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Abstract

How do party members manage recurring and divisive foreign policy agendas? Do they stay the course or switch their position? The annual decision in Congress regarding the extension of China's most favored nation (MFN) status was a high-profile foreign policy battle between the anti-China coalition and its pro-China counterpart. To test theories of members' vote choice and change, this article analyzes the U.S. House of Representatives roll call votes over China trade policy from 1990 through 2000. Despite the conventional wisdom of voting stability over a recurring agenda, some members engaged in a substantial amount of vote switching. Changes in voting context such as party status, constituency interests, campaign finance, and seniority contributed to members' position shifts. The findings of this study suggest that cross-cutting domestic interests over foreign policy debates in the post-Cold War era lead party members to recalculate the benefits of vote stability and the costs of vote switching.

Keywords

U.S. Congress, post-Cold War foreign policy, trade with China, vote switching, position taking

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There are 200,000 American jobs that are directly linked to trade with China. Cutting off trade with China would be a congressionally mandated pink slip for U.S. workers.

—Rep. Bob Matsui (D-CA)¹

Granting China permanent NTR status might be economically rewarding, but it would be morally wrong.

—Rep. Gene Green (D-TX)

There are principled people on both ends of the spectrum who tend to respect each other more than those who stick a wet finger in the air to see how to vote.

—Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA)²

In the post–Cold War era, congressional members often confront cross-cutting foreign policy agendas. Diverse interests from business, labor unions, environmentalists, and human rights and religious freedom activists vigorously compete to get their voices heard loud. Domestic cleavages intensified and congressional deference declined (Friedberg, 2000; Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2007; Lindsay, 1994). After all, the abrupt conclusion of the Cold War and rapid consolidation of the global economy has restructured the relationship between the legislative and executive branches in national politics. Legislative context for congressional members over foreign policy has increasingly become disjointed, diffuse, and divisive (Scott, 1998; Skidmore & Gates, 1997).

Yet despite this new pluralistic and cross-cutting voting environment in the post–Cold War era, the conventional wisdom of lawmakers' voting behavior is that members of U.S. Congress rarely change their position. Congressional scholars have long identified voting stability on the same topic over time as a key feature of legislative behavior (Arnold, 1990; Asher & Weisberg, 1978; Clausen, 1973; Fiorina, 1974; Kingdon, 1989; Poole & Rosenthal, 1997; Smith, 1981). First of all, representatives vote consistently so that they can rely on their voting history as an effective voting cue. Arnold (1990) points out that “for the recurrent issues, they need only determine if their previous votes have been well received and whether the political terrain has changed in the interim” (p. 87). Hibbing (1991) also notices that “representatives, like most of us, utilize the past as a benchmark for understanding the present and perhaps the future” (p. 6). In addition, members of Congress generally refrain from changing their voting records, which will haunt them in the election seasons. There is nothing any campaigns wanted less than to being branded as a “flip-flopper.” Lawmakers “find it difficult to explain

inconsistency to their constituents” (Kingdon, 1989, p. 277). Poole and Rosenthal (1997) expect members of Congress to “simply enter and maintain a fixed position until they die, retire, or are defeated” (p. 74).

Is this traditional understanding of members’ voting stability still true with high-profile foreign policy agendas that are repeatedly divisive? Do they stick to their initial position or switch their previous decision? Which set of factors that govern roll call voting lead members to approach the same topic over time from different perspectives? To test theories of vote choice and change by members of Congress over recurring foreign policy agendas, this article examines the debates over U.S. trade policy toward China in the 1990s, which provides a uniquely natural experiment opportunity. From the Tiananmen Square tragedy in 1989 through China’s joining of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, lawmakers continued to debate whether to renew or revoke the most favored nation (MFN) status for China. As China constituted the United States’ second largest source of imports and its fifth largest export market, the U.S. Congress as an institution consistently signed up for free trade with China.³

Political reality, however, was never far below the surface. Taking a broader perspective of China policy, ranging from consumer protection to national security, the debates over China’s MFN extension roused passions on all sides. Divisive and symbolic China issues exposed deep fissures among lawmakers. Responding to this complex nature of China trade policy in the 1990s, some members of Congress remained reasonably steadfast and continued to stand by their initial vote choice. Representatives like F. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and Charles Stenholm (D-TX) never switched their respective anti-China and pro-China position. On the contrary, other lawmakers made frequent vote reversals over the same recurring China policy. Some senior members’ vote switches are quite astonishing. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), a conservative Republican and future chair of the House Committee on International Relations, changed his annual position seven times out of the 11 voting opportunities.⁴ Rep. Joe Moakley (D-MA), a bread-and-butter Democrat and dean of the Massachusetts delegation, also engaged in the same number of vote switching over six Congresses. Figure 1 shows the number of vote switchers over China trade policy in the U.S. House from 1989 through 2000.

This article provides a microanalysis of the sources of vote stability and switching by members in the post-Cold War foreign policy making. I first examine a series of Congress-to-Congress roll call votes by returning lawmakers. Then, I analyze a unique set of panel data comprising the incumbent members of Congress and their repeated votes over time to explore the

sources of vote choice and change. In his “switcher analysis,” Krehbiel (1998) pointed out that “changes in behavior are most likely to occur among decision makers who are indifferent, or nearly indifferent, between two policies” (p. 97). The findings from the roll call analyses in this article also suggest that some members hardly change their position, with their hands tied up by solid constituency interests or extreme ideological convictions or disproportionate campaign finance. At the same time, some other rank-and-file members often take on the highly publicized foreign policy agenda and take a vote-switching strategy to advance their electoral and partisan goals.

The article proceeds as follows. I offer a brief overview of party politics of U.S. trade policy making toward China from the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 to the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) battle in 2000. Then, I review the existing literature on voting stability versus vote switching and propose several hypotheses about members’ voting behavior over recurring foreign policy agendas. Next, I present the test results from logistic regression of the Congress-to-Congress vote choices, random-effects probit regression analysis of roll call vote panel data, and Poisson regression model of vote change counts. Finally, I suggest some concluding remarks to emphasize diverse strategies by members in the era of polarized politics and global economy.

