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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to answer the question, Does religiosity cause ethnic intolerance? We define ethnic intolerance as the unwillingness to extend economic, political, and social rights to other ethnic groups. According to the "resurgence hypothesis," religious revivals associated with frequent church attendance and intense religious beliefs are partly responsible for intolerant attitudes toward minorities. The "salience hypothesis," on the other hand, suggests that ethnic intolerance and religiosity are jointly determined by in-group/out-group polarization resulting from competition and conflict for scarce resources. Under the salience hypothesis, religiosity is hypothesized to be merely a carrier of group identity and is not expected to affect intolerance. We evaluate these hypotheses with survey data from Croatia collected in 1996. Results support the salience hypothesis: the effect of religiosity on ethnic intolerance is largely spurious, caused by the joint determination of religiosity and ethnic intolerance by in-group/out-group polarization. These findings call into question popular views that posit resurgent religiosity as a significant motivator of intolerance in situations of ethnic conflict.

The recent resurgence of religiosity has been associated with the growth of intolerance and, in some cases, the outbreak of conflict around the world. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, the rebirth of religious and ethnic loyalties among Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims has

been blamed for the death and displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals. One need not look far to find other examples of conflict with a religious character: the West Bank, Sudan, Sri Lanka, India, and Northern Ireland are but a few. Moreover, there is substantial empirical evidence linking religiosity to intolerance (see Beatty & Walter 1984; Hodson, Sekulic & Massey 1994; Nunn, Crockett & Williams 1978; Piereson, Sullivan & Marcus 1980; Stouffer 1955). Religious resurgence and its links to intolerance is thus an important research issue and a pressing social concern.

While it is clear that religiosity is often associated with intolerance, is it accurate to state that religiosity causes intolerance, or is there some other structural condition or process that mobilizes individuals along religious lines and increases intolerance? Based in the theoretical work of Coser (1956), Barth (1969), and Olzak and West (1991), we suggest an alternative approach focusing on the role of competition and conflict in generating intolerance. Specifically, we argue that competition and conflict increase the "saliency" (Olzak & West 1991) of religious identification and increase ethnic intolerance. Religiosity, then, is simply one carrier of group identity, and although it might be associated with intolerance, it does not directly cause intolerance.

The purpose of the current analysis is to test two competing perspectives on religiosity and ethnic intolerance. The "resurgence hypothesis" suggests that the recent rebirth of religiosity is at least partly responsible for increases in intolerance. The "salience hypothesis," on the other hand, suggests that increases in intolerance and religiosity are both functions of competition and conflict. In other words, any effect of religiosity on intolerance is expected to be largely spurious. We will address this issue by investigating the question, Do church attendance and the intensity of religious beliefs increase intolerance for ethnic minorities in Croatia? We define ethnic intolerance as the unwillingness to extend political, economic, and social rights to other ethnic groups, regardless of perceived similarities or differences in basic values, norms, or beliefs. Conflict is defined as "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources" (Coser 1956:8). Conflict is distinguished from competition in that, in conflictual situations, "the aims of opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals" (Coser 1956:8).

Croatia provides an excellent case for examining the relationship between religion and intolerance. The geographic convergence of the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslim faiths, the policies of Tito and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), and the activities of the various churches during the Second World War, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the most recent civil conflict all contributed to the virtual nationalization of religion in the various republics of former Yugoslavia. Croatia, then, is a society in which religious lines converge with ethnicity. In combination, the historic role of the churches, the policies of the Communist regime, and overt conflict between ethnic groups with

different religious traditions provide an ideal setting in which to examine the resurgence of religiosity, in-group/out-group polarization, and ethnic intolerance.

In the analysis, we use "Social Structure and Quality of Life within a Period of Transition" data, collected in 1996 by the Center for the Investigation of Transition and Civil Society in Zagreb, Croatia. Results suggest that conflict fosters in-group/out-group polarization, which in turn increases religiosity. Also, the effect of religiosity on ethnic intolerance becomes insignificant once polarization is controlled, suggesting that the observed effect of religiosity on ethnic intolerance is largely spurious. In other words, religiosity is a carrier of group identity but does not increase ethnic intolerance in its own right beyond the level predicted for polarized groups.

Religiosity and Intolerance

Some scholars implicate religiosity in the development of intolerance and conflict:

> Religion, most of the time for most people, is not an instrument for killing. People are religious . . . as part of their effort to find peace, shalom, communion, consolation, and integration into systems of meaning and belonging. . . . A second look, however, revealed that the same elements that made religion a consoler and healer could be turned into the weaponry of disruption and killing. (Marty 1997:2-3)

Why might religiosity increase intolerance and conflict? Religiosity often involves believing in sacred mysteries. In other words, many church teachings must be accepted on faith. While faith in and of itself is not likely to lead to intolerance, unquestioned religious faith and fundamentalism are associated with authoritarianism (Leak & Randall 1995) and discriminatory attitudes (Kirkpatrick 1993). Religious teachings also deal with fundamental issues regarding life and death over which there is great concern and emotion. Related to this, religious organizations often become politicized and seek to affect policy along the lines of moral or religious teachings (Almond, Sivan & Appleby 1995). The politicization of religion and its extension into economic, political, and social institutions involve a struggle for resources and power. Taken together, unquestioned religious faith and the politicization of religion might lead to value conflict and intolerance between believers and nonbelievers.

A great deal of empirical evidence links religiosity to intolerance. While denominational differences typically disappear once controls for demographic characteristics are added, church attendance has been strongly linked to intolerance in the United States (see Beatty & Walter 1984; Nunn, Crockett & Williams 1978; Piereson, Sullivan & Marcus 1980; Stouffer 1955). Recent research in the former Yugoslavia also implicates religiosity in the development of intolerance. Hodson, Sekulic, and Massey (1994) demonstrate that religiosity is the single strongest

predictor of national intolerance, exceeding in effect the size and dispersion of ethnic groups, position in the stratification system, and participation in political and occupational organizations.

