DRAFT

With the Best of Intentions:

Singapore Volunteers and Donors and the Tsunami Reconstruction

by Tan Tay Keong

and Paige Johnson Tan

Charities and humanitarian organisations in Singapore that were involved in post-Tsunami relief and reconstruction work are repeatedly queried by volunteers, donors, and journalists.  The world has pledged and donated billions to Tsunami relief and reconstruction, and I have personally given money to Singapore charities.  Why do I still read about needy people in temporary shelters? Where has the money gone?  Another question reflects similar sentiments of puzzlement, even frustration: I am moved by the devastation and would like to help by volunteering my time and expertise.  I have signed up to volunteer with several humanitarian organisations.  I am highly qualified and could help people. Why am I still not sent overseas?

These are good questions that deserve solid answers.  This article discusses the latest thinking in relief circles as to which volunteers are best sent overseas and how donations can most responsibly be used for effective and sustainable reconstruction.  The authors draw on Singapore’s experience with providing relief in the aftermath of the Tsunami along with the Dr. Tan Tay Keong’s observations of relief and rehabilitation efforts in the Tsunami-affected areas of Sri Lanka and Indonesia.  The article finds that volunteering requires much more than just a giving heart.  Also, donations may be used most effectively by thinking long term rather than just short term.  Further, donations are best administered in a way coordinated with local relief plans and in consultation with local people.  The article closes by considering lessons for volunteers, donors, and humanitarian relief agencies from the Tsunami’s aftermath.

Many Have Called, but Few Are Chosen

Why is it that giving, able, and highly competent individuals seeking to be volunteers have been overlooked in the Tsunami’s wake?  Are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) too busy, exclusive or incompetent to meet volunteer interests?  The question, as it turns out, is a misguided one.  It suggests that all volunteers are needed, beneficial and welcome in the aftermath of a major disaster.  The right question to guide volunteer deployment should be: what resources and assistance are needed at what point and does an agency have the means to place them responsibly and safely in the field?  The people in the humanitarian sector have seen this so often that we have a term for it: ‘supply-driven volunteer deployment’, where volunteer agencies send volunteers overseas more as an outlet for the volunteers’ aspirations ‘to do something’ than to meet an assessed need in the field.

One of the most commonly cited blunders of well-meaning humanitarians is the supply-driven mismatch of volunteer skills with needs in the disaster sites. International volunteers rush in often without the requisite preparation and coordination.  Some stories from the Tsunami zones show the mismatch: doctors queuing for patients at a hospital camp in Galle, Sri Lanka; unskilled volunteers doing non-essential (manual) work in Meulaboh, Aceh while unemployed locals looked on; and the motley international aid contingents clogging the airports and supply lines leading into disaster zones.

When humanitarian workers descended upon the Tsunami-affected eastern coastline of Sri Lanka, for instance, we saw in one of the internally displaced persons camps the meager belongings of a family of five.  Their possessions would fit into a single large suitcase.  As NGOs streamed there to ‘set up tents and fly the flag’, we witnessed NGO leaders lining up at the District Administrators Office in Ampara to offer their aid to local officials.  We could see on a flipchart the long list of international agencies offering aid in healthcare, water and sanitation, housing, and education – a public listing of the ironical reality of too many aid agencies chasing after too few projects.  One international aid worker leaving the office said: “Look around you, there are so many untrained foreign reconstruction crews building temporary shelters when newly unemployed Sri Lankan men stand around watching; there must be a better way to rebuild this country!”

In Aceh, Director of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Reconstruksi, BRR) Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto lamented that during the immediate aftermath of the Tsunami and subsequent Nias earthquake foreign donors sent noodles, skirts and blankets, even cement, when what people most needed were sarongs, tents, sanitary pads, and biscuits (crackers) (Mangkusubroto, 2005).  Some thirteen hundred containers of donated materials just sat in Medan’s nearby harbortown at one stage.  Kuntoro further commented that people who rushed to the site of the disaster were not a help but became a burden as they needed to be housed, fed and given drinking water, items that were needed by Tsunami-affected persons as well.  

The Lifecycle of a Disaster

Disaster management experts often refer to distinct and discernable stages in the lifecycle of disasters, also broadly applicable to post-conflict situations - the emergency, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases.  The emergency phase is a time for scrambling – evacuations to save or preserve lives, fire- and flood-fighting, and search and rescue.  Swift action is most critical to get help to the people to prevent or limit the eventual impact.  Immediately following that is the relief phase, when urgent measures are taken to meet the most essential needs of the survivors by providing water, food, shelter and medical care.  Relief work is soon transitioned into rehabilitation, as the actions of the affected communities and aid workers turn to restoring basic services and assisting survivors in building their lives and means of livelihood.  The final phase following rehabilitation is the long protracted period for reconstruction, when damaged infrastructure is rebuilt and all essential services restored in the context of economic recovery and a long-term development plan.

