigns, proceeded smoothly for the most part and without serious incident.”  International approval of the presidential race was similar.  Chief Election Observer from the European Union John Bowis “salute[d] the East Timorese people for the way they conducted themselves before, during, and after the election.”[40] 

 

Among East Timorese, complaints of unfairness during the Constituent Assembly election did emerge, as with the case of Fretilin’s “sweeping” remarks mentioned above.  Before and after the polls, the elections were questioned by the UDT’s Joao Carrascalao (despite the parties’ pledges in the National Unity Pact to respect unconditionally the election results).  Carrascalao believed East Timorese were being rushed to the polls by the United Nations, despite the fact that East Timorese did not understand the purpose of the Constituent Assembly elections.  Carrascalao was on some solid ground here, as polling In February and March 2001conducted by the Asia Foundation found that many East Timorese did not know what they would be voting for in August of that year.  Many believed they would be choosing a president.  Only 5% knew that the elections were for a constituent assembly.[41]  This view was seconded by Cidadaun, the publication of Yayasan Hak, which found in its mid-August observations of the election campaign that many East Timorese still did not know at that eleventh hour the purpose of the elections, scheduled for August 30^th.[42]  After the elections, Carrascalao pronounced them “fraudulent” because of multiple voting, insecure ballot boxes, and intimidation of voters by Fretilin.[43]  Gomutil, the East Timorese Women’s Observation Group, and other East Timorese monitoring organizations found a variety of problems with the elections as well, including “intimidation, humiliation and forced attendance at campaign events” as well as “physical violence” in three districts.[44]  Regardless of complaints with certain admittedly flawed aspects of the elections, evidence suggests that the East Timorese more widely considered the elections legitimate.  Focus groups conducted by NDI in December 2001 found no questioning of the vote result among participants.[45]

 

The multi-party system is well entrenched in East Timor’s evolving political-legal structure; this reinforces the parties’ legitimacy within the political system.  However, the practice of the presidential election in April 2002 raises questions about party legitimacy, as will be explored below. 

 

In February 2001, the UN administration approved the election law to govern East Timor’s August 2001 Constituent Assembly elections.[46]  The regulations specified parties as the contestants for 75 of the 88 assembly seats, those chosen by PR (on the basis of a single, nationwide constituency).  The remaining thirteen seats were to be determined on a plurality basis in district races that could be contested by either party-nominated or independent candidates.  Registration of parties with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was made relatively easy.  Parties had only to submit the party name, acronym, symbol, contact information, leader’s signature, by-laws, and the names of party officers.  This application needed to be supported by the names and signatures of just five hundred voters.  Additionally, party officials had to attest to their residence in East Timor and avoid using symbols and names that might promote hatred or that were associated with another country, military organization, or the CNRT/resistance.  Party registration required no fee. 

 

The Constitution approved by the East Timorese Constituent Assembly in March 2002 specifically identifies East Timor’s political system as a “multi-party democracy” (Section 7).  In addition, the Constitution recognizes parties’ contribution to the political system.  “The State shall value the contribution of political parties for the organized expression of the popular will and for the democratic participation of the citizen in the governance of the country” (Section 7).  East Timorese have the full panoply of rights and freedoms, among which is the right to form political parties, as governed by law (Sections 43 to 46).  The Constitution provides for East Timor’s parliamentary elections to be run on a PR basis, implying a role for parties as the major electoral contestants.  In the formation of the government, the Constitution states that the country’s prime minister will come from the party or alliance of parties maintaining a parliamentary majority (Section 106).

 

The laws governing the presidential election of April 2002 were less party oriented.[47]  The operation of those laws in the April election rendered the presidential contest even less of a party affair.  According to Regulation 2002/01, East Timor’s president was to be selected on the basis of a single national constituency on a first-past-the-post (plurality) basis.  Parties which competed in August 2001 were authorized to nominate candidates for president.  The regulation left open the option of new parties forming and nominating candidates as well.  Presidential candidates could come one each from the political parties.  Independents were also allowed to stand, with the provision that prospective candidates could garner 5,000 signatures in support of their candidacy.  The Constitution reinforces that it is individuals, and not parties, who run for the presidency.

