BLACK FRANCE

Colonialism, Immigration, and Transnationalism

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People think immigrants are naked when they arrive in a new land at the end of their odyssey, yet migrants arrive arrayed with personal stories, and burdened with what passes for collective memory.

Abdourahman A. Waberi, *Transit* (2003)

Don't immigrants have a history of their own? Do you cease to have a history when you move from one point of the globe to another?

J. M. Coetzee, *Slow Man* (2005)

insist on the relational nature of identity and difference, on the productive tensions between the two, and on the intricate and interdependent ways in which human agents function . . . The aim, in the end, is to reconstruct new imaginative spaces where power configurations, inevitable as they are, may be reorganized to allow fewer dissymmetries in the production and circulation of knowledge. (Lionnet, *Postcolonial Representations,* 5–6)

The fact that African writers have chosen to situate their narratives in both Africa and France and to explore the various ways in which communities are organized outside of the homeland in the diasporic context is of course particularly striking. Additionally, the manner in which cultural practices are maintained, challenged, and transformed, subjected to multiple influences, and in turn how ethnic, national, and regional rivalries are exacerbated, is also highly significant in gauging the extent to which French society itself is being systematically reorganized according to a set of new coordinates. A transnational approach to these questions provides a better contextual framework, one that permits the incorporation of questions of labor mobility, immigration laws, youth culture, and so forth, in an attempt to uncover some of the intercultural dynamics evidenced in the literary productions of francophone sub-Saharan authors in general. Jules-Rosette's notion of "Parisianism" has of course been useful in circumscribing recent developments in African-French relations and the ongoing centrality of Paris in this discourse. But Paris alone cannot serve to completely delimit broader questions pertaining to reflection on blackness in France in general. *Black France* extends the analysis from the colonial era to the contemporary moment of postcoloniality, recognizes the importance of Paris, but also provincializes the immigrant experience while insisting upon a supranational dimension. All of these factors are of course important in assessing the African presence in France and in establishing a statistical record.

Calculating the number of sub-Saharan Africans in France involves a concerted analysis of the mechanisms employed in such calculations—mechanisms that in turn have much to reveal concerning the politics of immigration and the demands of the French Republic.[94] As Michel Wieviorka has shown, there has been a significant shift from the early category of *travailleurs immigrés* (immigrant workers) to "Arabs," "Beurs," and "Blacks," introducing the idea that "the transition from a social definition of immigration to an ethnic, national, religious, or racial one is a complex phenomenon that owes much to exclusion, stigmatization, or racism,"[95] in what constitutes a classic example of what Rey Chow has characterized as "the ever-renewable government efforts to fabricate and stabilize."[96] Official definitions and criteria have been deployed in order to ascertain who is classified as an immigrant or a foreigner, and these are outlined and reported annually by the Haut conseil à l'intégration (High Council for Integration, HCI) to the prime minister. Current definitions are as follows:

Etrangers: Persons who cannot claim French nationality no matter where they were born.

Immigrés: Foreigners born overseas who have settled in France. The *immigré* may at some time in his or her life acquire French nationality.

Immigrants: Foreigners who have received an initial authorization to stay in France for at least one year. This category is only for the purpose of monitoring immigration flows.[97]

The government census of 1999 uses the criteria outlined by the HCI and includes no categories for ethnic criteria or information. The population of metropolitan France is categorized according to nationality and place of birth, and methods of calculation are both confusing and complicated. In a total population of approximately 58,520,688, there were 4,308,527 immigrants (7.36 percent of the total), comprising non-French born overseas who either resided in France as foreigners (2,753,588) or had acquired French nationality (1,554,939). Foreigners born in France (of whom there were 800,354) are not considered immigrants, regardless of whether they have acquired French nationality (509,598 of them had not done so), which dramatically reduces the official numbers.[98]

