The Clinician’s Illusion
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There are several diseases, including schizophrenia, alcoholism, and opiate addiction, for which the long-term prognosis is subject to disagreement between clinicians and researchers and also among researchers. Part of this disagreement may be attributable to a difference in the populations they sample. The clinician samples the population currently suffering from the disease (a “prevalence” or census sample), while research samples tend to more nearly represent the population ever contracting the disease (an “incidence” sample). The clinician’s sample is biased toward cases of long duration, since the probability that a case will appear in a prevalence sample is proportional to its duration, hence “the clinician’s illusion.” The statistical mechanism of this bias is illustrated and its consequences detailed. Other sources of sampling bias in clinical and research samples are briefly described and partial remedies are suggested.

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There are several diseases for which there exists a great disparity in the prognostic expectations of practicing clinicians and investigators of the natural history of the disease. This difference in perspective sometimes leads clinicians to reject formal investigations as invalid or at best irrelevant to the patients they treat. It similarly leads some researchers to view clinicians as unable to surrender clearly invalid ideas about the nature of the problems and prognoses of their patients. Although doubtless some of these discrepancies arise from the difference in their professional roles vis-à-vis patients, another possibly major source of this difference is a function of a sampling problem that has not been generally appreciated.

In this article, illnesses in which this bias is most likely to be found are identified and a neglected methodologic problem that could account for the disparity wholly or in large measure is illustrated. In addition, several other sources of bias or discrepancy that may further complicate and obscure the problem are discussed. Finally, this same problem is shown to be reflected in inconsistencies among research findings. Current research reports in psychiatry often do not allow a proper consideration and correction of the bias. Recommendations for future research and research reports are made.

A 1982 example of a disputed prognosis is available for alcoholism. Although it is not the intent of this article to draw substantive conclusions, it seems likely that the debate regarding the long-term outcome of treatment programs for alcoholics has been fueled by the conviction of many clinicians that the research findings of the studies in question did not coincide with their clinical experience. Nevertheless, the preponderance of the research findings with regard to the long-term outcome of alcoholism seems to support the Sobel's findings in a general way. That is, they indicate that at least half of all serious alcohol abusers recover completely, many without formal treatment. Furthermore, in contrast to conventional clinical wisdom, a fair proportion of these once-alcoholics have returned to social drinking rather than to abstinence.

A similar debate exists with regard to prognosis in schizophrenia. The traditional view is that schizophrenia is a chronic, deteriorating, and more or less incurable disease. Among clinicians, the most favorable outcome estimate is the “½, ½, ½” rule: one third will get better, one third will stay the same, and one third will get worse. The DSM-III of the American Psychiatric Association is even less sanguine, stating that “a complete return to premorbid functioning is unusual—so rare, in fact, that some clinicians would question the diagnosis.” Thus, the issue of prognosis is addressed, in part, by defining the illness in such a way as to resolve it. In sharp contrast, studies of the natural history of schizophrenic illness suggest a much more favorable prognosis than the “one-third will get better” rule.

There are a number of other conditions in which a parallel discrepancy exists in the prevailing view of clinicians and results from clinical trials when compared with the evidence produced by research into the natural history of the condition. For example, Schacter has found what many lay people know firsthand, namely, that many people are obese at some time in their life but return, with or without professional help, to a weight within or close to published normal standards on a more or less permanent basis. Similarly, in contrast to the experience of services designed to help people quit smoking, it has been found that more than 60% of once heavy smokers who tried to quit no longer smoked.
Perhaps even more striking is the view of clinicians, widely shared by the public, of opiate addiction as an incurable state for most, if not all, users. This view was forcefully contradicted by Robins and associates, who found that of a sample of Vietnam veterans who were addicted to heroin when interviewed after their return to the United States, 7% were drug-free 2½ years later, often without great effort. Of all those who became addicted in Vietnam, even a larger proportion, 88%, avoided relapse over the three years following their joining the service.

It is not our intent to come to any substantive conclusions in this article, however, and readers who disagree with our characterization of findings in any given area are requested to consider the methodologic points being made and their relevance to research in areas familiar to them. Disparities similar to those discussed previously may be expected in investigations of recidivism of juvenile delinquents and adult criminals as well. They may also be found, although probably to a lesser degree, in certain more strictly physical illnesses, such as chronic pain conditions, arthritis, and some cancers, and possibly in many other diseases.

Are clinicians such poor observers? Of course not. They are simply reporting a reasonably accurate abstraction from their experience in the treatment of these conditions. Their day-to-day experience consists of encounters with a group of patients who seek their help. Within this experience are two sources of bias, the census nature of the group and the fact that these cases are necessarily drawn from that subset of patients who have sought help from a particular service provider. These biases attributable to the help-seeking behavior will be discussed later in this article and have been alluded to or discussed in many other places. However, the bias due to the census nature of the sample is likely to be less familiar and of even greater consequence in a number of settings, and is therefore the major component of what we call the “clinician’s illusion.”

