Paige Johnson Tan Indonesian Democratization after the 2004 Elections through the Lens of Party System Institutionalization AAS Chicago 2005

after the 2004 Elections through the Lens of Party System Institutionalization

E-Mail: tanp@uncw.edu

after the 2004 Elections through the Lens of Party System Institutionalization[1]

The parties have treated the people only as a means . . . to take power. The people understand this and have paid the parties back in the elections by handing them a defeat.

Introduction

It is often said that it is not the first elections after the fall of an authoritarian regime that matter; instead, the path to democracy is seen to be assured only after second elections have been completed. Indonesia’s second post-Suharto elections (pesta demokrasi, festival of democracy), both parliamentary and presidential, were held from April to September 2004. Can the country be seen finally to be firmly on the path to democracy? Is democracy now the “only game in town?”

This paper examines what the performance of Indonesia’s political parties through the 2004 “year of elections” can tell us about politics in the country. The parties are an important part of the political society envisioned by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan as forming one of the integral “arenas” of democratic consolidation.[3] By using the party system institutionalization framework first developed by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully in Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America,[4] the paper analyzes the degree to which the party system can be seen to be institutionalized, thus contributing to, as Mainwaring and Scully found in Latin America (or not, in the case of less institutionalized systems), democratization and stable governance.

The paper finds that, across Mainwaring and Scully’s criteria of party system institutionalization, the 2004 elections represented, on balance, a step toward deinstitutionalization, particularly as a result of the new system of direct presidential election. Democracy may indeed now be the “only game in town,” but its operation is likely to be rocky.

Theoretical Underpinnings

In much of the literature on transitions from authoritarian rule, the role of political parties is seen to be key. To Linz and Stepan, the development of political parties is part of the development of “political society,” by which they mean, “that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus.”[5] As scholars recognize, often it is not the political parties which bring down the old regime (this is typically brought about on the backs of union members, human rights campaigners, and students, among others), but it is to the political parties that one must look to observe the kernel of consolidation apparent in the transition. Consolidation requires political parties to build a new system of competition for political office.[6] O’Donnell and Schmitter see the founding election as “provoking parties” into action for the “party is the modern institution for structuring and aggregating individual preferences.”[7] Observers of areas as diverse as Russia, Portugal, and Chile have seen the role of parties as key to understanding the progress (or lack thereof) of the transition.

This discussion builds primarily from Mainwaring and Scully’s 1995 volume on Latin America, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Mainwaring, working alone, has gone on to develop further the ideas first presented in the 1995 study with his 1998 article, ”Party Systems in the Third Wave,” and his 1999 book, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil[8]. According to Mainwaring and Scully, past work on parties and party systems has focused almost exclusively on Sartori’s measures of the party system: the number of parties and the degree of polarization. [9] These are, to the authors, more relevant to a discussion of Western European politics. Developing and developed countries might well share features if evaluated based on the number of parties. Why, then, do the political systems operate so differently, the authors ask. To Mainwaring and Scully, the answer lies in different degrees of party system institutionalization.

For the authors, an institutionalized party system is one in which there is stability in inter-party competition, parties have stable roots in society, parties and elections are accepted as the legitimate means to determine who governs, and party organizations have relatively stable rules and structures.[10]

To Mainwaring and Scully, institutionalization of the party system is key, not so much as an end in itself, but for what a relative lack of institutionalization (what Mainwaring and Scully call “inchoate party systems” and what Mainwaring later calls “fluid” systems) can tell us about a country. Historically, holding politicians accountable has been difficult, legislatures weak, and government legitimacy low in countries with weak party systems, such as Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador. In these systems, “politics has a patrimonial flavor, as individual interest, political party, and public good are fused.”[11] To observers of Indonesian politics much should sound familiar.

Going in to 2004, there was much talk that the country was suffering from SARS, not Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, but Sindrom Aku Rindu Suharto, “I miss Suharto” syndrome (referring to Indonesia’s former authoritarian leader). This was demonstrated by opinion polling which showed Indonesians were increasingly alienated from politics. The Asia Foundation’s 2003 poll found that 71% of Indonesians felt that someone like them was unable to influence the political process, hardly promising in a notional democracy.[12] There was a growing sense, too, that the new democratic-era politicians were all about capturing power for themselves, not serving the people.

Freedom might have been limited during the Suharto years, it was said, but at least the country was stable and experienced steady economic growth. Certainly, Suharto’s daughter, known as Tutut, and some of the former president’s allies believed that SARS was ripe in Indonesia. A party emerged to promote Tutut as a presidential candidate in the 2004 elections. The party, Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, played on this “good old days” theme in its campaigning. Had PKPB been successful in 2004 (it scored just 2% of the vote in the parliamentary elections), this would have taken Indonesia down a familiar path. Fatigue with bickering politicians sets in as a country goes through the tumult of a democratic transition and the people of developing country X seek the return of a strongman to put everything right. We will see that this familiar story has some grains of truth for understanding the Indonesia of 2004, though the beneficiary was not PKPB.

Indonesia experienced three sets of elections in 2004. The first, in April, was for the country’s legislative bodies from the national to the local level. The second, in July, was for the national presidency. As no presidential-vice presidential candidate pairing scored over 50% of the vote in this July first round, a second round presidential election was held in September 2004 between July’s top two finishers.

The long year of elections was fatiguing (some Indonesians nicknamed the year, “the year of voting frequently” as a play on “the year of living dangerously”), and we will see that voter turnout did steadily decline. However, the elections were also a great source of pride for the country. The Economist magazine ran a cover touting “Indonesia’s Shining Example.”[13] For a country that has not experienced a lot of good press in recent years, this was doubtless encouraging. The elections were also peaceful, despite widespread fears of violence. In fact, the elections were more peaceful than those in 1999 which were in turn more peaceful than the last authoritarian New Order elections in 1997.

The issues in the campaign, such as they were, focused primarily on eliminating corruption, lowering prices/restoring higher levels of growth to the economy, and job creation. Non-party actors worked hard to keep particularly the corruption issue out in front. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, joined a campaign at the end of 2003 to demand that the government do something about the country’s corruption and culture of impunity about it. A coalition of more than 150 NGOs also coalesced to form the Gerakan Nasional untuk Tidak Pilih Politisi Busuk (National Movement against Rotten Politicians) which attempted to educate voters against choosing status quo politicians, those tainted by corruption allegations, and human rights violators, to name a few “rotten” categories.

Polling showed that corruption, the economy, and jobs were important priorities for the Indonesian people. In fact, the economy has come out as voters’ top concern in virtually every poll published since 1998. Research institute LP3ES’s polling before the parliamentary elections showed the economy, education, and corruption highest on citizens’ list of priorities.[14] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) focus groups before the first round of the presidential election showed that participants were “generally dissatisfied with the state of the their country, especially when discussions turn to economic matters (where inflation and unemployment top the list of concerns).”[15] After the second round of the presidential elections, priorities were the same. An LP3ES September exit poll found that voters most wished the new president to reduce costs (28%); create jobs (16%); eliminate corruption, collusion, and nepotism (15%); and reduce the cost of education (12%).[16]

Appendix I contains basic information on the parties competing in the 2004 parliamentary elections. To discuss a few of the most salient features of the party system as it entered 2004, the number of parties competing in the elections declined from the 1999 elections to just 24, from 48 previously. So, the party system got smaller, and this was in line generally with people’s wishes for a more manageable party system as well as the tighter requirements of the country’s new laws on political parties and elections.

Six parties, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P), Partai Golkar (Golkar), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) qualified for the 2004 elections based on their performance in 1999. Other parties represented splinters from the larger parties: for example, Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (PNBK) from PDI-P, PKPB from Golkar, and Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR) from PPP. Still other parties represented reworkings of parties that had tried in 1999, like the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera which was the renamed Partai Keadilan. The last category of party was the entirely new party, such as Sjahrir’s Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (PIB).

Another feature of the party system was the “Sister Act.” Megawati Sukarnoputri was the country’s incumbent president and leader of the PDI-P, the country’s largest political party. Megawati’s sisters, daughters of founding president Sukarno all, also joined in the political act this time, with sister Rachmawati promoting Partai Pelopor and sister Sukmawati promoting Partai PNI Marhaenisme.

In terms of parties’ “basis,” or fundamental ideological grounding, sixteen chose the state ideology of Pancasila; this suggests acceptance of the country’s plural nature and a general adherence to nationalism. Five parties chose to base themselves on Islam, two Sukarno’s ideology of Marhaenism,[17] and one “Justice, Democracy, and Prosperity.”

The winners of the parliamentary elections were seen to be the Partai Demokrat (Demokrat) and the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), two parties that had come out of nowhere to capture more than 7% of the vote each.[18] According to one observer, the parliamentary elections “ended the mandate of the status quo political parties.”[19] PKS Chair Hidayat Nur Wahid observed that it was a “David and Goliath” story “in which the small new parties are, because of democratic reforms, able to reach enough voters to topple candidates from the older, larger parties.”[20] The lower house of parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), would be occupied by legislators, almost 70% of whom were new to the body, leading many to view the elections as a turning out of the old and an entering of the new.

Not so fast, though. Most of those house members still come from the old established political parties. Golkar, the party of the Suharto era, was the top finisher in the election with 21.6% of the vote and 128 seats. Golkar outpolled the other top parties in 26 of the country’s 32 provinces. In second place was the party of then-incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri, PDI-P. Certainly in the game of perceptions PDI-P was the election’s big loser. It had set targets as high as 57% of the national vote, so 18.5% must have been a bitter pill. Perhaps Riswandha Imawan captured the situation best when he saw Golkar and PDI-P as “lonely winners.”[21] They had won the election but probably had little to feel happy about. At the same time, it is best not to get carried away with Partai Demokrat/PKS fever. Fifteen percent of the vote for the upstarts does not, on its own, a revolution make. The concentration of Demokrat and PKS voters among the urban, best educated, and wealthiest segments of the population certainly catches attention, though.

Table 2 compares the results of the April 2004 and June 1999 parliamentary elections

Examining the results of both elections should make clearer why analysts viewed the big parties as losers of the 2004 polls, but the results are actually more interesting than that simplistic analysis suggests. The depth of PDI-P’s drop in support becomes apparent. From 33.7% of the vote in 1999, PDI-P scored just 18.5% in 2004. The party no longer was dominant in terms of parliamentary seats either. Still, PDI-P scored 109 seats, almost one-fifth of the parliament. Golkar’s overall share of the vote dropped just a hair from 1999 but the party’s seat total actually went up from 120 to 128.[22] Other large parties, PKB and PPP, saw their national shares of the vote decline by 2-2.5% each; PPP managed to hang on to its 58 seats, and PKB saw its seats rise by one. PAN, too, saw its vote share drop from 7% to 6.4%. The party’s seat total, though, went up from 34 to 52, suggesting that the party did a better job this time of converting votes into seats. The “winners,” PKS and Demokrat, came literally from nowhere to nip the big parties’ heels. PKS rose from just 1.4% in 1999 to 7% in 2004 and grabbed 45 seats, up from just seven in the previous parliament. Demokrat did not exist in 1999. It captured 7.5% of the vote nationwide and 57 seats.

Overall seventeen parties won seats in parliament, ten in the double digits or more; this represented a slight shrinkage from 1999, when 21 parties scored representation at the national level. Still, more parties today are players in the system. Scholars use a measure called the effective number of parties to take the parties’ relative strengths as a way of weeding out the consequential from the inconsequential parties and coming to a conclusion on the size of the party system. This is done by squaring each party’s share of the vote, summing the squares, and dividing one by the result. The effective number of parties after the 2004 elections was 8.55, up strongly from 5.1 after 1999, confirming the dilution of the party system from 1999 to 2004.

Table 3 gives us a different look at the “concentration” of the party system.

Table 3: Concentration of the Parliamentary Vote: Elections of 1955, 1999, and 2004

From an examination of Table 3, it is clear that the overall strength of the big parties has been diluted somewhat (1955 is included just for comparison as Indonesia’s last free elections before 1999). In 1999, almost 80% of the vote went to the top four parties; in 2004, that figure was just 59%. In 1999, almost 90% of the vote went to the top seven parties; in 2004, just 80% of the vote was so concentrated.

But these parliamentary elections were not the only game to be played in 2004. After the April parliamentary elections, parties scoring at least 3% of the seats in the DPR or 5% of the vote in the parliamentary elections were permitted to put up a candidate pairing for the presidential-vice presidential contest to begin in July 2004. After one candidate was ruled ineligible to stand on health grounds (Abdurrahman Wahid), five candidate pairs were set to compete. Results from the two rounds of the presidential election are included in Table 4 below. Appendix II contains an elaboration on the candidates’ parties/organizations and backgrounds.

Many believed into 2003 that the presidential election was Megawati’s to lose. Though her regime had not performed in stellar fashion, it had at least restored stability to both politics and the economy after the tumult of the 1998-2001 period. Still, Megawati was unable or unwilling to move boldly forward in finding solutions to the country’s many problems: corruption, rising prices, sluggish growth, little foreign investment, and unemployment. Further, the president was singularly incapable of communicating to the public what efforts the government was taking in these areas.

