I.   Political background (the old Christian left and right)   pp. 202-06

    A.   Great Awakenings: social change triggers conflict with conservative religion

        1.   First (1730s-40s): reaction to Enlightenment rationalism and deism; rebound of Calvinism

        2.   Second (1820s-30s): reaction to rising secularism; expansion of Baptist and Methodist denominations

        3.   Third (1880s-1900s): reaction to industrial/scientific revolutions; widening the split of Protestantism between modernizing mainstream denominations versus the "old" Christian Right

        4.   Fourth (1970-80s): reaction to excesses of 1960s; emergence of the "new" Christian Right

    B.   Civil War/Reconstruction

    C.   Progressive Era and religious populism

        1.   Non-Southern leaders were generally both economic and social liberals (e.g., William Jennings Bryan – except for his opposition to the teaching of evolution in the public schools)

        2.   Southern leaders were generally economic liberals and social conservatives

    D.   1920s-1970s

        1.   Forces of change

            a.   Urbanization

            b.   Immigration

            c.   Science

            d.   Technology

            e.   Depression

            f.   WWII/Cold War

        2.   Consequences

            a.   Mainline Protestant *modernism*

                (1)   Theologically liberal denominations: Episcopal, Presbyterian (U.S.A.), Unitarian-Universalist, United Church of Christ

                (2)   Theologically moderate denominations: American Baptist, Disciples of Christ, Evangelical Lutheran, Mennonite, United Methodist

            b.   Protestant *evangelicalism* – theologically conservative denominations: Assemblies of God, Nazarene, Churches of Christ, Seventh-day Adventist, Southern Baptist, Presbyterian (in America), Evangelical Methodist, Lutheran (Missouri Synod)

                (1)   *Opposition*

                (2)   *Withdrawal*

                (3)   *Democratic partisanship*

                    (a)   Initial factors supporting (prior to 1948)

                        i)   Social/cultural conservatism of white southerners

                        ii)   Economic liberalism

                    (b)   Later factors opposing (1948 and after)

                        i)   Increasing social/cultural liberalism (secular humanism) of Democratic party

                        ii)   Increasing economic conservatism of southern white evangelical Protestants

II.   Roots of the "New Christian Right" (1970s-present)   pp. 206-216

    A.   Origin: backlash against 1960s secular humanism (as threats to values, institutions, & social status)

    B.   Building a national movement

        1.   Evangelical political action in the 1970s

            a.   Jerry Falwell, *Moral Majority*

            b.   Ralph Reed and Pat Robertson, *National Christian Action Coalition*

            c.   Ed McAteer, *Religious Roundtable*

            d.   *Christian Voice*

            e.   *American Coalition for Traditional Values*

        2.   The next generation in the 1980s

            a.   Change in strategy:

                (1)   Shift in focus from national to state and local (grass-roots) political arenas

                (2)   Greater emphasis on coalition-building, compromise, & mainstream rhetoric

            b.   NCR Groups: Table 8.1, pp. 213-14

                (1)   *American Family Association*   (action.afa.net)

                (2)   *Christian Coalition*   (cc.org)

                (3)   *Citizens for Excellence*   (nace-cee.org)

                (4)   *Concerned Women for America*   (cwfa.org)

                (5)   *Eagle Forum*   (eagleforum.org)

                (6)   *Family Research Council*   (frc.org)

                (7)   *Focus on the Family*   (fotf.org)

(8) *Traditional Values Coalition*   (traditionalvalues.org)

   c.   Groups opposed to the NCR

     (1)   *Americans United for Separation of Church and State*   (au.org)

     (2)   *American Civil Liberties Union*   (aclu.org)

     (3)   *Interfaith Alliance*   (Interfaithalliance.org)

     (4)   *People for the American Way*   (pfaw.org)

   d.   Excesses of both

     (1)   Self-righteousness

     (2)   Distortion and oversimplification

     (3)   Monopolizing symbols of legitimacy

III.   Theories of evangelical mobilization
- A.   Social influences
  - 1.   Objective social status
  - 2.   Subjective social status
    - a.   *Status-conflict* model (threats to social status)
    - b.   *Culture-war* model (threats to values & institutions)
- B.   Institutional influences
  - 1.   Rise of super-churches and electronic churches
  - 2.   Expansion of churches into education & social services
- C.   Creed
  - 1.   Shift from other-worldliness & personal salvation to political activism
  - 2.   Example of other conflicts over the morality of public policies

IV.   The impact of the Christian Right
- A.   The mass public's support for traditional moralism is ambiguous
- B.   A fractious family with differing core theological beliefs
  - 1.   *Moderate* evangelicals (Billy Graham) <www.billygraham.org>
    - a.   Experience salvation through a "born-again" conversion experience
    - b.   Believe in both the *inerrancy* and *sole authority* of the Bible on spiritual matters
    - c.   Have a strong religious duty to proselytize
    - d.   Are open to ecumenicalism with other Christian (e.g., Orthodox & Roman Catholic) and Jewish denominations and
    - e.   Therefore focus on proselytizing only the unchurched or those outside the Judeo-Christian tradition
  - 2.   *Fundamentalist* evangelicals (Jerry Falwell) <www.falwell.com>
    - a.   Have the same core beliefs as *moderates*, except *fundamentalists*
      - (1)   Reject ecumenicalism and
      - (2)   Therefore have a strong religious duty to proselytize not just the unchurched but also those of other faiths whether Christian or not
    - b.   In addition, *fundamentalists* (to a greater degree than *moderates*)
      - (1)   Believe in a *literal interpretation* of the Bible
      - (2)   Distrust scientific and intellectual approaches to understanding
  - 3.   *Charismatic/Pentecostal* evangelicals (Pat Robertson) <http://www.patrobertson.com/>
    - a.   Have the same core beliefs as *moderates*, including ecumenicalism
    - b.   In addition, *charismatics/Pentecostals* believe that, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, they have the gifts or powers of
      - (1)   Speaking in tongues
      - (2)   Healing by faith
      - (3)   Uttering prophecies

V.   The consequences for public policy
- A.   Prior to 1994: compromise
- B.   After 1994: ??

VI.   Good times? The Christian Right and the Bush administration
- A.   Issue activist ideologues (purist amateurs) v. party regular pragmatists
- B.   1980s NCR comparable to 1960s Democratic new secular left

VII.   The Christian Right as a mass movement
- A.   Cultural barriers   Table 8.2, p. 226
- B.   Political diversity among Christians
- C.   Sectarianism
- D.   Republican electoral concerns
- E.   Political style