In the Red Cross and Red Crescent’s World Disasters Report 2005, an evaluation of post-Tsunami work in Aceh is offered which highlights a number of interesting findings (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005).  “The highly ‘visible’ health sector attracted the most agencies: 22 health NGOs were operating in one area on the west coast [of Aceh].  Ten international field hospitals were set up in Banda Aceh, none of which worked at full capacity.  There were too many surgeons.  One UN witness in Meulaboh saw ‘20 surgeons competing for a single patient’.  Yet midwives and nurses were in short supply” (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005).  In the early phases of the recovery effort, UN officials already began to warn of ‘Tsunami tourists’ – non-essential humanitarian workers touring the disaster cites, surveying the devastation and taking photographs but contributing little else.

Placement of volunteers overseas in a developing country, especially in a disaster zone, presents many physical, psychological and social challenges.  They range from adjusting to the local diet, potential housing and hygiene hardships, to coping with local stereotypes about and prejudices against foreigners.  Especially in responding to complex emergencies where a natural disaster overlays a civil strife situation such as in both Sri Lanka and Aceh, the preparation of volunteers and coordination of their work must be carried out with the utmost care.  Suzanne Charest of the Canadian Red Cross writes: “When you are talking about emergency disasters of this size and scope, it’s something that you really need to think twice about before spontaneously going over there to offer to help.  If you’ve no training and experience in dealing with traumatic situations, it probably isn’t a very good idea.  We never send spontaneous volunteers to do relief work overseas” (Izon, 2005).

Why this level of selectivity and caution?  The service provided by international volunteers is typically more complicated than that performed by domestic Samaritans.  The challenge of aiding recovery and development is a complex and continuous process.  Thoughtful, sustainable projects empower people and communities to rise up on their feet and take control of their lives and livelihood.  Their struggle with disaster and disadvantage will continue for years.  In this context, reconstruction projects, to have a lasting impact on the living standards for many people, must have local ownership and participation, and they must contribute to a larger policy framework supported by the local governments and the wider development donor community.  For instance, instead of supporting stand-alone projects, the development community is now encouraging aid agencies to work within nationally-driven reconstruction plans and sectoral frameworks that address poverty, conflicts, poor governance, scarce resources, and diseases.  Before aid agencies build a school, we have to ensure that it will be used to deliver effective services to the local pupils, and it will be well run and adequately staffed by local people long after the internationals leave.

The well prepared and committed international volunteer can be a positive presence in a community, a source of inspiration and empowerment.  But the outsider's role can also be disruptive and burdensome.  There have been countless examples of outsiders who impose their cultural norms, force their own agenda, and initiate projects without the participation of the local community.  The results can range from inappropriate to disruptive or destructive, and the local people are left to put the pieces back together long after the well-intentioned visitor has left.  Overseas volunteers must bear in mind that much of the services that foreigners fly in to provide can also be more efficiently provided by locals at a fraction of the cost.  The Chairman of the Singapore Red Cross commented that it was “a mistake” to send a first group of volunteers to Aceh during the immediate rescue phase, largely to meet the volunteers’ strong pent-up interest to get to ground zero to offer help (Choo, 2005b).  The volunteer teams were sent in the first quarter of 2005 to Meulaboh to perform physical work of clearing debris and erecting temporary structures (tasks that could be more efficiently carried out by Acehnese).

It was not for a lack of volunteers that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the US-based Mercy Corps have a special scheme to hire local people (especially former fishermen) to work on various projects in Banda Aceh.  There is a concern that young Acehnese men will leave town and further weaken the affected communities’ cultural fabric and the prospects for sustainable long-term recovery.

Whether to comfort the sick, help the needy, or raise money for charities in our local community, domestic volunteers typically perform a service in a familiar local context.  Often, disaster-affected communities are recovering from shock, their support systems decimated, and the structures for their day-to-day survival threatened.  Overseas aid workers, hence, must be prepared to take on challenges far beyond the simpler tasks of domestic volunteering.  An extraordinary degree of tolerance and cultural sensitivity must be observed.  Singapore military officers learned to take off their sunglasses when they spoke to locals in Aceh, and aid distributors found it helpful to mark their rations clearly marked with halal-certified[1] signs.  To make a positive impact on the lives and livelihoods of people, international volunteers must ensure that contributions are welcome and are effective in the cultural context.  Beneficiary communities expect and deserve nothing less.