This left an opening which would be filled by Megawati’s former coordinating minister for political and security affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). SBY left the cabinet in March before the parliamentary elections presented with the gift of a reported insult by Megawati’s husband, Taufik Kiemas. The largely unpopular power behind the throne accused SBY of being a “four star [general] who has the attitude of a child.”[23] According to one analyst, this was like a “sinetron,” one of Indonesia’s soap-opera dramas, which greatly increased the profile of both SBY and his to-that-point largely unknown Partai Demokrat.[24]

SBY’s candidacy developed a momentum, greatly helped by the Demokrats’ results in the parliamentary elections, and peaked at just the right time to carry him through the two rounds of presidential elections. The campaign’s strategy was brilliant as well. SBY basically ran against the existing political parties. In the words of an official with the SBY campaign: “We want to portray SBY as the people’s president, not as a party president.”[25] The former general attracted votes because of his personality as much as anything else. NDI Focus groups found people liked the fact that SBY was “polite,” “calm . . . [with] an authoritative bearing,” firm, and because he appeared to have integrity.[26] SBY was the first choice of many voters and the second choice of both Golkar and PDI-P voters, too. Interestingly, in Indonesia’s historically communalized politics. SBY was popular with both supporters of secular-nationalist parties like Golkar and PDI-P as well as Muslim party voters.[27]

A vote for SBY may have been cast as a vote for change. The candidate campaigned with a simple message that he would work hard to create a more “secure, just, and prosperous Indonesia.” In fact, SBY’s landslide 60% of the vote in the presidential election’s second round could be seen as an overwhelming mandate for change. But, again, not so fast. Many of those backing SBY’s candidacy were former Golkar stalwarts. The new president himself is a former general. SBY campaigned brilliantly selling honeyed words, serenity, and few concrete details. I would argue that SBY was elected as a savior, a strongman to put everything right. Typically, this would be seen to be antithetical to party system institutionalization. However, we will see that in Indonesia’s case this has not been entirely so.

Party System Institutionalization in Indonesia: The Results of the 2004 Elections

During the preceding discussion, I have outlined a number of ways in which Indonesia’s party system has changed from 1999 to 2004. New parties have risen; some older ones have declined. The number of parties competing in the system has grown smaller, as has the number of parties achieving representation in parliament. Despite this, the effective number of parties in the system has actually risen as the vote has been dispersed among more parties. Now it is time to turn from this basic discussion of the party system to a consideration of Mainwaring and Scully’s criteria of party system institutionalization.

Stability in Inter-party Competition

Scholars examining party system institutionalization look to inter-party competition as providing a clue to the relative stability or instability of the overall complex of party relationships and voter preferences. Systems such as the United States’, in which the actual number of swing voters is relatively small from election to election, would be seen to provide a high degree of stability. How does Indonesia fare?

Traditionally, stability in inter-party competition is measured through volatility from one election to the next. Volatility is simply a measure of the degree of change in overall support for the political parties in the system from one election to the next. Indonesia’s 2004 parliamentary election volatility (calculated by the vote) was 28.55; calculated by seats earned, the figure was 25.78. This is high compared to established democracies such as the US and Switzerland, where figures in the range of four are common. Indonesia’s volatility is just on par with other transitional countries, however. Mainwaring lists volatility figures for Poland (31.4) and the Czech Republic (29.2) during the 1990s that are quite close to Indonesia’s current level of volatility.[28]

Clearly, the parties have not yet found their natural levels of support, and we will continue to experience instability in inter-party competition for the foreseeable future. Contributing particularly this time to Indonesia’s moderately high level of volatility was PDI-P’s dramatic 15-point downward swing. I have seen this interpreted as PDI-P members not showing loyalty to the party. We don’t have the data to support this conclusion. I believe a more likely interpretation is that reformist votes went to PDI-P in 1999. These were frustrated by PDI-P alliances with status quo politicians and Megawati’s relative inactivity in office from 2001. PDI-P had no long-term claim to these votes, and they have moved elsewhere in an attempt to seek satisfaction.

We can expect further changes to levels of party support in the future. Can a reformed PDI-P reclaim some of its previous electoral space? Or the more fundamental question, can PDI-P be reformed? The March 2005 PDI-P congress will provide some clues. Can the Partai Amanat Nasional maintain its level of support without leader Amien Rais at the helm?[29] Can small parties like Sjahrir’s PIB strut their intellectual stuff at the provincial and regency-level to build a broader following? These questions remain to be answered.

Has Golkar reached its natural level of support? Table 5, below, provides information on the movement of the party’s vote over the years by province.

Surely, we can see that the Golkar vote has fallen from the absurd levels it achieved under the New Order (sometimes more than 90% in Sulawesi and other Eastern Indonesia areas) to the more moderate 20-30% range, scoring generally in the teens on the island of Java. Will the party maintain its current level of support, as it held a great deal from 1999 to 2004? As other parties’ capacities in Eastern Indonesia rise, education levels improve, and access to non-state/party-provided opportunities for material success increase (there is no guarantee that any of these will happen), we may expect to see the Golkar level drop further.

Beyond volatility, are there any other notes we might take of the nature of inter-party competition through 2004? Deborah Norden critiques classical party system theory’s emphasis on the number of parties and ideological polarization and says that what is important to examine in newer democracies is the nature of inter-party competition, whether that competition is collusive, combative, or moderate.[30] Moderate competition, according to Norden, is the most promising for democracy, as it prevents the rise of extra-system movements attendant to collusive competition (because significant interests may be unrepresented) and the chaos of combative competition (in which defeating one’s rival is more important than the survival of democracy itself).

Overall, Indonesia’s system shows a confusing mix of collusive, combative, and moderate features. In the legislature, party leaders seem to collude to shepherd the business of parliament without transparency (votes are rarely taken, and decisions are arrived at by faction leader-driven consensus). Dan Slater finds “parties share power far more than they fight over it,” with the parties acting like a cartel.[31] Party relations are also combative, as the painful presidential impeachment process of 2001 showed. But, party competition is also moderate.

The rules of the system are still in a process of development. The Election Commission was dramatically revamped, from party representatives to a smaller non-partisan body, between 1999 and 2004, as were the laws on political parties, elections (including the addition of direct presidential elections), and the structure and function of legislative bodies. In addition, a new Constitutional Court has been created to hear election-related disputes as has an entirely new second chamber of parliament, the Regional Representatives Assembly (dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). Still, from the relative rulelessness of the campaign in 1999 in which rules were violated with impunity, the long list of election violations (7,000 according to the election oversight body Panwaslu) could actually represent a positive, I would argue. These violations ranged from the small (flyers where they were not supposed to be, involving children in campaign activities) to the not-so-small (attempts to vote twice, giving gifts or money to buy votes, intimidation of voters, ballot officials pre-perforating ballots). Perhaps, though, the increasing attention to these violations and the penalties that were handed down this time around were a case, as O’Donnell and Schmitter observed likening transitions to a multi-layer chess game: “with people challenging the rules on every move, pushing and shoving to get to the board, shouting out advice and threats from the sidelines, trying to cheat whenever they can—but, nevertheless, becoming progressively mesmerized by the drama they are participating in or watching and gradually becoming committed to playing more decorously and loyally to the rules they themselves have elaborated.”[32] Perhaps 2004 was slightly more decorous play; at least violations were more public, and there was pressure to act upon them.

Examining some of the incidents from the 2004 campaign we can see that there was an attempt to maintain the discourse of playing by the rules as well. Before the start of the parliamentary and presidential campaigns party heads/candidates gathered and issued calls for peaceful, orderly campaigns. At outset of the presidential election, candidates gathered at the signed at the national monument in Jakarta “Ready to Win, Ready to Lose” (“Siap Menang, Siap Kalah”).

“Black campaigning” certainly played a role in 2004, but this was under the rug, not directly associated with any of the presidential campaigns. Still, someone felt that leaking that SBY was overly close to Christians and Chinese would be useful. At the same time, SBY’s vice presidential running mate dodged charges that he was anti-Chinese! Wiranto was dogged by the arrest warrant issued by the United Nations court in East Timor; this suggested that a vote for Wiranto was a vote for a war criminal and that the candidate would not be an acceptable leader on the international stage. Of course, if this was black campaigning, it represented an international attempt to influence the elections against Wiranto. The former general ran from domestic accusations launched by Kivlan Zein that Wiranto had organized the Pamswakarsa, a paramilitary force seen to be in opposition to reformists back in 1998. Several kyai, Muslim religious leaders, issued an edict that would ban women from holding the presidency in an attempt to weaken incumbent president Megawati Sukarnputri. Lastly, a video circulated that purported to show Abdurrahman Wahid (later disqualified from the race) being baptized by a Christian priest. Wahid, an outspoken proponent of inter-faith understanding, was actually receiving a blessing from the priest.

Calls to boycott the elections came from several student-linked groups. The Kaum Muda Tidak Percaya Pemilu 2004 (Youth who Don’t Believe in the 2004 Elections) wanted to boycott or delay the elections, alleging that due to corruption and the nature of the electoral/party laws, no change could be delivered through the present system.[33] Another group, Reject the Elections, Tolak Pemilu, was organized by Jakarta-based student groups. The elite’s ignoring of the interests of the people and the government’s failure to deliver rendered the elections a moot exercise. In Jakarta for the first round of the presidential elections, I saw Tolak Pemilu grafitti was still much in evidence. Abdurrahman Wahid, too, once disqualified from the race, vowed to golput, or cast a blank vote, in order to register his protest at this exclusion from the presidential race. Originally Wahid suggested he would encourage NU members to join in the boycott, but he backed off of this threat in the end. In fact, despite various calls for boycotting the elections, largely the elections were well attended and the results respected by the people at large.

There was a great deal of dissatisfaction in 2004 with the General Elections Commission (KPU). Observers charged that the body was too dictatorial and not responsive to outside inputs. Monitors charged that their access to polling places was weakened from 1999. Logistical troubles hounded the whole series of elections as it seemed the body was stretched to the maximum trying to deliver the right number of ballot boxes, ballots, and ink to the right place and providing materials of the right quality. Shortages of ballots were accused to have disenfranchised voters in the parliamentary elections. Ink that failed the indelible test was said to have made multiple voting possible in the first round of the presidential elections. The KPU’s information technology system was criticized, too, as observers believed the results transmission system was vulnerable to hacking. That the system was vulnerable to hackers seemed to come true after the parliamentary elections when someone hacked the system and changed all the party names to various fruits! Party pineapple (nanas) it seemed had attained X number of votes. Party rose-apple (jambu) had Y number of votes. On a serious note, re-votes were necessary in a variety of areas. Many ballots were spoiled in the parliamentary elections due perhaps to the confusing design and inadequately socialized new system of casting one’s ballot. After voting and vote counting was concluded throughout much of the country after the first round of presidential elections, the KPU changed what would be accepted as a valid vote, causing polling stations all over the country to have to go back to the drawing board with their counting. Despite all these problems, though, and the refusal of fourteen political parties to sign the election results, [34] popular faith in the elections was high, as we shall discuss below as we consider the parties’ and elections’ legitimacy.

What about the ideological distance in the system? Scholars usually predict that greater ideological distance between parties will contribute to greater instability in the party/governing system. Ideology has become less salient in 2004 even from the low starting point of 1999. At least in 1999, parties seemed to battle over whether they were reformist or status quo. Others battled over Islam and nationalism. Today, the picture is even more murky as most parties made alliances across these former ideological chasms. On the parties’ platforms for the elections, Habibie Center scholar Irman Lanti tellingly observed that the “platforms were made only to complete the registration procedure in KPU. The contents are too general, such as to bring Indonesia into prosperity, to stabilize and secure the political situation, etc.”[35] It is still nonsensical to try to put parties on a left-right spectrum on economic policy, for example. In fact, there are “big-staters” and to a lesser extent free marketers in most parties. The only party with a clearly defined ideology is the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, and its strategy of steady education to foster Islamization among the already-Muslim population, is not currently in direct conflict with any existing ideas such as nationalism.

As suggested above, the primary cleavage points in Indonesians politics have historically been centered around secular-nationalism and Islam. Historically, too, political parties representing socialism/Communism/and workers have filled the party system as have parties representing minority religious or ethno-linguistic or regional groups. How has politics moved through these party streams (aliran) in 2004?

Table 6 above shows the performance of the streams from 1955 through 2004. The 1955 elections were Indonesia’s last free elections before long years of authoritarian rule (typified here by the 1971 elections) and free elections returned in 1999. Truthfully, the streams were a more satisfying tool for examining the parties in past periods. Among the larger parties today, besides a broad stream orientation, most parties tend to attempt to reach across streams for support. There are none, in particular, that are able to completely ignore either Islam or nationalism. Golkar is an example of this phenomenon. Under the New Order, the party went from its basis in secular-nationalism to “green,” or Islamize, significantly during the 1990s. So, while the party is still technically committed to Pancasila, it is also considered an appropriate venue for those from the Muslim stream, particularly those off-Java, to channel their aspirations. In PDI-P, too, while clearly a secular-nationalist party, Megawati could not disregard the wishes of Muslim voters too strongly. The necessity of coalition government forced these accommodations as did the logic of a winner-take-all direct presidential election. No potential vote could be given up by appearing too exclusive to one stream.

Examining Table 6, though, we can see that the big gains made by the nationalist stream from 1955 to 1999 (32.5%) were generally maintained in 2004; this stream declining a narrow 2.2%. The above comments, though, should temper our enthusiasm for the meaningfulness of this result.

