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~ Louis Galambos and Eric John Abrahamson 2002

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ONE

The Race

In the twilight at the Los Angeles Coliseum, sprinter Carl Lewis bounced on his roes, shook his arms loose, and then stepped inro the blocks. From high in the stands, where Sam Ginn sat, you could pick ou(Lewis wearing a red USA singlet and shorts and sporting a distinctive square, brush-cut hairstyle. Slowly, the chams of "USA, USA" subsided and a tense quiet enveloped the stadium. It was a perfect southern California evening, warm and clear. A night for making history. Alrhough the polirics of the Cold War were ever presem – the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. boycott of the I\10scow Olympics in 1980, and now the absence of the Soviets and their allies from the games in 1984-rhey seemed banished ro rhe shadows tonight. Lewis hoped to vanquish those shadows by winning four gold medals, just as his idol Jesse Owens had done, triumphing over politics in Hitler's 1936 Olympics in Berlin. The IOO-meter dash was Lewis's first test.

Rising with the crowd for the start, Sam Ginn watched the runners come to the set position. Tall and trim, and looking considerably less than his 47 years, Ginn relished the moment: the sudden quiet in the stadium, the flickering of the Olympic flame at the western end of the stadium. Like Lewis, Ginn had been born in Alabama. He was raised in Anniston, a small city that embodied many of the disappointed industrial dreams of the post-Civil War South. As a child in a working-class family, Ginn had dreamed of crossing over the tracks to the side of the city where big houses lined the boulevard and where people had the money to travel to events like the Olympics. In high school, sports gave him his first opportunity to enjoy a privileged status, and he had developed a taste for winning. Smart, intensely competitive, and personable, Ginn had reached Los Angeles by racing up the corporate ladder over the course of a 24-year career with the largest company in the world - American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T).

Now a top executive with the newly launched enterprise known as Pacific Telesis Group (one of rhe seven "Baby Bells" creared by rhe breakup of AT&T), Ginn was a guest at this event, hosted by the company he had spent all of his career serving. As a result of the breakup, AT&T had become Pacific Telesis's largest customer, competitor, and supplier in the marketplace for telecommunications; it was AT&T that had provided Ginn with tickets to this track and field event. Being wooed by his former employer, however, was only one of the many strange aspects of the world Ginn confronted in 1984. The settlement in the antirrust suit had completely restructured his economic setting, seriously disrupting his sense of mission and purpose in life.

For nearly a quarter of a cemury he and his peers in the Bell System had believed they were the public stewards of one of the greatest engineering feats in the history of mankind - the national telephone network. With the breakup, however, regulators and the courts had made it clear that competition, not Bell System planners, would shape the future. Ginn and his peers in the other Baby Bells were still trying to understand what kind of future lay ahead of them. Many were giddy with the prospect of emering new lines of business and developing the potential of new technologies. After all, they reasoned, their companies had access ro enormous amounts of capital and tens of millions of existing customers. The capabilities of as history had shown, were prodigious. Many people their organizations, on Wall Street, however, feared that - because of their size and bureaucratic organizations - the Baby Bells would lumber down the track and finish far behind the fresh-faced newcomers to the telecommunications industry. Ginn favored neither of these two extremes. He was cautiously optimistic~abour Pacific Telesis and the industry. Bur in 1984 neither he nor the other Bell execurives had a positive fix on their prospects, and none of them could possibly understand how much the past would shape their future.

That future was on Ginn's mind at the Olympics because he carried ______ while arrending all of the events - a device that most people had never seen before. Ir was a brand-new \$3,500 Mororola porrable relephone. Known in the fledgling wireless industry as "the brick," the heavy, putty-colored device with a black face was one of the first portable cellular phones to be offered to consumers. It looked like it should be used by someone at NASA, not by a fan in the stands of the Los Angeles Coliseum. When Ginn turned it on, the phone transmitted radio signals ro a tower that was part Martin Cooper and in on phones in vehicles portability. The result

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
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Marrin Cooper and the Motorola DynaTAC phone- While the Bell System focused on phones in vehicles, Marrin Cooper and his team at Motorola concentrated on ponabiJity. The result was the DynaTAC, known in the industry as "the brick."

of the cellular wireless network Ginn's company had raced to complete in time for the Summer Olympics.

People stared and listened when Gino made a call from his seat. They nudged their friends and pointed. Frequently, Ginn turned and offered them the phone. In a warm voice that srill betrayed traces of his Alabama roots, he asked, "Would you like to call home?"1 Ginn showed them how to punch in the numbers. Then inevitably they would shout to some distanr friend or relative – inaugurating what would become one of the riruals of mobile telephony – the statement of location: "You won't believe this. I'm *in* the stands at the Olympics, talking on this radio phone." A Japanese

businessman called Tokyo. Another man called his wife thousands of miles away. Each was delighted in a way that Ginn would never forget.

