

***Chapter 14: Making Foreign & Military Policy***

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- I. Untitled introduction: challenges of foreign & military policy making
  - A. Military intervention
    - 1. Rejected
      - a. Chinese invasion of Tibet (1950)
      - b. Soviet invasion of
        - (1) Hungary (1956)
        - (2) Czechoslovakia (1968)
        - (3) Afghanistan (1979)
      - c. Genocide in
        - (1) Uganda (1972)
        - (2) Rwanda (1994)
        - (3) Darfur, Sudan (2003 - )
    - 2. Adopted
      - a. Declared wars: (5)
      - b. Undeclared wars (presidents order U.S. military forces into foreign areas of hostile fire)
        - (1) Funded by Congress
          - (a) Before the War Powers Act (150+) - longest & costliest = Philippines (1899-1902), Korea (1950-53), & Vietnam (1959-75)
          - (b) After the War Powers Act (at least 18)
            - i) Ford: 1975 -
              - a) Vietnam evacuations
              - b) Mayaguez rescue
            - ii) Carter: 1980 - unsuccessful Iran hostage rescue
            - iii) Reagan:
              - a) 1981-83: U.S. military advisers in El Salvador & Honduras
              - b) 1982-84: U.S. Marine peacekeepers in Lebanon
              - c) 1983: U.S. invasion of Grenada
              - d) 1986: U.S. bombing of Libya
              - e) 1987-88: U.S. escort of tankers in Persian Gulf during the Iraq/Iran war
            - iv) G. Bush:
              - a) 1989-90: U.S. invasion of Panama
              - b) 1992-93: U.S. peacekeepers in Somalia
              - c) 1993: U.S. peacekeepers in Yugoslavia
            - v) Clinton:
              - a) 1994: U.S. peacekeepers in Somalia
              - b) 1994-95: U.S. invasion of Haiti
              - c) 1994-95: U.S. peacekeepers in Yugoslavia
              - d) 1999: U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo
          - (2) Three undeclared wars explicitly authorized by Congress under the provisions of the War Powers Act
            - (a) G. Bush: 1991 Persian Gulf War
            - (b) G. W. Bush:
              - i) 2001- present: Afghanistan War
              - ii) 2002 - present: Iraq War
  - B. Alexis de Tocqueville: democracies at a disadvantage to authoritarian or totalitarian regimes
- II. Kinds of foreign policy
  - A. Majoritarian politics: U.S. in WWII (after Pearl Harbor)
  - B. Rival interest-group politics
    - 1. Trade policies
    - 2. Middle-East policies
  - C. Client interest-group politics: corporate tax policies

- D. Entrepreneurial politics
  - 1. President Truman's
    - a. Recognition of the new state of Israel in May of 1948
    - b. Desegregation of U.S. armed forces in July of 1948
  - 2. President L. B. Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War in August of 1964
  - 3. President Reagan's Iran-Contra policy in 1985-
  - 4. President G. W. Bush's pre-emptive war policy in Iraq in 2003-
  
- III. The constitutional framework – separation of powers and checks-and-balances make legislative-executive relations especially important
  - A. Checks on the president include Congress, the federal courts, and a number of executive branch agencies
  - B. Most important check, however, is public opinion
  
- IV. The new international world – 11 September, 2001 demonstrated the importance of terrorism
  - A. Presidential interest in foreign affairs
  - B. Military force structure and strategy
  
- V. Three major problems
  - A. Rebuilding nations (like Afghanistan and Iraq) Table 14.1, p. 340
    - 1. Lessons learned from past efforts include ...
      - a. Do not leave the country quickly – rebuilding takes a long time
      - b. Organize your agencies so that they are closely coordinated and can learn from their experiences
      - c. Carefully coordinate military and civilian efforts in the country
    - 2. Each lesson is very difficult to implement – public opinion, bureaucratic tensions, and fragmented power all have their impact
  - B. Foreign policy and terrorism
    - 1. War formally declared in only 5 of 14 major wars fought by the U.S.
    - 2. Constitutional division of power and War Powers Act do not greatly limit the president, if the president has public support for military action Table 14.2, p. 341
    - 3. President must be able to articulate clear principles that govern the military decisions, which is especially challenging today
      - a. Previously a bipolar world of two super-powers
      - b. Currently a unipolar world – U.S. the only superpower, but still vulnerable to attack
      - c. China is an emerging superpower and is the only one likely to challenge the U.S. militarily and economically in the near future
    - 4. Bush doctrine of preemption, attacking a determined enemy before it attacks the U.S.
      - a. Highly controversial among public, analysts, and Congress
      - b. Congressional debates have re-introduced partisanship to foreign policy
    - 5. U.S. has only sometimes sought the support of U.N. for its interventions
  - C. Changing the military
    - 1. President G. W. Bush & Defense Secretary Rumsfeld proposed redesigning the military so it could move quickly, in smaller units, with close collaboration between the services
    - 2. Still, traditional military structures endure
      - a. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), advisory group of presidential nominees
      - b. U.S. military is controlled by civilians – president, defense secretary, etc.
    - 3. Change is very difficult due to the strong socialization of officers, frequent transfers of personnel, and enduring relationships with Congress
  
- VI. The politics of foreign and military policy
  - A. Majoritarian politics: war and peace decisions Figure 14.1, p. 345
    - 1. Unanimous outrage may not last when military responses are made (ex., September 11th and Iraq)
    - 2. Are also likely to see different positions taken by the general public and by foreign policy elites, because the general public is more influenced by events Table 14.3, p. 346
  - B. Interest group politics: free trade debates (NAFTA, tariffs)
  - C. Client politics: military base closures, military contracts
  - D. Entrepreneurial politics: special forces, ICBMs, establishment of the JCS
  
- VII. Summary: reconsidering the enduring questions