 

As the presidential contest evolved, however, it took a further anti-party bent.  Xanana Gusmao, the overwhelming favorite in the race, was able to wring concessions out of the parties lined up behind his presidential bid which reduced the parties’ role in the election to almost nil.  In the Declaration of Principles issued by Xanana and his nominating parties, all committed themselves to recognizing the “independence of the candidate” from the sponsoring political parties. [48]  The Declaration of Principles specified that the presidential campaign was to be conducted in the name of the candidate and not on the basis of party symbols.  In a final humiliation, parties supporting Xanana’s candidacy abdicated any say over the candidate’s policies.  “The signatories to this declaration agree to defend and promote the policies defined by the candidate.”  Removing the campaign from party control, Xanana set up his own National Independent Commission (NIC) to serve as the vehicle of his campaign.  The NIC was responsible for coordinating the campaign and soliciting funding independent of the respective political parties.  If this contest between one man and the parties were not enough, Xanana threatened not to run at all unless party logos were specifically excluded from the ballot papers (Xanana used resignations and threatened resignations as political leverage repeatedly throughout the transition period).  This latter stipulation required the acquiescence not just of the parties behind Xanana’s candidacy but also those behind Francisco Xavier do Amaral’s as well.[49]  In the end, in the interests of compromise and maintaining a Xanana candidacy, all acquiesced to a non-party contest. 

 

The case of the presidential election as an indication of Xanana Gusmao’s anti-party attitudes is not an isolated incident.  Since at least 1987 when Gusmao took over the leadership of the unified resistance movement and left the leadership of Fretilin (but not Falintil), he has grown apart from the parties, East Timorese “unity” an almost manic quest.[50]  An open letter to the East Timorese from 2000 gives a strong indication of Gusmao’s views:

 

At a time when some of our population is still facing hunger, other groups fly flags everywhere while at the same time spreading the winds of conflict amidst the population.  Violence, lies, and the psychological and emotional abuse of our people is starting to occur.  The existing political tension reminds us of the democratic awakening of 1974.  We see that the present race for power by the parties who are already trying to control the population may next year lead to a repetition of the events of 1975.[51]

 

Gusmao went on in the open letter to declare that national unity could not be achieved by political parties.

 

During the transition, Xanana worked hard to inculcate norms of fair, peaceful, and rule-based competition among the political parties, but he never grew close to them.  Gusmao continues to see himself as above party—and, I would allege, above the parties.  His reluctance to assume power is contrasted with the parties’ power-hungry nature.  Gusmao’s quest for unity is intuitively understandable to most East Timorese who have suffered much in the name of politics.  His super-human status and anti-party attitudes present a challenge to the legitimacy of the political parties.  Running for the presidency in 2002, Xanana vowed to serve as the people’s “eyes, ears, and mouth.”[52]  Presumably, the people needed an advocate at the top to protect their interests against the usurpations of the new party political elite.

 

Despite his anti-party attitudes, as president, Gusmao has sought to establish a harmonious working relationship with the political parties, particularly Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri from Fretilin, from which, there is little secret, Gusmao is estranged.  Xanana has also worked hard to hold the politicians accountable for performance and to raise important issues, such as the rising gap between the political class and the rest of the population.  He has been helpful to the parties’ legitimacy in controlling popular expectations of what can be achieved immediately in the devastated little country.  In his speech marking one hundred days of independence, Gusmao acknowledged criticisms of the government.  He said he found them “natural” and “human.”[53]  However, he did not find them “reasonable.”  “We all accept the fact that we are only now beginning in everything: in politics, in development, in building the state, in the school system, in education, etc.  Beginning with myself, we are all learning to serve the nation.”  Gusmao was counseling patience. 