As with the secular-nationalist parties which have greened, the Islamic stream presents problems as well. I have included both PKB and PAN within the Islamic stream, though these are both Pancasila-based political parties notionally open to all. Other scholars might disagree with this categorization; however, I have found the parties’ reliance on their particular breeds of Muslim voters (traditionalist and modernist respectively) too strong to ignore. Taking together the various Islamic parties, these parties took 39% of the vote in 2004; this was up just one point from 1999.

Stable Roots

A method Mainwaring and Scully use to examine whether the parties have stable roots in society is to look at the average age of parties winning 10% or more of the vote. This makes intuitive sense as a measure since older parties would suggest more staying power and thus more stable roots in society. For Indonesia, this is a rather loaded measure, though, since only three parties topped 10% of the vote in 2004, Golkar, PDI-P, and PKB. So, Indonesia’s relatively long-lived average age of 25.6 speaks poorly to the party system as a whole. If we looked at the top seven parties, those with 6% or more of the vote, though, we still find an average age of 17.5 years. This suggests that, despite the new-ness of Indonesia’s democracy, the top parties are more strongly rooted than they might at first glance appear.

Rootedness might also be found by locating specific geographic areas or socio-economic groups associated with the various political parties. Parties that have roots in groups such as these can expect a certain level of support from election to election, thus contributing to the stability of the party system.

Table 7 presents a very simplistic view of geographic rooting, drawing a distinction between parties that do well on Java, where a majority of the country’s voters live, to those that do well off-Java. Java accounts for almost 62% of Indonesia’s population but just 55% of seats in the county’s national legislature, the DPR. Those parties with a high degree of Java dependence in 2004 include PKB with 87% of its support from Java, PDI-P with 71%, and Partai Demokrat with 68%. On the lower end of the scale, we find PAN with 60% of its support coming from Java and Golkar with just 52%. From these simple calculations, we can see that PKB and PDI-P are Java-based political parties, while Golkar is an off-Java party.

Table 8 attempts to break down areas of support in more detail by showing the top seven parties and their results by province. Appendix III, with Tables III: A through III: G, attempts to provide more light in this area by showing the top seven parties by province in both 1999 and 2004 along with the change in the parties’ shares of support from 1999 to 2004. I will make reference to results from these tables in the appendix in my discussion.

Examining the parties’ province-by-province results, one can see re-affirmed Golkar’s strength off-Java.[36] The only province on Java the party has consistently done well in is West Java. Seven of the off-Java provinces showed Golkar’s results at 30% or better. The situation was similar in 1999. By province, though, Golkar still saw some big drops. In eight of the off-Java provinces, Golkar saw drops of nine points or more. One drop was as high as 26 points.

PDI-P scores the worst in the most heavily Muslim areas of the country. In West Sumatra, Aceh, and South Sulawesi, PDI-P finished second from last, “underscored” among the big parties only by the heavily Java-based PKB. PDI-P was below 10% in eleven of the off-Java provinces. Java is a stronghold for the party, particularly populous East and Central Java. But, the party experienced at least a ten-point drop in all the provinces of Java from 1999 to 2004 (this ranged from 9.5% in Yogyakarta to as high as 25% in Jakarta). PDI-P experienced a drop of nine points or more in eighteen of Indonesia’s provinces. The party’s drops in the provinces of Sumatra[37] are particularly noteworthy. Perhaps in future, if the party is to rebound, it will need to rely even more heavily on support on Java or build a more national basis.

If PDI-P were to rely on a Java stronghold, it would have to share that position currently with the PKB. Like PDI-P, PKB is strongest on Java, particularly East and Central Java. The party was down in 2004 across Java, five points in its East Java stronghold. PKB attempted to attract non-Muslim candidates to run in areas of different religious complexion from the PKB’s NU home base. This strategy experienced limited success in helping the party to move off-Java.

Support for the Muslim-based PPP is the mirror image of support for PDI-P. PPP areas of strength include strongly Muslim West Sumatra and Aceh. Ironically, though, PPP suffered one of its largest declines in Aceh, along with Jakarta. The party performed at its national par in West and Central Java. Clear strongholds for the PPP are difficult to see.

It is too early to speak of particular areas of geographic support for Partai Demokrat, this was the party’s first set of elections. It is unclear if Demokrat will be able to hold any of the areas in which it scored well in 2004 next time around. Still, areas of Demokrat strength do suggest that the party did well with urban, better educated, higher income voters and minorities. The party is also to have done well in areas near TNI bases, though without SBY, it is unclear that the party itself could hold these areas.[38]

Like Demokrat, PKS did well in areas with urban, educated, higher income voters. In Jakarta, the party was up 17 points from 1999 to 2004, winning the capital outright with 22% of the vote. Like PPP, PKS did well in more staunchly Muslim areas such as Aceh, W. Sumatra, S. Kalimantan, West Java, and Banten.

PAN clearly has a home base in Amien Rais’ Yogyakarta, but with Amien’s stepping down from his leadership of the party in 2004, it is not clear that the party will be able to hold the area. PAN did well in Aceh, as in 1999, but experienced a five point drop from five years ago, apparently losing votes to PKS. PAN was down by ten points in Jakarta from 1999, again losing votes clearly to both PKS and Demokrat. Anecdotal evidence suggests PAN’s machinating politics and feeding at the trough of power over the past five years with little to show for it hurt the party in 2004.

Opinion polls back up what we can observe from the election results above. Voters in rural areas, those with less education and lower incomes tend to vote for Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, and PKB. In contrast, those in urban areas, with more education and higher incomes tended to vote Demokrat, PKS, or PAN in 2004.[39] So in terms of both geography Java/off-Java and particular provinces, as well as socio-economic characteristics, the parties do indeed have different complexions.

Rooted parties are chosen by voters consistently from year to year and election to election. Polling already in 2003 suggested that the parties were not strongly rooted and that large numbers of “swing voters” were up for grabs in 2004. In mid-2003, 58% of respondents to the Asia Foundation poll were unsure what party they would support in the upcoming parliamentary elections.[40] This did not suggest that voters would behave with a great deal of loyalty from 1999. In fact, 66% of those in the Asia Foundation poll could not (or would not) identify any differences among the parties.[41]

The table below, Table 9, shows self-reported voting in 1999 and 2004 as revealed in an LP3ES April 2004 exit poll. High levels of non-response mean the table cannot be taken to represent accurately the national picture. Still, the results are highly suggestive, and they represent among the best information we have on consistency of voting from 1999 to 2004.

Table 9: Consistency in Party Vote: 1999 to 2004

Notes: * Party acronyms PPP=Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Demokrat=Partai Demokrat, PAN=Partai Amanat Nasional, PKB=Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKS=Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PDIP=Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Golkar=Partai Golongan Karya, PK=Partai Keadilan, PBB=Partai Bulan Bintang. **1999’s PK is now PKS.

Source: Table reorganized from LP3ES exit poll conducted at 1,603 polling stations on parliamentary election day, April 5, 2004. N=6,155. See LP3ES, “Pemilih PDIP Beralih ke Partai Demokrat, Suara PPP dan PAN Bocor ke PKS,” April 7, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.lp3es.or.id [accessed March 2, 2005].

Figures in bold show the share of a party’s voters which remained with the same party from 1999 to 2004. PKS voters were most loyal, followed by voters for PKB. Strikingly, only 36% of self-reported PDI-P voters volunteered that they stuck with the party in 2004.

Table 10 reports polling results after the April 2004 parliamentary elections and links party voters in the parliamentary elections with candidates for the presidential election which would be held in July. As with voters supporting the same party from year to year, in systems in which the parties have stable roots in society, we would expect to see voters choose a party and a presidential candidate from the same party in simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) elections.

The results shown in Table 10 belie this idea in the case of Indonesia. The bold figures show party voters who planned to stick with the party’s presidential candidate in the first round of the presidential elections. The “loyalty rate” was highest for Demokrat voters (87%); this is intuitively understandable. Since Demokrat was set up as a vehicle for Yudhoyono, it would make sense that voters that chose the party intended to choose SBY as their presidential candidate of choice. Amien Rais was to hold 71% of PAN voters, but interestingly, 14% of PAN votes, too, were going to go to SBY. Megawati kept almost 60% of PDI-P voters, but a significant 22% planned to vote SBY in the presidential race after choosing PDI-P for parliament. More Golkar voters chose SBY than planned to choose the party’s own candidate, Wiranto (39.1%-38.4%). With PPP voters, too SBY was more popular than party leader and then vice president Hamzah Haz (39.4% for SBY with just 26.3% sticking with Hamzah). The table makes two interesting points. First, a glance at the table would predict an election victory for SBY. Second, voters were not solid behind parties and their respective presidential candidates, reflecting weak rooting in the population. This is typical of weakly institutionalized party systems. It is interesting to wonder whether the SBY/savior phenomenon contributed to this weakness or whether the weakness contributed to the rise of the SBY phenomenon.

Legitimacy

Acceptance of the system of parties and elections is key to the institutionalization of the party system. If the parties or the electoral system, for example, are not widely considered legitimate by the population, instability can be expected. Legitimacy, though, is probably also a result of the institutionalization of the party system. Long-lived, stable systems that are regularly able to deliver governing solutions are much more likely to be accepted by citizens and thus considered legitimate.

In Indonesia, the picture of the legitimacy of parties and elections is extremely muddled. Polls since 1998 have repeatedly found parties as among the least trusted social/political institutions. In this vein, an LP3ES poll conducted in early 2004 found that respondents felt the parties to be out of touch and self-seeking.[42] A mid-2004 urban poll conducted under the aegis of global corruption watchdog Transparency International found Indonesians wary of the nation’s political parties. Of a variety of institutions, including the military, the media, business, the customs service, the police, and the judiciary, the political parties and the legislature come out with the worst corruption perception rating at 4.4 (on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being not at all corrupt and 5 being extremely corrupt).[43]

Further, the large vote for SBY in the presidential polls can be seen as an anti-“established party” protest vote. The horse-trading (cow trading, dagang sapi, in Indonesian parlance) that parties engage in, the corruption, the lack of attention to or ability to solve the nation’s most pressing problems all seem to weigh down popular sentiments toward the country’s political parties. Anecdotal evidence with July 2004 SBY voters suggests that they cast their vote consciously as a vote against more of the same. The parliamentary election results with large drops for the major parties, particularly the PDI-P of then-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, and the rise of new powers, such as Partai Demokrat and PKS, also seem to demonstrate popular dissatisfaction with politics as usual, and the parties are a big part of that.

Widespread antipathy toward the parties is echoed in and reinforced by comments by public intellectuals on the subject of the parties. A selection of typical views follows. Be mindful that this section could run on for pages, as expressing antipathy for the parties and politicians is the norm in the Indonesian public square. Arbi Sanit, a political scientist at the University of Indonesia, observes that the “[p]arties have failed to carry out their duty and function in a quality manner.” The leaders are oriented toward their own ends “as a result of [their] egoism.” The party leaders “do not have developed abilities as statesmen, politicians, and technocrats.” According to Arbi, the party politicians use the cheap and easy way to motivate their followers, playing on values and primordial ties.[44] After a litany of complaints against the parties, Arbi closes by saying that the parties have failed to make themselves institutions of political reform: “the performance of the parties has been really disappointing to society at large.”[45]

Abd Rohim Ghazali, the author of the quotation at the outset of the paper, seconds many of Arbi’s sentiments. As shown by the 2004 parliamentary elections, the parties, rather than channeling the people’s aspirations, have become “the stage for the betrayal of the people’s aspirations.” According to him, the parties are just a “Trojan horse” to get the party elites into power.[46] Another cynical view comes from Frans Magnus Suseno, from the Driyarkara School of Philosophy. “Though there is the perception that all of the 24 parties [running in the parliamentary elections] are bad, pick the one that is the best of the worst!”[47] That seems to be Frans’ backhanded means of encouraging people to use their right to vote despite the pathetic offerings.

Frans’ comment leads us from attitudes toward the parties to attitudes toward the elections. Intuitively, we can see how perceptions of these two institutions would be linked. While intellectually it seems possible that the elections could be run perfectly and praised by the population, even while extremely negative views of the parties were maintained, in practice this seems unlikely, though more research is needed in this area. In Indonesia’s case, despite fears that election turnout is declining and innumerable complaints about the election-organizing KPU, polls continue to find the elections rated extremely highly.

Turnout has historically been high in Indonesian elections. During the Suharto years, voting was compulsory and averaged almost 92% across the six New Order elections. Turnout in 1999, at 93%, was typical of New Order elections and high even by the standards of many “euphoric” first-democratic elections. Turnout across the three elections in 2004 declined continuously. Turnout for the parliamentary elections in April was 84%. For the first round of the presidential elections in July, turnout was 78%. For the final round of the presidential polls in September, turnout was just 75%.[48] Many explanations may be offered for the declining turnout: the confusing ballot[49] and inadequate socialization of the new voting system[50] for the April parliamentary elections; people feeling free not to vote; fatigue with the seemingly incessant elections of 2004; the relative certainty that SBY would win the second round presidential contest, as demonstrated by opinion polling before Hari-H (Indonesian D-Day, used to refer to polling day); and the last, lack of feeling of efficacy on the part of voters. It is this last sentiment that would be most important to know. Did voters not turn out to vote because they felt unable to influence the system? Did they believe the machinating party politicians could not be brought to heel by ordinary voters? Did the high number of spoiled ballots in the 2004 parliamentary polls suggest disgust at the party offerings or confusion over the new voting system? These are, at this time, still unknowns. Rises in these types of sentiments, though, would be ill harbingers for institutionalization of the party system and, potentially, political stability.

