## Political Socialization and Political Learning

Definition of political socialization: the acquisition of political values and knowledge

- I. The preadult years: socialization to citizenship
  - A. Preschool (3-5)
    - 1. Idealization of authority figures
      - a. Policeman: benevolent
      - b. President
    - 2. Sense of political community through national symbols
  - B. Early childhood (6-9)
    - 1. Continued idealization of authority figures --> diffuse system support
    - 2. Partisan identification acquired without content
  - C. Late childhood (10-12)
    - Movement begins from personalized view to more knowledge --> separation of individual from institutional roles
    - 2. But low support for democratic values
  - D. Adolescence (13-18)
    - 1. Major spurt in learning -->
      - a. Abstract conception of community interest
      - b. Coherent policy positions
    - 2. Increase in political efficacy
    - 3. Decrease in political trust
    - 4. But still no great increase in support for democratic norms

E.The consequences of preadult socialization to citizenship

- II. The agents of preadult socialization
  - A. The family
    - 1. Correlates: communication and receptivity
    - 2. Content
      - a. Political attitudes -- modest relationship

Table 5.1, p. 131

- b. Party id -- Table 5.2, p. 132
  - If parents congruent in party identification, then the child is highly likely to adopt that party identification
  - (2) If parents are incongruent in their party identification, then:
    - (a) Their child is more likely to be independent in party identification
    - (b) Or will adopt the party identification of the parent with whom the child has the closest bond (usually, but not always the mother)
  - (3) Trend: decline in parent/child congruence
- B. The peer group
  - 1. Influence increases in adolescence
  - 2. Little research on influence
  - 3. Role usually less influential than parents
- C. The primary and secondary school
  - 1. Major purpose: inculcate system support
  - 2. Far less influence in transmitting democratic knowledge and values
    - a. "Hidden" curriculum
    - b. Unqualified teachers
  - 3. But, education still the best predictor of political knowledge and democratic values
- III. College: higher education and its impact
  - A. Extent
    - 1. Rate of college-going by h.s. graduates
    - 2. Proportion of adult population with some college
    - 3. Proportion of adult population with college degree
  - B. Impact on ideology | Figure 5.1, p. 139
  - C. Explanations Table 5.3, p. 140; & Table 5.4, p. 142; Table 5.5, p. 143
    - 1. Awareness -- of alternatives to status quo
    - 2. Enlightenment -- to analytical and critical thinking in place of stereotypes and prejudice
    - 3. Indoctrination -- by liberal faculty

- IV. Personal predispositions and political attitudes
  - A. Personality and political attitudes
  - B. Genetic factors and political attitudes
- V. Socialization during adulthood pp. 146-54
  - A. Explanations (all four can overlap or occur at the same time) Table 5.6, p. 147
    - 1. Compositional effect -- sociodemographic differences e.g., class, gender, race, religion, region, etc.
    - 2. Life-cycle effect -- life-stage differences e.g., pre-adult v. working v. retirement
    - 3. Generational effect -- *largely negative* historical events (war and/or economic depression) that impact everyone but most profoundly those young-adults in their vulnerable years
      - a. 1930s-40s: Great Depression/WWII
      - b. 1960s-70s: domestic & foreign disorder
      - c. 1980s: heightened Cold War rivalry and worst economic recession since Great Depression
      - d. 2000-?: dot-com bust & U.S. war on global terrorism
    - 4. Period effect -- *largely positive* historical events (the combination of peace & prosperity) that impact all age groups more evenly; hence, all birth cohorts move in tandem to the ethos of the times
      - a. Roaring Twenties: WWI over and explosive economic expansion
      - b. Late-1940s and 1950s: WWII over and long period of profound economic expansion
      - c. 1990s: end of Cold War and longest economic boom since WWII
  - B. The life cycle, generations and party identification [research shows stronger generational than life-cycle effects on partisanship]
    - 1. Explanations
      - a. Generational effects on *direction* of party identification Figure 5.2, p. 150 higher Republican identification levels among pre-Depression cohort who reached working age prior to its start (1990 82 + 17 = 1925) and post-boomer cohorts who reached young adulthood after Vietnam and the turbulent 60s (1990 33 + 17 = 1974)
      - b. Life-cycle effects on *strength* of party identification party attachments tend to strengthen as individuals age
    - 2. Consequences
      - a. Party identification
        - (1) Generational effects on *direction* of party identification mobilization of young just entering work force/military
          - (a) 1930s realignment
          - (b) 1960s dealignment outside the South and realignment within the South
        - (2) Period effects on *strength* of party identification conversion of all age groups e.g., TV age produced declines in partisanship
      - b. Issue positions
        - (1) Generational effects: 1950s moderates; 1960s liberals; 1980s conservatives
        - (2) Life-cycle effects: pull to center
        - (3) Compositional effects: growth of middle class
  - C. Generations, the life cycle, and policy issues Table 5.4, p. 142
    - 1. Each generation becomes more ideologically conservative with age
    - 2. However.
      - a. we have previously seen that ideological conservatives are often operationally liberal, and
      - b. generational replacement keeps the aggregate balance of liberals and conservatives more or less constant.
- VI. The persistence of political orientations
  - A. Basic v. policy content
  - B. Impressionable years (17-26)
  - C. A note on marriage