 

Gusmao is not alone in his anti-party attitudes, and this should not surprise, given East Timor’s history.  In the past, party activity, any political activity, has been associated with massive violence.  The Asia Foundation poll in 2001 (before the Constituent Assembly elections) and the NDI focus groups (after the elections) both found popular fear of violence associated with political party activity.  According to Jose Ramos Horta, “when they [the East Timorese] see the proliferation of political parties, they really don't equate it or associate it with freedom of choice.  What comes to their minds first and foremost is violence, that the political parties, the fight between political parties, might bring violence to their community again.”[54] 

 

This brings us to a consideration of attitudes toward politics and the parties. It is here that the battle for party legitimacy is fought, in the public mind.  Clearly, the legacy factor pushes toward negative attitudes toward the parties;  however, evidence shows that past attitudes are being overcome through democratic experience.  Opinion polls will be used in order to consider public attitudes.  It is worthwhile to remember, though, that opinion polling can be problematic in situations of transition from authoritarian rule.  Surely, the trauma East Timorese have suffered may render them unwilling to speak their minds freely and openly to survey researchers.  With this caveat in mind, the polls considered here, conducted by the Asia Foundation, were conducted scientifically, randomly, and nationally.  Thus, they provide the best window into East Timorese views that we possess.

 

East Timorese express higher levels of interest in politics than do many in situations of transition from authoritarian rule.  In the 2001 poll, 54% expressed an interest in politics;  this rose to 62% in 2002.[55]  This high level of interest in politics can be contrasted to low levels of interest in politics expressed in Indonesian polls.  In 1999, following Indonesia’s parliamentary elections, polling by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) found that only 36% of respondents in Indonesia expressed that they were very or somewhat interested in politics (63% expressed that they were not very or not at all interested).[56] 

 

Tolerance for the activities of political parties also grew from 2001 to 2002.  Asked whether a respondent thought “all political parties should be allowed to hold meetings” in their area, 53% replied yes in 2001;  this rose to 62% in 2002.  Another of the Asia Foundation poll questions touched directly on popular attitudes toward inter-party competition.  Asked whether competition among parties was a good thing, in 2001, only 46% of East Timorese respondents thought so;  while 41% thought competition among the parties was a bad thing.  Those approving of inter-party competition grew in 2002 when 56% thought competition among parties was a good thing and only 33% thought it was not.  Representing the legacy of the association between politics and violence, among those who said inter-party competition was a bad thing, 64% said it was because it led to violence and riots. 

 

The rise in those expressing an interest in politics, tolerance for party activity, and acceptance of inter-party competition all seem to reflect a successful learning process as East Timorese become accustomed to peaceful, democratic political competition.  This is good news for the legitimacy of the parties.

 

Despite the good news, all is not entirely well.  NDI focus groups conducted in December 2001 identified several areas of popular concern about the parties.  First, following the Constituent Assembly elections, many focus group participants expressed concern about the parties’ unrealistic promises.  Also, participants were uncomfortable with the distance between elected representatives and electors.  Many claimed not to have heard from their representatives since the election.  Last, participants were aware of a rising gap between the political class and the rest of the population.  All of these issues present challenges for the legitimacy of the political parties over the longer term.  Unrealistic promises can lead to unfulfilled expectations and disappointment.  Lack of accountability on the part of elected officials and distance between the political class and the rest of the population can lead to alienation from the parties.  All of these trends can be complicit in the delegitimation of the parties and, potentially, the delegitimation of democracy. 

 

Stable Rules and Structures

 

The underlying concept behind institutionalization is that in an institutionalized system, the parties and the party system will provide stability to the political system.  By offering enduring expectations about political outcomes, a stable party system can help to structure behavior in predictable ways.  Party organizations, if well developed, can foster party system institutionalization by offering predictability and professionalization. 

 

In order to be considered institutionalized, party organizations should be independent of any sponsoring organizations.  According to Panebianco, the existence of a sponsoring organization results in a weak institution because the sponsoring organization has “no interest in strengthening the party (beyond certain limits) for this would inevitably reduce the party’s dependence on it.”[57]  In addition, parties should have regular funding coming from a variety of sources.  The parties themselves should also not be personalistic in nature;  this should follow logically.  Personalistic parties, with a direct bond between a charismatic figure and the people, have little need for strong organizations. Consequently, the latter infrequently develops.  In addition, personalistic parties rarely outlast their founders, thus failing in another way in providing stability to the political system.