With these considerations in mind, one can make the following assumptions about the numbers of sub-Saharan Africans in France today. Recourse to statistics is extremely important in order to counter, on the one hand, popular misconceptions concerning definitions of "foreignness" and, on the other, perceptions that France is being "invaded" and "contaminated" by outsiders.[99] The fundamental reorientation that Gérard Noiriel proposed in his book *Le creuset français: Histoire de l'immigration, XIXe–XXe siècles* came from his commitment to demonstrating that France had a long history of immigration from many regions of the world, and accordingly to dispelling and countering stereotypes and myths through statistical facts: "If one takes seriously the statistic that establishes that one-third of the people living in France today have foreign 'roots,' then the centrality of the family as the explanatory principle of 'permanence' and 'tradition' collapses" (64). Peabody and Stovall suggest that "there were about 4,000 blacks living among the 25 million French at the time of the revolution" ("Race, France, Histories," 2). In 1936, according to Noiriel, non-naturalized foreigners were estimated at 2,198,236 and included 720,926 Italians, 422,694 Polish, 28,290 Portuguese, and 253,599 Spanish. By 1982, the total had risen to 3,680,100, and included 333,740 Italians, 764,860 Portuguese, 321,440 Spanish, and a substantial addition of 795,920 Algerians and 431,120 Moroccans (Noiriel, *Le creuset français,* 417–418).[100] The real nature of the perceived problem (one that has been well documented) concerns more recent transitions in the demographics of immigrants. For, in reality, in figures mostly gathered by the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE), the percentage of foreigners in the total French population has remained

relatively constant since the 1930s: 1.06 in 1851, 2.97 in 1886, 6.58 in 1931, 5.28 in 1968, and 6.35 in 1990."[101] According to approximate statistics gathered by the Ministry for the Colonies in 1926, there were 1,685 Africans from Afrique occidentale frangaise (AOF, French West Africa) and 230 from Afrique équatoriale française (AEF, French Equatorial Africa) living in France in 1926.[102] But the main nationality groups in France's foreign population have changed dramatically: in 1946 88.7 percent of foreigners were Europeans, 2.3 percent Maghrebis, and 0.8 percent other Africans; in 1962 72.2 percent were Europeans, 18.9 percent Maghrebis, and 0.8 percent other Africans; in 1975 60.7 percent were Europeans, 32.3 percent Maghrebis, and 2.3 percent other Africans; and in 1990 40.6 percent were Europeans, 38.7 percent Maghrebis, and 11.8 percent other Africans, constituting a total of 3,596,602 foreign nationals in a total population of 56,651,955 (Hargreaves, *Immigration,* "Race," and Ethnicity, 11, 26). Methodological issues and population estimates are cornplicated when all Africans are aggregated. While Todd estimates that there were approximately 28,000 Africans in France in 1968 and 176,745 in 1990 (406), and Michelle Guillon claims that there were 177,871 sub-Saharan Africans in France in 1982, 307,902 in 1990, and 447,521 in 1999,[103] the main point to underline is that their numbers grew exponentially at the end of the twentieth century, thereby transforming the cultural, political, and social landscape of Black France, while accelerating all kinds of transversal movements between and from Africa and the metropole. Many countries are now represented: Senegal (43,692), Mali (37,693), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (22,740), Cameroon (18,037), the Ivory Coast (16,711), and Congo (12,755).[104]