The Partisan Politics of Trade Policy Toward China

Trade relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been marked by three decades of rapid growth since the recognition of China in 1979. President Carter established full diplomatic relations with the PRC and waived the Jackson–Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which prohibited the granting of MFN status to any nonmarket economy that did not allow free emigration. Whereas some conservative Republican members opposed the so-called “One China” policy, many of the Cold War hawks, including Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA), a staunch anti-Communist and leading advocate of human rights, strongly supported Carter’s recognition of the Peking regime (Zelizer, 2008).⁵ From 1979 through 1989, no U.S. president had confronted any congressional opposition to the granting of trade privilege to China (Johnson, 2006).⁶

This honeymoon period came to a sudden end when the Chinese government forcefully repressed prodemocracy demonstrators on June 4, 1989. The brutal repression in Beijing in 1989 fired up the China debate on Capitol Hill. Suddenly, the annual process of renewing China’s MFN status by Congress became a major institutional and partisan battle over China policy (Mann, 1998; Shoch, 2001; Suettinger, 2003). China trade votes quickly became a




Figure 1. The number of vote switchers each year over China trade policy, 1989-2000

vehicle for both China supporters and China bashers in reshaping their own stance toward a symbolic American policy toward the world's most populous country. In 1990, Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY) introduced a House resolution to disapprove of the Bush administration's waiver of the Jackson–Vanik amendment for China, which had earlier been announced on May 24, 1990. The outspoken conservative from upstate New York argued that Congress should act “to send a message to the angry old men who are hiding out in the so-called Great Hall of the People” (1990 *Congressional Quarterly [CQ] Almanac*, p. 768). The House passed not only Solomon's disapproval resolution by a bipartisan 247-174 vote, but also endorsed a bill placing human rights conditions on the MFN extension for 1991. The Senate, however, never acted on its own legislation or any of the House-passed bills or resolutions against China trade.

Then, the 102nd Congress (1991-1992) witnessed a climax of the China MFN debate when the lower chamber passed joint resolutions disapproving the favorable trade status for China in both 1991 and 1992 (Li & Drury, 2004). The Democratic majority in Congress claimed that they took the lead in asserting a tougher China policy because President George H. W. Bush, a former U.S. envoy to Beijing, was too gentle on China. On the Senate side, however, majority leader Sen. George J. Mitchell (D-ME) found Republican

senators highly supportive of the White House on trade policy toward China. Senate Democrats, on the contrary, were split. A majority of farm-state Democrats feared losing the lucrative Chinese market, which bought more than \$500 million of U.S. wheat products in 1990 (1991 *CQ Almanac*, 45-B).

After having won the three-way presidential contest in 1992, President Clinton announced his plan to set human rights goals that China would have to meet before he would consider a renewal of MFN status. Siding with the president sharing the same party label, the two leading congressional critics of China, Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell and California Democrat Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), gave up their hostile positions. In particular, the San Francisco congresswoman, in an about-face, voted for free trade and claimed that “it is very important to get a big vote behind the president” (1993 *CQ Almanac*, p. 184). Even when the Clinton administration in 1994 decided to discard her previous position to link China’s human rights to privileged trade status, congressional rules still enabled Democrats to rally behind their president. Using the so-called “king of the hill” procedure, House Democrats adopted a bill to codify Clinton’s executive order renewing China’s MFN status.

Then, in 1995, Congress changed hands, putting Republicans in control for the first time in 40 years, and the GOP tried to reshape the China debate in Washington D.C. Particularly, the freshman class of Republicans, under the “Contract with America,” was apparently less supportive of free trade in general than their traditional probusiness colleagues. Instead, those Republican backbenchers riding the wave of the “Gingrich Revolution” of 1994 mid-term elections weighed in on economic nationalism (Conley, 1999), fiscal responsibility (Broz, 2005), and religious freedom (Karol, 2005). When it came to China policy, GOP party ranks rallied behind the China Policy Act of 1995 (416 yeas and 10 nays), which was sponsored by Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-NE), the chairman of the House Foreign Relations Asia Subcommittee. The legislation without any trade sanction provisions, however, was regarded as nothing but a symbolic gesture. Later, Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-VA) offered a motion to table the joint resolution to disapprove China’s MFN status, and the House agreed to the motion by a 321-107 vote.⁷ From 1996 through 1999, the House continued to reject the idea of trade protectionism against China (141-286 in 1996, 173-259 in 1997, 166-264 in 1998, 170-260 in 1999).⁸

In 2000, his final year in the White House, President Clinton made an all-out effort to win congressional support of China’s permanent NTR status.⁹ Clinton considered China trade policy as one of his “legacy” issues (Shoch, 2001; Suettinger, 2003).¹⁰ Roughly in need of support from 70 House Democrats, President Clinton worked across the aisle to reach traditionally protrade

Republicans in Congress (Victor, 2003). Trying hard to take back control of the House, however, Democratic leadership knew that the passage of PNTR for China (HR 4444) would greatly upset the very constituents they desperately needed during the November election (Jackson & Engel, 2003). Labor unions, human rights activists, and environmental groups, as well as conservative veterans groups and religious organizations, were all opposed to granting permanent free trade status to China.

In fact, as the House approached the final vote on China's PNTR on May 24, 2000, more than 100 lawmakers had not yet made up their minds. Traditional probusiness Republicans were placed at odds with newly elected social conservative colleagues over the issue of religious freedom in China (Rosin & Mufson, 2000). In spite of the leadership push for free trade with China, some Republican members still expressed their frustrations over worsening religious freedom in China and national security complexity. Rep. Robert B. Aderholt of Alabama as a staunch religious conservative and Rep. Duncan Hunter of California as a defense hawk, while both being cross-pressured, ultimately defected from their party position and decided to vote nay. Democrats are no different. Rep. Martin T. Meehan (D-MA) found free trade with China helpful for flourishing high-tech industries in his district of northwest Boston. At the same time, the cosponsor of campaign finance reform in Congress was deeply concerned that PNTR status for China would ultimately render irrelevant external pressures on the country's handling of human rights and intellectual property rights (2000 *CQ Almanac*). Moderate Democrats, who were calling for engagement policy toward China, found it hard to persuade their labor-friendly ranks to sign on to a trade deal with China (Jackson & Engel, 2003).¹¹

