

- 0. Untitled introduction
  - A. The same framework for studying a crime works also for studying religious (or any group's) mobilization in the political arena
    - 1. Motive
    - 2. Means
    - 3. Opportunity
  - B. This framework is useful for understanding religious interests of the left, center, and right
  
- I. Studying religious interests
  - A. Steps
    - 1. Articulation (of the group's grievance)
    - 2. Aggregation (of the group's members) into collective action
      - a. Direct action (demonstrations)
        - (1) Non-violent
          - (a) Legal
          - (b) Illegal – civil disobedience
        - (2) Violent
      - b. Electioneering
      - c. Lobbying
      - d. Litigation
  - B. Types of political mobilization
    - 1. Unorganized (political movements)
    - 2. Organized
      - a. Political interest groups – more common in the fragmented U.S. federal/presidential system
      - b. Political parties – more common in the less fragmented unitary/parliamentary systems
  
- II. Establishing motive
  - A. Religious interests and culture
    - 1. Culture performs 3 functions
      - a. Identify
      - b. Norms
      - c. Boundaries
    - 2. Religion justifies in transcendent terms (“God says so”)
    - 3. But, religious groups vary in their willingness to engage the political world – a concern with the by and by can lead to a neglect of the here and now
  - B. Sources of motivation
    - 1. Group identity – provides cognitive lens through which the world is viewed
    - 2. Group status or influence
      - a. Types
        - (1) *Objective status* – Jews at or near top by objective measures, e.g., income and education should make them more politically conservative and Republican Figure 5.1, p. 115
        - (2) *Subjective status deprivation* – however, Jews are much further down the social-status ladder in subjective terms, which makes them more politically liberal and Democratic Figure 5.2, p. 117
      - b. Interaction effects:
        - (1) Religion influences political views even after controlling for education, income, urbanization, ethnicity, or occupational status
        - (2) Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* – religious values influence economic systems and status
          - (a) Calvinist Protestants viewed material success as evidence of being among the elect predestined for salvation
          - (b) Catholics' social Gospel viewed poverty as a sign of grace

3. Theology:
  - a. Desire for congruence between religious values (both liberal and conservative) and public policies
  - b. Linkage is strongest on “below the belt” issues of sexual morality and gender (gay marriage, abortion); much weaker on other social (race), environmental, economic, & international human-rights issues

c. *Cultural war thesis* – religious values are now more important than denominational membership in predicting political attitudes and behaviors

Theological issue	Religious Values	
	Traditionalists	Modernists
Scriptural authority	final & unchallengeable	open to interpretation
Redemption	personal battle for eternal salvation	moral commitment to improving society
Sin & evil	inherent in human nature	social result of environmental causes
Natural pleasures	resisted as corrupting	embraced as God’s beneficence
Image of God	masculine (stern & vengeful)	feminine (nurturing & loving)
Religious mission	individual salvation through faith	communal salvation through social justice

d. However, the culture-war thesis is not well supported by historical or empirical evidence: there are many examples of mixed religious and political views among both leaders & the mass public

- (1) Among political leaders:
  - (a) William Jennings Bryan typified mixed religious & political values
    - i) Favored women suffrage, worker’s rights, public ownership of utilities, military disarmament, & opposed U.S. entry into WWI
    - ii) Opposed teaching of evolution in public schools
  - (b) Today, many Protestants & Roman Catholics also exhibit mixed views
  - (c) The principle leadership of the neoconservative movement today includes many Jewish intellectuals – e.g., William & Irving Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser and Elliot Abrams (some of whom championed liberalism in the 1960s & 70s)
- (2) Among the American public, when presented with a centrist alternative, we usually support the moderate policy choice rather than the more radical option proposed by the far left or far right – even on hot-button issues like abortion, school prayer, gay rights, immigration, etc.

4. Worldview (mental maps)
5. Institutional interests: oppose regulations (e.g., on schools, media, social services) & support subsidies (e.g., vouchers for private schools)

### III. Establishing means

- A. The role of elites:
  1. Ideological leadership – frame issues
  2. Organizational leadership – aggregate, mobilize, and organize movements
- B. Clergy as political leaders (e.g., MLK, Jr. & Jesse Jackson v. Jerry Falwell & Pat Robertson)
- C. Religious activists (e.g., Barry Lynn v. Ralph Reed)
- D. Community activists
- E. The question of (mis)representation
  1. Mainline Protestant leaders are more *liberal* than congregants on *social* issues but are more *congruent* on *other* policy matters including environmental protection & food stamps
  2. Evangelical Protestant leaders are more *conservative* than congregants on *other* domestic & foreign policy issues but more *congruent* on *social* issues
  3. Roman Catholic & Jewish leaders are both closer to their respective congregants

### IV. Conclusion