Despite declining turnout, public perception of the elections was generally quite positive, as demonstrated through opinion polling.[51] That the elections were very or somewhat well organized was agreed to by 90% of respondents after the first round of the presidential contest and 96% after the second round. Were the elections fair? After the second round of the presidential contest, when, assuming all three elections were in respondents’ minds, 97% considered the elections mostly or completely fair. Respondents also found the KPU, on balance, fair with 85% agreeing and only 10% disagreeing. Eighty-nine percent of respondents felt that the election monitoring organization Panwaslu was effective at supervision of the polls; just 7% disagreed. I found this latter figure important. Election rules were not well enforced in 1999. In 2004, election oversight seems to have improved.

In addition to viewing attitudes toward parties and elections, we may look to the embeddedness of the political parties in the current political system to attempt to see recognition of the legitimacy of their role. This cuts two ways, however. When completing my Ph.D. dissertation (2002) on this topic, I saw embeddedness as an unmitigated positive for institutionalization. Now, I am not so sure. Now, I believe we must look at embeddedness in conjunction with attitudes toward legitimacy, and here is why. Parties that are strongly embedded in the political system without being viewed as legitimate, as was the case up to 2004, seems to me actually a recipe for dissatisfaction. It is this dissatisfaction that could lead to alienation from the democratic system and potential instability.

The parties were strongly embedded in Indonesia’s post-Suharto system of government. Changes to the laws on political parties and elections, including the direct election of the president, and the creation of the new notionally party-less Regional Representatives Council (DPD) as a house of parliament have changed the situation slightly. In keeping with popular attitudes toward the parties—that party representatives in parliament were seen as just that, party representatives and not people’s representatives--Indonesia’s electoral law was revised from a closed to an open-list proportional representation system. The open-list feature would allow voters to choose both a party and a candidate in order, notionally, to foil the parties’ strangleholds on the party lists. Despite this institutional innovation, few (I have heard that only 2) candidates were elected via this open-list feature (which would require a single candidate to obtain a proportional representation “quota” of votes on his or her own to trump the list). Similarly, estimates suggest that only 50% of voters took advantage of the new feature, the rest voting as they had always done, choosing just a party symbol, leaving the parties and the party lists in charge of who actually enters parliament. [52]

The creation of the DPD, or Regional Representatives Council, was also seen as a blow against the parties. For these first elections for the new body, candidates could not have held a party post from May 2003 to the time of election (April 2004). Future elections will require that candidates have held no party post for the past four years. Still, it is not written into the law that the parties cannot support candidates of their choice. West Java DPD representative Ginandjar Kartasasmita, who went on to become chair of the DPD, is a long-time Golkar politician who made his name as head of the National Planning Body, Bappenas, during the Suharto years. This party-less body is also of uncertain authority (it remains to be seen what authority the body will carve for itself) and is currently assuredly less powerful than the party-dominated DPR.

The parties were the ones drafting the new laws, and they saw to it that their position of monopoly was maintained. Only parties could contest elections, not individuals or other organizations. Likewise, the parties made it harder to qualify as a party, thus explaining in large part the drop in number of parties contesting the elections from 1999 to 2004. In fairness, this likewise fit with popular attitudes that there were just too many parties and some were not “real” parties, but this flew in the face of the idea that in a free system anyone should be able to organize and stand for election. According to the new criteria, parties needed 2% of seats in the existing DPR, 3% of regional parliament seats (DPRD) in half of all provinces, or 3% of seats in regency or municipal-level councils (DPRD II) in half of all the country’s regencies and cities to qualify to take part automatically in the elections. Parties not fulfilling the criteria could merge with an existing party or attempt to create a new party meeting the criteria. New parties needed executive committees and permanent offices in two-thirds of the provinces and two-thirds of the regencies/cities in those provinces and 1,000 party members (or 1/1000^th of the population, whichever is smaller) in each regency/city where the party is organized.

In addition to the tighter strictures on qualification of parties to take part in the elections, parties were also the only organizations allowed to propose candidates in Indonesia’s new direct presidential elections. Only those with 3% of the seats in the DPR or 5% of the vote in parliamentary elections were allowed to put forth a presidential-vice presidential candidate pairing. This is set to rise to 15% of the seats or 20% of the votes in 2009, likely forcing coalition formation between parties before the elections since, for example, this past election, only two parties would have passed this threshold on their own performance.

Stable Rules and Structures

This last criterion is the most “organizational.” In order to be considered institutionalized, parties need to have developed their capacities as political organizations. First, party organizations should be relatively independent: having sufficient and regular funding, free of the dictates of any sponsoring organization, and not personalistic. Secondly, parties should be internally disciplined. They should have the capacity to vote as a bloc in legislative bodies. They should also be relatively free of faction. Parties should also control processes of candidate selection. Lastly, parties should be routinized, that is, regularized as organizations. The parties should have system-ness, or internal integration, and they should be territorially comprehensive.

It is this criterion that provides much concern about Indonesia’s political parties. It is also this criterion about which concrete information at the micro-level is least known. Observers have noted that party organizations wither in the absence of election; this, of course, suggests a lack of stable structures and thus a lack of institutionalization.

Understanding of party funding is also rudimentary, though slightly more transparent than 1999. Audits were required of party funding in 1999, but these were not made public (the parties were in control of the election commission which set the rules on these matters back then). In 2004, we have somewhat improved information on funding generally. Transparency International Indonesia (TII), though, estimated that the Round I presidential candidates under-reported their actual spending by US$31 million. The organization came to this estimate from observing spending out in the regions and comparing this with candidates’ claimed spending as revealed in publicly available information. TII’s finding suggests that, though more information may now be public, it may not provide a very reliable guide to party/candidate funding. We can say that funds tend to come from large donors rather than numerous small contributions. If these large donors can be counted on to provide regular funding, the parties may be able to secure their organizational bases. If not, then not.

One of the great stories of the 2004 elections was PKS’ turning of its clean and orderly image into dramatic gains. Less well understood is the role PKS’ dramatically different organization plays in the party’s success. The party is apparently the only one in Indonesia with the ability to collect regular dues from its members. PKS is hierarchically organized and ideological, rather than personalistic. The party has “systematic and methodical cadreization process.”[53] It also makes good use of information technology from the national to the local level, not just to inform members but also to allow them to coordinate among themselves. Ironically, this Muslim party is the most “party-looking” party. Clearly, though, PKS is the exception that proves the rule. Examination of the criteria for stable rules and structures demonstrates that Indonesia’s parties continue to experience numerous organizational weaknesses.

As an example, the PKB is the electoral vehicle of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization. Does this make the party overly dependent on its sponsoring organization? One way to conceive of this is to wonder what would happen if NU chose another political party to support, would PKB die? The answer is most probably it would (depending on the actions of the wily Abdurrahman Wahid, but that raises questions of personalism, another organizational weakness).

The personalism of Indonesia’s parties is the most remarked upon organizational concern. Because parties have the ability to manipulate voter sentiments through charismatic leaders, it actually does not make sense to invest heavily in organizational building. For this reason, aside from the PKS exception, most parties are “rational” and rely on “irrationality,” thus resulting in weaker organizations.

The first-ever direct presidential election brought the issue of personalism glaringly to the fore. One Indonesian observer noted that Indonesia’s “media-democracy was leaving political parties at the margin of political activity.”[54] What was the Partai Demokrat except an electoral vehicle for the presidential ambitions of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono? This does not mean that Demokrat cannot become a more substantial organization; it just suggests that as of now, the party is still mysterious, even to many who voted for it. In addition, other bodies seem to compete with the party for the president’s attention, demonstrating another organizational weakness.

Demokrat was not alone, though. The nature of the entire campaign from parliamentary to presidential elections was highly personalistic. Both the parliamentary and presidential campaigns were largely focused on the parties’ respective presidentiables (to borrow a term from the Philippines), in addition to an array of stars from the worlds of television, movies, and music. Rallies tended to feature candidates singing songs and two presidential candidates even appeared on the local version of American Idol. According to Andi Mallarangeng, now spokesman for SBY, the personalistic nature of the campaign suggested that "[p]olitical leaders don't think people are smart enough or rational enough to look at the issues."[55] Issues were treated only vaguely in the campaign. Candidates were big on identifying the nation’s problems: unemployment and corruption, for example, but were much weaker on how these problems would be overcome.

Presidential campaigns were run by “success teams” or were headed out of organizations known as the Mega Center and the Amien Rais Center, for example. Figures from the respective candidates’ parties were brought into these presidential election efforts, but so were people from outside: non-party figures and academics. Megawati’s success team was half PDI-P figures and half NU, the mass Muslim organization from which her running mate Hasyim Muzadi originated.[56] In this way, organizations like the NU were as important to the election effort as the political parties were. Reportedly, SBY’s choice of Jusuf Kalla as his vice presidential running mate was the candidate’s “prerogative.”[57] The Democrat Party was not involved and only ratified SBY’s decision after the fact. Further, according to Tempo magazine, some of the SBY-linked groups around the capital have offices more resplendent than those of the Demokrat party.[58]

Ubiquitous in the campaign was the “candidate book”, again focusing attention on the candidate and often his or her personal characteristics rather than the candidate’s party and its agenda. One can learn a great deal about marketing in Indonesia from reading these books, at least what the success teams thought would best market their candidates. In Wiranto’s Witness in the Storm,[59] the former general sought to get out his side of the story about his role in the events that had shaken Indonesia over the previous six years. Rather than as an indicted war criminal, Wiranto portrayed himself as a man who had acted in perilous times always with an eye to protecting the nation. He restrained himself and the military from taking power at several junctures and allowed Indonesia’s transition to proceed in a constitutional manner.

Pairings of presidential and vice presidential candidates were made on a complex calculus not just of party affiliation but also of salability, region, and religiosity. A particular feature of the pairings seems to have been to have the vice presidential candidate make up for a perceived weakness in the presidential candidates. SBY’s political/security background was paired with Jusuf Kalla’s business (though the president has just completed a Ph.D. in agricultural economics). Wiranto’s perceived weakness on human rights was paired with Salahudin Wahid’s Deputy Chairmanship of the National Human Rights Commission. For more information on the presidential-vice presidential pairings, readers are invited to take a look at Appendix II.

Campaign commercials tended to be simple, none more so than the PDI-P’s telling voters to “punch the white snout” (coblos moncong putih) referencing the party’s symbol, the wild bull of Java. Amien Rais’ campaign told voters to “choose the one that’s clean” (“pilih yang bersih”). Giving a campaign speech one day, Megawati told the voters there was no need to be confused about which presidential candidate to select, “Just pick the prettiest,” she said (she was the only female in the race). The incumbent president’s campaign focused on reacquainting herself with voters and trying to convince them that she and her government had been working hard and that reformasi had not failed under her watch. The Mega-Hasyim team, further, had “five [general] recommendations” to guide them into the future.

IFES’ tracking surveys also showed that voters’ choice of presidential candidate was based on personality (39%) or personality and policy (34%) more so than on policy alone (just 26%).[60] The virtues cited in victor SBY, that he was polite, calm, firm, and a man of integrity are virtues of personality, not virtues of policy as well.

Critical readers should be saying that much sounds familiar of this portrayal of Indonesia’s presidential elections from the experience of presidential races in the United States. Indeed, US candidates run their own campaigns and are supported by the party organizations. Often, voters identify more so with personal characteristics and broad values promoted by the candidates than with specific solutions peddled to specific policy problems. So, why is this a problem? At least one scholar would say this is no accident. Well meaning organizations such as the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute with their party training programs and IFES with its polling are exporting the American campaign model (which, of course is very personalistic and media-heavy) to Indonesia.[61] Well, US parties are extremely weak, despite their long-livedness. Indonesia, though, may not be able to afford decades of party dithering. Failure to deliver stable governance could lead to revolutionary change. Already we have seen, in the presidential elections of 2004, voters turn to a savior figure. Thankfully, to this point, SBY does not seem inclined to destroy the parties. He has been very moderate in using his political mandate, in keeping with his cautious nature.

One important indicator of the degree to which 2004 was a series of contests about personality rather than party was the failure of the parties to deliver their voters to their respective presidential candidates. As Indra J. Piliang of the Center for Strategic and International Studies observed, a “political rebellion took place at the grassroots level.”[62] Voters chose for themselves who would be the most apt presidential candidate, taking few cues from party organizations or other bodies. Megawati Sukarnoputri’s marriage of her own PDI-P with the multi-million member Nahdlatul Ulama’s Hasyim Muzadi made mathematical sense, if one believed that voters would follow party and organization cues about how to vote. Clearly, though, voters did not. Wiranto’s vote total did not match Golkar’s around the nation, and he should have picked up PKB votes because of the official alliance between the two parties as well. This must have been especially trying for party leaders as Golkar and PKB had with much fanfare announced a union of “visions, missions, and programs” between the two parties, all to little effect.[63] SBY’s vote wildly outperformed Partai Demokrat’s performance. This was discussed above, in conjunction with Table 10. The former general was a first or second-choice favorite of voters from a wide variety of political parties. PKS, as much as its solid organization is touted, was torn between support for Amien Rais, a natural aliran/stream ally, or Golkar’s Wiranto.