When members of Congress began to engage in this pivotal debate over China's PNTR status, House Minority Whip David E. Bonior (D-MI) turned out to be a leading opponent of the free trade legislation, acting against his own party's president. Bonior, a longtime supporter of labor unions, was joined by Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman of New York, the Republican chair of the House International Relations Committee and the cochair of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus Frank R. Wolf (R-VA). Both Gilman and Wolf have been influential critics of China's repression of human rights and religious freedom. On the side of supporting PNTR was the Republican leadership, including the Rules Committee chair and California congressman David Dreier and Representative Bill Archer (R-TX), the Ways and Means Committee chair. In the end, the House GOP leadership incorporated a proposal written by Rep. Levin (D-MI) and Bereuter (R-NE) into the PNTR bill, which greatly enhanced the prospects of final passage by the provision of

Table 1. House Roll Call Votes on the Extension of China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) Status, 1990-2000

Year	Total (yea-nay)	Republicans	Democrats	Northern Democrats	Southern Democrats
1990	247-174	81-90	166-84	117-53	49-31
1991	223-204	51-112	171-92	119-60	53-32
1992	258-135	76-79	181-56	121-41	60-15
1993	105-318	63-108	41-210	25-143	16-67
1994	75-356	36-141	38-215	27-145	11-70
1995 ^a	321-107	178-52	143-54	96-40	47-14
1996	141-286	65-167	75-119	62-75	13-44
1997	173-259	79-147	93-112	74-76	19-36
1998	166-264	78-149	87-115	73-76	14-39
1999	170-260	71-150	98-110	81-72	17-38
2000 ^b	237-197	164-57	73-138	43-114	30-24

Note: All votes, except those mentioned in footnotes a and b, suggest that a "nay" was a vote in support of the president's position of free trade with China.

a. 1995 vote was on the motion to table so that a "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position of the MFN extension for China.

b. 2000 vote was on the final passage of permanent normal trade relations for China so that "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

"anti-surge safeguards." The provision would enable the president to increase tariffs and quotas to provide relief to specific domestic industries and workers, when the U.S. International Trade Commission regarded a surge of Chinese imports as threatening to disrupt the U.S. market. The final vote over the PNTR legislation in 2000 was 237-197, with more than one third of House Democrats (73-138) joining nearly three quarters of Republican members (164-57) to usher China into the new global economy (see Table 1).

Vote Stability Versus Position Switch: Preference, Procedure, and Party

The subject of vote stability versus vote switching in legislative politics has been an enduring research question for the study of Congress. Congressional scholars have long observed that parties and members do not always stand by their collective party positions or individual voting records. Downs (1957) earlier confirmed that parties try to *shift* their positions toward the median voter in elections. Realignment theorists use the notion of "critical elections" to capture the mechanism of dramatic policy shifts in Congress (Brady, 1988;

Burnham, 1970; Key, 1955). Some scholars also suggest that issues such as race, abortion, and defense spending have evolved over time to induce party leaders to revisit the configuration of coalition politics (Adams, 1997; Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Fordham, 2007). In addition, Miller and Schofield's (2003) focus on the "flanking move" enhances our understanding of how political parties strategically relocate their positions over the space of social and economic policies.

At the individual level, position change and vote switching often occur in shifting political contexts. Whether representatives maintain credible voting records or make responsive position changes have been a core issue of democracy. In a seminal analysis of vote changes, Asher and Weisberg (1978) suggested that vote changes would occur because of the systematic sources of change: long-term issue evolution, membership replacement, and change in partisan control of the White House. Many other students of Congress have also observed that congressional members sometimes reverse their vote choices for the purpose of credit-claiming strategies (Mayhew, 1974), legislative career building (Hibbing, 1991; Stratmann, 2000), supporting or opposing the president's agenda (Biglaiser, Jackson, & Peake, 2004; LeoGrande & Brenner, 1993; Meinke, 2005; Uslaner, 1998), overriding presidential veto (Cameron, 2000; Krehbiel, 1998), reassuring party defection decisions (Nokken, 2000), and adjusting their own policy or ideological positions (Espino & Canon, 2009).

Given the importance of U.S.–China trade relations, it is not surprising to notice that a substantial body of research has investigated what determined legislators' vote choices over the renewal of China's MFN status in the 1990s. Victor (2003) and Karol (2005) focused on the two-dimensionality of China trade policy and examined how interest groups and political parties strategically used the China bills in Congress for opening up a policy gate and introducing a new issue. Focusing on a strange alliance between liberals and conservatives in the context of the increased ideological polarization, Nokken (2003) elaborated on the emergence of an "ends against the middle" coalition for China's NTR extensions. The China's NTR extension debates provided Jackson and Engel (2003) with an interesting case of "unusually high salience and public attention" (p. 447), when they found that labor political action committees (PACs) followed a strategy of punishment for some selected Democrats.

Members of Congress not only comply with constituency pressures and interest group demands but also weigh in on strategic choices and procedural contexts when they make their roll call voting decisions over China policy. Explaining why procedural legislation is quite appealing among lawmakers,

Lindsay (1994) points out that procedural measure, not substantive legislation, makes it easier for legislators to avoid blame and to shift the burden onto the executive branch. Nokken (2003) noted that if members of Congress had truly wanted to restructure the trade policy-making process toward China, they should have introduced new legislation enabling a new voting coalition to form on this issue. Instead, until the battle over legislating the PNTR in 2000, members of Congress had chosen to stick to the joint resolution measures. Once the president issues the annual extension of China's free trade status, it becomes highly unlikely that Congress will revoke the president's decision. Suettinger (2003) explains that

[b]y statute, a disapproval resolution must be reported out of committee within 30 days of the June 3 deadline for extending MFN (NTR). It is not amendable and debate is limited to 20 hours, while the resolution must be approved by August 31. (p. 461)

Interchamber dynamics of trade policy making also led many House members to recalculate the costs and benefits of vote stability and switching over China's MFN extension. As Karol (2007) recently reaffirmed, senators are less protectionist, but more free-trading than House members. Particularly when there is barely a remote chance that 67 senators will join together to override presidential veto against any protectionist measures, the China MFN decision often turned out to be a "free vote" for members from the lower chamber. Under these procedural constraints and contextual opportunities, House members are inclined to be more interested in position-taking strategies than in coalition-building movements. Instead of fighting and negotiating for separate legislation addressing the diverse and controversial China issue, lawmakers could easily score political points by casting their own votes to express their positions about China. Consequently, voting on trade policy toward China provided members with a rare legislative opportunity to publicly express various concerns over China.

