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PLS 405, Section 1 PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS IN THE U.S.

Hershey & Beck Chapter 14

Part V: The Party in Government THE PARTY IN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE COURTS

- I. Presidents and governors as party leaders
 - A. Party leader as representative of the whole constituency
 - 1. Presidential constituency: national usually over-represents large-state, urban populations recent Republican presidents are exceptions
 - 2. U.S. Senate constituency: collectively over-represents small-state, rural populations
 - 3. U.S. House constituency: local and particularistic
 - B. Party leader as organizational leader
 - 1. Apolitical: Ford, Carter, George Bush
 - 2. Partisan: FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush
 - C. Party leader as electoral leader
 - 1. Coattail effects
 - a. Positive: 1980 Republicans capture of Senate for 1st time since 1952
 - b. Neutral or negative: 1988 Bush, 1996 Clinton
 - 2. Coattails even without the coat
 - a. Surge-and-decline pattern in presidential & midterm congressional elections (-34 seats in the 35 midterm elections between 1862 and 1998)
 - b. Explanations
 - (1) Decline in presidential popularity
 - (2) Increase in turnout among those who disapprove of presidential performance
 - (3) Absence of short-term forces with a reduction in turnout among less partisan
 - (4) Return of presidential defectors to their home party
 - (5) "Strategic" politicians deciding when to run for Congress
 - c. Exceptions: 1934 (+9 D), 1998 (+5 D), 2002 (+8 R)
 - 3. A broader perspective on electoral influence
 - D. Limits on electoral leadership
 - E. The executive-centered party
- II. Party leadership and legislative relations
 - A. How executives try to influence legislatures
 - 1. Prestige
 - 2. Persuasiveness
 - 3. Command of media
 - 4. Patronage & preferments
 - 5. Coattails
 - B. Legislative support for executives
 - 1. Divided control of government | Figure 14.1, p. 283
 - 2. Comparison to governors: governors usually stronger than presidents
 - a. Legislative careerism
 - b. Seniority rules
 - c. Party organizational strength

III. Party influence in executive agencies pp. 284-87

- A. Bureaucrats have constituents too
 - 1. Bureaucratic responsiveness to constituency interests: iron triangles
 - 2. Legislative role in executive organization
 - a. Appointments & senatorial courtesy (about 3500 positions)
 - b. Civil service
 - c. Independent agencies long & staggered terms
 - 3. Plural-executive system in many states: separately elected council-of-state positions (long ballot)
 - 4. Term limits for executives
- B. Holding bureaucrats accountable
 - 1. Cabinet and agency appointments
 - a. Partisan
 - b. Ideological
 - 2. White House staff and EOP appointments
- C. Changing political outlooks in the federal bureaucracy
 - 1. Generational replacement (of New-Deal/Fair-Deal/New-Frontier/Great-Society career appointees with Eisenhower/Nixon/Ford/Reagan/Bush appointees)
 - 2. Senior Executive Service created by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (expanded the top-level management positions subject to presidential control by about 8500)
- IV. Traces of party in the courts Box, p. 288
 - A. Judicial voting along party lines
 - 1. Compared to party voting in legislatures: stronger in legislatures
 - 2. By type of case: worker's comp., criminal, tax, tort
 - B. What causes partisan behavior on the courts? Box, p. 290
 - 1. Explicit partisan activity: now violate judicial norms
 - 2. Patronage: still available guardianships, receiverships, clerkships
 - C. Party considerations in judicial appointments
 - 1. Federal judges Table 14.1, p. 291 20th c. presidents average 90% from own party
 - 2. State court judges
 - a. Gubernatorial appointment (6)
 - b. Legislative election (5)
 - c. General election partisan (13)
 - d. General election nonpartisan (14)
 - e. 'Missouri Plan' (12) nonpartisan selection committee compiles list; governor appoints; retention election required after several years
 - 3. All five selection methods still produce measurable partisan outcomes in judicial decisions because of internalized value differences between Democratic and Republican judges
 - 4. Most continental European countries use civil-service, merit examinations
- V. The party within the executive and the judge
 - A. Similarities: main avenue of party influence is indirect (stemming from internalized values)
 - B. Important limits to direct influence