As far as internal discipline is concerned, the parties are obviously strongly divided. Between 1999 and 2004, most of the major parties experienced significant splinters. True believers in reform and democracy have shown signs of splitting away from Megawati’s iron grasp on PDI-P. In 2004, PDI-P competed against Eros Djarot’s Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (PNBK). Another splinter, Dimyati Hartono’s Partai Indonesia Tanah Air (PITA) did not qualify to compete in the 2004 polls. Megawati’s stranglehold on the party and perceived failures as president and as campaigner have already begun to draw attacks from important PDI-P figures. Arifin Panigoro, Roy B.B. Janis, Guruh Sukarnoputra, Laksamana Sukardi, Kwik Kian Gie, Sophan Sophiaan, and others have planned a challenge to Megawati’s prerogatives in the management of party affairs and perhaps even her chairmanship at the March 28, 2004 PDI-P congress; the rebels claim they want to bring “democracy” to the party.[64]

Golkar, too, had splinter parties competing against it in 2004, though, as with PDI-P’s splinters, the parties were unable to steal many votes. The Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB), led by General Hartono and promoting Suharto’s daughter Tutut as its presidential candidate, put forth the idea that it was the “true” Golkar able to deliver the stability and prosperity of the Suharto years. Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI) was an earlier splinter that survived to fight again in 2004, under a slightly changed name. Within the party, Golkar was evidently unable to unify behind the party’s presidential candidate, chosen in Indonesia’s first-ever candidate nominating convention, General Wiranto. Party regional leaders continued to maintain relationships with Jusuf Kalla, who would run with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, even before the second round of the presidential election was done (when notionally the party was to support Nationhood Coalition ally Megawati Sukarnoputri). The Golkar Party Reform Forum (Forum Pembaharuan Partai Golkar), which grouped SBY-leaning party figures, was particularly open and clear evidence of faction. Attempts to discipline rogue figures and teach party cadres a “lesson” (according to Agung Laksono) were unsuccessful.[65] Kalla went on to capture the party and SBY supporters within the party were rewarded. Rebels such as Fahmi Idris found themselves members of the new president’s cabinet (Fahmi became Minister of Manpower and Transmigration).

As with PDI-P and Golkar, other parties were split as well. The NU-linked Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, was notionally signed up to support Golkar presidential candidate Wiranto. Clearly, though, many of the party’s voters chose otherwise, with many supporting the Mega-Hasyim team (Hasyim was the former executive head of the NU) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. One prominent figure that did not follow the notional party line was PKB Secretary-General Syaifulloh Yusuf. He lost his job in the PKB for his boldness in going against the party line. He was rewarded with the ministership for development of disadvantaged regions in SBY’s government. Abdurrahman Wahid, too, surreptitiously supported SBY in the second round of the elections despite the PKB’s crafting of a supposedly long-term alliance with Golkar.

The United Development Party (PPP) competed against its splinter the Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR) in 2004. The PPP dropped several points in 2004 from its 1999 results. As Table 10 strongly suggested, many PPP voters did not intend to support the party’s notional presidential candidate, party head and then-incumbent vice president Hamzah Haz. Hamzah finished round one of the presidential race with just 3% of the vote compared to PPP’s 8% in the parliamentary elections. In March 2005, Hamzah went on to expel a number of prominent leaders from the party—including deputy chairmen Zarkasih Nur, Suryadharma Ali, and Andi Ghalib, suggesting further unrest in the ranks.

Despite factions and splits, though, generally the parties are derided as overly centralized (thus making them strong in this criterion). The parties have recovered the right to recall misbehaving representatives in legislative bodies, contributing to generally strong party control and discipline in the legislature. However, as regular observers of Indonesian politics are aware, there have been glaring examples of party officials, particularly in the regions, failing to support party candidates for leadership positions. According to Nankyung Choi, “[l]ocal elections during the past several years have shown that in many cases, even candidates of the largest party . . . have failed to win elections. This was often because representatives of the party failed to follow the official party line and presumably sold their votes to rival candidates. In other cases, elections were lost because of bitter internal fragmentation following rumors or suspicions about ‘money politics’ involving some members.”[66] We have seen this phenomenon again following the 2004 elections where in the choice of head of the Jakarta provincial assembly, Golkar candidate Ade Surapriyatna won, despite the notional numerical superiority of allies PKS, Demokrat, and PAN.[67]

However, the centralization of Indonesia’s parties tends to contribute to the parties’ incapacity. Because all decisions must be taken by the party chair, other arms of the organization wither. Because important decisions on candidates and alliances are made at the center, of what use are local level organizations except as vote mobilizers come election time? Some scholars see over-centralization also as a factor in the parties’ failures to contribute to the country’s democratization. The party centers, making their machinations for reasons known only to those at the center, cannot react to the situation on the ground. This seems to me a solid explanation for the established parties’ decline in 2004 and the rise of new political parties.

Parties have strong control over processes of candidate selection, at least for the more powerful DPR. Though the open-list proportional system was instated in 2004, which would notionally allow voters to move their favorite candidates into a position to be elected against the rankings given to those candidates by the party centers, probably less than half of voters took advantage of this feature and few candidates were elected in this way. One who was, Hidayat Nur Wahid in Jakarta, was at the top of his party’s list and so would have been elected anyway based on the party’s stunning performance in the capital.

Last, let’s consider routinization of the parties. This factor attempts to capture the parties’ regularization of processes, internal systematization, and territorial comprehensiveness. All these things, if found, suggest increasing institutionalization to the party system. Here, information falls short. This requires a great deal of on-the-ground data collection from the parties, and I have not been in a position to do so since conducting my dissertation research in 2000.

Still, we can draw some preliminary conclusions. There is a vast difference in capacity between the big parties and the smaller ones (PKS now counts as a big, not a small, party). Beyond these top parties which get the lions’ share of donations, votes, and legislative seats, resources are scarce and parties are organizationally weak. One exception might be Sjahrir’s Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru which seems determined to take a slow, long-term view to grabbing power in Indonesia. The party intends to use its highly educated party members to build solid structures, to build dedicated cadres, and to build organizations with a view to the future. We shall see.

Conclusion: Implications for Indonesian Democracy

Scholars Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully pointed to the level of party system institutionalization as the key difference between developed and developing country politics. In the Latin American systems the authors studied, low levels of institutionalization of the party system were accompanied by low levels of accountability and unstable governance. I have used the authors’ framework in a different, Asian, context, and in a situation of recent transition from authoritarian rule. I view the party system institutionalization framework not as the be-all-end-all of analysis of Indonesian politics but instead as a lens which highlights important areas in considering Indonesia’s democratization.

On balance, through the 2004 year of elections, I find that Indonesia’s party system has deinstitutionalized slightly—but with a silver lining. In the realm of inter-party competition, we see a declining share of the vote to the established political parties and a rise in the effective number of parties in the system. Volatility at more than 28 is high, but on par with other countries in transition. The PDI-P’s large swing downward explains a great deal of the volatility in the system. In 2004, rules of campaigning were broken wildly, suggesting a lack of decorum in the parties’ inter-relationships, but that these rules brought down sanctions in contrast to 1999’s utter rule-lessness could be seen as a strong positive.

Examining the parties’ province-by-province performance shows the large swings the parties experienced in support from 1999 to 2004. Parties do seem to have established on-Java or off-Java support bases. In addition, there seems to be a firm split between parties of the urban, educated, and relatively wealthy (Demokrat and PKS), in contrast to parties of the rural, less educated, and relatively poor (Golkar, PDI-P, PKB). This is only the bare bones of rootedness, though. Parties were unable to deliver their parties’ parliamentary voters to particular presidential candidates, nor were they able to hold them unambiguously from 1999; these would be two markers of greater rootedness of the parties in the population.

The parties are widely seen as corrupt and self-seeking; this is affected and reinforced by public intellectuals’ commentary on the party system. The decline in turnout through 2004 (84%, 78%, 75% in the three elections) might also speak to voters’ declining sense of efficacy. Instead, the declining turnout might be seen as acceptance of a foregone conclusion (SBY was going to win, and polls demonstrated this in advance), so voters behaved rationally accordingly. The parties are strongly embedded in the system as shown in the revision of the laws on parties (making qualifying as a party more difficult) and the new law on presidential elections (only parties of a certain size can nominate). Attempts to minimize the parties’ centers’ power by implementing an open-list form of proportional representation had minimal impact. The new party-less Regional Representatives Council is also no match for the party-dominated DPR. The vote in 2004, though, should be seen as a vote against politics as usual. The upturn in vote for PKS and the new Partai Demokrat as well as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s victory in the presidential race were indications of a desire for change and thus a lack of legitimacy for existing ways of doing business.

Lastly, the parties’ rules and structures are weak. Personalistic parties still dominate the political system, nowhere better demonstrated than in SBY’s and Demokrat’s triumph. Parties have behaved rationally in betting on the electorate’s irrationality. Why build structures when personalism can work just as effectively (and much more cheaply)? The parties experienced splits in the 1999-2004 interval, and, while there is discipline in the legislature enforced by the right of recall, the parties were unable to deliver their voters to the presidential candidates of their choice.

Olle Tornquist, respected observer of Indonesian politics, and associates finished a massive survey project regarding democracy in Indonesia going in to 2004. The report concludes that democracy has failed to be implanted in Indonesia and that Indonesians are highly dissatisfied with their current system. “The crafting of supposedly ‘good’ institutions has not delivered.” The report takes swipes at the formalistic nature of Indonesia’s democracy, the lack of participation, the corruption, and the weak rule of law. Representation, according to the report’s authors is “defunct.”[68]

A key criticism I have offered of Indonesia’s democratization in previous writings has been the weakness of accountability in the present system. With a president coming to power on the back of a grand coalition, who is to be held responsible, in the end, for policy successes and failures? With a legislature that disdains voting, shepherding its business through the consensus of faction leaders, where, too, is accountability? The key lesson of 2004 is that the anvil of accountability did indeed come crashing down, and this is the silver lining for those hoping for democratic consolidation in Indonesia. According to Thamrin Amal Tomagola of the University of Indonesia, "[f]rom now on, leaders will have to reckon with the people."[69] Indeed, Golkar and PDI-P have little to relish in their parliamentary “triumphs.” Movements have stirred in both parties to try to react to the popular verdict. SBY was elected as a non-partisan savior, but he has not acted as a De Gaulle or a Yeltsin, a party destroyer. While we can expect to see shifts in levels of support for the parties in future, the people cannot be written out of the equation, and that is the best news of all.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Online Media and Information Sources

Amien Rais Center http://m-amienrais.com (no longer active)

Antara News Agency

Australian Broadcasting Corporation-Asia News http://www.goasiapacific.com

BlogPemilu2004 http://pemilu2004.goblogmedia.com/

Center for Electoral Reform http://www.cetro.or.id/

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Far Eastern Economic Review http://www.feer.com (since re-launched as new periodical)

Habibie Center http://www.habibiecenter.or.id/

Indonesia House http://www.indonesia-house.org

International Foundation for Election Systems http://www.ifes.org

Jakarta Post http://www.thejakartapost.com

Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial http://www.lp3es.or.id

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Ananta, Aris, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Leo Suryadinata, Indonesian Electoral Behavior: A Statistical Perspective. Singapore: ISEAS, 2004.

Asia Foundation. Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate 2003. Jakarta: Asia Foundation, 2003.

Choi, Nankyung, “Local Elections and Party Politics in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: A View from Yogyakarta,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, August 2004, 280-301.

Dhakidae, Daniel et. al. eds. Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum 1999-2004, Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2004.

Furkon, Aay Muhammad, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer, Jakarta: Teraju, 2004.

Haris, Syamsuddin, “Pemilu 2004: Peluang Konsolidasi Demokrasi atau Perangkap ‘Status Quo’ Politik?” Jurnal Ilmu Politik, “April 2003, 3-27.

Hisyam, Usamah et. al. SBY: Sang Kandidat, special edition of Magazine MO, 2004.

Irsyam, Mahrus and Lili Romli, eds. Menggugat Partai Politik, Jakarta: Laboratorium Ilmu Politik, Fackultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Indonesia, 2003.

Koirudin, Profil Pemilu 2004: Evaluasi Pelaksanaan, Hasil dan Perubahan Peta Politik Nasional Pasca Pemilu Legislatif 2004, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004.

Kompas, Siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik Seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004, Jakarta: Penerbt Buku Kompas, 2004.

KPU, “Visi, Misi dan Program Pasangan Calon President dan Wakil Presiden,” Undated.

Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996.

Mainwaring, Scott. "Party Systems in the Third Wave," Journal of Democracy, 9, 3, 1998, 67-81.

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Norden, Deborah L. “Party Relations and Democracy in Latin America,” Party Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1998), 423-443.

O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Omar, Irwan and Muhammad Najib. Mohammed Amien Rais: Putra Nusantara, Singapore: Stamford Press Pointe, undated.

Reso, Panembahan. Megawati Harus Tetap Jadi Presiden: 62 Alasan Kenapa Kita Harus Tetap Memilih Megawati. Jakarta: MM Corp., 2004.

Sebastian, Leonard C. “The Paradox of Indonesian Democracy.” Contemporary Southeast Asia. August 2004, 256-279.

Setiawan, Bambang and Bestian Nainggolan. Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009. Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2004.

Slater, Dan. “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition,” Unpublished manuscript, July 29, 2004.