The existing literature on vote switching has rarely examined the case of recurring foreign policy agendas on Capitol Hill. My roll call vote analyses blend together the accounts of constituency pressures, ideological preferences, partisan strategies, and procedural constraints when legislators confront a divisive foreign policy agenda. Little research has systematically addressed members' vote stability and switching over this key foreign policy issue in the post-Cold War world, except for the pooled trade vote analyses by Peake, Jackson, and Biglaiser (2007). They grouped together the five trade measures from 1993 to 2001 for the investigation of vote consistency in

Congress, and found that members' preference conversion influenced changing trade policies by the U.S. House.¹² Still, their five significant trade votes do not constitute the "recurring" dynamic that characterizes the annual China NTR debates. The answer to the question of when and why representatives *sustained or shifted* their vote choices over the same China trade bills remains elusive. This article tries to fill this gap by investigating returning members' voting decisions over time. I present five hypotheses along three dimensions: constituency characteristics, member characteristics, and party politics.

Hypotheses and Methods

Hypothesis 1: The Constituency Pressure Hypothesis. Members representing constituencies with stronger interests in China trade will be less likely to switch their positions on the annual grant of MFN to China.

Hypothesis 2: The Campaign Finance Hypothesis. Members receiving asymmetrical campaign contributions from either business PACs or labor PACs tend to stand by their initial positions toward China trade.

Conventional consensus is that constituency interests guide legislators' positions on trade policy (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996; Frieden, 1988; Milner & Judkins, 2004; Uslander, 1998). More specifically, lawmakers who represent districts vulnerable to China trade might be less inclined to support NTR extensions to China. For instance, given the character of imported goods from China, congressional districts with textile industry interests at stake were more likely to see their representatives constantly voting against the NTR extensions (Schiller, 1999). For sure, in the era of post-Cold War and global world economy, constituents are more likely to view certain foreign policies as conflicting with their domestic interests. Consequently, voters tend to hold their representatives more accountable than before for their foreign policy votes (Lindsay, 1994; Trubowitz, 1998). Members from those districts view the China NTR legislation as an opportunity to cast an "anti-globalization" vote (Jackson & Engel, 2003). Indeed, winners and losers of China trade came to engage in typical congressional politics of sectional and sectoral disputes (Frieden, 1988).

When it comes to the influence of campaign contributions on legislative choices, members receiving a disproportionate amount from either business PACs or labor PACs are hypothesized to less likely switch their initial voting positions toward China trade bills. Given that high-tech industries along with insurance and financial services have been key sectors benefitting from the

China market, business PACs have tried hard to convince many members of Congress not to turn their back on China's NTR status (Bradsher, 2000; Karol, 2005).¹³ At the same time, labor unions found every reason to fight against free trade with China as a proxy war against globalization. Blue-collar workers, hit hard by labor-intensive products imported from China, led their union leaders to pour campaign contributions to labor-friendly representatives in Congress. Jackson and Engel (2003) confirmed labor PAC punishment strategy against electorally insecure Democrats who supported PNTR legislation in 2000.

Hypothesis 3: The Ideological Extremity Hypothesis. The higher level of ideological conviction a member holds, the less frequent position change he or she is likely to engage.

Hypothesis 4: The Marginality and Seniority Hypothesis. Electorally secure members tend to switch their China policy positions more often than members from marginal districts.

A second explanation about members' vote choice and change over China policy might be ideological (Cronin & Fordham, 1999; Schiller, 1999; Trubowitz, 1998): First, knowing where lawmakers generally stand on U.S. support for the security of Japan and South Korea might function as a good predictor of where they stood on engagement policy toward China such as the NTR extension. Indeed, the literature on Congress' politics of foreign policy has no shortage of scholarly works pointing to legislator ideology as their key voting determinant. The more conservative a legislator is, the more likely he or she is to consistently vote for "hawkish" policies. Over the issue of linking trade policy to religious freedom in China, for instance, traditional probusiness Republicans were placed at odds with newly emerging social conservative colleagues (Rosin & Mufson, 2000). Meanwhile, liberals continue to approach the China issue from a more internationalist and engagement perspective. Yet moderate Democrats calling for engagement policy toward China found it difficult to persuade their labor-friendly copartisans to sign on to trade deals with China (Shoch, 2001).

What is also interesting over the issue of China's NTR extension is the emergence of an "ends against the middle" voting coalition, as explored by McRae (1970), Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Shoch (2001), Nokken (2003), and Karol (2005). Members of Congress who were ideologically committed in their vocal opposition to China established a rare "unholy alliance" or "strange bedfellows" composed of both liberals and conservatives in the 1990s (Biglaiser et al., 2004).¹⁴ Obviously, representatives with extreme ideological

positions have different motivations, with liberals calling for human rights and environmental protections and conservatives concerned about religious freedom and national security. Still, as recent as 2005, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, a liberal Democrat from New York, teamed up with Sen. Lindsey Graham, a conservative Republican from South Carolina, to cosponsor a measure that would impose a 27.5% tariff on Chinese imports if China does not revalue its currency.

Electoral security is another critical dimension of individual members and their vote changes. First, following the conventional wisdom of marginality hypothesis in congressional literature, continuing members facing tougher challengers are assumed to have less latitude for position turnaround (Bartels, 1991; Conley, 1999; Fiorina, 1974). Being stuck to home, not to Hill, some legislators are likely to find vote switching not in their best electoral interests. Second, senior members are hypothesized to have enjoyed more leeway than backbenchers to alter and adjust their positions over the China trade debate in the 1990s. Given mixed testing results of Richard Fenno's (1978) seminal distinction between the expansion and protection stages in congressional careers (Hibbing, 1991), it might be unsurprising that returning representatives deal with a divisive issue more flexibly than junior ranks of each party. Electoral security might lead senior members to take a wider shot of electoral connection between China votes and congressional careers.

Hypothesis 5: The Party Influence Hypothesis. If partisan control of the presidency or Congress changes, members will be more likely to reverse their previous roll call votes.

