

- I. Political background (the old Christian left and right) pp. 207-11
- A. Great Awakenings: social change triggers conflict with conservative religion
 - 1. First (1730s-40s): reaction to Enlightenment rationalism and deism; rebound of Calvinism
 - 2. Second (1820s-30s): reaction to rising secularism; expansion of Baptist and Methodist denominations
 - 3. Third (1880s-1900s): reaction to industrial/scientific revolutions; widening the split of Protestantism between modernizing mainstream denominations versus the “old” Christian Right
 - 4. Fourth (1970-80s): reaction to excesses of 1960s; emergence of the “new” Christian Right
 - B. Civil War/Reconstruction
 - C. Progressive Era and religious populism
 - 1. Non-Southern leaders were generally both economic and social liberals (e.g., William Jennings Bryan – except for his opposition to the teaching of evolution in the public schools)
 - 2. Southern leaders were generally economic liberals and social conservatives
 - D. 1920s-1970s
 - 1. Forces of change
 - a. Urbanization
 - b. Immigration
 - c. Science
 - d. Technology
 - e. Depression
 - f. WWII/Cold War

- 2. Consequences
 - a. Mainline Protestant *modernism*
 - (1) Theologically liberal denominations: Episcopal, Presbyterian (U.S.A.), Unitarian-Universalist, United Church of Christ
 - (2) Theologically moderate denominations: American Baptist, Disciples of Christ, Evangelical Lutheran, Mennonite, United Methodist
 - b. Protestant *evangelicalism* – theologically conservative denominations: Assemblies of God, Nazarene, Churches of Christ, Seventh-day Adventist, Southern Baptist, Presbyterian (in America), Evangelical Methodist, Lutheran (Missouri Synod)
 - (1) *Opposition*
 - (2) *Withdrawal*

- (3) *Democratic partisanship*
 - (a) Initial factors supporting (prior to 1948)
 - i) Social/cultural conservatism of white southerners
 - ii) Economic liberalism
 - (b) Later factors opposing (1948 and after)
 - i) Increasing social/cultural liberalism (secular humanism) of Democratic party
 - ii) Increasing economic conservatism of southern white evangelical Protestants

- II. Roots of the “New Christian Right” (1970s-present) pp. 211-222
- A. Origin: backlash against 1960s secular humanism (as threats to values, institutions, & social status)
 - B. Building a national movement
 - 1. Evangelical political action in the 1970s
 - a. Jerry Falwell, *Moral Majority*
 - b. Ralph Reed and Pat Robertson, *National Christian Action Coalition*
 - c. Ed McAteer, *Religious Roundtable*
 - d. *Christian Voice* (christianvoice.web229.net/)
 - e. *American Coalition for Traditional Values*
 - 2. The next generation in the 1980s
 - a. Change in strategy:
 - (1) Shift in focus from national to state and local (grass-roots) political arenas
 - (2) Greater emphasis on coalition-building, compromise, & mainstream rhetoric
 - b. NCR Groups: Table 8.1, pp. 219-21
 - (1) *American Family Association* (afa.net/)
 - (2) *Christian Coalition* (cc.org/)
 - (3) *Citizens for Excellence* (nace-cee.org/)
 - (4) *Concerned Women for America* (cwfa.org/)
 - (5) *Eagle Forum* (eagleforum.org/)
 - (6) *Family Research Council* (frc.org/)
 - (7) *Focus on the Family* (fotf.org/)

- (8) *Traditional Values Coalition* (traditionalvalues.org/)
- c. Groups opposed to the NCR
 - (1) *Americans United for Separation of Church and State* (au.org/)
 - (2) *American Civil Liberties Union* (aclu.org/)
 - (3) *Interfaith Alliance* (tialliance.org/)
 - (4) *People for the American Way* (pfaw.org/)
- d. Excesses of both
 - (1) Self-righteousness
 - (2) Distortion and oversimplification
 - (3) Monopolizing symbols of legitimacy

III. Theories of evangelical mobilization

- A. Social influences
 - 1. Objective social status
 - 2. Subjective social status
 - a. *Status-conflict* model (threats to social status)
 - b. *Culture-war* model (threats to values & institutions)
- B. Institutional influences
 - 1. Rise of super-churches and electronic churches
 - 2. Expansion of churches into education & social services
- C. Creed
 - 1. Shift from other-worldliness & personal salvation to political activism
 - 2. Example of other conflicts over the morality of public policies

IV. The impact of the Christian Right

A. The mass public's support for traditional moralism is ambiguous

- B. A fractious family with differing core theological beliefs
 - 1. **Moderate evangelicals** (Billy Graham) <www.billygraham.org>
 - a. Experience salvation through a "born-again" conversion experience
 - b. Believe in both the *inerrancy* and *sole authority* of the Bible on spiritual matters
 - c. Have a strong religious duty to proselytize
 - d. Are open to ecumenicalism with other Christian (e.g., Orthodox & Roman Catholic) and Jewish denominations and
 - e. Therefore focus on proselytizing only the unchurched or those outside the Judeo-Christian tradition
 - 2. **Fundamentalist evangelicals** (Jerry Falwell) <www.falwell.com>
 - a. Have the same core beliefs as *moderates*, except *fundamentalists*
 - (1) Reject ecumenicalism and
 - (2) Therefore have a strong religious duty to proselytize not just the unchurched but also those of other faiths whether Christian or not
 - b. In addition, *fundamentalists* (to a greater degree than *moderates*)
 - (1) Believe in a *literal interpretation* of the Bible
 - (2) Distrust scientific and intellectual approaches to understanding
 - 3. **Charismatic/Pentecostal evangelicals** (Pat Robertson) <<http://www.patrobertson.com/>>
 - a. Have the same core beliefs as *moderates*, including ecumenicalism
 - b. In addition, *charismatics/Pentecostals* believe that, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, they have the gifts or powers of
 - (1) Speaking in tongues
 - (2) Healing by faith
 - (3) Uttering prophecies

V. The consequences for public policy

- A. Prior to 1994: compromise
- B. After 1994: ??

VI. Good times? The Christian Right and the Bush administration

- A. Issue activist ideologues (purist amateurs) v. party regular pragmatists
- B. 1980s NCR comparable to 1960s Democratic new secular left

VII. The Christian Right as a mass movement

- A. Cultural barriers Table 8.2, p. 235
- B. Political diversity among Christians
- C. Sectarianism
- D. Republican electoral concerns
- E. Political style