Competition, Conflict, Polarization, and Intolerance

While it is likely that religiosity and intolerance are associated, we argue that the causal mechanisms lie in competition and conflict. Specifically, direct competition and conflict for scarce resources between differentiated groups increase in-group/out-group polarization. Polarization occurs around specific cultural traits or values, such as religion, which then become more "salient" to group identity (Olzak & West 1991). Competition, conflict, and polarization are also expected to increase ethnic intolerance. This occurs because of a heightened sense of awareness of differences and the use of negative sanctions within one's own group to encourage conformity and solidarity. The work of Barth (1969), Coser (1956), and Olzak and West (1991) provide the theoretical foundation for this argument.

COMPETITION, CONFLICT, AND IN-GROUP/OUT-GROUP POLARIZATION

According to Barth (1969), individuals identify perceived differences in culture through contact, interaction, and negotiation. Cultural differences provide a basis for group polarization and lead to the development and maintenance of ethnic boundaries. The crucial point is that contact, interaction, and negotiation are continual and that ethnic boundaries are maintained despite changes in the patterns of cultural differences.

This position is consistent with that of Coser (1956) and Olzak and West (1991), who suggest that contact, specifically direct competition and conflict over scarce resources, leads to greater internal group solidarity.

> It seems to be generally accepted by sociologists that the distinction between "ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the other-groups, out-groups" is established in and through conflict. This is not confined to conflict between classes. . . . Nationality and ethnic conflicts, political conflicts, or conflicts between various strata in bureaucratic structures afford equally relevant examples. (Coser 1956:35)

As differentiated groups compete over scarce resources, certain unique values or perceived cultural traits such as ethnicity or religiosity become more "salient" (Olzak & West 1991). When there are inequalities between groups competing directly in the same niche for scarce resources (e.g., for wages in the same labor market), differences between the groups become more salient as they provide a basis to exclude the "other" and protect advantages associated with group

membership. Regarding the group-binding functions of conflict, Coser (1956) argues that

> [internal] conflict makes group members more conscious of their group bonds and increases their participation. Outside conflict has the same effect: it also mobilizes the group's defenses among which is the reaffirmation of their value system against the outside enemy. (90)

There is significant empirical support for the salience perspective. Portes (1984) demonstrates that Cuban immigrants in Miami who leave Cuban enclaves for work, feel discriminated against, speak English, have higher education, and have more information about the U.S. are also more ethnically aware. In other words, those Cuban immigrants who are more likely to compete directly with nonimmigrant populations are most aware of differences between themselves and nonimmigrants.

Other scholars examine how conflict and competition affect the founding and support of ethnic organizations such as newspapers and ethnic political parties. Olzak and West (1991) and West (1995) argue that ethnic conflict increases the salience of ethnicity, which in turn increases demand for ethnic organizations. In support of the salience hypothesis, Olzak and West (1991) demonstrate that ethnic conflict increased the founding of ethnic newspapers for white immigrant populations in the U.S. from 1877 to 1914. Similarly, West (1995) reveals that ethnic conflict increased the founding of both Polish and Swedish newspapers. Regarding ethnic political parties, Nielsen (1980) examines the effect of six modernization processes on the rate of ethnic political mobilization in Belgium from 1961 to 1970. He shows that regions with high employment in the tertiary sector and high total income were associated with support for the Flemish movement. "An increased share of resources and a high proportion of the labor force in the most modern sector of activity facilitate mobilization on the basis of ethnic . . . boundaries" (Nielsen 1980:89). Similarly, Ragin (1979) examines the effects of development, economic competition, and ethnic segregation on ethnic political mobilization in Wales in nine elections from 1935 to 1974. Using pooled cross sections techniques, he demonstrates that counties with high rates of employment in tertiary and advanced industries — industries with high ethnic competition — have the highest level of support for Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party.

In sum, contact, especially direct competition and conflict for scarce resources, facilitates in-group/out-group polarization. Through contact, interaction, and negotiation, groups identify perceived differences between "us" and "them." The cultural trait or value that acts as the basis for group differentiation becomes more salient because it is the marker used to maintain the group boundary and circumscribe any advantages associated with group membership. Readily available boundary markers include religion, ethnicity, and class.

COMPETITION, CONFLICT, AND INTOLERANCE

If group competition and conflict increase the salience of certain cultural identifiers and lead to in-group/out-group polarization, how do they also lead to intolerance? Competition and conflict for scarce resources increase intolerance partly because of the heightened awareness of differences and because in-groups use negative sanctions against those who do not conform. For example, Coser (1956) suggests that conflict with an out-group defines group structure and consequent reactions to internal conflict:

> Groups engaged in continued struggle with the outside tend to be intolerant within. They are unlikely to tolerate more than limited departures from the group unity. ... Their social cohesion depends upon total sharing of all aspects of group life and is reinforced by the assertion of group unity against the dissenter. (103)

In other words, in-groups are intolerant of out-groups because they seek to increase consensus within the in-group and because of a heightened awareness of intergroup differences. In sum, the result of competition and conflict for in-group structure is the silencing of divergent opinions, increases in adherence to group symbols, and intolerance for out-groups and dissenters.