The mobile phone broughr people together and gave rhem a new freedom. No longer forced to wait unril they could "get to a phone" to share news wirh friends and family, people could reach out and touch someone from wherever they were. Here in the midst of the crowd in the Coliseum they could report on events live, and those listening on the other end could share in that exciting momenr. Watching people talk on his phone and pass it through the stands, Sam Ginn had an epiphany. He recognized for the first rime that these new phones represented more rhan an incremental improvement on existing technology. They created a whole new paradigm for communications. For years he had tried ro imagine how Alexander Graham Bell must have felt at the beginning of the telephone era, at the realization that his new technology could become basic to the lives of millions of people. In Los Angeles, Ginn sensed that he was experiencing an "Alexander Graham Bell moment."

As the gun sounded down on the track, Ginn watched Lewis and the other sprinters bolr oUt of the blocks. Over the first fifry meters, Lewis lagged behind the two leaders, but then he changed gears and accelerated. Throwing his arms up at the finish, he Won by nearly two meters. Ginn clapped with the crowd as Lewis rook a huge American flag from a fan. He jogged through his vicrory lap beaming and waving to his cheering fans. Already rhe sprinrer had embarked on rhe path to hisrory.'

Ginn had a sense rhar day that he, too) was at the start of something big. BUt while a sprinter like Carl Lewis could look down the track, see his destination, and know what it would take ro get there, Ginn faced a more uncertain furure. It was *obvious* in 1984 to everyone in telecommunications that rhe industry was changing

maybe even the global leveL But it was not at all obvrous at the national and would play in this transformation. Nor was it clear whether Pacific Telesis or any of the orher existing firms in the industry would be the leaders who would champion new technologies, styles of organization, or approaches to doing business. Over the next few years, it was sometimes hard for Ginn and his peers to tell what race they were running and who exactly was the competition.

For consumers around the world, however, wireless Was an obvious winner, an innovation that inrroduced a whole new way of life. Today, there are more cell phones in use rhan personal compUters, and increasingly people Connect to rhe Internet through a wireless device rather than a PC. Awkward as it was, the Motorola brick was thus launching something exrremely i nauts. Atd person ro d anyone, an~

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exrremely important for millions of people. It was not designed for astronauts. Ar rhe beginning of the wireless era in 1984, it allowed any ordinary person to do what had been a piped ream for decades - communicate with anyone, anytime, anywhere.

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Consumer enthusiasm for wireless prompted a race ro develop a new wireless world. The race, which is the central narrarive of our story, rook place amidst a series of dramatic rransformations that occurred around the world in technology, politics, and rrade, and we have rried to describe these transitions and the way they played out in wireless. The race was between entrepreneurs and their organizations, and we devore considerable attention to the nature of thar entrepreneurship and its role in a long-established industry experiencing sudden change. Back in the darkesr days of the Grear Depression of the 19305, when scholars of "the dismal science" were struggling to explain the collapse of the global economy as well as the factors thar would lead rhe world back ro happier days, Harvard University republished a stUdy by Moravian-born economist Joseph Schumpeter. He was an unusual scholar who had many years before advanced a unique theory of economic development. Schum peter's ideas about economic growth flew in the face of neoclassical and Marxist explanations. Innovation, he said, is the engine of economic growth, and rhe agent of innovation is the Capitalist economic progress was inherently uneven but enentrepreneur.] trepreneurs, if allowed to continue, would inevitably spur anorher surge of growth.

Schum peter told his readers that entrepreneurs were not intellecruals, tinkers, or inventors. They were individuals in business who saw rhe potential for a new product, service, or process, or who perceived the opportunities in a new source of raw material, a style of organization, or also had the temerity to act despire the serious a market. Entrepreneurs challenges they faced. Uncertainty stemmed from a lack of reliable data. The path ahead was always unclear when innovation was taking place. Doing what was familiar was always easier than doing something new. Sociery normally resisted change, making it difficult for rhe entrepreneur to obrain capital. Banks were conservarive. Established interests - public as well as private - that were threatened by innovation rhrew up roadblocks Even if buyers could see the benefit of some new product or to change. service, rhey ofren preferred what they already knew. To succeed, the entrepreneur had to overcome the resistance of individuals, organizations, and sometimes an entire sociery.