 

Institutionalized party organizations should also have an internal unity. Factions should be relatively uncommon, and party discipline in voting should be high.  Elected representatives should remain loyal to their parties rather than hopping from one party to another in the legislature.  Party control over candidate selection can encourage internal unity.  Additionally, parties should have routinized many of their internal tasks.  Leadership elections should proceed according to agreed-upon rules.  Party organizations should not have to be built from scratch each time an election rolls around.  Finally, parties should have some territorial comprehensiveness.  They should spread across the territory/state in question or at least across the region where the parties’ expected vote base is located.

 

Data on East Timor’s party organizations is sparse.  In fact, in many countries around the world, data which might suggest party weakness are often kept under wraps for fear of a negative impact on party competition next time around.  With this caveat in mind, there are some observations that we can make about the organization of East Timor’s political parties.

 

The parties can be seen to be independent of sponsoring organizations.  Fretilin and UDT, two of the largest legacy parties, for example, have long histories of independent existence.  Even the Church, perhaps the largest and most influential non-party organization in Timor, has vowed its independence from politics.  Two Christian-Democratic parties, one closer to the Catholic Church, the other closer to Protestant churches, remain relatively independent of both.

 

Pat Walsh, observing the parties in early 2001, noticed that many of the parties seemed to experience trouble with securing funding for their activities.[58]  UNTAET attempted to be even-handed to all the political parties for elections in 2001, providing free media access, telecommunications, printing, internet services, and even transportation to the parties (each party received the use of a car to help it carry out its campaign).[59]  Beyond this UN-provided base, however, parties were responsible for raising their own funds.  Reports suggest Fretilin was particularly aggressive in its fundraising, cajoling voters to support the party with cash, goods, and labor to avoid being left behind later when the party assumed power.

 

A number of parties in 2001 could be seen to be personal vehicles.  However, the share of the vote to non-personalistic parties was much higher, dominated by Fretilin’s large vote share.  Even a generous identification of personalistic parties shows around 25% of the vote channeled in that direction.  Anchored by Fretilin, non-personalistic parties took the bulk of the vote, at least 75%.[60]  Interestingly, observers on the ground in East Timor suggest that Fretilin is becoming increasingly personalistic over time.  If so, this is an interesting development which suggests the party’s search for a post-independence political strategy.  A more personalistic Fretilin, given the party’s size in the political system, would have serious consequences for the party system as a whole.

 

Party control over nomination of candidates for election to the PR portion of the elections reinforces strong party organizations, empowering particularly the party center.  This may have played a role in encouraging discipline in the East Timorese system, which is relatively high, as well as low levels of factionalization and party hopping.  As the largest party, Fretilin might be expected to have the greatest problem with factionalization.  Several parties, PST, PNT, PD, and CPD-RDTL, can be seen to varying degrees as Fretilin splinters.  Within Fretilin, tensions are said to exist between those who were inside and outside East Timor during the long struggle against Indonesian rule. Additionally, there appears to be resentment against newcomers to Fretilin, particularly officials who were close to the Indonesian authorities during the occupation.

 

Evidence from the ground suggests that the case for many parties in 2001 was that party organizations were put together on an ad hoc basis to handle the tasks of the campaign.  Observation of the elections by Cidadaun suggested that, even when the campaign was in full swing, party activities, and perhaps even party organization, had yet to come to many areas of East Timor.  This is less true for Fretilin, of course.  Fretilin, the lead party of the resistance to Indonesian rule, remained active in East Timor throughout the long years of occupation.  Fretilin’s strong result in 2001 can be attributed to popular gratitude toward the party for spearheading the resistance as well as organization.  Intimidation may have played a role, too, in Fretilin’s result, though it is difficult to quantify the effect this had on the election outcome.  Reinforcing the notion that party structures have been assembled on an ad hoc basis is the fact that many parties appear to be family, if not personal, vehicles, and party organizations, particularly in the regions, reportedly operated out of the homes of party officials.