In the ethnic competition literature, scholars do not typically examine individual-level outcomes such as ethnic intolerance. Nevertheless, there is empirical support for the idea that competition and conflict lead to negative attitudes toward ethnic and racial minorities. For example, Quillian (1995) demonstrates that declining economic conditions and relative group size affect racial prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe. According to Quillian (1995), "prejudice is a defensive reaction against explicit or (usually) implicit challenges to the dominant group's exclusive claim to privileges" (588). Similarly, the perceived threat from out-groups is an important predictor of ethnic and political intolerance (see Gibson & Duch 1992; Green & Waxman 1987; McIntosh et al. 1995; Shamir & Sullivan 1983; Stouffer 1955; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus 1982).

Religious Identity and Polarization in Croatia

If the boundary markers developed through direct competition and conflict over scarce resources vary over time and by location, how might we account for the focus on religiosity as one possible boundary marker in the former Yugoslavia? We argue that the geographic convergence of the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslim faiths, policies of the Communist regime, and actions of the various churches during World War II, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the most recent civil conflict have led to the nationalization of religion throughout the former Yugoslavia. In other words, conflict between the churches, the

government, and the national groups heightened the relationship between religious affiliation and ethnic identity. While religious affiliation is only one possible boundary marker, it is highly salient and largely reliable in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, as the overwhelming majority of Croats are Catholic and the overwhelming majority of Serbs are Orthodox.

The former Yugoslavia is and has been the meeting place of the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslim faiths. The convergence of these three religions has led to much competition and conflict throughout the region over the last seven centuries. For much of this time period, for example, Serbia and Bosnia were occupied by the Ottoman Empire. In addition to conflict between Islam and Christianity, there have been deep divisions within Christianity between Roman Catholics in Croatia and Orthodox Christians in Serbia. Some have argued that the Catholic Church was actually more dangerous to Orthodox interests than was Islam due to its policy of seeking converts (Jelavich 1983). This was especially true because the Orthodox Church in Serbia was allowed considerable power to manage day-to-day affairs despite occupation by the Ottoman Empire.

Religion is also a likely boundary marker in the former Yugoslavia because of specific policies of Tito and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Specifically, the major goal of the LCY was to rebuild Yugoslavia following genocide and civil war that had occurred during the Second World War. To do so, the regime needed to level the playing field between republics and regions, effectively decreasing the power of Serbia and Croatia while increasing the power of other areas. Part of this process involved creating an autocephalous or independent Macedonian Orthodox Church, fostering Muslim identity among Bosnians, and suppressing Catholic organizations and institutions that supported Croatia's nationalist leanings (Ramet 1989). While the larger goal was to create an integrated "Yugoslav" society, these actions actually drew attention to group differences and increased the salience of religiosity, tying Catholicism to Croatia, Orthodoxy to Serbia, and Islam to Bosnia.

The actions of the churches during the Second World War, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the most recent civil conflict have also increased the saliency of religion as an ethnic boundary marker. Following the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia during the Second World War, a Croatian fascist government (the Ustasha) set up a puppet state in Croatia and ruthlessly executed Serbs, Gypsies, Jews, and nonsupporters in an attempt to create an independent Croatian state (Ramet 1990). The church hierarchy in Croatia was divided — some supported the Ustasha while others supported leftist rebels (the Partisans). Nevertheless, the Catholic Church did little to prevent or condemn the atrocities committed by the Ustasha, since they also supported Croatian independence (Partos 1997).

With disintegration following the death of Tito in 1980, the various churches again became involved with the national question. In Serbia and Croatia, the Orthodox and Catholic churches were quick to support nationalist leaders such

as Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman (Partos 1997). In Serbia, the Orthodox Church was on the far right, and despite its initial support for Serbian president Milosevic, it eventually criticized him for not going far enough to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Meanwhile the Catholic Church in Croatia, by quickly supporting the rise of Franjo Tudjman, benefited from the introduction of religious education and general support from the new regime (Partos 1997; Ramet 1996). In addition to supporting nationalist leaders, church officials on all sides defended the war effort. Clergy members bound together church and state and effectively turned the war into a fight for God (Partos 1997; Ramet 1996).

In sum, the geographic convergence of the three faiths, policies of the Communist regime, and actions of the churches during the Second World War and the current conflict have led to the nationalization of religion and increased its salience as an ethnic boundary marker throughout the former Yugoslavia. To be Croatian is, therefore, to be Catholic. Trends in religious identification since 1985 provide support for this argument.

Table 1 lists the percentage of Croatians living in Croatia who self-identify as Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Muslim, other, and not religious in 1985, 1989, and 1996. There is a dramatic decrease in the percentage who self-identify as not religious and a dramatic increase in those who self-identify as Catholic. The small percentage of Croatians who identify as Greek Orthodox, Muslim, and other also increases over this time period. These patterns suggest the rebirth of religion and particularly of Catholicism from 1985 to 1996.

In addition to the increased proportion of individuals who self-identify as Catholic, there has been an intensification of beliefs among Catholics in Croatia (see Table 2). Specifically, the percentage of Catholics who believe that "it [orthodoxy] is all true," believe in God, believe in life after death, and believe that God created people has increased — the most dramatic increase being from 1989 to 1996. Moreover, church attendance has been on the rise. For example, from 1989 to 1996, the percentage who reported attending mass daily rose from .7% to 33.8%.

In sum, from 1985 to 1996, more Croatians have been self-identifying as Catholic, there has been an intensification of religious beliefs among Catholics, and Catholics have been attending mass more frequently.[1] Moreover, heightened religious beliefs and frequent church attendance are clearly correlated with high levels of ethnic intolerance in Croatia in 1996 (see Table 3).