Hence, volunteers for overseas humanitarian and development missions can take heart in the fact that not all Samaritans should be deployed overseas.  Local people can do much of the work, given time and the right resources and opportunities.  And the humanitarian community has a responsibility to work with local peoples and support their initiatives to meet their needs and empower them to rise up to overcome disaster and disadvantage in a sustainable and culturally appropriate way.  While volunteers may be fueled by passion and the strong urge to help, the very best of intentions, volunteer managers have to a take a dispassionate and calculated perspective of the reconstruction challenges ahead.

Much Is Given, Much Is Expected

Non-governmental organizations in Singapore are regularly posed two questions: one relating to volunteering overseas in disaster situations and the other concerned with how money donated to the Tsunami disaster has been used.  Now, we turn to the issue of money for Tsunami relief and reconstruction.  News reports continue to show displaced and needy people who are still suffering.  How can that be, when so much money was donated?  Are there funds “lost” to organisational overhead, inefficiencies, or worse, corruption?

The Tsunami was an unusual disaster in recent history because of the unprecedented international impact and global response.  Twelve countries were affected, with about a quarter million killed within the span of just a few hours, offering very little lead time for evasive action and response.  Some eight thousand kilometers of coastlines were devastated, and these included three conflict zones in Aceh, Sri Lanka and Somalia.  This was truly an international disaster, with people from more than thirty-five nations affected in Phuket, Thailand alone (the Tsunami caused the greatest loss of life of any natural disaster in faraway Sweden’s modern history).  Flash appeals during the immediate aftermath saw billions of dollars pledged, with a sizable proportion from the private sector.  There was extremely stirring media coverage, with dramatic images of the mayhem broadcasted straight into living rooms all around the world.  By any yardstick, this was a disaster characterized by the unprecedented scale and speed of the international response.  A UN official called it “the biggest relief operation launched by the Organisation” (OCHA Official, 2005).

Singaporeans poured out their hearts and dug into their pockets, and organisations of every stripe raised funds for disaster relief.  In the ultimate count, some US$52.8 million was raised for the Asia Tidal Waves Fund in response to the Singapore Red Cross Society’s public appeal.[2]  The appeal specifically called for donations in cash as it is the most efficient means of providing relief assistance; the needed relief items could be purchased in bulk and then delivered and distributed quickly to the victims.

The international donor community, too, is concerned about the effective and accountable use of the money given for Tsunami reconstruction.  In Indonesia, a Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra (MDTF) of US$500 million fund has been specially created to pool donor resources to finance projects and programs to assist in the reconstruction.  The MDTF pools donor resources to support a portfolio of projects and programs within the Government's Master Plan for recovery in Aceh and Nias.[3]  It also serves as a forum for donor coordination for the various projects to regenerate communities and community infrastructure, restore livelihoods and rebuild governance in Tsunami-affected areas.  The MDTF helps to fund the work of the Indonesian government's Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR), the body established to oversee reconstruction and rehabilitation work in Aceh and Nias.  The BRR holds ministerial level authority and has the capacity to eliminate bureaucratic or organisational laziness and undertake autonomous planning and delivery.  For probity, BRR has established an Anti-graft Task Force with a budget of Rp 1 million (US$100,000) to monitor corruption. 

Questions have been raised over international involvement in reconstruction efforts after previous natural disasters. For instance, US Agency for International Development assistance to El Salvador following an earthquake there in 2001 raised questions as to the safety of building materials and techniques used in the reconstruction of homes.  Risks exist for the post-Tsunami rebuilding as well – from the suitability of the design to the quality of materials used.  Asbestos is a commonly used construction material in Sri Lanka, and building contractors resort to sub-quality materials in a practice called “reverse mark-ups” in Indonesia.  Will projects be well carried out when the international spotlight has long since moved on to the next disaster or terrorist attack?  How do we guard against these reconstruction pitfalls? 