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For the most part, economists, public officials, and the general public ignored Schumperer's ideas for decades. He labored away, continuing to elaborare his rheory and history of capitalism, but meanwhile economics was rransformed in the Iare 1930s and 19405 by rhe ideas of John Maynard Keynes.4 For several decades following the Second World War, the Keynesian model and narional planning were rhe centerpieces of political economy in the capitalist democracies. In recent years, however, the Schumpeterian perspective on economic growth has experienced a remarkable revival as academics, business leaders, and policymakers - the neo-Schumpeterians - have sought to understand the dynamics of capitalism and the intricare relationships between economic growth and entrepreneurship in industries like wireless.5

Thanks in large part ro rhe research of Alfred D. Chandler, Richard Nelson, and ocher scholars, neo-Schumpeterians recognize that much of the innovation that takes place in modern capitalism comes out of very large corporations. Schumpeter was suspicious of great corporare combines, nor but because they rended ro be organized because they were monopolistic along bureaucratic lines. Bureaucracy, Schumpcter said, was the enemy of the entrepreneur. It would stifle creativity. His ideal entrepreneur was the great individual who, in the nineteenth-century style, built and dominated an innovarive business empire. It remained for a host of hisrorians, economists, and business school analysts ro show how, in the twentieth centrury, large corporations began to perform the entrepreneurial function. The most obvious manifestation of this major economic transirion was indusrrial research and developmenr (R&D), which yielded new products and new processes. Meanwhile, the £Op executives and managers of the corporations were organizing and reorganizing their enterprises in an ongoing effort £0 improve efficiency and foster further innovation. While this was happening, neither the old style of heroic entrepreneur nor the small innovative business disappeared; both remained imporranr aspecrs of capitalist development. BUt they coexisted with large, multinational enterprises that achieved innovation rhrough bureaucratic means.6

By polirical fiat, the modern wireless industry included both types of entrepreneurs. Early in the 1980s, the U.S. government made a fateful decision thar would turn the development of wireless into a race berween these two kinds of innovarors. In every city across the country, two companies would be allowed to offer cellular telephone service. One would be run by people (like Sam Ginn) who had spent their entire careers working for AT&T or some smaller local relephone company. The other would be launched by individuals and organizations from outside the Bell System. This expel rhe furure grand lega after the b In the sl of entrepre legends. A ro place tI porrunity challenged dustry. M, his vision. Confidenr wanted m(on the fled But Sam and the ch offers us ir or highly I later Air T(Like their western Be lar as a bir like McCa respondinJ gular, and United Sta 60 percent Their rn fone. Led wireless r:; every cont rhe race rc focused 01 tion, Gent ditions. C other had the British common the future.

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
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This experiment with a contrived form of dual competition would shape the future of the enrire relecommunications industry and ensure that the grand legacy of the Bell System would nor quickly wither away in the era after the breakup.

In rhe short history of the wireless industry, Craig McCaw was the kind of entrepreneur who delighted Schumperer and still roday makes American legends. An industry outsider from the Seattle area who risked everything to place the biggest bet possible on an emerging technology and an opportunity that he believed would change the world, McCaw and his team challenged the Baby Bells in the race for dominance in the U.S. wireless industry. McCaw became a major rival (0 Sam Gino and the Baby Bells, and his vision and daring made him a billionaire when he sold out to AT&T. Confident rhar there would be a mass market because whar customers wamed most was the freedom to roam, McCaw had a powerful influence on rhe fledgling industry.'

But Sam Ginn's story may rell us more about the development of wireless and the changes raking place today in global telecommunications. Ir also offers us insighr inro the future of other industries that were once state-run or highly regulated. Ginn and his managers ar Pacific Telesis Group and later AirTouch Communications launched their revolution from the inside. Like their peers at the six other Baby Bells (Nynex, Bell Atlantic, Southwestern Bell, BellSouth, U.S. West, and Ameritech), they were handed cellular as a birthrighr wirh rhe 1984 breakup of rhe Bell Sysrem. Entrepreneurs like McCaw pushed them ro become more flexible and comperitive, and by responding successfully the former Bell System companies - Verizon, Cingular, and AT&T Wireless - emerged on top of the wireless world in the United Stares. At rhe end of 2001, these companies controlled more than 60 percent of the marker.

Their main challenger roday is an upsrarr British company called Vodafone. Led by Chris Genr, Vodafone has grabbed rhe inside lane in rhe wireless race by assembling an intimidating collection of assets on nearly every continent. Wirh its acquisition of AirTouch in 1999, Vodafone began rhe race toward global consolidarion while irs main competitors were still focused on consolidaring national markers. As a result of that acquisition, Gent had to integrate two very different corporate cultures and traditions. One was deeply roored in the history of rhe Bell System; the other had succeeded by challenging the dominant relephone company in rhe British market. Forrunarely for Gent, the two organizarions shared a common straregy based on the assumption thar wireless was rhe way of the future.



Sam Ginn - Sales and marketing were far more important ro wireless than they had been to the Bell System. As CEO of AirTouch, Sam Ginn cultivated a new image that emphasized his role as the company's lead salesman.