 

Additionally, lack of contact between electors and elected suggests that, where organization in the regions existed, it has fallen into disuse since the elections.  Party activity appears to be highly concentrated in Dili, the capital.  Several parties are exceptions. Fretilin has a legacy of organization throughout East Timor.  It has conducted elections for posts throughout the party and has a history of party congresses on which to draw (though top party meets have declined in 2002).  PSD also worked hard to establish party branches throughout the country.  PST, a party run on democratic-centralist lines, too, is attentive to organization.  Founded in 1997, it is also older than some of the relative newcomers.

 

East Timor’s parties appear to have many of the organizational problems associated with parties in a situation of transition.  Fretilin’s structures appear to be an exception to the status of many of the parties, however, one party does not a party system make.  Overall, how can the level of institutionalization of the party system be seen to impact East Timor’s evolving political society and the consolidation of democracy in the country?

 

Political Society: The Importance of Parties and Party System Institutionalization in Democratic Consolidation

 

Two important concepts related to parties that underpin democratic theory are accountability and legitimacy.  Parties enable voters to hold officeholders responsible for governmental choices.  Imagine the situation in which each citizen had to look up the legislative record of his or her representatives, plus that of challengers, at each election—and at each level of office for which a vote was being cast.  The information costs of participation would likely be too high to all but a narrow circle of individuals to have meaningful, rational input into the political system.  Parties put forth programs, at the least loose packages of policies or governing concepts, to which they can later be held accountable when the term of office is done.  Parties allow voters to hold legislative and executive officeholders responsible for their actions while in office as well.  That the parties seek to continue winning office in the future enables voters to make governing officials responsive, even when an election is not imminent. 

 

Legitimacy is the other concept that helps parties to underpin democratic rule.  Internationally, elections are the sine qua non of being a modern democratic state.  In order for elections to be considered free and fair, parties have to be allowed to organize and compete freely.   Parties and elections are the badge of democratic modernity and are the most widely accepted means of government formation.

 

Having established that parties are necessary for democracy to function, this study also subscribes to the ideas first put forth by Mainwaring and Scully in their volume on Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America that the institutionalization of the party system is the proper way to examine parties and their impact on the political systems in more recent democracies. 

 

Mainwaring and Scully look to the degree of institutionalization of the party system to fill the void in understanding party systems in newer democracies.  To the authors, it is the degree of institutionalization that separates the operation of politics in newer democracies from their advanced democratic counterparts.  Institutionalized party systems, such as those in the advanced industrial democracies and some of the newer democracies, provide a stability to politics which makes the system operate with greater predictability.  Institutionalized systems also indicate more moderate, rule-based competition.  In institutionalized systems, parties can fulfill their democratic functions as described above.  They enable voters to hold government accountable.  Party competition through elections is considered the legitimate means of forming a government.  To Mainwaring, “[i]nstitutionalized party systems structure the political process to a high degree.  In fluid [relatively uninstitutionalized] systems, parties are important actors in some ways, but they do not have the same structuring effect.”[61] 

 

Mainwaring and Scully do not suggest the party system institutionalization framework as particularly appropriate for examining cases in the immediate transition from authoritarian rule.  This is a shame because Mainwaring hints at the importance of the party system at the time of transition as setting the stage for the evolving system.  According to Mainwaring, “democracy is likely to have shortcomings if a moderately institutionalized party system does not emerge after democratic government has been in place for some time.”[62]  Further, examining Brazil’s transition from authoritarian rule, Mainwaring observes, as mentioned previously,”[f]rom the perspective of party building, the first seven or eight years of democracy could hardly have been worse.”[63] 

 

If the party system could hardly have been worse, then it certainly could have been better.  Linz and Stepan point to the parties as an important element of a country’s political society.  Therefore, the state of the parties in a transition has much to say about whether the consolidation will occur at all.  Remedying weaknesses in party system institutionalization offers itself as an important area in which improvements might be made to ensure democratic consolidation in some cases.  All too frequently, without any attention, weakly institutionalized party systems have simply limped to their own demise, unmourned by tired and often relieved populations.