A final important dimension for members' voting might be institutional and partisan (Aldrich, 1995; Arnold, 1990; Asher & Weisberg, 1978; Buchanan, 2004; Fiorina, 1974; Karol, 2007; Rohde, 1991). If a legislator was a member of the presidential party and the president supported free trade with China, the member was likely to have engaged in the politics of "protecting our president." To prevent the other party's strategic move to "embarrass the president," presidential party members tended to unite behind their party's occupant of the White House. Bailey and Brady (1998) claim that senators representing homogeneous versus heterogeneous electorates pay different degrees of attention to their party strategies. Biglaiser et al. (2004) also found that it was the shift in control of the presidency, not the changes in constituency interests, which explain Republican reversal on the grant of presidential fast-track authority from 1997 to 2001. For cross-pressured

Republicans, according to their analysis, constituency factors and ideological stance were substantially less critical compared to the party status in control of the White House.

The debate over trade with China during the 1990s had proceeded during an era of partisan gridlock and a polarized Congress. "Strategic disagreements," in Gilmour's (1995) terms, are relevant for the understanding of U.S. policy toward China from 1989 to 2001 (Layman & Carsey, 2002; Roberts & Smith, 2003; Rohde, 1991; Shoch, 2001). Accordingly, a party's position over China policy is hypothesized to depend on which party controls the White House and which party is the majority coalition in Congress. My test here centers on the proposition that legislators are more likely to oppose the granting of NTR to China if a president from the other party occupies the White House. The case of a minority president's initiatives and a majority party's opposition applied to House Democrats during the George H. W. Bush presidency from 1990 through 1992. The same environment describes the Republican-controlled Congress from 1995 through 2000, struggling with the White House occupied by a two-term Democratic president for the first time since Franklin D. Roosevelt. The first 2 years of the Clinton presidency were, of course, the case of unified government where Democratic leaders controlled the House rules and supported the new president. In short, party status change is assumed to lead members to switch their positions on the grant of MFN status to China (see Figure 2).

To test the effects of these possible explanations for vote stability and switching, I separately coded three different dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the Congress-to-Congress roll call votes by continuing members from 1989 through 2000, with "1" for a back-to-back anti-China MFN position and "0" otherwise. This dichotomous dependent variable analyzed by the logistic regression is appropriate for figuring out why some members were so determined to oppose the extension of MFN status for China over the course of years. Another set of dependent variables constructed from the same data set allows for exploring the opposite scenario. This time, the dependent variable takes a value of "1" if a returning representative changes his or her mind from that of the previous Congress and "0" otherwise. Again, the logit regression analysis will provide a proper framework for examining vote reversal hypotheses.

The next dependent variable incorporates a panel study of 244 lawmakers who represented the same congressional districts from 1993 through 2000. Because of the redistricting for the 1992 election, the first session of the 103rd Congress became the baseline year for analyses of time-varying constituency characteristics and members' vote choices and changes over several




Figure 2. Party difference: vote switches by continuing members only, 1990-2000

time periods. As Wawro (2001) has advocated for his examination of campaign contributions and roll call votes, I use a panel probit approach to find out what made party members stabilize or switch their position over the key foreign policy issue. A random-effects model of roll call votes is fitted on the constituency, electoral security, ideology, party unity, and party label. To interpret more precisely the meaning of coefficients, I also calculated the marginal effects on the probability of vote choice and change, assuming that the random effect for each panel is zero.

The actual number of vote switches by continuing members is the final dependent variable for this study. This time, I further narrowed the list of lawmakers into 93 with identical constituencies over six Congresses. As the dependent variable measuring the number of vote switches over time is a count, I employ the Poisson regression, which is the standard method for modeling count data. As King (1988) suggested in his study of 19th-century party switching in the U.S. Congress, the linear regression model could provide inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates, whereas the Poisson regression model is more suitable to event count data. In addition, because the data are not overdispersed ($G^2 = .01$, $p > .10$), the Poisson regression model is preferable to the negative binomial regression model (Hilbe, 2007; Rosenson, Oldmixon, & Wald, 2009). Table 2 provides the list of continuing

Table 2. Continuing Members (1989-2000) and the Number of Vote Switches

The number of vote switches	Member of congress	
	Democrats	Republicans
7	Moakley	Hyde
6	Oberstar	Ballenger
5	Berman, Hoyer, Gordon, Gonzalez, Boucher	Goodling, Spence
4	Miller, Lewis, Cardin, Mollohan, Clay, Hall, Ortiz, McDermott	Porter, Skeen, Kasich, Smith
3	Gejdenson, Viscloskey, Dingell, Vento, Sabo, Gephardt, Payne, Kaptur, Defazio, Borski, Kanjorski, Murtha, Coyne, Clement, Frost, Sisisky, Klecza, Obey	Young, Stearns, Rogers, Barton, Wolf
2	Tauzin, Neal, Skelton, Sawyer, Tanner	Callahan, Kolbe, Herger, Morella, Roukema, Gillmor, Regula, Weldon, Shuster, Gekas, Combest, Delay
1	Evans, Frank, Markey, Taylor, Traficant, Spratt	Hefley, Bilirakis, Ros-Lehtine, Burton, Smith, Duncan, Sensenbrenner
0	Hall, Stenholm, Pickett, Dicks	Stump, Shays, Johnson, Hastert, Leach, Baker, Bereuter, Oxley, Archer, Armey, Hansen, Bateman, Petri

Source: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (various years).

Republican and Democratic House members from 1989 to 2000 representing the same districts and their number of vote switches over the China MFN measures. The counts range from 0 to 7, which indicates that higher counts reflect more frequent vote switching.

When it comes to independent variables, I employed Scott Adler's (2003) congressional district data and U.S.–China Business Council data for testing the influences of district-level interests, such as the percentages of blue-collar workers, farmers, wholesale industry employees, foreign-born population, and exports to China.¹⁵ With respect to member-level variables, the average margin of election victory and the number of years in the office are employed as the measures of electoral security for party members. Campaign

finance as another member-dimension variable is gauged by the difference between business PAC and labor PAC contributions and is used to measure any disproportionate impacts on members' vote consistency.¹⁶ For testing the impacts of ideological extremity on vote switching, I calculated the absolute value of DW-Nominate scores for continuing members, following Nokken (2003). Thus, the greater the difference, the more ideologically extreme the member. Finally, dummy variables are used for party labels, with "1" denoted for the Democratic Party to determine whether presidential party status would induce members to change their positions more frequently than congressional majority status.