"The use of the word 'irnmigration' to encompass what are in many respects post-migratory processes," as Hargreaves has shown, "is itself syrnptomatic of the difficulties experienced by the French in coming to terms — both literally and ontologically — with the settlement of people of imrnigrant origin . . . such people are commonly referred to as 'ethnic minorities' or 'minority ethnic groups,' and a large part of what the French call 'immigration' is commonly known as 'race relations.'"[105] In the French context, the term *immigré* (that is, the social status accorded to an immigrant)—as opposed to "immigrant," "migrant," or "emigrant"—"has a tendency to fix the individual in a given condition . . . named as such s/he will always carry the trace of a stigmatized past." The term is even applied "to a whole category of people who have never migrated (the 'second' and 'third generation')."[106] Balibar has, in turn, insisted upon the fact that the official rhetoric is organized around the figure of the "foreigner" (*étranger*)—the "immigrant" functions as signifier for a broad range of cultural, political, and social issues, and "the less the social problems of the 'immigrants,' or the social problems which massively affect immigrants, are specific, the more their existence is made responsible for them."[107] As we shall see, this "capacity to lump together all the dimensions of 'social pathology' as effects of a single cause, which is defined with the aid of a series of signifiers derived from race or its more recent equivalents" (Balibar, "Racism and Crisis," 220), was deployed during the colonial period, as documented in Sembene's novel Le docker *noir* (Black Docker), as effectively as it was in postcolonial France during the 1990s with the "affaire des sans-papiers." These discursive patterns duplicated earlier ones, as for example the Abbé Grégoire's own antislavery writings, such as De la littérature des *nègres* (1808), and Gobineau's Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines (published between 1853 and 1855) which, though not widely read during his lifetime, nevertheless "remains the most comprehensive statement on and the master synthesis of nineteenth-century French racial thought" (Cohen, 218).[108]

Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire have, arguably, collectively edited the most significant contribution to French scholarship on (post)colonial studies, namely La fracture coloniale: La so*ciété française au prisme* de *l'héritage colonial.*[109] Blanchard and Bancel have argued, in an essay entitled "Les origines républicaines de la fracture coloniale" ("The Republican Origins of the Colonial Fracture"), that although ideals of liberty and equality were fundamental in the founding of the French Republic, they were strategically adopted within a more strictly "culturalist" discourse," and in fact "racial inequality is at the heart of the colonial Republican mechanism."[110] This attempt to deracialize the colonial project and adopt a more culturalist agenda allowed for the civilizing mission while sirnultaneously deferring assimilation indefinitely, and this colonial discourse informs to this day official thinking on the question of immigration in France (Blanchard and Bancel, "Les origines républicaines," 38–39) as it has mutated across various paradigms from "le droit à la différence" ("the right to be different"/"the right to difference") to "le seuil de tolérance" ("the threshold of tolerance"), "la préférence nationale" ("national preference"), universalism, particularisrn, communitarianism, hyperpluralism, and multicommunitarianism.[111] This is precisely the kind of transcolonial vector I have alluded to, in which, as Balibar has shown, "the equivocal interiority-exteriority configuration which had, since the period of colonial conquest, formed one of the structuring dimensions of racism, finds itself reproduced, expanded or re-activated"[112] and has now triggered new forms of racism, "a racism of the era of 'decolonization' . . . whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions."[113]

In reality, France's rejection of multiculturalism is due to what it perceives as the term's historical indebtedness to and indissociability from the

American context in which the accompanying discourses on civil and individual rights are considered to protect citizens above and beyond the communitarian imperatives of the Republican state.[114] Paradoxically, Memmi points to the circularity of the argument in which communitarianism "is seen as proof of resistance by immigrants to integration into the collective body of the nation," and the ghetto, while "feeding the idea of separation, also stands as the expression of it"; accordingly, the "constitution of small communities at the heart of the national entity is not the outcome of some perverse gesture aimed at its destruction . . . but rather a spontaneous and utilitarian agglomeration of minorities who have been unable to identify themselves fully with the majority" (Memmi, *Portrait du décolonisé,* 104). In France, the primary concern remains the integrational, assimilationist drive toward that ambiguous ideal that is Frenchness. Because of this, according to David Blatt, "the increased political saliency of immigration issues helped revive a traditional French discourse on integration and the nation-state that insists on the preservation of republican principles of undifferentiated citizenship and a firm rejection of any public recognition of ethnic or cultural identities."[115]