Sukardi, Wina Armada, ed. Megawati Menjawab: Wawancara Ekslusif Harian Merdeka. Jakarta: PT Pers Indonesia Merdeka, 2004.

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Parties Contesting the 2004 Parliamentary Elections: Basic Information

Party (Official Abbreviation)	Basis	Stream	Date of Founding (Previous Name)	Leader/Prominent Figure(s)	Affiliated With?	Verification in Number of Provinces	Seats 2004 National DPR
Partai Nasional Indonesia-Marhaenisme (PNI Marhaenisme)	Sukarno’s Teaching of Marhaenism	Nationalist	May 2002	Sukmawati Sukarnputri		24	1
Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (PBSD)	Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution	Nationalist-Workers	1998 (Partai Buruh Nasional)	Mukhtar Pakpahan	Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Indonesian Prosperous Workers’ Union)	22	0
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)	Islam	Islam-Modernist	July 1998	Yusril Ihza Mahendra	Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia	(passed in to 2004 elections due to having passed threshold in 1999)	11
Partai Merdeka (Merdeka)	Pancasila	Nationalist (with a hint of Islam)	October 2002	Adi Sasono	NGO network	22	0
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	Islam	Islam	January 1973	Hamzah Haz		(passed in to 2004 elections due to having passed threshold in 1999)	58
Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)	Pancasila	Nationalist	July 2002	Ryaas Rasyid, Andi Mallarangeng (since departed)		23	5
Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (PIB)	Justice, Democracy, and Prosperity	Nationalist	September 2002	Sjahrir		22	0
Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (PNBK)	Sukarno’s Teaching of Marhaenism	Nationalist	July 2002	Eros Djarot Haryanto Taslam	Split from PDI-P by frustrated reformers/democrats	21	1
Partai Demokrat (Demokrat)	Pancasila	Nationalist	September 2001	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Some prominent former Golkar figures involved	25	57
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI)	Pancasila	Nationalist	1998 (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan)	Edi Sudrajat	Split from Golkar before 1999 elections	23	1
Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (PPDI)	Pancasila	Nationalist	January 2003	Dimmy Haryanto	Split from PDI-P	21	1
Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (PNUI)	Islam	Islam-Traditional	1998 (Partai Nahdlatul Ummat)	Syukron Ma’mun	Nahdlatul Ulama	22	0
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	Pancasila	Islam-Nationalist	August 1998	Amien Rais AM Fatwa		(passed in to 2004 elections due to having passed threshold in 1999)	52
Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB)	Pancasila	Nationalist	September 2002	R Hartono	Split from Golkar	23	2
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	Pancasila	Islam-Traditional	1998	Alwi Shihab, Abdurraman Wahid (Gus Dur)	Nahdlatul Ulama	(passed in to 2004 elections due to having passed threshold in 1999)	52
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	Islam	Islam-Modernist	1998 (Partai Keadilan)	Hidayat Nur Wahid	Campus mosque network	23	45
Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR)	Islam	Islam	January 2002 (PPP Reformasi)	Zainuddin MZ	Split from PPP	23	13
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDIP)	Pancasila	Nationalist	January 1973	Megawati Sukarnoputri		(passed in to 2004 elections due to having passed threshold in 1999)	109
Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS)	Pancasila	Minority-Nationalist	October 2001	Ruyandi Hutasoit		21	12
Partai Golongan Karya (Partai Golkar)	Pancasila	Nationalist, with elements of Islam	October 1964	Akbar Tandjung (since defeated as party chair), Jusuf Kalla (new party chair)	New Order bureaucrats, businessmen, former military	(passed in to 2004 elections due to having passed threshold in 1999)	128
Partai Patriot Pancasila (Pancasila)	Pancasila	Nationalist	June 2001	Japto S Soerjosoemarno	Built on former Golkar-affiliated youth organization, Pemuda Pancasila)	21	0
Partai Sarikat Indonesia (PSI)	Pancasila	Nationalist	1998 (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia)	Rahardjo Tjakraningkrat		22	0
Partai Persatuan Daerah (PPD)	Pancasila	NA	November 2002	Oesman Sapta		21	0
Partai Pelopor (Pelopor)	Pancasila	Nationalist	August 2002	Rachmawati Sukarnoputri		21	2

Sources: “Partai Politik,” Wikipedia.org. "Perhitungan Perolehan Kursi DPR RI," KPU Indonesia, Undated [ONLINE] http://www.kpu.go.id/dprkursi.php [accessed March 1, 2005].

Indonesia Presidential Elections, 2004: Brief Descriptions of the Candidates

KPU, “Visi, Misi dan Program Pasangan Calon President dan Wakil Presiden,” Undated.

[1] I was a visiting fellow at The Habibie Center in Jakarta, Indonesia when much of the research for this paper was conducted. The Habibie Center also arranged for me to observe the first round of the 2004 presidential elections in Depok, West Java. I am most grateful to the Center’s kind staff.

[2] Abd. Rahin Ghazali, “Putus Hubungan Partai dengan Rakyat,” Kompas, Siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik Seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004, Jakarta: Penerbt Buku Kompas, 2004, 320.

[3] Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996.

[4] Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

[5] Linz and Stepan describe five “arenas” in which the consolidation of democracy takes place. Consolidation requires a vibrant civil society, an autonomous political society, the rule of law, a usable state, and an economic society. For more on the arenas, see the introductory chapter of Linz and Stepan.

[6] Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 57-58.

[7] Ibid., 58.

[8] Scott Mainwaring, "Party Systems in the Third Wave," Journal of Democracy, 9, 3, 1998, 67-81. Also, Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

[9] Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[10] Mainwaring and Scully, 1.

[11] Ibid., 20.

[12] Asia Foundation, Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate 2003, Jakarta: Asia Foundation, 2003, 93.

[13] This cover followed the first round of the presidential elections and was dated July 10, 2004.

[14] N=5,592. LP3ES survey preceding parliamentary elections reported on in Laksamana.net, “Not Who, but What the Voters Want,” March 18, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.laksamana.net [accessed March 1, 2005].

[15] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), “The People’s Voice: Presidential Politics and Voter Perspectives in Indonesia: Report on a Series of Focus Groups Conducted during May in seven Indonesian Provinces Ahead of the July 2004 Presidential Elections,” June 2004, 1. Henceforth, NDI Focus Groups.

[16] N=4,951. LP3ES, “Quick Count Mendapat Diandalkan Untuk Memprediksi Hasil Pemilihan Umum,” October 4, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.lp3es.or.id [accessed March 2, 2005].

[17] Marhaenism was Sukarno’s answer to Communism in Indonesia. According to Sukarno, Marhaen was the typical Indonesian peasant. He was not an exploited, landless peasant who would or should turn to Communism. Instead, he was a smallholder, exploited by colonialism.

[18] As Partai Keadilan, PKS had competed in 1999, achieving just 1.4% of the vote. Partai Demokrat was a wholly new party.

[19] Tamrin Amal Tomagola, “Pasangan Presidensial 2004,” Kompas, Siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik Seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004, Jakarta: Penerbt Buku Kompas, 2004, 44.

[20] “Decentralization and Emerging Leaders of Indonesia,” USIndo Conference Report, February 2, 2005 [ONLINE] http://www.usindo.com [accessed March 12, 2005].

[21] Riswandha Imawan, “The Lonely Winners,” Kompas, Siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik Seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004, Jakarta: Penerbt Buku Kompas, 2004, 182.

[22] Military representatives were absent from the DPR elected in 2004 (there were 38 in 1999). In addition, the size of the body was expanded from 500 to 550.

[23] Koirudin, Profil Pemilu 2004: Evaluasi Pelaksanaan, Hasil dan Perubahan Peta Politik Nasional Pasca Pemilu Legislatif 2004, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004, 127.

[24] Mochtar W Oetama, “Sinetron Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,” Kompas, Siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik Seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004, Jakarta: Penerbt Buku Kompas, 2004, 206.

[25] “Love Affair with Mega Over,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 2004.

[26] NDI Focus Groups, 6.

[27] Ibid., 8.

[28] Mainwaring, 29.

[29] The new PAN leader is scheduled to be chosen at an April 7-10, 2005 PAN Congress.

[30] Deborah L. Norden, “Party Relations and Democracy in Latin America,” Party Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1998), 423-443.

[31] Dan Slater, “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition,” Unpublished manuscript, July 29, 2004, 3.

[32] O’Donnell and Schmitter, 66.

[33] “Organisasi Pemuda dan Mahasiswa Serukan Boykot Pemilu 2004,” Warta Berita Radio Nederland Wereldomroep [ONLINE] http://www.indonesia-house.org/focus/election/2004/01/010504Organisasi_pemuda_dan_mahasiswa_%20serukan_boykot.htm [accessed March 6, 2004].

[34] According to a PKS official, refusal to sign was not rejection of the results of the elections. Instead it was a “lesson in democracy” and the result of maintaining a “critical attitude toward the KPU-organized elections which were so full of weaknesses and violations.” “Baru 10 Partai Politik Tanda Tangani Hasil Pemilu,” Kompas, May 6, 2004.

[35] Quoted in “Report on Discussion: Coalition Politics on Presidential Elections: Platform Commonality or Expansion of Support Base? The Habibie Center, May 18, 2004” Postscript, June 2004, 22.

[36] The Java provinces include Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java.

[37] The Sumatra provinces include Aceh, N. Sumatra, W. Sumatra, Bengkulu, Jambi, Riau, S. Sumatra, Lampung, Bangka Belitung, and Kepulauan Riau.

[38] “Amien Rais dan Yudhoyono Didukung Warga ‘Asalnya,’” Kompas, April 10, 2004.

[39] These results can be seen in the LP3ES 2004 parliamentary election exit poll. See, LP3ES, “Pemilih PDIP Beralih ke Partai Demokrat, Suara PPP dan PAN Bocor ke PKS,” April 7, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.lp3es.or.id [accessed March 2, 2005].

[40] Asia Foundation, Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate 2003, Jakarta: Asia Foundation, 2003, 98.

[41] Ibid., 100.

[42] N=5,592. LP3ES survey preceding parliamentary elections reported on in Laksamana.net, “Not Who, but What the Voters Want,” March 18, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.laksamana.net [accessed March 1, 2005].

[43] N=1,234. Survey conducted July 19 to August 16, 2004 in Jakarta, Medan, and Surabaya. Transparency International, “Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004,” December 9, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.transparency.org [accessed January 18, 2005], 18.

[44] Arbi Sanit, “Pembaharuan Mendasar Partai Politik,” Mahrus Irsyam and Lili Romli, eds., Menggugat Partai Politik, Jakarta: Laboratorium Ilmu Politik, Fackultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Indonesia, 2003, 1, 10, 12, 13.

[45] J. Kristiadi, “Introduction,” in Koirudin, Profil Pemilu 2004: Evaluasi Pelaksanaan, Hasil dan Perubahan Peta Politik Nasional Pasca Pemilu Legislatif 2004, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004, xxiii.

[46] “Putus Hubungan Partai dengan Rakyat,” Kompas, April 23, 2004.

[47] Quoted in Koirudin, Profil Pemilu 2004: Evaluasi Pelaksanaan, Hasil dan Perubahan Peta Politik Nasional Pasca Pemilu Legislatif 2004, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004, 80.

[48] IFES Electionguide, “Results Summary” for Indonesia Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, Undated [ONLINE] http://www.ifes.org [accessed March 1, 2005].

[49] IFES surveys found ease of understanding the ballot jumped from 71% in April to 97% and 99% for the two rounds of the presidential elections. IFES Tracking Surveys, Wave XVIII, October 19, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.ifes.org [accessed November 11, 2004].

[50] NGO CETRO’s pre-parliamentary election test of the ballots/new voting system presaged big problems come voting day. See Moch. N. Kurniawan, “Voters Unable to Punch Ballots,” Jakarta Post, January 16, 2004.

[51] Figures in this paragraph come from IFES Tracking Polls, Wave XVIII.

[52] Eep Saefulloh Fatah citing KPU figures, “Report on Discussion: Coalition Politics on Presidential Elections: Platform Commonality or Expansion of Support Base? The Habibie Center, May 18, 2004” Postscript, June 2004, 26.

[53] Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer, Jakarta: Teraju, 2004.

[54] Eko Prasojo, “Mediokrasi dalam Pemilu 2004,” Kompas, Siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik Seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004, Jakarta: Penerbt Buku Kompas, 2004, 223.

[55] Gary LaMoshi, “Dispatches from Indonesia’s Presidential Election,” Slate..com,, June 28, 2004.

[56] “Demi Strategi Mengepung Kota,” Tempo, Edisi Pemilihan Presiden 2004.

[57] “Yusuf Kalla was SBY’s Personal Choice, Says Democrats’ Party Executive,” Antara, April 20, 2004.

[58] “Shadowy Maneuvers,” Tempo, February 08-14, 2005 [ONLINE] http://www.tempo.co.id [accessed February 15, 2005].

[59] Wiranto, Witness in the Storm, Jakarta: Delta Pustaka Express, 2003.

[60] N=2,000. Survey conducted September 2 to 9, 2004, preceding second round of presidential elections. See, IFES Tracking Surveys, Wave XVII, September 15, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.ifes.org [accessed March 1, 2005].

[61] Dedy N Hidayat, “Americanisasi Industri Kampanye Pemilu,” Kompas, Siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik Seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004, Jakarta: Penerbt Buku Kompas, 2004, 233.

