- I. Introduction: the discontent with American parties
  - A. Two sets of critics
    - 1. Advocates of "responsible party government"
    - 2. Advocates of ideological parties
  - B. Ideological polarization of parties since 1960s
- II. The case for responsible party government
  - A. Goals
    - 1. Strong and decisive government
      - a. Liberal goal:
      - b. Conservative goal:
    - 2. Simplify the electoral choices:
    - B. How would party government (responsible parties) work?
      - 1. Clear and coherent (and conflicting) party electoral platforms:
      - 2. Candidates:
      - 3. Campaigns:
      - 4. Programmatic policy making to enact electoral mandate:
      - 5. Control of both elected branches:
    - C. The case against party government
      - 1. It would increase conflict
        - a. Rigid and dogmatic politics
        - b. Limits on representation of diverse interests
        - c. Undercut or destroy interest groups and other nonparty organizations
        - d. Splintering of the two-party system
      - 2. It wouldn't work in American politics
        - a. Constitutional barriers
          - (1) Division of powers and representation
          - (2) Separation of powers and representation Table 15.1, p. 290
          - (3) Sharing of overlapping powers
        - b. Statutory barriers
          - (1) Direct primary
          - (2) Campaign finance
        - c. Social barriers
          - (1) Voter ignorance, disinterest, and distrust
          - (2) Issue complexity
    - D. The Gingrich experiment: a temporarily responsible party
      - 1. Changed institutional arrangements
      - 2. Increased organizational discipline
      - 3. Increased ideological cohesion
- III. Party cohesion and ideology (the semi-responsible parties)`
  - A. Are the American parties ideological? Box, pp. 294-95
    - 1. Pragmatic
    - 2. Brokerage function
  - B. Do they at least offer clear choices?
    - 1. Divisive issues:
    - 2. Attractive leaders with a simple message, such as Ronald Reagan:
  - C. But internal divisions remain
    - 1. Economic v. social conservatives
    - 2. Moderate v. extreme liberals

## IV. Ideology and the American voter

- A. How ideological is the American public?
  - 1. Media answer:
  - 2. Academic answer
    - a. Issue consistency:
    - b. Issue voting vs. results-oriented retrospective voting:
  - 3. The dilemma of ideology:
  - 4. Differences by social class:
- B. Differences among activists, candidates, and voters Figure 15.1, p. 298 & Figure 15.2, p. 299
  - 1. Differences among the party's three parts
  - 2. Regional differences
  - 3. Striking the right ideological balance:

V. When is party government most likely? pp. 300-02

- A. When there is strong presidential leadership:
- B. In times of crisis:
- C. When the parties' supporting coalitions realign:
  - 1. Single line of partisan cleavage
  - 2. Greatest intra-party cohesion
  - 3. Greatest inter-party polarization
  - 4. One-party control of both elected branches at federal level (and the federal judiciary by appointments) and a majority of state governments:
  - 5. But, not as much ideological purity and policy cohesion as in European parliamentary democracies:
- D. Barriers to party responsibility: divided government
  - 1. Definition:
  - 2. Historical patterns
    - a. Prior to WWII:
    - b. Since WWII: Table 15.1, p. 298
  - 3. Causes
    - a. Weakening of party identification:
    - b. Increased careerism in Congress
    - c. Separation and division of governmental powers
    - d. Insulation of legislative from executive elections
    - e. Proliferation of single-issue groups
    - f. Loss of control of electoral politics
      - (1) Nomination
      - (2) Campaign funding
  - 4. Consequences:
    - a. Increased of partisan conflict
    - b. Increased policy gridlock
    - c. Increased political distrust & cynicism in electorate
    - d. Decreased political efficacy in electorate
    - e. Decreased popular sovereignty
- VI. Party government and popular control