Findings

The logistic regression analysis reported in Tables 3 and 4 confirms the constituency, ideology, and party explanations for vote stability among members of Congress. The Constituency Pressure hypothesis argues that strong district interests toward China trade—either favorable or hostile—have members' hands held tightly. The proportion of blue-collar workers in congressional districts, with all of the independent variables held at their base values, provides a predicted probability for consistent anti-China MFN votes—roughly 19% to 37% higher than other members. The chance that members from farmer-dominant districts change their favorable votes toward China is 22% to 58% lower than others. What is also noticeable is the explanatory power of the "extreme ideology" variable measured by absolute values of DW-Nominate scores. Table 3 illustrates across-the-board hostility against trade with China by members with strong ideological convictions, except for the 1st year of the Clinton administration, during which a large number of liberal Democrats switched their positions to support their new president. This result largely substantiates the "ends against the middle" proposition by Nokken (2003) to highlight a rare coalition pattern by "strange bedfellows" in American foreign policy making. Finally, the Democrats in general continued to be opposed to free trade with China throughout the 1990s, again except for the year of 1993.

With respect to vote switching, seniority proved to be expedient for members changing their minds in the early fights over the extension of China's MFN status. The predicted probability of *years in chamber* for vote reversals from 1990 to 1991 is 27% higher than others in Congress (see Table 4). Also, members with extreme ideologies after the breathtaking 1994 midterm election newly joined their stalwart colleagues and reversed their positions. In fact, 68% of those who switched their votes in the first session of the 104th Congress were a position change from pro-China MFN in 1994 to anti-China

Table 3. Continuing Members and Congress-to-Congress Vote Stability: Anti-China Most Favored Nation Both in Congress_{t-1} and in Congress_t

	From the 101st (1990) to the 102nd (1991)	From the 102nd (1992) to the 103rd (1993)	From the 103rd (1994) to the 104th (1995)	From the 104th (1996) to the 105th (1997)	From the 105th (1998) to the 106th (1999)
Years in chamber	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.022)	0.009 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)
Democrat	-47% 1.204*** (0.256)	-0.930*** (0.326)	0.357 (0.441)	0.721*** (0.279) + 15%	0.615*** (0.249) + 14%
Electoral margin	+28% -0.003 (0.004)	-14% -0.211 (0.689)	0.453 (0.698)	0.879 (0.601)	-0.434 (0.418)
Blue collar	0.016 (0.054)	0.070 (0.067)	0.130* (0.075)	0.115** (0.055)	0.111** (0.052)
Farmer		+19% -0.339** (0.142)	+19% -0.444 (0.299)	+33% -0.204 (0.166)	+37% -0.343** (0.150)
Foreign born		-22% 0.002 (0.018)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.013)	-38% -0.001 (0.012)
Wholesale/retail		-0.249*** (0.094)	0.129 (0.124)	0.035 (0.093)	-0.000 (0.083)
Extreme ideology		-48% 2.206*** (0.721)	-29% -2.488** (1.066)	2.841*** (1.185)	3.563*** (0.249)
Constant	+42% 1.758 (1.163)	-26% 1.646 (1.398)	+23% -5.382*** (1.78)	+53% -3.887*** (1.312)	+78% -2.809*** (1.144)
Log-likelihood	-221.79	-132.55	-117.10	-199.67	-233.11
Percentage correctly predicted	69.7	80.6	88.1	68.2	68.0
Pseudo-R ²	.16	.08	.07	.08	.09
n	383	288	345	355	391

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Italicized numbers indicate percentage change.
p* < .10. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01.

Table 4. Continuing Members and Congress-to-Congress Vote Switching: Position Change From Congress_{t-1} to Congress_t

	From the 101st (1990) to the 102nd (1991)	From the 102nd (1992) to the 103rd (1993)	From the 103rd (1994) to the 104th (1995)	From the 104th (1996) to the 105th (1997)	From the 105th (1998) to the 106th (1999)
Years in chamber	0.030* (0.016)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.026)	-0.038 (0.034)
Democrat	+27% -0.567** (0.275)	0.329 (0.253)	-0.031 (0.345)	-0.373 (0.386)	0.362 (0.478)
Electoral margin	-9% -0.305 (0.457)	1.117** (0.565)	0.541 (0.569)	-1.346 (0.922)	-0.098 (0.791)
Blue collar	0.001 (0.063)	+27% -0.051 (0.059)	0.092 (0.063)	0.098 (0.077)	0.190** (0.093)
Farmer	0.151 (0.101)	-0.089 (0.097)	-0.449** (0.221)	-0.037 (0.181)	+20% -0.359 (0.317)
Foreign born	0.005 (0.021)	-0.018 (0.031)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.051* (0.031)	-0.027 (0.027)
Wholesale/retail	-0.051 (0.105)	-0.027 (0.095)	-0.060 (0.101)	-0.188 (0.138)	0.057 (0.172)
Extreme ideology	-1.250 (0.275)	1.098 (0.768)	1.663* (0.938)	1.172 (1.085)	0.354 (1.398)
Constant	-0.651 (1.290)	-0.204 (1.144)	-1.611 (1.397)	-0.103 (1.802)	-4.046* (2.343)
Log-likelihood	-187.05	-191.81	-164.09	-124.82	-85.99
Percentage correctly predicted	79.60	60.42	80.30	87.30	93.80
Pseudo-R ²	.03	.03	.04	.09	.04
n	383	288	345	355	388

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Italicized numbers indicate percentage change.

*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Table 5. Annual Extension (1999) Versus Permanent Grant (2000): Vote Stability or Switching?