[62] Indra J. Piliang, “What the Future Holds for the Party System,” Jakarta Post, October 6, 2004.

[63] “Golkar, PKB sign Coalition Accord,” Jakarta Post, May 29, 2004.

[64] “Reformists Ready to Show Mega the Door,” Jakarta Post, January 18, 2005. Megawati’s failures of leadership are certainly behind much of the agitation against her. In addition, the reform group will be targeting the PDI-P chair’s prerogative powers which allow her to point the party board on her own, without regard to sentiments in the party or democratic processes.

[65] “Partai Golkar Berhentikan Jusuf Kalla dan 9 Pengurus,” Kompas, September 16, 2004.

[66] Nankyung Choi, “Local Elections and Party Politics in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: A View from Yogyakarta,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, August 2004, 283.

[67] “Partai Demokrat Akan Pecat Anggotanya yang ‘Mbalelo’,” Kompas, September 19, 2004.

[68] Olle Tornquist, “Indonesian Democracy: Façade or Underway?” Jakarta Post, January 20, 2005.

[69] Chris Brummitt, “Election Seen as Lesson for Indonesia’s Political Elite,” Associated Press, September 21, 2004.

Table 1: Parliamentary Election Results: 2004

Party	Vote	Share of Vote	Seats	Share of Seats
		(percentage)		(percentage)
1. PNI Marhaenisme	923,159	0.81	1	0.18
2. Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat	636,397	0.56	0	0.00
3. Partai Bulan Bintang	2,970,487	2.62	11	2.00
4. Partai Merdeka	842,541	0.74	0	0.00
5. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	9,248,764	8.15	58	10.55
6. Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan	1,313,654	1.16	5	0.91
7. Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru	672,952	0.59	0	0.00
8. Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan	1,230,455	1.08	1	0.18
9. Partai Demokrat	8,455,225	7.45	57	10.36
10. Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	1,424,240	1.26	1	0.18
11. Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia	855,811	0.75	1	0.18
12. Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	895,610	0.79	0	0.00
13. Partai Amanat Nasional	7,303,324	6.44	52	9.45
14. Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	2,399,290	2.11	2	0.36
15. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	11,989,564	10.57	52	9.45
16. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	8,325,020	7.34	45	8.18
17. Partai Bintang Reformasi	2,764,998	2.44	13	2.36
18. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	21,026,629	18.53	109	19.82
19. Partai Damai Sejahtera	2,414,254	2.13	12	2.18
20. Partai Golongan Karya	24,480,757	21.58	128	23.27
21. Partai Patriot Pancasila	1,073,139	0.95	0	0.00
22. Partai Sarikat Indonesia	679,296	0.60	0	0.00
23. Partai Persatuan Daerah	657,916	0.58	0	0.00
24. Partai Pelopor	878,932	0.77	2	0.36
TOTAL	113,462,414	100.00	550	100.00

Source: "Hasil Perhitungan Suara," KPU Indonesia, Undated [ONLINE] http://www.kpu.go.id/suara/hasilsuara_dpr_sah.php [accessed March 1, 2005].
Perolehan Kursi Anggota DPR-RI," KPU Indonesia, Undated [ONLINE] http://www.kpu.go.id/suara/dprkursi.php [accessed March 3, 2005].

Parliamentary Elections: Share to Top X Parties	1955	1999	2004
4	78.0	79.5	58.8
5	80.9	86.5	66.3
6	83.6	88.5	73.6
7	85.6	89.9	80.0

Presidential/Vice Presidential Candidate Pair	July 2004 First Round Elections (percentage)	September 2004 Second Round Elections (percentage)
Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid	22.2	--
Megawati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi	26.2	39.1
Amien Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo	14.9	--
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla	33.6	60.9
Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar	3.1	--

Table 5: Golkar Vote by Province and Election: 1971 - 2004

Province	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997	1999	2004
Aceh	49.71	41.17	36.97	51.96	58.41	64.81	15.61	16.19
North Sumatra	70.14	66.46	72.54	72.76	71.29	80.33	21.84	20.46
West Sumatra	63.22	66.5	60.4	78.65	82.07	91.15	23.63	28.71
Riau	76.72	63.33	71.69	79.73	76.55	82.7	29.73	29.95**
Jambi	88.21	83.49	84.8	88.87	90.69	92.58	34.67	24.73
South Sumatra	62.62	49.82	56.03	69.26	70.24	84.98	22.11	21.20***
Bengkulu	82.69	76.44	70.62	84.81	86.07	94.77	28.87	23.72
Lampung	71.82	61.84	59.36	87.03	90.46	93.21	19.38	21.62
DKI Jakarta	45.73	39.28	44.99	50.23	54.41	65.34	10.32	9.16
West Java	76.12	66.27	63.34	71.31	70.48	72.34	23.58	27.90****
Central Java	50.32	52.62	60.47	68.21	55.46	68.26	13.35	15.9
DI Yogyakarta	63.35	56.58	60.55	70.19	58.6	62.57	14.34	13.84
East Java	54.91	58.84	56.78	71.21	58.82	62.97	12.66	13.09
West Kalimantan	66.66	68.88	70.99	68.73	63.85	69.72	29.35	24.46
Central Kalimantan	81.14	69.86	84.22	89.19	86.27	86.6	27.77	25.57
South Kalimantan	64.84	49.58	59.25	71.82	69.65	72.02	24.04	20.76
East Kalimantan	54.77	56.96	61.3	67.82	61.49	70.02	29.68	27.38
North Sulawesi	60.72	72.88	87.13	87.49	88.23	95.9	49.48	32.32
Central Sulawesi	76.84	79.31	81.3	83.13	80.78	84.89	54.58	38.59
South Sulawesi	78.36	85.18	89.18	90.01	89.78	91.63	66.5	44.34
Sulawesi Tenggara	92.48	96.11	96.94	97.15	94.35	97.22	63.07	36.81
Bali	82.95	85.37	88.35	87.74	78.48	93.21	10.37	16.84
West Nusa Tenggara	69.82	57.49	68.61	82.56	78.5	80.66	42.18	24.44
East Nusa Tenggara	61.49	90.28	96.35	94.74	91.21	94.94	40.83	37.02
Maluku	47.68	71.86	75.25	81.48	73.86	82.07	30.46	20.74*****
Irian Jaya/Papua	0*	86.85	92.48	92.95	86.61	88.86	37.3	24.70^
East Timor	-	-	99.45	93.68	82.62	84.7	48.66	-

National	62.82	62.11	64.34	73.16	68.1	74.51	22.4	21.58

Notes: *No vote results are available for Irian Jaya for the 1971 elections. All seats were awarded to Golkar. - East Timor was not incorporated into Indonesia.
Figure does not include 2004 results for Kepulauan Riau (15.90). * Figure does not include Bangka Belitung (18.32).****Figure does not include results for
Bantan (21.52). *****Figure does not include N. Maluku (23.53). ^ Figure does not include W. Irian Jaya (24.83).
Source: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum. Pemilu Indonesia Dalam Angka dan Fakta Tahun 1955-1999. Jakarta: Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2000.
For 2004, see KPU Indonesia at http://www.kpu.go.id.

Table 6: Share of the Vote by Party Stream: 1955, 1971, 1999, and 2004

Stream	Party	1955	Stream	Party	1971	Stream	Party	1999	Stream	Party	2004	Stream	Change	Change
		(%)	1955		(%)	1971		(%)	1999		(%)	2004	1955-1999	1999-2004
Islamic Parties	Masyumi	20.9		Parmusi	5.36		Partai Bulan Bintang	1.94		Partai Bulan Bintang	2.62
Modernist	PSII*	2.9		PSII*	2.39		Partai Keadilan	1.36		Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	7.34
							Partai Amanat Nasional	7.12		Partai Amanat Nasional	6.44
							Partai Daulat Rakyat	0.40		Partai Merdeka	0.74
			23.8			7.8	Other Modernist	1.60	12.42			17.14	-11.38	4.72
Islamic Parties	NU*	18.4		NU*	18.68		Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	12.61		Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	10.57
Traditional	Perti	1.28		Perti	0.69		Partai Nahdlatul Umat	0.64		PNUI*	0.79
	Other Trad.	0.2	19.9			19.4	Other Traditional	1.10	14.35			11.36	-5.55	-2.99
Islamic Parties							PPP*	10.71		PPP*	8.15
Merged			0			0	Other Merged	0.62	11.33	Other Merged	2.44	10.59	11.33	-0.74
Nationalist	PNI*	22.3		PNI*	6.93		PDI-P*	33.74		PDI-P	18.53
Parties	IPKI*	1.4		IPKI*	0.61		Golkar	22.44		Golkar	21.53
	Other Natl'ist	3.66		Golkar	62.82		Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan	1.01		Partai Demokrat	7.45
							Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	0.33		Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	2.11
			27.4			70.4	Other Nationalist	2.25	59.76	Other Nationalist	7.97	57.59	32.36	-2.17
Christian/	Parkindo	2.7		Parkindo	1.34		PDKB*	0.52		Partai Damai Sejahtera	2.13
Minority	Katolik	2.04		Katolik	1.1		Partai Bhineka Tunggal Ika	0.34
Parties	Persatuan Daya	0.39					Partai Kristen Nasional	0.35
			5.1			2.4	Partai Katolik Demokrat	0.20	1.42			2.13	-3.68	0.71
Socialist/	PSI*	1.99
Communist/	Partai Buruh	0.59					Partai Buruh Nasional	0.13		Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat	0.56
Workers'	PKI*	16.4					Partai Rakyat Demokratik	0.07
Parties	Murba	0.5		Murba	0.08		Murba	0.03
	Baperki	0.47
	Other Soc/Comm	0.17	20.12			0.1	Other Soc/Comm	0.17	0.40			0.56	-19.72	0.16
Uncat./Other	Other	3.68	3.68	Other	0	0	Other	0.33	0.30	Other	0.58	0.58

Total		99.97	100		100	100.1		100.01	99.98		99.95	99.95

Note: This table is meant to give an approximation of in-stream voting. Especially in 1999 and 2004, a number of parties cross streams and are thus difficult to categorize as simply
one stream or another. The parties have been placed in the most proximate stream.
* IPKI=Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia. PPP=Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. PPIIM=Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi. PDI-P=Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
Perjuangan. PNI=Partai Nasional Indonesia. NU=Nahdlatul Ulama. PKI=Partai Komunis Indonesia. PDKB=Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa. PSI=Partai Sosialis Indonesia.
PSII=Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia. PPIIM=Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi. PNUI=Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia.
Source: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum. Pemilu Indonesia Dalam Angka dan Fakta Tahun 1955-1999. Jakarta: Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2000. pp. 18, 52, 192. Also, KPU Indonesia, http://www.kpu.go.id.

E-Mail: tanp@uncw.edu

Introduction

Theoretical Underpinnings

Table 3: Concentration of the Parliamentary Vote: Elections of 1955, 1999, and 2004

July 2004

Party System Institutionalization in Indonesia: The Results of the 2004 Elections

Stability in Inter-party Competition

Stable Roots

Table 9: Consistency in Party Vote: 1999 to 2004

Party Chosen 1999*

PK**

NA

Legitimacy

Stable Rules and Structures

Conclusion: Implications for Indonesian Democracy

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Online Media and Information Sources

Amien Rais Center http://m-amienrais.com (no longer active)

Antara News Agency

Australian Broadcasting Corporation-Asia News http://www.goasiapacific.com

BlogPemilu2004 http://pemilu2004.goblogmedia.com/

Center for Electoral Reform http://www.cetro.or.id/

The Economist, http://www.economist.com

Far Eastern Economic Review http://www.feer.com (since re-launched as new periodical)

Habibie Center http://www.habibiecenter.or.id/

Indonesia House http://www.indonesia-house.org

International Foundation for Election Systems http://www.ifes.org

Jakarta Post http://www.thejakartapost.com

Books, Articles, and Monographs

Parties Contesting the 2004 Parliamentary Elections: Basic Information

Nahdlatul Ulama

Nahdlatul Ulama

Indonesia Presidential Elections, 2004: Brief Descriptions of the Candidates

Name

Party sponsoring in capital letters

· Logic of Pres-VP Pairing

Nahdlatul Ulama

Partai Demokrat

Table 2: Parties' Results in the 1999 and 2004 Parliamentary Elections: Share of Vote, Number of Seats, and Share of Seats

Parties*	Share of Vote	Seats	Share of Seats	Share of Vote	Seats	Share of Seats
	1999 (%)	1999	1999 (%)	2004 (%)	2004	2004 (%)
Partai Golkar	22.4	120	26.0	21.6	128	23.3
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan	33.7	153	33.1	18.5	109	19.8
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	12.6	51	11.0	10.6	52	9.5
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	10.7	58	12.6	8.2	58	10.5
Partai Demokrat	NA	NA	NA	7.5	57	10.4
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	1.4	7	1.5	7.3	45	8.2
Partai Amanat Nasional	7	34	7.4	6.4	52	9.5
Partai Bintang Reformasi	NA	NA	NA	2.4	13	2.4
Partai Bulan Bintang	1.9	13	2.8	2.3	11	2.0
Partai Damai Sejahtera	NA	NA	NA	2.1	12	2.2
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	1	4	0.9	1.3	1	0.2
Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	0.6	5	1.1	0.8	0	0.0
Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa	0.5	5	1.1	NA	NA	NA
Other	8.2	12	2.6	11	12	2.2
Total	100	462	100	100	550	100

Notes: *In the event a party's name changed between 1999 and 2004, the most recent name has been used.
Sources: "Elections in Indonesia," Electionworld.org [ONLINE] http://wwww.electionworld.org/indonesia.htm [accessed March 3, 2005].
Elaine Paige Johnson, "Streams of Least Resistance: the Institutionalization of Political Parties and Democracy in Indonesia," PhD.
Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2002.
"Perhitungan Perolehan Kursi DPR RI," KPU Indonesia, Undated [ONLINE] http://www.kpu.go.id/dprkursi.php [accessed March 1, 2005].