AirTouch was a desirable acquisirion because Sam Ginn had distanced himself and his organization from some, but not all, of the values of the bureaucrars and engineers who had long guided the Bell System. In order to become fast-moving, cusromer-focused, and innovative competirors, Ginn and his colleagues had abandoned crucial elements of the Bell way. They had made many mistakes, and they had never completely shucked off the Bell culrure. Bur their su and organization had en prise in the world by 1991 this transformation – bo! effects of this sryle of en global economy.s

From this saga of late major rhemes emerge. rnents with wireless rel< it was nOt until rhe mil to large numbers of COI world we know today d the integra red circuit, in Revolution. These new' just as surely as warerp economy forward in rhe early nineteenth centuril development of the rni(personal fortunes that s

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From this saga of late rwentierh-century entrepreneurship, three other major rhemes emerge. The first involves technological change. Experiments with wireless telephones began nearly a hundred years ago, but ir was nor until rhe mid-1980s rhat rhis innovation was made available to large numbers of consumers. To a considerable degree, rhe wireless world we know today depends on the development of the rransistor and rhe integrated circuir, innovations that have catalyzed the Third Industrial Revolution. These new rechnologies have driven change around the globe jusr as surely as waterpower and the steam engine propelled rhe British economy forward in the First Industrial Revolution of the eighreenth and early nineteenth centuries. Informarion Age technologies have fostered the development of the microcomputer and the Interner and built the great personal fortunes rhar successful entrepreneurship always yidds.

Wireless is a disrinctly Third Industrial Revolution industry. Today, miniaturization and increases in computing power are the basis for the new wireless world that fits in the palm of your hand. Although the impact of computers and broadband telecommunications has been discussed in hundreds of books, the social and economic transformations enabled by "anytime, anywhere" wireless communications are only just beginning to be understood.9

Anorher theme involves political change. Around rhe world, the failure of state-owned or highly regulated industries to sustain a high rare of innovation has led to deregulation and privatization. As a result, former monopolists in large industries, including telecommunicarions, have for some time been srruggling to become effective global competitors. At the same time, regulators have been striving to redefine their roles as they shifr from being watchdogs for consumers in a monopoly environment to managers of markers in a world of partially regulared competition. In California, where AirTouch originated, recent regularory efforts to manage the transition to competitive utility markets have been highly criticized. But neither the critics nor the regulators seem to have noriced rhat most of the state's conremporary difficulties with electrical power were foreshadowed by rhe rransition (0 comperitive markets in relecommunications during the 1980s and 1990s. That is when business executives, politicians,



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and regulators aU discovered, as Sam Ginn did, that it is difficult to leave the pasr behind. Despite enormous changes, the telecommunications industry and its political overseers are still deeply roo red in the engineering, managerial, and regulatOry concepts of the previous century.IO

The modern wireless industry became a global phenomenon very early in irs development, and this provides our final major rheme. Although corporations and nations have been trading in a global economy for hundreds of years, new transportation and information technologies and new policies tOward trade have stirched tOgether the global economy in a novel way, expanding the srage upon which political and economic institUtions must actY Sam Ginn and his team came onto this stage from a relarively nalve company _ Pa; posirion as managers of a large-scale telecommunications cific Telesis Group - operating in only rwo American states, California and Nevada. In 1994, Pacific Telesis spun off its wireless operations to create AirTouch Communications. with Ginn as chief executive officer (CEO). By then, AirTouch had already become a global company with wireless networks and partners on four continents. BUt while AirTouch had beit was not a traditional multinational come a global organization, Corporation. Ir built its domestic and global enterprise in a new way, using joint venture partnerships and strategic technological relationships firm structures characteristic of rhe most innovative Third Industrial Revolution industries. 12

This book rhus offers a personal, a corporate, and a general economic perspective on the wireless industry and a rapidly changing global economy. The study focuses on AirTouch and the efforts made by its managers to combine the technical and organizational virtuosity of the Bell System with the light-footed performance needed in wireless. This was not an easy combination to create. Around rhe world, former monopolists operating within national boundaries - including telecommunications giants like AT&T, Verizon, BellSourh, and SBC in the United Stares, as well as Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, Brirish Telecommunications, and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph - are engaged in a similar struggle to become global innovators.

Like telephone regulators and managers around the world today, rhe early wireless entrepreneurs were often baffled by events beyond their control and uncertain about the future of their enterprises. None of the wireless pioneers had a crystal ball. Many people believed in rhe early days of cellular rhar rhis new technology would succeed only as a convenience for rhe urban rich and powerful, a marginal business for existing wireline companies. The pessimists failed to see either the technological potential of wireless or rhe J was certainly the, and women were e ican dream.

The Race

of wireless or the larent demand for a new form of communication. This was certainly the case ar AT&T in the 1960s, when a generation of men and women were entering the Bell System looking for a ricker to the American dream.

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