	From annual MFN in 1999 to permanent MFN in 2000	
	Vote stability	Vote switching
Years in chamber	0.023 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.017)
Democrat	1.214*** (0.262) <i>+25%</i>	0.578** (0.273) <i>+8%</i>
Electoral margin	0.059 (0.419)	-0.398 (0.478)
Blue collar	0.143*** (0.052) <i>+40%</i>	0.078 (0.057)
Farmer	-0.445*** (0.164) <i>-37%</i>	-0.110 (0.141)
Foreign born	-0.018 (0.013)	0.016 (0.012)
Wholesale/retail	-0.038 (0.084)	-0.031 (0.094)
Extreme ideology	3.931*** (0.744) <i>+82%</i>	-0.477 (0.808)
Constant	-3.418*** (1.179)	-1.608 (1.277)
Log-likelihood	-235.28	-205.43
Percentage correctly predicted	72.4	81.1
Pseudo-R ²	.14	.03
<i>n</i>	435	435

Note: MFN = most favored nation. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Italicized numbers indicate percentage change.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

MFN in 1995. Also, it was Democratic House members who reversed their votes from the 1999 *annual* MFN extension to the 2000 *permanent* NTR battle during the 106th Congress (1999-2000). Additionally, given the importance of procedural and policy differences associated with another extension in 1999 and permanent grant of NTR in 2000, I provide separate evidence about vote choice and change in Table 5. Despite huge pressure from the Clinton administration, a large number of Democrats altered their previous

Table 6. Panel Probit Model Results, Vote Stability Versus Switching by 244 Members, 1993-2000

	Vote stability	Vote switching
Democrat	0.350*** (.065) <i>+12.8%</i>	0.099 (0.082)
Electoral margin	0.001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.002)
Years in chamber	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.004)
Extreme ideology	1.538*** (0.198) <i>+0.6%</i>	0.592*** (0.251) <i>+0.1%</i>
Blue collar	0.080*** (0.014) <i>+2.9%</i>	0.050*** (0.017) <i>+1.1%</i>
Farmer	-0.149*** (0.034) <i>-5.5%</i>	-0.129*** (0.045) <i>-2.9%</i>
Foreign born	-0.0008 (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.004) <i>-0.3%</i>
Military base	0.103*** (0.020) <i>+3.8%</i>	-0.019 (0.028)
Wholesale/retail	0.047** (0.022) <i>+1.7%</i>	-0.035 (0.029)
Constant	-2.177*** (0.316)	-1.060*** (0.400)
Wald $\chi^2(9)$	152.47	33.93
ρ	0.057 (0.031)	0.071 (0.041)
<i>n</i>	1,952	1,708

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Italicized numbers indicate the marginal effects on the probability of vote choice and change, assuming that the random effect for each panel is zero. * $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

votes to oppose the PNTR for China in 2000. This finding seems particularly critical because it suggests that the changing nature of vote from “free and symbolic” to “final and substantive” sometimes lead representatives to adopt a position-switching strategy in legislative processes.

A panel probit framework of 244 continuing members from non-redistricting districts provide the numbers, as reported in Table 6, that highlights an

Table 7. Poisson Regression Results for 93 Members and Party Differences Over Vote Shifts

	Republicans	Democrats
Blue-collar workers	0.06 (0.04)	0.007 (0.06)
Farmers	-0.50** (0.26) -39.4%	-0.16 (0.15)
Wholesale/retail employment	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.11)
Export to China	-0.06 (1.6)	0.04 (0.04)
Extreme PAC	0.004 (0.005)	-0.008** (0.004) -0.8%
Seniority	0.05** (0.02) +4.9%	0.02 (0.01)
Vote margin	-0.005 (0.005)	0.08 (0.06)
Extreme ideology	0.005 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.04)
Constant	-0.42 (1.23)	1.71 (1.45)
<i>n</i>	45	48
$\chi^2(8)$	9.38	8.81
Pseudo- R^2	.05	.05

Note: PAC = political action committee. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Italicized numbers indicate percentage change in expected count.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

important pattern. Party members with a high stake in both blue-collar and farmer interests sustained their respective opposing and supporting positions toward trade with China. With respect to vote switching, on the contrary, they show a very different trend. Lawmakers from predominantly blue-collar districts tend to change their position a lot more substantially than representatives protecting agricultural sectors in their districts. The fact that liberal Democrats switched both in 1995 and 2000 seems to account for this contrast. I also checked party unity scores for each member to see how members who are loyal to their party respond to a recurring foreign policy topic. It turns out, however, that party unity scores and extreme ideology measures show a serious collinearity problem so that Table 6 presents strong ideology variable only. Members with strong ideological convictions consistently expressed their anti-China stance over the course of years, and their vote-switching

pattern also shows some statistical significance. Party unity, according to a separate test, was not necessarily a strong indicator for vote reversals by congressional members over the extension of China's MFN status.

The final results from the Poisson regression analysis particularly reveal party differences over vote change (see Table 7). When constituency-driven inputs and member-dimension factors are combined by party labels, Republicans and Democrats appeared to face somewhat different constraints for position change. The number of GOP lawmakers' vote switching drops by almost 40% if they represent farm districts. Campaign finance makeup, on the contrary, significantly affects the House Democrats, with more disproportionate PAC contributions contributing to fewer vote changes. Also, senior members from the Republican Party tend to be more ready to reverse their positions than their colleagues from the other side of the aisle (4.9% increase in expected vote switching). This is interesting, because members are generally known to evolve from an "expansionist" to a "protectionist" stage in their congressional careers, and "protectionist" strategy entails no further position change (Fenno, 1978; Hibbing, 1991). Indeed, the double pressure of polarization and globalization in a rapidly changing vote context might no longer protect long-term vote commitments by senior lawmakers. Or, rather proactively than reactively, senior party members with electoral security pursue more partisan positions contingent on their party power change in Washington, D.C.

Discussion

The analysis in this article examines the multiple roll call votes cast on the recurring China trade policy in a broader effort to understand when and why members of Congress stay or reverse the course of their previous votes. Representatives under "bounded rationality" tend to get their voting cue handily from their own past vote choice. Additionally, being branded as a "flip-flopper" in election campaigns would be the last thing on any lawmakers' wish list. In short, demands for practicality as well as credibility rationalize vote stability by members of Congress. The results from the Congress-to-Congress analyses in this article confirm this traditional consensus. I also found evidence of a resurgent Congress in the post-Cold War era. When pluralistic and crosscutting voting context over foreign policy emerged, party members became assertive in their expression of district interests and ideological convictions. Economic indicators such as blue-collar workers or percentage of farmers in the district, combined with members' principled positions, explain a great deal of vote stability.