The colonial civilizing mission was premised on the attempt to create French cultural prototypes. Newly formed French-Africans soon realized that that stated objective was unattainable. Their status as colonized subjects and constructs inscribed by a hyphenated identity forever precluded their access to some distant evolutionary point, much in the same way as today's ethnic minorities are relegated to topographic zones in the *banlieues* (housing projects) outside of the parameters of Frenchness. Ironically, of course, the marginalization of these groups creates the very ghettos that the French perceive as the inevitable outcome of U.S. multicultural politics. The end result of these disparate policies is similar, though, thus reducing the validity of French critiques of U.S. multiculturalism. Fanon underscored how linguistic and even broader cultural identification with France was insufficient to confer full Frenchness, a dimension Cohen addressed in his book *The French Encounter with Africans:* "The black migrants from the Antilles, however, should not have suffered most of these problems: they knew French and French culture, they were French citizens, and their lifestyle was not significantly at variance from that of their white compatriots. To the extent that they suffered ostracism, they were victims not of xenophobia but of racism, for race seemed to be the only characteristic that distinguished thern from countless other Frenchrnen" (Cohen, 287). My own analysis, without claiming to be exhaustive, nevertheless attempts to explore the pluridimensionality of migration to achieve a more accurate rendition of population flows and the bilateralism of French-African relations. To this end, the analysis extends to African soldiers, students, intellectuals, victims of modern servitude and gender oppression, political refugees, *sapeurs,* asylum seekers, and *sans-papiers.* In order to extrapolate with a degree of accuracy the significance of African contributions to public discourse in France, it remains crucial to correct false assumptions and to denounce the reductive discourse that occludes African contributions (among others) to the cultural, social, and political landscape of the Hexagon today.[116]

For example, African soldiers made immeasurable contributions to France's military forces during both the First and the Second World Wars. In fact, as Miller has shown, the decade of the 1920s "has long been excluded from histories of francophone literature [and it] is in fact remarkably contemporary. It was in the 1920s that the question of African immigration (now such a pressing issue) was first posed."[117] Furthermore, as a point of contact for colonial subjects, Paris itself became a privileged site, and "almost all the great political leaders of Indochina, sub-Saharan Africa, the Antilles, and Madagascar either visited or lived in Paris at some time between the two wars."[118] Imrnigrant populations from Africa and Asia transformed the Parisian landscape during the twentieth century (one only has to think of the neighborhoods around La place d'Italie, Barbès Rochechouart, and Belleville), but only rarely is the longevity of this influence understood: "In France, immigrants from the colonies became 'visible' at the beginning of the 1930s, in particular in Paris . . . this reality has as much to do with colonialism as it does with the history of immigration, although only rarely is it linked specifically to colonial history" (Blanchard and Deroo, "Contrôler," 107).[119] Most notably, the Paris Mosque opened in 1926, and "a new generation settled in Paris and its suburbs. In addition to irnrnigrant laborers, a significant number of political leaders, artists, and students began to arrive . . . and as for 'illegal' immigration, it represented up to one-third of all workers in the metropole" (111–112). Literary magazines and journals began to be published, such as La *revue du monde noir* in 1931 and *Légitime défense* in 1932, among others including *Le paria, La voix des nègres,* and *La race nègre;* most are rarely discussed today.[120] Black political organizations were created, most notably Le comité de défense de la race nègre (CDRN), founded in 1926 by Lamine Senghor.[121] An active Black intelligentsia established itself and was critical of the first African deputy elected to the French National Assembly, Blaise Diagne. The discourse at the time surrounding African and French bilateral relations was truly symbiotic because the French authorities made concerted efforts to interrupt the flow of ideas between France and Africa. Already, "blackness" had become a defining concept, one that served to organize and mobilize individuals.