 

Analysis of the institutionalization of East Timor’s party system shows both strengths and weaknesses.  The party system shows greater concentration than the sheer number of parties suggests.  While sixteen parties competed in the elections in 2001, only four parties scored above seven percent of the vote (in the PR races), with Fretilin taking more than 57%.  Fretilin’s dominant position in the political system is resonant of the position of national liberation movements in earlier double transitions.  But, party vote shares can be expected to fluctuate in coming years, particularly as Fretilin is credited or blamed for its leadership of the government, and the mystique of the resistance fades.  The nature of inter-party competition showed certain problems, such as the use of intimidation by certain parties during the campaign, but East Timorese accepted the results of the ballot as evidenced by NDI focus groups and the lack of conflict after the vote.  Ideological polarization has declined dramatically since the 1970s.  Further, non-party figures, the UN administration, and the parties (openly) signed on to new norms of peaceful, rule-based competition.

 

The nature of the bond between parties and voters is an area that requires further research before a conclusive answer on the stability of party roots can be reached.  Clearly, an affective bond seems to have been created between Fretilin and a large swathe of the population (though the use of intimidation by the party creates questions).  The durability of this bond and the ability of new parties to find niches in ethnic, regional, or socio-economic groupings remain an unknown for the future.  The parties are older, though, than the sheer age of East Timor’s new political system might suggest.  Fretilin was founded in 1974.  Among the other top parties, PD and PSD both seem to have found a niche among the young, a thriving demographic in East Timor’s youthful population.  The ASDT appears to be rooted in Mambae-speaking area in which it performed well in 2001.

 

The new system of inter-party competition faced an uphill battle in establishing its legitimacy by virtue of popular attitudes that associated parties and politics with violence.  Turnout has been high for East Timor’s three elections since 1999.  International and domestic monitors watching East Timor’s 2001 and 2002 races identified certain specific problems with the nature of inter-party competition.  However, on the whole, the elections were pronounced free and fair, and it is clear that they were accepted as such by the population.  Evidence from opinion polls suggests, in contrast to the legacy factor, that successful democratic experience is raising levels of interest in politics, tolerance of party activity, and acceptance of inter-party competition as a good.  The parties are heavily embedded in the new country’s legal framework, too.  The Constitution specifies that the country’s parliament will be chosen based upon a party-list PR system.  The legal basis for party involvement in presidential races is weaker.  The operation of politics and the magnitude of Xanana Gusmao’s pull made the parties even less of a factor.  The President has set himself as a non-party actor. Occasionally, his comments and actions push him fully to the anti-party side of the equation.  NDI’s focus groups have indicated certain problems that could lead to longer-term legitimacy questions for the parties.  Unrealistic promises by the parties, which may lead to disappointment, and the distance developing between the new political elite and the East Timorese population, which may lead to alienation, raise a red flag for the future.

 

As many of East Timor’s parties are new, they might be expected to see weaknesses in structure, and this is the case.  Party funding is precarious and structures outside the capital, Dili, appear weak.  On the positive side, however, party discipline appears high and factionalism relatively low.  Many of the parties are personalistic in nature;  however, on the whole, these parties were not those rewarded by the population on election day.  Organizational and program parties like Fretilin, PD, and PSD took the bulk of the vote.

 

East Timor’s parties, even in their embryonic state, are a key part of the country’s evolving political society.  Political society is one of the important “arenas” in which democratic consolidation takes place.  How do East Timor’s parties do in fulfilling two of the vital functions of parties in a democracy, fostering accountability and legitimacy?  Weaknesses in institutionalization and concerns for the future come to the fore.  East Timorese participants in focus group discussions have expressed concern, already at this early stage, in a lack of accountability on the part of elected representatives to citizens.  Legitimacy appears to be strong, despite a legacy of anti-party attitudes, and public approval of parties is rising;  however, disappointment with the parties’ inability to deliver on their promises and alienation from the parties as a result of their distance from the people could cause popular support for democracy to decline over the longer term, threatening democratic consolidation.