Do church attendance and the intensity of one's religious beliefs cause ethnic intolerance, or is the association spurious? To address this question we will evaluate the model diagrammed in Figure 1 using survey data from Croatia in 1996. In the proposed model, ethnic intolerance is a function of in-group/out-group polarization, war-related conflict, and social-demographic characteristics.[2] In-group/out-group polarization is expected to increase ethnic intolerance because of the heightened awareness of group differences and the use of negative

TABLE 1: Trends in Religious Preference among Croatians in Croatia, 1985, 1989, and 1996

	1985 (%)	1989 (%)	1996 (%)
Religious Preference			
Catholic	39.7	88.4	95.5
Greek Orthodox	.1	.1	.3
Muslim	.0	.1	.3
Other	.2	.3	.4
Not religious	60.0	10.9	3.5
Missing	.0	.3	.0
N	2,644	1,846	2,030

sanctions to secure group solidarity. Polarization is also hypothesized to have an indirect effect on ethnic intolerance through religiosity. In other words, war-related conflict is expected to increase in-group/out-group polarization around Catholicism, increasing the frequency of church attendance and the intensity of religious beliefs. The effect of religiosity, then, is expected to be largely spurious — caused by the increase in in-group/out-group polarization. Social-demographic characteristics provide a foundation for the development of tolerant or intolerant attitudes. Education and size of residence, for example, are expected to decrease ethnic intolerance because of increased exposure to diverse ideas and people.

Hypotheses

Resurgence hypothesis: Religiosity, involving frequent church attendance and intense spiritual beliefs, causes ethnic intolerance.

Salience hypothesis: War-related conflict increases in-group/out-group polarization, religiosity, and intolerance. Thus, the relationship between religiosity and intolerance is expected to be largely spurious.

Data and Measurement

We test these hypotheses using survey data collected in March and April 1996 by the Center for the Investigation of Transition and Civil Society in Zagreb, Croatia.[3] Ninety-five out of a possible 350 *opœine* (sing. *opœina*), or counties, were selected to form the sampling base from which households and then individuals were randomly sampled. *Opœine* were selected in a purposeful manner to maximize variation relating to people's experience of the war. The face-to-face survey was

TABLE 2: Trends in Religiosity among Croatian Catholics in Croatia, 1985, 1989, and 1996

	1985 (%)	1989 (%)	1996 (%)
Religious orthodoxy			
Not religious and opposed to religion	.2	.6	.2
Not religious but not opposed to religion	5.5	20.4	7.7
Indifferent about religion	5.9	9.3	4.8
Think about religion but not clear if it's true	17.4	13.2	7.1
Believe, but not that it's all true	52.7	36.5	38.4
Believe it's all true	18.2	19.9	41.9
Missing	.1	.1	.0
Believe in existence of God			
Do not believe	14.0	18.9	5.8
Have doubts	33.4	29.5	12.9
Believe	51.8	51.4	81.3
Missing	.8	.2	.0
Believe in life after death			
Do not believe	45.0	44.5	19.6
Have doubts	31.7	28.3	28.0
Believe	22.6	27.0	52.4
Missing	.7	.2	.0
Believe that God created people			
Do not believe	26.4	30.1	11.6
Have doubts	32.4	28.8	20.6
Believe	40.1	41.1	67.8
Missing	1.1	.1	.0
Attendance			
Never	17.3		
On special occasions	22.4		
Rarely	19.7		
Sometimes	28.0		
Usually every day	12.1		
Missing	.5		
Never		43.6	19.6
Monthly		40.0	26.7
Weekly		15.6	17.9
Daily		.7	33.8
More than once a day[a]		—	2.0
Missing		.4	.0
N	1,050	1,631	1,939

[a] "More than once a day" is not listed as an available response category in 1989.

TABLE 3: Zero-Order Correlations of Ethnic Intolerance, Church Attendance, and Intensity of Religious Beliefs: Croatia, 1996

	Ethnic Intolerance
Church attendance	.074**
Scale of intensity of religious beliefs	.092**
Religious orthodoxy	.110**
Belief in existence of God	.062**
Belief in life after death	.054*
Belief that God created people	.083**
(N = 1,939)	

* p < .05   ** p < .01 (two-tailed)

administered to a random sample of 2,305 respondents within these selected *općine*. Because we examine in-group/out-group polarization around religion and national identity and their relationships with intolerance for ethnic minorities in Croatia, we exclude non-Croatians and non-Catholics from the analysis. Of the 2,202 completed interviews, 2,030 of the respondents are Croatian. Of the 2,030 Croatians, 1,939 are Catholic. The focus is thus on the attitudes of majority Croatian Catholics — who comprise 88% of the total respondents of the survey — toward other groups. Other groups offer too few cases to meaningfully analyze.

ETHNIC INTOLERANCE

Ethnic intolerance is defined as an individual's unwillingness to extend economic, political, and social rights to ethnic minority groups. Forty items have face validity as indicators of ethnic intolerance. Respondents were asked to approve or disapprove of extending five rights — cultural associations; schools in minority languages; independent television, news programs, and radio; representatives in the legislature; and a separate political-territorial area — separately to eight different minority groups living in Croatia. Five of these groups — Serbians, Bosnian Muslims, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians — were Yugoslav nationals. The remaining ethnic minorities are Italians, Hungarians, and Czechs.

Bivariate correlations and exploratory factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction indicate that 32 of these items are highly intercorrelated. The eight questions associated with the minority right to a separate political-territorial area have the weakest intercorrelations and factor loadings. Responses to these questions are strongly negative, with relatively little variation — this may be due to the fact that the question of separate political-territorial area for minority groups has recently been resolved by armed conflict. These eight items have accordingly been dropped. Since we are concerned primarily with the intolerance of ethnic groups who were once Yugoslav nationals, we exclude all questions with Italians,

FIGURE 1: Theoretical Model of Ethnic Intolerance

Note: The bold lines represent the salience hypothesis. The broken line represents the resurgence hypothesis.