Table 7: Big Seven Parties with Java Dependence, 2004

	Golkar	PDI-P	PKB	PPP	DEMOK	PKS	PAN	Total
Total Vote Java	12,914,850	14,979,937	10,486,133	6,125,421	5,832,967	5,535,959	4,385,664	69,936,146
Total Vote	24,480,757	21,026,629	11,989,564	9,248,764	8,455,225	8,325,020	7,303,324	113,462,414
Share Party Vote Java	52.76	71.24	87.46	66.23	68.99	66.50	60.05	61.64

Source: KPU Indonesia, http://www.kpu.go.id

Table 8. Vote for the "Big Seven" Parties by Province, 2004

		Golkar		PDI-P		PKB		PPP		DEM		PKS		PAN
Province	Golkar	SHARE	PDI-P	SHARE	PKB	SHARE	PPP	SHARE	DEMOK	SHARE	PKS	SHARE	PAN	SHARE	Total
Aceh	340,971	16.19	86,312	4.10	80,781	3.84	291,410	13.84	128,659	6.11	192,469	9.14	280,249	13.31	2,105,477
N. Sumatra	1,133,411	20.46	825,584	14.91	125,270	2.26	397,811	7.18	427,522	7.72	427,724	7.72	317,697	5.74	5,538,736
W. Sumatra	577,323	28.71	75,839	3.77	30,738	1.53	234,806	11.68	101,260	5.04	236,858	11.78	284,432	14.15	2,010,545
Bengkulu	178,513	23.72	63,499	8.44	28,384	3.77	62,270	8.27	39,422	5.24	61,906	8.22	67,777	9.00	752,696
Jambi	316,039	24.73	142,588	11.16	64,503	5.05	74,388	5.82	73,824	5.78	68,846	5.39	224,825	17.59	1,278,080
Riau	619,056	29.95	211,513	10.23	66,468	3.22	167,858	8.12	78,902	3.82	135,903	6.58	164,523	7.96	2,066,708
S. Sumatra	714,399	21.20	576,596	17.11	143,501	4.26	218,019	6.47	358,718	10.65	204,870	6.08	234,608	6.96	3,369,800
Lampung	772,890	21.62	676,798	18.93	266,405	7.45	171,228	4.79	238,452	6.67	290,796	8.14	215,717	6.03	3,574,522
Bangka Belitung	87,698	18.32	91,785	19.17	16,970	3.54	35,953	7.51	25,014	5.22	26,619	5.56	23,299	4.87	478,748
Kepulauan Riau	90,034	15.90	81,447	14.39	21,777	3.85	34,092	6.02	36,802	6.50	61,565	10.87	64,941	11.47	566,126
Jakarta	433,966	9.16	664,245	14.02	164,249	3.47	386,614	8.16	958,763	20.24	1,057,246	22.32	333,116	7.03	4,736,652
West Java	5,775,780	27.90	3,625,476	17.51	1,062,963	5.13	2,189,484	10.58	1,634,523	7.90	2,369,231	11.44	1,119,011	5.41	20,702,455
C. Java	2,803,991	15.90	5,245,879	29.75	2,578,241	14.62	1,593,219	9.04	1,179,898	6.69	839,356	4.76	1,352,029	7.67	17,631,806
Yogyakarta	266,444	13.84	503,321	26.15	193,476	10.05	94,268	4.90	108,544	5.64	141,114	7.33	342,921	17.82	1,924,647
East Java	2,691,619	13.09	4,325,918	21.04	6,297,366	30.63	1,407,803	6.85	1,568,587	7.63	608,810	2.96	1,001,002	4.87	20,558,798
Banten	943,050	21.52	615,098	14.04	189,838	4.33	454,033	10.36	382,652	8.73	520,202	11.87	237,585	5.42	4,381,788
S. Kalimantan	323,298	20.76	137,989	8.86	115,799	7.44	220,735	14.18	74,500	4.78	166,847	10.71	125,239	8.04	1,557,199
W. Kalimantan	459,252	24.46	330,226	17.59	52,662	2.81	157,351	8.38	114,950	6.12	66,608	3.55	79,455	4.23	1,877,409
C. Kalimantan	223,498	25.57	190,630	21.81	37,902	4.34	70,627	8.08	66,430	7.60	25,137	2.88	49,402	5.65	874,163
E. Kalimantan	368,782	27.38	187,000	13.89	48,812	3.62	108,250	8.04	75,281	5.59	129,819	9.64	77,251	5.74	1,346,699
Bali	320,710	16.84	999,889	52.50	27,050	1.42	17,226	0.90	121,665	6.39	18,837	0.99	20,456	1.07	1,904,600
NTB	491,394	24.44	139,158	6.92	84,350	4.20	174,386	8.67	89,468	4.45	111,471	5.54	124,357	6.19	2,010,517
NTT	758,869	37.02	396,619	19.35	54,031	2.64	36,330	1.77	83,281	4.06	19,827	0.97	29,398	1.43	2,049,895
N. Sulawesi	388,469	32.32	195,090	16.23	26,562	2.21	37,814	3.15	172,321	14.34	18,939	1.58	18,709	1.56	1,201,938
Sultra	329,376	36.81	69,082	7.72	19,747	2.21	101,416	11.33	18,363	6.66	39,397	4.40	65,048	7.27	894,886
C. Sulawesi	431,929	38.59	77,476	6.92	28,056	2.51	78,339	7.00	59,606	11.49	42,768	3.82	52,222	4.67	1,119,319
S. Sulawesi	1,847,306	44.34	189,539	4.55	72,494	1.74	273,364	6.56	126,487	3.04	303,950	7.30	266,677	6.40	4,166,333
Gorontalo	254,525	53.07	29,204	6.09	16,548	3.45	62,384	13.01	4,279	0.89	16,184	3.37	20,979	4.37	479,632
Maluku	136,483	20.74	121,588	18.48	14,186	2.16	38,183	5.80	26,453	4.02	47,947	7.29	34,773	5.28	658,037
N. Maluku	97,401	23.53	37,651	9.09	5,254	1.27	27,943	6.75	26,651	6.44	43,772	10.57	24,415	5.90	413,983
W. Irian Jaya	70,781	24.83	37,239	13.06	6,620	2.32	16,553	5.81	10,718	3.76	8,130	2.85	7,513	2.64	285,032
Papua	233,500	24.70	76,351	8.08	48,561	5.14	14,607	1.55	43,230	4.57	21,872	2.31	43,698	4.62	945,188
National Total	24,480,757	21.58	21,026,629	18.53	11,989,564	10.57	9,248,764	8.15	8,455,225	7.45	8,325,020	7.34	7,303,324	6.44	113,462,414


Source: KPU Indonesia, http://www.kpu.go.id

Party Chosen 2004*	Party Chosen 1999*
	PPP	Demokrat	PAN	PKB	PK**	PDIP	Golkar	PBB	Other
PPP	34	NA	2	6	0	1	2	6	1
Demokrat	3	NA	4	3	3	8	4	12	5
PAN	3	NA	44	2	0	3	2	6	3
PKB	3	NA	1	54	0	1	2	2	3
PKS	9	NA	16	4	56	4	2	22	9
PDIP	3	NA	1	4	0	36	5	0	7
Golkar	6	NA	3	2	2	7	46	2	10
Other	12	NA	10	6	12	14	13	42	23
No Response	27	NA	19	20	27	27	24	10	39

Table 10: Support for Presidential Candidates (Round I/July 2004) by Party Chosen in Parliamentary Contest (April 2004)**

Party Chosen	Susila Bambang	Megawati	Wiranto	Amien Rais	Hamzah Haz	Don't Know/
April Parliamentary	Yudhoyono	Sukarnoputri				No Response
Elections	(percentage)	(percentage)	(percentage)	(percentage)	(percentage)	(percentage)
Partai Golkar	39.1	5.1	38.4**	5.1	1.1	11.2
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan	22.3	59.2**	3.8	1.2	NA	13.5
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	39.4	3	7.1	10.1	26.3**	14.1
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	47.4	5.9	18.4	2.6	2.6	23.1
Partai Demokrat	87.3**	2.4	3.2	2	NA	5.1
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	40.2	1	7.2	39.2	2.1	10.3
Partai Amanat Nasional	14.7	0.9	2.6	71.6**	0.9	9.3
Partai Bulan Bintang	48.6	2.7	10.8	18.9	5.4	13.6
Partai Bintang Reformasi	52.2	4.3	17.4	26.1	NA	NA
Partai Damai Sejahtera	33.3	33.3	22.2	NA	NA	11.2
Other	59.1	6	10.4	9.6	1.7	13.2
Secret	36.1	6.4	7.1	4.9	1.9	43.6
No Response	23.8	2.4	2.4	4.8	2.4	64.2

Note: *Interviews conducted June 2004. N=2,000.
**Figures enlarged and in bold represent solidity of support from candidate's own party.
***Read across presidential candidates as support for candidate from each party's voters.
Source: Table taken from IFES, Wave XIV Tracking Surveys, July 1, 2004 [ONLINE] http://www.ifes.org [accessed August 7, 2004].

Name Party sponsoring in capital letters	Party/Social Group	Place of Origin/Association · Logic of Pres-VP Pairing	Brief Bio-data
GOLKAR: Wiranto	Golkar	Java · Military-civilian · Suspected of human rights violations-former deputy head National Human Rights Commission · Nationalist-religious	Wiranto is a former commander of the armed forces, defense minister, and coordinating minister for political and security affairs. He has been accused of involvement in a variety of atrocities such as the Trisakti, Semanggi I and II incidents, as well as the violence which attended East Timor’s separation from Indonesia. He also oversaw the military’s abandonment of its dual function which guaranteed it a political, in addition to a defense, role. Wiranto was chosen as Golkar’s nominee in the only “nominating convention” held by a political party.
Salahuddin Wahid	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)/Rise of the Islamic Scholars	Java	Salahuddin (known as Gus Solah) is a blue-blood descendent of the founder of NU and younger brother of former President Abdurrahman Wahid/Gus Dur, who was ruled ineligible to stand in the 2004 presidential elections for reasons of ill health. NU is Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization. Salahuddin previously served as a deputy chairman of both NU and the National Human Rights Commission. Salahuddin was sponsored to run with Wiranto by Wahid’s party, the PKB.
PDI-P: Megawati Sukarnoputri	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan	Java (associated also with Bali, one-quarter Balinese) · Nationalist-religious · Figurehead-competent administrator	Megawati Sukarnoputri was the incumbent president (2001-2004). She is the daughter of Indonesia’s founding president Sukarno.
Hasyim Muzadi	Nahdlatul Ulama	Java	Hasyim was executive head of the Nahdlatul Ulama. In addition, he is a traditionalist Islamic cleric as well. He chose to run with Megawati without the endorsement of NU or its affiliated political party, PKB. He spoke often of Islam as tolerant and inclusive religion.
PAN: Amien Rais	Partai Amanat Nasional	Java · Religious-nationalist · Both competent and clean	Amien was speaker of Indonesia’s upper house of parliament, the MPR (1999-2004). He was known as the Father of Reform for his role in the protests that brought down long-serving dictator Suharto in 1998. Amien was head of Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second-largest Muslim organization, until stepping down in 1999.
Siswono Yudo Husodo	Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia/Farmers’ Association and Partai Sarikat Indonesia	East Kalimantan	Siswono was seen as adding a nationalist element to Amien’s Muslim image. Both conveyed technocratic mastery of the challenges facing Indonesia in their campaign appearances
DEMOKRAT: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Partai Demokrat	Java · Java-non-Java · Nationalist-religious · Political/security-business/economics · Military-civilian	Susilo was formerly a coordinating minister for political and security affairs in both Megawati Sukarnoputri’s and Gus Dur’s administrations. He is retired military but is not known to be close with other generals. As head of the military’s socio-political office in the 1990s, he proposed weaning the military away from its dominating political role as society was changing.
Jusuf Kalla	Golkar/NU	Sulawesi	Kalla was a coordinating minister in Megawati’s government. He is a wealthy businessman from South Sulawesi. The Golkar party did not sponsor his vice-presidential run. After assuming office, he returned to Golkar and captured its leadership.
PPP: Hamzah Haz	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	Kalimantan · Religious-nationalist · Civillian-military	Hamzah Haz was the incumbent vice president. His run for the presidency was highly quixotic, leading some to speculate that he was in the field only to draw “Muslim” votes away from other candidate pairs to the advantage of President Megawati. If this was the notion, it was relatively unsuccessful. Hamzah scored just 3% of the vote.
Agum Gumelar	Retired military	Java	Agum is a former minister, known to be close to President Megawati; this increased the perception that the Haz/Gumelar run was just a smokescreen.