In Singapore, a new structure to oversee the use of funds raised from the public and to monitor the progress of various reconstruction projects was set up.  The monies contributed by the public were consolidated in the Singapore Red Cross’ Asia Tidal Waves Fund.  To allocate and disburse the funds, a Tsunami Reconstruction Facilitation Committee (TRFC, a group of heads of civil society organisations) was created to receive, assess and award project funds to civil society groups.  The Committee was set up in January 2005 to help coordinate the people sector's involvement in the reconstruction efforts in the Tsunami-affected countries by evaluating project proposals to tap on the money donated to the Singapore Red Cross.  Apart from people sector projects, the Committee also works with other agencies in supporting key reconstruction projects, such as the building of a barge-pier, a hospital and schools in Aceh and the construction of several schools and a clinic in Sri Lanka.

The committee reports progress in the use of the public donations for the Tsunami reconstruction projects by providing information on the approved projects, by country, sector and amount approved for the project.  To this writing, projects by the Singapore Red Cross, Mercy Relief, Habitat for Humanity, YMCA, Central and Southwest CDC, and the Singapore International Foundation, along with others, have been approved by the TRFC.  The repertoire of projects reflects the broad representation of civic, corporate, religious and special interest organisations in Singapore, and their work focuses on diverse sectors, ranging from community development and housing to health, education and economic recovery.  The Red Cross Society’s website[4] lists the funded projects and regularly reports progress in the projects.

To ensure that the funds are effectively and efficiently allocated, the projects have to undergo strict eligibility requirements for funding evaluated by the TRFC.  The Committee engaged Integrated Project Systems (IPS), an international consulting firm, to develop a tracking, monitoring and reporting system for the disbursement of funds for projects. 

As of September 2005, close to US$ 27.6 million, or over 50% of the donated money, had been allocated to reconstruction efforts in Tsunami-affected areas (Choo, 2005a).  Most was approved for Aceh (65%), followed by Sri Lanka (30%), and the Maldives (5%).  This leaves only about US$ 25.2 million for new reconstruction projects as we enter the height of the reconstruction phase in late 2005 and 2006.  For those who ask: why is there still so much money undisbursed, there is actually precious little left for the remaining reconstruction work just one year into the job.  Reconstruction is a very complex and long-drawn process that takes years.  The BRR (established only in April 2005) has a mandate to work in Aceh and Nias for four years based on the assessed scale of infrastructure reconstruction and livelihood rehabilitation.

Hence, NGOs in Singapore must educate Singaporeans as to how their donated funds are being used and how a measured approach to disbursing funds is beneficial to a coordinated, consultative response to the disaster.  Gradual and deliberate use of funds is a sign, not of laggardly administration, but rather of effective and accountable stewardship of public donations.  Still, this is not an excuse for allowing red tape and inertia to slow down the stream of aid.  Agencies responsible for rebuilding in Aceh were criticized for the slow pace of their efforts, as 65,000 people were still living in tents nine months from the disaster (Wake-up call for Aceh donors, 2005).  In today’s world, there are not many disaster mitigation and developmental challenges that require unplanned international interventions.  Good management of donations must balance the race against time to shelter the homeless and feed the hungry with prudent allocation of money and careful planning and implementation of projects.

Learning for the Future

So what lessons has the Asian Tsunami offered to individual volunteers and donors as well as humanitarian agencies? 

The first is that there is a time for swift action and rapid response;  this is best carried out by organisations with strong and proven emergency response capacities such as the United Nations and the Red Cross/Red Crescent.  In addition, the Tsunami showed that military involvement can be of great use; this includes the militaries of the affected nations as well as those countries invited to assist them. 

Other organisations and individuals trooping in immediately after a disaster merely stretch existing resources.  Although well-intentioned, these volunteers might be more of a burden than a blessing in the early stages.  It is important to note that ‘crowding in’ during the early phase of the disaster was not just the preserve of ‘Tsunami tourists’.  Respected international NGOs were also guilty of a ‘compulsive desire to do good’ in the Tsunami’s wake.

While the impetus to get out in the field and help feels most urgent immediately following a disaster (technology enables images of suffering and destruction from around the world to be broadcast into our living rooms), aid agencies, governments, international organisations, and media can help the long-term prospects of those in disaster zones by engaging in public education of the world’s citizens.  Rather than making a one-off cathartic donation, citizens should be encouraged to see disaster recovery as a long-term process; likewise, while fatiguing, citizen interest and engagement with the tragedy should be long term as well.  Donors should be overseers of the funds they provide, remaining interested throughout the life cycle of the tragedy to ensure that monies pledged are well used.  If Acehnese are still living in temporary shelters almost one year after the disaster, citizens must be encouraged to remain aware of their conditions and to let relevant governments, international agencies, and non-governmental organisations know that they are aware.  Hold relief providers’ feet to the fire to ensure that those in need are not forgotten.  Sustained media interest can be of invaluable assistance in keeping public attention on a particular crisis.  Unfortunately, the media often quickly move on to the next big thing.