Hungarians, and Czechs as target groups. The resulting 20-item index (Cronbach's $\alpha = .948$); then, measures the degree to which an individual is unwilling to extend the rights of cultural associations; schools in minority languages; independent television, news programs, and radio; and representatives in the legislature to Serbians, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, Macedonians, and Montenegrins.

RELIGIOSITY

Church attendance and intensity of religious beliefs constitute our measures of religiosity. Church attendance is measured by one question, "How often do you go to church?" (response categories are "never, monthly, weekly, daily, or more than once a day"). Intensity of religious beliefs is a weighted scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .794$) that includes three questions dealing with specific beliefs — the existence of God, life after death, and creation — and one general question related to one's level of religious orthodoxy (see Appendixes).

IN-GROUP/OUT-GROUP POLARIZATION

Two variables measure in-group/out-group polarization: distrust of others and the importance of Croatian national culture. The former measures one's sense of security and level of trust for "others" as identified by national origin. The latter measures the degree to which individuals believe that language, traditions, art, and culture are important to Croatian national identity. Both distrust and cultural saliency identify the degree to which individuals distinguish between in-groups and out-groups. Distrust and cultural saliency are weighted scales. Distrust (Cronbach's α = .824) consists of nine questions, and cultural saliency (Cronbach's α = .834) consists of four (see Appendices).[4]

CONFLICT

Two indices measure the degree to which individuals were exposed to conflict during the recent war: a property damage index and a violence index. The property damage index consists of six items measuring the degree of destruction to one's home, vacation home, economic/farming property, household property, livestock, and crops. The violence index consists of 18 war-related experiences such as being wounded, attacked, or forced to emigrate. Targets include friends, family, and self (see Appendix A).

SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS

In addition to the analysis variables, we control for age, sex, education, income, size of residence, and employment status. Age is measured in years. Education is measured by educational attainment (no schooling, elementary school, basic high school, technical school, middle school, high school, university, post-university). Income is measured by household monthly income. Values for income were divided by 10,000 to make results more interpretable. Present locale (village, local town, large local town, regional city, large regional city, and republic center) measures size of residence. Employment status is a dummy variable in which the unemployed are coded as 1.

Results

In support of the theoretical model presented in Figure 1 and the salience hypothesis, war-related conflict directly increases in-group/out-group polarization and ethnic intolerance. War-related conflict also indirectly increases religiosity (see Table 4). On average, individuals who experienced property damage and violence during the war are less trustful of others and are more likely to believe that language, art, traditions, and culture are important to the Croatian nation. Specifically, a one

standard deviation increase in property damage increases distrust for others and the importance of Croatian national culture by .057 and .041, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in war violence increases distrust by .089 and the importance of Croatian national culture by .063. Conflict also increases ethnic intolerance. Those who experienced property damage and violence during the recent war are more intolerant of ethnic minorities. A one standard deviation increase in property damage and in violence increases intolerance by .049 and .052, respectively. Finally, while conflict does not directly cause religiosity, property damage and violence do affect religiosity indirectly through in-group/out-group polarization.

Also in support of the salience hypothesis, in-group/out-group polarization increases religiosity and ethnic intolerance. The importance of language, art, traditions, and culture to the Croatian nation and distrust of others are among the most powerful predictors of both church attendance and the intensity of religious beliefs. A one standard deviation increase in the importance of Croatian national culture increases attendance by .089 and increases the intensity of religious beliefs by .075. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in distrust increases attendance and the intensity of religious beliefs by .127 and .145, respectively. Distrust for others also increases ethnic intolerance. A one standard deviation increase in distrust increases ethnic intolerance by .158. Finally, and most important, the association between religiosity and ethnic intolerance appears to be largely spurious.

How specifically can we account for the absence of a significant effect of religiosity on ethnic intolerance? Consistent with bivariate correlations in Table 3, results from columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 suggest that — without controls — attendance and the intensity of religious beliefs significantly affect ethnic intolerance. Without controls, a one standard deviation increase in attendance increases ethnic intolerance by .074 and a one standard deviation increase in belief intensity increases intolerance by .092. After controlling for the demographic variables and war-related experiences, the regression coefficients for attendance and belief intensity decrease substantially. They nevertheless remain significant. Once we control for in-group/out-group polarization in column 5, however, the effect of religiosity on ethnic intolerance becomes nonsignificant — that is, the relationship between religiosity and intolerance is largely spurious based on their joint determination by polarization. The spurious relationship is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.

In sum, war-related conflict produces in-group/out-group polarization, which increases religiosity and heightens ethnic intolerance. The relationship between religiosity and ethnic intolerance is largely spurious, due to the joint determination of religiosity and intolerance by in-group/out-group polarization.

TABLE 4: Path Model Regressions of Ethnic Intolerance on Religiosity, In-Group/Out-Group Polarization, War-Related Conflict, and Social-Demographic Controls: Croatia, 1996