The diseases most likely to be subject to the phenomenon of large discrepancies between clinicians’ views of the disease and researchers’ findings are characterized by great variability in the duration of the illness. Other characteristics (which serve to make long duration possible) are that they are not immediately life threatening and that treatment is either confined to symptom suppression or, if curative in intent, is often not successful.

To illustrate how the variation in duration of the illness may affect the clinician’s view, look at a hypothetical disease for which the treatment provides only symptomatic relief. To make the example even simpler, without any loss of generality, let us assume that all persons will be treated for the entire duration of the illness. Suppose further that the distribution of duration of illness in the population of all persons who ever contract it is as displayed in Fig 1.

As can be seen, the distribution noted in Fig 1 is skewed, with a median duration for the entire population of less than six months and one tenth of all cases lasting more than two years. Although this is likely to be a reasonable distribution shape for some of the illnesses discussed, a more symmetrical distribution may be characteristic of others. However, the clinician’s illusion is not dependent on this shape but only on the degree of the variability of duration relative to the average duration (literally, on the coefficient of relative variation).

Imagine a clinician viewing persons with one of these illnesses as they appear in the current case load, say, on ward rounds on a given day. The probability of encountering a given patient on this day will be proportional to the duration of this patient’s illness. A patient whose illness lasts a year is far more likely to appear on any given day than one whose illness lasts only two months, in fact, six times more likely; and a patient whose illness lasts for ten years is ten times more likely to appear than one whose illness lasts only one year. For this example, each of the few patients making up the 2% of the population of longest duration (X = 128) is 64 times more likely to appear than each of the 40% of shortest duration (X = 2), 32 times more likely to appear than each of the 25% of next shortest duration (X = 4), and so on.

The outcome of this duration-dependent differential probability of being encountered on rounds is that the distribution of illness duration for the rounds sample is markedly different from that of the population made up of people who ever contract the illness. By weighting the percentages in each duration interval in Fig 1 by its mean and recomputing the percentages for the weighted distribution, the duration distribution for the rounds sample of Fig 2 is produced. Perhaps most startling is the outcome of this differential weighting for the typical current clinic group; nearly a quarter of the group is made up of the 2% of the population who have the longest duration, i.e., the worst

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**Fig 1.** Distribution of illness duration in population. (Sum of X times percent values for seven intervals in Fig 1 is 1,088. This is now divisor for weighted percentages. For example, percent of lowest interval for rounds sample is 2(40)/1,088 = 7.5%; for next highest, 4[25]/1,088 = 9.4%; etc.)

**Fig 2.** Distribution of illness duration in clinic sample from same population.
prognosis. Furthermore, the ultimate average duration for the daily clinic rounds sample seen by our hypothetical clinician will be more than four years (i.e., 50.8 months), in stark contrast to the true population average duration of less than one year (10.7 months). Small wonder that the clinician will view any truly population-based findings as grossly discrepant from daily experience. Note again that the phenomenon does not depend on the shape of the distribution but only on its relative variability.

It is useful to examine what happens to this illusion if a duration requirement is inserted into the diagnostic criteria, as has been done for some of the diseases discussed previously. Suppose in our previously mentioned example that those ill less than six months were excluded from the diagnosis. For the remaining 35% of the original population, the mean duration is now 25.4 months. A clinic sample of cases so diagnosed would have a mean duration of 60.5 months, still a large discrepancy.

How then can one correct the observed rounds sample for this distortion of its population representation? Since each case’s chance of being included in the sample is proportional to its illness duration, one needs to weight each case inversely by its duration to reproduce the population distribution. Although we do not know what the eventual duration of each case will be, we do know the duration up to the time of observation, and Freeman and Hutchison provide a detailed exposition of how to use durations to date of the clinic sample to estimate the distribution of illness duration for the entire population.

In the previously mentioned example, we assumed a constant probability of treatment throughout the illness. Should this not be the case, the bias may be increased or decreased. If treatment is most likely for the short duration cases, the bias will be lessened, if most likely for the long duration, it will increase. Probably the latter is most frequent in real clinical populations. Again, it is a question of the ratio of probabilities. In our example, if the longest duration group were twice as likely to be treated relative to the shortest, they each would be 128 (rather than 64) times more likely to appear in the sample than a member of the shortest duration group.

One necessary consequence of this bias in the representation in the sample is a bias with regard to the presence of any condition or symptom more characteristic of short-term than long-term treatment of patients. Therefore, it may be impossible to distinguish between a characteristic affecting the duration of illness (failure to recover) from one causally related to the illness.

In sum, the clinician’s illusion is the attribution of the characteristics and course of those patients who are currently ill to the entire population contracting the illness. To put the issue in terms familiar to epidemiologists, it is the consequence of using a prevalence sample as a substitute for an incidence sample.

OTHER SOURCES OF BIAS IN SAMPLES FROM CLINICAL SETTINGS

There are, of course, several other reasons why samples of cases in treatment settings are likely not to be representative of the entire population of persons experiencing the condition in question. Although they have been discussed in other places, it is useful to consider them herein because they are likely to add to the illusion identified previously.