Indeed, recent party polarization adds another reason for members' staying the course in the legislative processes. Many scholars and observers confirm that congressional parties in the 1990s had substantially become united among themselves and distinct with each other (Aldrich, 1995; Layman &

Carsey, 2002; Roberts & Smith, 2003; Rohde, 1991; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003; Theriault, 2008). Policy consequences of polarized parties have two dimensions. First, party rank-and-file members have become increasingly homogeneous over their policy preferences so that the number of party-splitting policy agendas has actually decreased. Second, given the increasing political clout by party leadership, the number of party-splitting votes on the floor has also declined. In other words, “conditional party government” or “party as procedural cartel,” at least in theory, neither come across nor consent to a recurring and divisive agenda in Congress.

Contrary to these theoretical arguments for united and distinct parties, the evidence from this article does suggest that party members still have some latitude in shifting position, particularly when party leaders keep pondering party reputations over a wedge issue like trade policy toward China. The core supporters of both parties, such as religious conservatives, business interests, labor unions, and engagement policy advocates, revealed conflicting responses to the question of extending China’s MFN status every year. These competing interests and complex policymaking ultimately tied the hands of party leadership and loosened the positions of party ranks. By reversing their votes in support of their new president and party position, liberal Democrats gave a break to the Clinton administration in 1993, whereas the same group collectively changed their position in 2000, despite the major foreign policy ambition by the same copartisan president.

Additionally, when legislative procedures and interchamber differences make House members find it hard to reverse presidential initiative, lawmakers tend to use recurring votes as a public forum for expressing their diverse concerns. Mayhew (1974) earlier suggested that “[t]he electoral requirement is not that he make pleasing things happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements” (p. 62). With a substantial number of senators concurring with the president, members in the lower chamber face a different incentive structure regarding their vote stability and switching. While scratching their collective heads over how to create a united party position toward China, some party members chose to employ vote-switching strategies. They often reverse their previous votes in accordance with the changing control of the legislative body and the changing consequence of the voting record. In sum, this research shows that in the post-Cold War Congress, party rank-and-file members respond to pluralistic and complex foreign policy voting contexts by constantly recalculating the costs of vote switching and benefits of vote stability over time.

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Notes

1. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* of 2000.
2. Eric Schmitt (2000, May 24). "Temporary Coalition Against Trade Bill Crosses Party and Ideological Lines." *The New York Times*, p. A15.
3. On July 22, 1998, the 105th Congress (1997-1998) passed legislation that replaced the term *most favored nation* (MFN) with *normal trade relations*, or NTR. NTR status means that imported goods to the United States from that country are subject to the lowest American tariff rates.
4. In 1990, joining the anti-China mood in Congress and in the country, the Republican lawmaker opposed the renewal of China's MFN status to express his protest against the Chinese government's crackdown on prodemocracy demands in the previous year. Then, in 1991, the senior congressman changed his position and supported free trade with China. In 1993, the 1st year of the Clinton presidency led this conservative representative to reverse his position back to anti-China. Then, from 1994 through 1996, the Illinois congressman turned himself around and endorsed the grant of free trade status to China. The future chair of the House Committee on International Relations once again switched his position in 1997 and maintained his disapproval of China's free trade status for the following 2 years. Finally, when the Clinton administration pressed for the passage of a permanent NTR bill in 2000, Rep. Hyde flip-flopped again and signed on to free trade with China.
5. Conservatives, however, were not united to support the Carter administration's adoption of "One China" policy as requested by PRC. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) famously argued that abrogation of the Taiwan Treaty also needed two thirds of the Senate (*TIME*, "Playing the China Card" November 6, 1978).
6. On the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Johnson (2006), in his analyses of U.S. Congress during the Cold War, points out that "the Jackson-Vanik amendment united human rights activists, hard-line Cold Warriors, and supporters of Israel in demanding a linkage between US-Soviet economic relations and the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel" (p. 199).

7. During the 109th Congress, Congressman Frank R. Wolf (R-VA) is the cochairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, a bipartisan organization of about 200 House members that identifies and works to alleviate human rights abuses worldwide. In the 1995 congressional controversy over China's MFN status, Rep. Wolf tabled a resolution he himself had sponsored that would have revoked MFN status for China and instead called for the passage of the China Policy Act of 1995.
8. Democratic senior legislator Charles Rangel (D-NY), a Korean War veteran, succinctly pointed out that "these Chinese, these communist bums, shot me over there in 1950. . . . But, I do not know whether the United States of America has to have a litmus test with who we trade with" (1996 *CQ Almanac*, pp. 9-10).
9. The Chinese government's efforts to join the institution governing global commerce conflicted with the annual extension process of NTR status required by the Jackson-Vanik amendment. WTO rules obligate member countries to grant "permanent" NTR (PNTR) status for one another's trade products.
10. In return for the Chinese government's drastic cut of tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers on U.S. exports to China in 1999, the Clinton administration agreed to support China's entry into the WTO. On China's accession to the WTO, President Clinton remarked that "China's entry into the WTO . . . is clearly in our larger national interest. The WTO agreement will move China in the right direction" (Suettinger, 2003, p. 393).
11. Other undecided members included senior lawmakers such as Rep. Charles B. Rangel of New York, the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, and Henry J. Hyde (R-IL), the Republican chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. These members eventually embraced pro-China positions during the week of May 15, 2000, less than 10 days before the final passage vote.
12. The five most significant trade votes analyzed by Peake et al. (2007) included NAFTA in 1993, GATT/WTO in 1994, Fast Track Authority in 1997, PNTR with China in 2000, and Trade Promotion Authority in 2001.
13. Keith Bradsher (2000, May 21). "Rallying Round the China Bill, Hungrily." *The New York Times*, p. 18.
14. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) also illustrate an odd alliance between conservative Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and liberal Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts over foreign policy toward Central America.
15. Data sources are Adler, E. Scott. "Congressional District Data File [Congressional Term]." University of Colorado, Boulder, CO and <http://www.uschina.org/public/exports/congressional/>
16. Because of collinearity problem, disproportionate PAC variable was dropped from the logistic regression analysis of Congress-to-Congress vote changes. Instead, Poisson regression model, addressing party variable separately, included the extreme PAC variable. PAC campaign contribution data sources are from Center for Responsive Politics (<http://www.opensecrets.org/>).

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