| | In-Group/Out-Group Polarization | | | | Religiosity | | | | Ethnic Intolerance | |
| | Distrust of Others | | Importance of Culture | | Attendance[a] | | Intensity of Beliefs | | | |
	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β
Social-Demographic Controls										
Age	.005 (.001)***	.080	.004 (.002)***	.078	-.001 (.002)	-.011	-.000 (.001)	-.002	-.001 (.001)**	-.062
Male	.172 (.041)***	.094	.036 (.042)	.020	-.479 (.053)***	-.203	-.294 (.041)***	-.158	.014 (.015)	.021
Education	-.082 (.016)***	-.138	.078 (.016)***	.129	-.041 (.021)*	-.053	-.095 (.016)***	-.157	-.021 (.006)***	-.098
Family income	-.392 (.107)***	-.090	-.046 (.111)	-.010	.179 (.137)	.032	-.016 (.106)	-.004	.099 (.039)***	.063
Size of residence	-.019 (.012)	-.039	.001 (.012)	.013	-.049 (.015)***	-.077	-.047 (.012)***	-.094	-.002 (.004)	-.011
Unemployed	-.149 (.072)*	-.048	.000 (.075)	.000	.042 (.093)	.011	.001 (.071)	.002	.010 (.027)	.009
War-Related Conflict										
Property damage	.033 (.014)**	.057	.024 (.014)*	.041	-.006 (.017)	-.008	.018 (.013)	.032	.010 (.005)*	.049
Violence	.020 (.005)***	.089	.014 (.006)**	.063	.010 (.007)	.034	.007 (.005)	.032	.004 (.002)*	.052
In-Group/Out-Group Polarization										
Distrust of others					.164 (.030)***	.127	.146 (.023)***	.145	.057 (.009)***	.158
Importance of culture					.114 (.029)***	.089	.075 (.022)***	.075	.007 (.008)	.019
Religiosity										
Attendance									.008 (.007)	.028
Intensity of beliefs									.012 (.009)	.034
Constant	-.589		.118		3.198		.615		.515	
R²	.077***		.025***		.078***		.114***		.056***	

(N = 1,939).

a Results from the OLS regression of attendance were compared with those from an ordered logit regression. The direction and significance of the effects are identical.

* p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .005   (one-tailed)

TABLE 5: The Effects of Religiosity on Ethnic Intolerance Controlling for Other Determinants: Croatia, 1996

	Ethnic Intolerance		Ethnic Intolerance		Ethnic Intolerance		Ethnic Intolerance		Ethnic Intolerance	
	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β
Religiosity										
Attendance	.021 (.006)***	.074			.013 (.007)*	.046	.013 (.007)*	.044	.008 (.007)	.028
Intensity of beliefs			.033 (.008)***	.092	.023 (.009)**	.063	.020 (.009)*	.055	.012 (.009)	.034
Social-Demographic Controls										
Age					-.001 (.001)*	-.057	-.001 (.001)*	-.049	-.001 (.001)**	-.062
Male					.030 (.016)*	.044	.028 (.016)*	.042	.014 (.015)	.021
Education					-.023 (.006)***	-.108	-.024 (.006)***	-.113	-.021 (.006)***	-.098
Family income					.079 (.040)*	.050	.077 (.040)*	.048	.099 (.039)**	.063
Size of residence					-.002 (.004)	-.010	-.002 (.004)	-.014	-.002 (.004)	-.011
Unemployed					.010 (.027)	.009	.002 (.027)	.022	.010 (.027)	.009
War-Related Conflict										
Property damage							.012 (.005)**	.058	.010 (.005)*	.049
Violence							.005 (.002)**	.065	.004 (.002)*	.052
In-Group/Out-Group Polarization										
Distrust of others									.057 (.009)***	.158
Importance of culture									.007 (.008)	.019
Constant	.640		.583		.506		.531		.515	
R²	.006***		.008***		.022***		.032***		.056***	

(N = 1,939)

* p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .005 (one-tailed)

FIGURE 2: The Spurious Relationship between Religiosity and Ethnic Intolerance (Standardized Regression Coefficients)

In-Group/Out-Group Polarization

Ethnic Intolerance

.158

Distrust of Others

.127

Religiosity

.145

Attendance

.089

.075

Intensity of Religious Beliefs

Importance of Croatian National Culture

SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS

Social-demographic characteristics also play an important role in the development of in-group/out-group polarization and ethnic intolerance (see Table 4). Education decreases both distrust of others and ethnic intolerance. A one standard deviation increase in education decreases distrust by .138 and ethnic intolerance by .098. On the other hand, education also increases the saliency of Croatian national culture. A one standard deviation increase in education increases cultural saliency by .129. Income and age differentially affect polarization and ethnic intolerance. Increases in income decrease distrust and increase ethnic intolerance. Conversely, age increases distrust and cultural saliency while decreasing ethnic intolerance. Finally, results suggest that, on average, men and the employed are more distrustful of others.[5]

THE IMPERFECT NATIONALIZATION OF RELIGION: WHO ARE THE "DEVIANT" CASES?

Thus far we have focused on "nondeviant" individuals, or, in other words, on individuals who are both religious and intolerant. This focus is based on the premise that in-group/out-group polarization in Croatia occurs around religious identity (Catholicism) and intolerance for other ethnic groups. We have referred to this process of polarization as the nationalization of religion. While this focus on

nondeviant individuals has been useful, it obscures the possibility that some individuals are both religious and tolerant or not religious and intolerant. In fact, almost 12% of the sample fall into one of these two "deviant" profiles.

Who are these deviant individuals, and what does their presence mean for the nationalization of religion in Croatia? To answer these questions, we examine mean values of social-demographic variables, war-related conflict, and in-group/out-group polarization for the two deviant groups: those who are both religious and tolerant and those who are not religious but are intolerant.[6]

Who are the deviant individuals? A comparison of nonreligious, intolerant individuals ($N = 88$) with nondeviant individuals ($N = 1,713$) suggests that no significant differences exist with respect to the social-demographic variables, war-related conflict, and in-group/out-group polarization. This may be the result of the relatively small number of nonreligious, intolerant individuals. Two variables, however, do approach statistical significance: unemployment and distrust. On average, nonreligious, intolerant individuals have a higher mean level of unemployment and distrust.

