


- I. Untitled introduction
- A. Review of basic terms
1. **Government**: the only group of people entitled to make decisions that everyone in the state has a duty to obey.
 - a. Shively is incorrect when he says that people have a duty to “accept” government’s decisions.
 - b. Even obeying government’s decisions has limits, e.g., the notion of **civil disobedience** to unjust laws.
 2. Limits on government’s power
 - a. **Constitutional limits**
 - b. **Extra-constitutional limits** (people refuse to obey)
 3. Government’s sources of the power to get people to obey it’s decisions: **force, persuasion, authority**
- II. (Legitimacy) authority: sources
- A. **Results**: most important = independence, peace & prosperity
 - B. **Habit** of compliance
 - C. **Group identities**: religious, ethnic, racial, etc.
 - D. **Governmental procedures** match the national character or dominant political personality of citizens
- III. The “democratic citizen” (**national character** or dominant **political personality**)
- A. **Authoritarian personality**
1. Seminal theorists:
 - a. The fascist right: Theodor Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, (1950)
 - b. Both the Nazi right and the Soviet communist left: Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (1951)
 2. Key traits
 - a. Intolerance of those who are different in thought or condition
 - b. Impatience with basic democratic norms (e.g., limits on government & willingness to bargain & compromise)
 - c. Preference for a hierarchical authority structure with submissiveness to superiors and exploitation of subordinates
- B. **Democratic personality**
1. Seminal theorists:
 - a. Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (1962)
 - b. Paul Sniderman, *Personality and Democratic Politics* (1975)
 2. Key traits:
 - a. **Tolerance**
 - (1) Of opposing points of view & those who are different
 - (2) Of ambiguity: patience with the messiness & delays inherent in democracy
 - b. **Efficacy**: willingness & ability to participate in self-government (political efficacy, interest, & knowledge)
- C. How well are these (democratic) requirements met? Tables 8.1 - 8.3
- IV. **Social capital**
- A. Definition: social networks that include people who trust and assist each other (opposite = social isolation, atomization)
 - B. Types:
 1. **Bonding social capital**: networking with people who are similar (age, race, ethnicity, religion, etc.)
 2. **Bridging social capital**: networking with dissimilar people – more important in a pluralistic democracy
 - C. Seminal theorists:
 1. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (1959)
 2. Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse & Revival of American Community* (2000)
 - D. Importance:
 1. Social networks (clubs, churches, civic associations, neighborhoods, etc.) get people involved in their communities and build a reservoir of trust and positive expectations of collective action
 2. Social capital is positively related to two interrelated **prerequisites of democracy**
 - a. **Political efficacy** (opposite = alienation, *anomie*, cynicism, distrust)
 - (1) **Internal political efficacy**: the belief that people like you can understand and influence government
 - (2) **External political efficacy**: the belief that the government represents the interests of people like you
 - b. **Political participation**: the types & amounts of individual interest & involvement in the political system (e.g., self-education, voting, demonstrating, running for office, etc.)

V. **Political culture**

A. Definition: the set of all political attitudes & beliefs held communally by a nation

B. Seminal theorists:

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Vol. I, 1835; Vol. II, 1840)
2. Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1963)



3. Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (1990) argues that since WWII in Western European political culture there has been a shift to post-material and post-nationalistic values – from security to self-expression.

C. Shively (and many others) argue that **political culture is slow to change**; hence, it is difficult to export democratic institutions to non-democratic cultures

1. Unsuccessful attempts to change from a non-democratic to a democratic political culture:

- a. **Provisional Government** (Kerensky Republic) in Russia during WWI (lasted from the February 1917 Revolution – which deposed the Czar – to the October Revolution by the Bolsheviks which deposed the Provisional Government)
- b. **German Reich** (Weimar Republic) after WWI (1919-33) was replaced with the **Third Reich** when Hitler came to power
- c. **NATO** bombed the **Federal Yugoslav Republic** in 1999. In Western countries, opposition to NATO's intervention was mainly from conservatives and libertarians on the right viewing Yugoslavia as irrelevant to national interests, and from most of the far left as Western imperialism in violation of the UN Charter. Within Yugoslavia, opinion on the war was (unsurprisingly) split between highly critical Serbs and highly supportive Albanians.
- d. **Operation Iraqi Freedom** (20 March 2003 - present)

2. Successful changes from a non-democratic to a democratic culture:

- a. **West Germany & Japan** after WWII

D. An application of political culture: Robert Kagan's *Of Paradise and Power*: the greater costs of WWI & II for W. European powers has caused them to become less nationalistic and more likely to endorse multi-lateral solutions to international conflict than the U.S.

E. **Religion** & political culture Tables 8.4 and 8.5

1. Definition: 1) beliefs about creation & existence and 2) the ethical and moral values that follow from those beliefs
2. Religion in U.S. politics has always been important
3. Religion in Islamic politics has also always been important
4. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*
 - a. Assumes (incorrectly) there has been a decline of class politics in the West
 - b. Argues that there is a clash between Islamic fundamentalism and Western secular society that defines the new world order
5. Shively notes that there is a good deal of agreement with Western political values in Jordan Table 8.6 However, Jordan is more westernized than most Islamic countries

F. **Political socialization**

1. Definition: the acquisition of political knowledge and beliefs (the transmission of political culture from one generation to the next)
2. Characteristics
 - a. **Stages**
 - (1) Can be a **life-cycle change** that is common to members of all generations (e.g., basic political identifications are usually learned early in childhood and typically remain stable thereafter – e.g., nationalism & party identification) Table 8.7
 - (2) Or can be a **periodic change**: i.e., political learning specific to a particular generation impacted by traumatic events in a particular historical period (primarily war or depression)
 - b. **Process**
 - (1) Can be conscious or unconscious on the part of the learner
 - (2) Or intentional or unintentional on the part of the teacher
 - c. Most important **agents**
 - (1) **Primary groups**: family, school (e.g., the fundamentalist **Wahhabi** branch of Sunni Islam taught in many **madrassas** funded by Saudi Arabia), & peers
 - (2) **Secondary groups**: place, class, race/ethnicity, gender, political party

VI. Examples:

A. Building authority & legitimacy in West Germany after WWII Tables 8.8 - 8.10

B. Declining democratic legitimacy in the U.S. (since mid-1960s) Table 8.11 & Figure 8.1

1. **Divisive issues**: social, economic, political
2. **Adversarial journalism**