Detailed needs assessments, coordination with the affected governments, and consultations with citizens in disaster zones can be conducted as humanitarian agencies gear up to participate in the longer-term processes of relief, reconstruction, and recovery.  Analysis and consultation, reflection and planning, when the natural impulse is to get into the trenches and help, require great discipline.  However, assessments, coordination, and consultation ensure that aid is well-timed, appropriate in nature and kind, and in keeping with the desires, cultural norms, and absorptive capacities of local governments and disaster-affected persons. 

Many in the aid community are used to working in an environment of resource shortages.  One can, it seems, always use more money to offer better health care, more school houses, and better irrigation systems.  However, in the wake of the Tsunami (and perhaps as will be the case with other ‘telegenic disasters’), overall resources were not a problem.  Using the bonanza of resources effectively and in a coordinated way was much more at issue.  Stories of too many organisations on the ground, dividing up territory between them and competing to fly their own flags dogged the Tsunami’s aftermath.  Coordination and consultation take time.  Surely, lessons can be learned from delays in the Indonesian government’s planning process to make for more expeditious results.  But, slow planning is invariably better than no planning.

We must inculcate in the humanitarian community a more holistic sense of its accountability, helping Samaritans to depart from the ‘savior mentality’.  Typically, humanitarian agencies are responsive to the needs and interests of their funders, be they individuals, governments, or foundations.  However, it is especially clear from the Tsunami that other stakeholders are owed accountability as well.  Local governments and disaster-affected persons should not be passive recipients of (often white, Western) largesse.  Those in the disaster zones, those most affected, are those with the greatest stake in how recovery takes place.  They should be ‘subjects’ of the reconstruction of their areas and not just ‘objects’.  They have resources, skills, and preferences to be mobilized in their own service.  They should be consulted as to how funds should be spent.  Similarly, governments, international organisations, and NGOs should also account through public forums to affected persons for how money and resources raised in their names were used.

Lastly, there is no one right way to provide volunteers or donations for disaster relief.  The balance between fast response and thorough planning, the importance of consultation as opposed to quick results is still being worked out in the field, in government offices, and at the headquarters of humanitarian agencies.    While the Sphere Project, grouping the International Red Cross with non-governmental organizations like Oxfam, attempted in 2004 to put together a Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, effectively a code of conduct for those operating in disaster zones, this standard is not well known even among members of the humanitarian community (Sphere Project, 2004).[5]  Nor is the standard binding in any way.  At book length, the standards and accompanying indicators are also somewhat unwieldy, making their operationalization extremely involved.  We are left to learn from experience and apply those best practices we observe.

A UN official from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reflected: “Relief agencies are notorious for not learning from the experience of previous disasters.  They tend to respond to each disaster as if it was the first time” (OCHA Official, 2005).  Let us hope we do not lose the lessons from this last year.  With all our advanced technology, humankind still cannot prevent some natural disasters, or even accurately predict them.  But we can learn to be better prepared and to respond better when they hit.  When we fail to learn from past disasters and take their lessons to heart, then lives may be lost and suffering prolonged needlessly.  This would be an even greater catastrophe.

References

BRR (2005). Aceh masterplan.  Retrieved March 9, 2006, from http://e-aceh-nias.org/index.php?id=master_plan.html.

Choo, W.  (2005a).  How has Singapore helped restore lives of the people in the tsunami affected countries, nine months after the disaster? (press release).  September 23, 2005.

Choo, W.  (2005b).  Remarks at the Singapore Humanitarian Conference, Singapore, August 2005.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2005).  World disasters report 2005.  Retrieved March 9, 2006, from http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2005/index.asp.

Izon, L. (2005).  Volunteer vacations target the tsunami zone. Globe and Mail (Canada), January 15, 2005.

Mangkusubroto, K.  (2005).  The route to a modern Indonesia: rebuilding from zero (public lecture).  Singapore, August 31, 2005.

OCHA Official (Official with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN).  (2005).  Remarks at the Enhancing the capacity and role of NGO networks in disaster : A workshop by the Asian disaster reduction & response network (ADRRN), Chennai, India, August 2005.

Sphere Project (2004).  Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response, Oxford: Oxfam Publishing. 

Wake-up call for Aceh donors (2005).  Straits Times (Singapore), October 5, 2005, 13.