Significant differences do emerge in a comparison of religious, tolerant individuals ($N = 138$) with nondeviant individuals ($N = 1,713$). Compared to nondeviant cases, tolerant, religious individuals are older, have less education and income, experienced less war-related violence, and are more distrustful of others. Religious, tolerant individuals are more likely to live in rural areas. Finally, roughly 75% of the religious, tolerant individuals are women.

How can we account for the existence of these deviant groups? We suggest that social pressure to conform to "Croatian" values appears to have only partially affected both deviant groups. More specifically, the nonreligious, intolerant individuals have, in a sense, failed to conform to other values such as religiosity. Similarly, religious, tolerant individuals have failed to conform to social pressure to be intolerant of ethnic out-groups. Perhaps this lack of conformity for the religious, tolerant group is the result of a mature or more spiritual religiosity that at least partially rejects notions of intolerance. Given the significant differences between the religious, tolerant individuals and the nondeviant respondents, it is also possible that certain structural constraints caused by rural life, low education, or low income prevent access to social values such as intolerance.

These differences should be interpreted with caution because of the absence of controls. That having been said, the examination of deviant cases suggests that the nationalization of religion in Croatia has been imperfect. Many individuals do not conform to social pressure to be intolerant, while others do not conform to be religious. The imperfect nature of the nationalization of religion suggests that discussions of complete overlap between religion and identity in the former Yugoslavia are premature.

Discussion

From these results, then, it is apparent that church attendance and the intensity of religious beliefs do not directly cause ethnic intolerance in Croatia. Rather, the effect of religiosity on ethnic intolerance is largely spurious, caused by the joint determination of religiosity and intolerance by in-group/out-group polarization. Therefore, dramatic religious revivals such as those in Croatia from 1985 to 1996 involving frequent church attendance and intense religious beliefs should be viewed as correlates of a larger process of group differentiation and should not be seen as having a direct causal connection to heightened intolerance.

If religiosity does not cause ethnic intolerance, what possibilities exist for decreasing intolerance among differentiated groups? Results from the current analysis suggest that support for minority rights is based at least partially in exposure to diverse ideas. Such exposure may come through education or political socialization emphasizing unity and integration. Education decreases both distrust and ethnic intolerance — possibly through increasing pressure to think critically about the surrounding world. Age is also associated with lower intolerance in this sample. While the direction of this effect might initially appear suspect, we believe that it represents a period effect. In other words, older individuals were exposed to the ideology of Yugoslavism and experienced specific policies designed to erode ethnic divisions. Despite the ultimate failure of this ideology and these policies, the socialization process may have led older individuals to be more tolerant of ethnic minorities.

Our research also suggests that the nationalization of religion has not affected all individuals. Two relatively large deviant groups — tolerant, religious individuals and nonreligious, intolerant individuals — are present. A number of scholars discuss the overlap between religion and identity in the former Yugoslavia as if they are one and the same. The existence of these deviant groups, particularly the well-defined group of religious, tolerant individuals, suggests that the nationalization of religion is an incomplete process. Future analyses should examine the factors that constrain or facilitate adherence to group norms such as religiosity in Croatia. In addition to education and liberal political socialization, certain structural constraints may exist that prevent the diffusion of social values such as ethnic intolerance.

Our results also suggest that the development of ethnic intolerance is a complicated process - for example, age increases distrust and decreases intolerance, while income decreases distrust and increases intolerance. Clearly, the causal chain is complex. Only through a more detailed analysis of such complex processes will we fully understand how intolerant attitudes are formed.

Finally, the early detection and prevention of conflict should be a high priority among political leaders. Certainly conflict and intolerance have a cyclical relationship. By preventing the spread of conflict or limiting its negative

consequences, it might be possible to break the cycle and prevent further in-group/out-group polarization.

Conclusions

While this analysis has answered one question — Does religiosity cause ethnic intolerance in Croatia? — it raises several more. First, what conditions lead to the selection of a specific target for group differentiation and polarization? We have suggested that this has occurred around religion in Croatia because of the geographic convergence of the three churches, the policies of Tito and the LCY, and the actions of the various churches throughout the history of Yugoslavia. Do other cases in which groups distinguish themselves by religious preference or beliefs have similar histories? Under what conditions might class or race become the fulcrum for group identity? Would class or race directly affect intolerance, or would their effects also be spurious? Also, future analyses should examine the basic model presented here in a different setting, especially one in which there is direct competition for scarce resources such as jobs or housing. By identifying other potential targets of group polarization — such as class and race — and their possible effects on intolerance across a number of societies, it may be possible to develop appropriate strategies to build a constructive dialogue between hostile groups while increasing support for minority rights.

Notes

1. In addition to the sources already discussed, this religious resurgence may be the result of the demise of the Communist system. The Communist regime was somewhat hostile to the Croatian Catholic Church, which favored an independent Croatian state. Thus, the collapse of the Communist federal government coupled with other factors such as President Tudjman's support for the Catholic Church and overt conflict between ethnic groups may have led to an increase in attendance and religiosity.

2. Ethnic competition theorists argue that niche overlap (Barth 1969) — for example, direct competition for jobs or housing — leads to intolerance. Direct competition for economic resources between Croats and ethnic minorities in Croatia, however, was not likely to occur in 1996. While there were sizable minority populations in Croatia, especially in the Krajina region, these largely disappeared following the war. We therefore focus on conflict.