First, those who recover from a given episode of the condition without entering the formal treatment system, that is, by using personal and social resources, are likely to have a better prognosis by virtue of the stability of the curative factors. Unlike those who seek professional help, their help will not disappear when they recover, but will tend to remain through the improved state.

Those who enter the formal treatment system are also likely to have been ill longer. For some of the conditions we have discussed here-in, the patient’s ‘social margin’ has declined over time and be accompanied by a decline in the natural support system and increase in alienation from and rejection by others. For these and other reasons, past duration of illness may be causally related to future duration of illness.

The clinician’s illusion is also related to another common observation, at least in the field of schizophrenia and probably in some or all of the other diseases mentioned. That is the apparent association between disease onset at a young age and poor prognosis. To illustrate how this observation could be an artifact closely linked to the previously identified bias, let us examine the characteristics of any given age group seen by our hypothetical clinician, say, all 30-year-old schizophrenics. Note that those who became ill at age 20 years have already had a longer illness duration than those with later onsets, and therefore they can be expected, on the average, to have a duration that projects longer into the future. Or to look at the same phenomenon from another angle, we can note that those who recovered during the decade following their onset at age 20 (the patients with early onset and good prognosis) are no longer present to be observed. Therefore, if there is any prognostic value to duration of past illness as such, this (remaining) group is on the grounds alone, more vulnerable to future poor outcome. Note that this is in the absence of any other diagnostic or any other implication of age of onset for the disease process. If, however, one again, let us insist that we are not trying to present or evaluate epidemiological evidence on any issue but only to illustrate problems that arise with empirical findings that are incontrovertably natural.

To return to other reasons why a clinical population might be atypical compared with the entire population, we note another biasing artifact known as Berkson’s or the bias due to bias in the selection of the study population. It is generally the case that those who have other disabilities that are not causally connected to the condition being investigated are more likely to enter the formal treatment system. Thus, a clinical group may show a conjunction of problems or conditions that are uncorrelated in the population. To use Berkson’s example, those who have diabetes and cholecystitis are more likely to be found in the hospital than those with diabetes alone. Similarly, patients who are depressed and also abuse alcohol may be more likely to enter into treatment than those with either affliction alone. This error source is a kind of ascertainment bias that, like the others mentioned herein, will further confuse the picture and confound sound conclusions.

This problem should not be confused with that of the distortion of relationships between characteristics that is typical when samples are selected on the basis of these characteristics. When, for example, two characteristics are positively correlated in the population and selection into a sample is based only on the presence of either (or both) of these characteristics, their correlation in the sample will be negative. If, on the other hand, they are also involved in selection, the sign of the correlation may not change, but its magnitude will be diminished. Thus, selection for symptoms is yet another source of discrepancy between clinical samples and the population whence they come.

FACTORS RELATING TO THE MAGNITUDE OF THE CLINICIAN’S ILLUSION

In addition to characteristics of patients and treatment selection that lead to bias in treated samples, it is worthwhile to identify factors that are likely to maximize the impact of the clinician’s illusion. The disparity between what the clinician actually observes and the true state of the population will be greatest when the following occur:

1. The variance in illness duration is large relative to the mean duration.

2. Disease manifestations fluctuate, symptoms are episodic, and treatment is sporadic and handled by multiple clinical services or clinicians. Under these conditions, it is impossible for clinicians to know whether a “cure” is permanent and whether the patient is receiving help in a new setting. Since recovered patients do not return to the clinic whereas relapsed patients do, it may be unclear whether recovery occurs at all.

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clinical populations. The advisability of studying new cases rather than all current cases should be given careful consid-
eration (but note the risk of accrual shortfall). When the
course of the illness is at issue, the prior illness duration
must be taken into account. If the past duration is long
relative to the follow-up period for any of the patients, an
appropriate consideration of the possible effects of this
variation on the study conclusions is clearly required.

Second, natural history investigations of cases un-
selected for duration of illness (and preferably also regardless
of treatment) should be considered crucial to the under-
standing of any illness whose duration varies materially
relative to its average length. Such studies are demanding
of continuity of effort and support over an extended period
of time.

Finally, given the likely distortion of our current knowl-
edge base, we should be cautious in advising lay people in
matters relevant to the natural history of chronic diseases.
This issue arises with particular potency in the area of
genetic counseling. To illustrate, in a research carried out in
one of the most sophisticated and research-oriented centers
in the country and reported in a journal devoted to research
in this area, a parent of a schizophrenic patient is quoted as
saying “I’ve known people who were cured of cancer, of all
these illnesses, but I know of no one who was cured of
schizophrenia.” One would hope that someone concerned
with the care of this patient had informed the parent of
the high spontaneous remission rate generally found over a
more protracted period of time. Nor was any lifetime
perspective apparent in the report of the genetic counseling
offered. Wider appreciation of the phenomenon we call the
clinician’s illusion should prove salutary for both clinical
practice and the interpretation of research findings.

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