

*Chapter 4: The Race for Delegates*

- I. Introduction
  - A. National party convention delegates choose presidential nominees
  - B. Procedures for delegate selection are determined by
    - 1. State law (exclusively, prior to 1970s)
    - 2. National party guidelines (also, since the 1970s)
  
- II. Reforming the nomination process
  - A. Historical perspective
    - 1. 1790s-1820s: congressional party caucuses chose nominees
    - 2. 1830s-1900s: state party leaders chose & controlled voting of convention delegates
    - 3. 1900s-1920s: origin of primary selection of an increasing number of convention delegates
    - 4. 1920s-1960s: reinstatement of state party leader dominance
    - 5. 1970s-present: dominance of the primary-selection of convention delegates
  - B. Democratic rules, 1968-1980
    - 1. Catalyst
    - 2. McGovern Commission
      - a. Goals
        - (1) Grass-roots participation
        - (2) Equitable representation
      - b. Means
        - (1) Primaries and caucuses Box 4-1, p. 107
        - (2) Closed primaries and caucuses
        - (3) Proportional voting
        - (4) Group quotas
    - 3. Unintended consequences
      - a. Length of campaign
      - b. Financial costs
      - c. Party factionalization: pros v. amateurs
  - C. Democratic rules, 1981-present Table 4-1, p. 112
    - 1. Composition of delegate (affirmative action quotas & goals)
    - 2. Time-frame: February-June (front-loading is still an increasing problem)
    - 3. Allocation of votes by proportional method (winner-take-all & winner-take-more alternatives were tried and then dropped by '92)
    - 4. 15% threshold (minimum vote necessary to receive delegates)
    - 5. Unpledged "party leader & elected official" (PLEO) delegates (roughly 18%)
      - a. To select more winnable candidates
      - b. To select candidates more likely to work well with state and congressional leaders
      - c. To be tie-breakers in a divided convention
  - D. Republican rules Table 4-1, p. 112
    - 1. State's rights philosophy
    - 2. Impact of Democratic party rules
  
- III. The legality of party rules
  - A. State's rights v. state- and national-party rules
    - 1. *Cousins v. Wigoda* (1975): party rules upheld as 1<sup>st</sup>-Am. right of association
    - 2. *Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut* (1986): state-party open primary upheld
    - 3. *Democratic Party v. Jones* (2000): voter-initiated blanket primary invalidated at request of both state parties
  - B. Republican apportioning formula
    - 1. Components
      - a. Statehood
      - b. Population size
      - c. Voter support for party's candidates in previous elections
    - 2. Biases
      - a. Small v. large states
      - b. Noncompetitive v. competitive states

- IV. The impact of the rules changes
- A. Turnout (of primary and caucus voters)
    1. Size
    2. Distribution
      - a. Primary v. caucus states
      - b. Early v. later contests
      - c. More v. less competitive states
      - d. Higher v. lower SES
      - e. Moderate v. extreme ideology: research does *not* support the conventional wisdom that primary voters are more ideologically extreme than general-election voters
  - B. Representation (by nominating convention delegates)
    1. Socio-demographic
    2. Ideological
  - C. Party organization and leadership
  - D. Winners and losers
    1. Rise of political “amateurs” or “purists”
      - a. Single-issue activists
      - b. Ideological extremists
    2. Decline of
      - a. Party regulars
      - b. Moderates, pragmatists

- V. Campaigning for delegates
- A. Basic strategic guidelines
    1. Plan far ahead
    2. Concentrate efforts in the early contests Figure 4-1, p. 122
    3. Raise and spend big bucks early
    4. Gain media attention Figure 4-2, p. 125; Figure 4-3, p. 127; Box 4-2, pp. 128-31
    5. Develop a deep and wide organization
    6. Monitor public opinion
    7. Design and target a distinctive appeal
      - a. Establish credentials
      - b. Articulate general theme
      - c. Discuss specific policy problems and solutions
  - B. Two successful prototypical strategies
    1. Non-front-runner strategies
      - a. Try to upset leaders in early contests: stepping stones to prominence
        - (1) Carter <76
        - (2) Bush <80
        - (3) Hart <84
        - (4) McCain & Bradley 2000 Box 4-3, pp. 137-41
      - b. Use the campaign as a pulpit
        - (1) Jackson <84 & <88
        - (2) Robertson <88
        - (3) Brown & Buchanan <92 & <96
        - (4) Bauer & Keyes 2000
    2. The front-runner strategy: amassing delegates
      - a. If strong: crush opponents early
        - (1) Reagan & Mondale ‘84
        - (2) Bush ‘88
        - (3) Clinton <92 & <96
        - (4) Dole <96
        - (5) Bush & Gore 2000 Box 4-4, pp. 144-47
      - b. If weak: maintain credibility & roll up delegate count
        - (1) Carter & Reagan ‘80
        - (2) Dukakis ‘88
        - (3) Bush in ‘92

VI. Summary