3. Refer to Appendixes A and B for question wording and details of scale construction.

4. An additional exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring and Varimax rotation was performed to identify any overlap between the following attitudes: ethnic intolerance, the intensity of religious beliefs, distrust, and cultural saliency. Results suggest the existence of seven factors. The intensity of religious beliefs items, distrust

items, and cultural saliency items form three clearly distinct factors. The remaining four factors correspond to the four different dimensions of ethnic intolerance — that is, the intolerance items are grouped on the basis of the degree to which an individual is unwilling to extend the rights of cultural associations; schools in minority languages; independent television, news programs, and radio; and representatives in the legislature. Moreover, the largest factor loading for any item intended to measure a *different* attitude is .171. Thus, there is evidence that ethnic intolerance, the intensity of religious beliefs, distrust, and cultural saliency are, in fact, distinct attitudes.

5. The regressions contained within Tables 4 and 5 were reestimated using a reduced version of the ethnic intolerance scale. Specifically, we examined the sources of ethnic intolerance for Serbians only (e.g., the degree to which an individual is unwilling to extend the rights of cultural associations; schools in minority languages; independent television, news programs, and radio; and representatives in the legislature to Serbians). Results are strikingly similar to those presented in Tables 4 and 5. Thus, there is evidence that ethnic intolerance has similar sources in the former Yugoslavia, regardless of the target group.

6. To define the two deviant groups, the ethnic intolerance and intensity of religious beliefs scales were converted into quartiles. Tolerant, religious individuals are defined as those who are in both the most tolerant and most religious quartiles. Nonreligious and intolerant individuals are defined as those who are in both the least tolerant and least religious quartiles. These two groups are compared to individuals who are not in both extreme quartiles.

APPENDIX A: Variables Used in the Analysis

Dependent Variable

Ethnic Intolerance Index (sum of responses)

Which rights should ethnic minorities living in Croatia have, among the following:

Cultural associations

Serbs (yes, no [0, 1])

Bosnian Muslims (yes, no)

Slovenes (yes, no)

Montenegrins (yes, no)

Macedonians (yes, no)

Schools in their languages

(Asked separately for the five minority groups listed above)

Independent TV, news programs, radio

(Asked separately for the five minority groups listed above)

Representatives in the legislature

(Asked separately for the five minority groups listed above)

Independent Variables

Attendance

How often do you go to church? (never, monthly, weekly, daily, more than once a day [1-5])

Intensity of Religious Beliefs Scale (refer to Appendix B for factor analysis)

What do you think about religion? (I am not religious and I oppose religion; I am not at all religious, but I'm not against it; I am indifferent about religion; I think about it, but it's not all clear if it's true or not; I believe, but it is not all true; I believe it is all true [1-6])

Do you believe in the existence of God? (don't believe, have doubts about, or believe [1-3])

Do you believe in life after death? (don't believe, have doubts about, or believe)

Do you believe that God created people? (don't believe, have doubts about, or believe)

Distrust of Others Scale (refer to Appendix B for factor analysis)

Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree [1-5])

The common origin of our people is the basis of our mutual trust. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree)

We should not trust foreigners too much. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree)

The past of our people for all of us must be sacred. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree)

APPENDIX A: Variables Used in the Analysis (Continued)

Every inch of our country should be treated as sacred. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree)

A nation that does not honor its traditions deserves to perish. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree)

Survival of your nation is the main goal of every individual. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree)

Everyone has all they need when the country is strong. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree)

Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to their nation. (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree)

Importance of Croatian National Culture Scale (refer to Appendix B for factor analysis)

How important are the following for your nation? (not important, a little important or don't know, very important [1-3])

language, traditions, art, culture

Property Damage Index (sum of responses)

Did you suffer any war damage to your home? (no, partial, complete [0, 1, 2])

Did you suffer any war damage to your vacation home? (no, partial, complete)

Did you suffer any war damage to economic/farming things? (no, partial, complete)

Did you suffer any war damage to household things? (no, partial, complete)

Did you suffer any war damage to livestock? (no, partial, complete)

Did you suffer any war damage to crops? (no, partial, complete)

Violence Index (sum of responses)

Did you have any of these war-related experiences:

forcefully emigrated (no, yes [0, 1])

life endangered (no, yes)

a relative was in life threatening danger (no, yes)

a friend was in life threatening danger (no, yes)

relatives disappeared (no, yes)

friends disappeared (no, yes)

relatives wounded (no, yes)

friends wounded (no, yes)

family member attacked (no, yes)

relatives attacked (no, yes)

friends attacked (no, yes)

relatives captured (no, yes)

friends captured (no, yes)

family forcefully emigrated (no, yes)

relatives forcefully emigrated (no, yes)

friends forcefully emigrated (no, yes)

relatives killed (no, yes)

friends killed (no, yes)

APPENDIX B: Scale Construction

Intensity of Religious Beliefs Scale Factor Analysis[a]

	Factor Loadings
Religious orthodoxy	.712
Believe in God	.824
Believe in life after death	.629
Believe God created people	.834
N	1,939
Eigenvalue	2.688
Percent variance	67.205
Cronbach's alpha	.794

Distrust Scale Factor Analysis[a]

	Factor Loadings
Cooperation but not trust	.540
Common origin equals mutual trust	.690
Shouldn't trust foreigners	.504
Past is sacred	.726
Every inch of country is sacred	.665
Nations not honoring traditions perish	.562
Survival of nation is main goal	.599
Have all we need when country is strong	.519
Safe when majority are of your nation	.554
N	1,939
Eigenvalue	3.861
Percent variance	42.896
Cronbach's alpha	.824

Importance of Croatian National Culture Scale Factor Analysis[a]

	Factor Loadings
Importance of language to Croatian nation	.601
Importance of traditions to Croatian nation	.721
Importance of art to Croatian nation	.850
Importance of culture to Croatian nation	.811
N	1,939
Eigenvalue	2.671
Percent variance	66.770
Cronbach's alpha	.834

[a] Results are based on principal axis extraction.

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