Estimates are that some 189,000 soldiers from the AEF and AOF fought in the First World War, and that approximately 30,000 were killed.[122] During the Second World War, 178,000 sub-Saharan African and Malagasy soldiers fought, and some 21,500 lost their lives (Dewitte, *Deux siècles d'immigration,* 51).[123] In addition to these African soldiers, Stovall has

claimed that about 200,000 African Americans "saw duty in France" during the First World War (Paris *noir,* 5). This moment in history was absolutely critical in raising the political consciousness of colonized subjects: "The milieu that these veterans formed during the 1920s was one in which the most fundamental premises of colonialism were called into question, critiqued and attacked—in organizations whose newspapers circulated back to Africa, threatening colonial order" (Miller, Nationalists *and* Nomads, 10). Much has been said and written about the invaluable contributions made by the now-famous *tirailleurs sénégalais*—in 1994, the French government was heavily criticized for "its relative silence during commemorative events in August 1994 with regard to the role played by African troops in the landings on the Provence coast."[124] Of course, there were significant political developments from World War II onward, legal changes and decrees enacted to redefine relations between France and Africa, from the 1944 French Conference in Brazzaville to the 1946 debates on the French Union. Their ultimate objective was to keep the Union française as a functioning organism under the aegis of the loi-cadre of 1956, but the September 28, 1958, referendum paved the way for independence—or rather the beginning of new alignments for a French-African community. Guinea had voted "no" in the referendum and became independent on October 2 of that year,[125] and other AEF and AOF countries followed Guinea's lead during 1960. Governance was to have been conducted by the Ministry for Cooperation, focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, and "in this situation France devised the policy of cooperation in order to provide its former territories with the necessary financial aid, technical expertise, and personnel for administration and development. Through this policy, it also sought to maintain a privileged relationship with them despite their attainment of international sovereignty."[126] Only in 1998 did the French government finally change its official way of working with Africa by abandoning the model provided by the Ministry of Cooperation and incorporating African matters into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, this was ultimately a conscious attempt to relinquish "bad habits linked to an unequal and paternalistic cooperation in favor of a partnership respectful of equality in difference" (Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Colonisation," 41).

In addition to the African soldiers on French soil, growing numbers of African students were coming to France as intellectual migrants. These students were designated interchangeably as étudiants coloniaux (colonial students), étudiants d'outre-mer (overseas students), and étudiants noirs (Black students).[127] According to Abdoulaye Gueye, there were as few as twenty African students in France in the 1920s.[128] As Guimont's extensive research has shown, "students in the '30s were the product of the ideals of assimilation ... Those of the '50s were the students of action." (Guimont, 15). Yet there were tremendous disparities in formalized educational and literacy levels in colonial zones—for 1949–1950, Guimont reports average literacy rates of 4.2 percent in the AOF and 8.5 percent in the AEF sectors, with figures jumping to 22.9 percent and 20 percent in Cameroon and Togo respectively as a result of variations in administrative practices (22). In fact, prior to 1946, the number of African students in France was negligible; "education was prioritized in the process of developing the territories" (80), and the creation of bursaries radically altered this dynamic, such that by 1952–1953 there were some four thousand African students in France (72), a number that grew to eight thousand by 1965 (299). "At Independence," Guimont notes, "every francophone African country sent most if not all of its [qualified] students to the former metropole. Only Madagascar and Senegal had developed a higher education system prior to 1958, without of course keeping all their students in Africa because of a lack of space, the absence of certain fields of specialization, and of course because they could not compete with the appeal to students of studying in France" (37); "the motivations of non-bursary recipients to study in France reflected the prestige accorded to the metropole in the African imaginary" (299). In any case, by 1960–1961, only 2,674 students from the AOF were pursuing higher education in Africa (39). "After Independence, France's control over African students was of the greatest importance to its new policy on Africa, based on 'cooperation'" (155). While France's educational policy aimed to establish the "ideological continuity of the French colonial system based on assimilation and the idealization of the metropole" (300) and to create a sympathetic political elite, student mobilization in the metropole against colonialism was inevitable and inaugurated a complex process of mediation between Africa and France whereby the very "identity of African students oscillated between a long-term position as interlocutors for the French and African authorities and an immediate oppositional political force" (301).

Ultimately, student groups in the metropole proved to be powerful voices in articulating anticolonial positionalities. "Unlike their predecessors, post-FEANF intellectuals [Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique noire française, Federation of Students from French sub-Saharan Africa] have not felt it necessary to be in Africa in order to contribute to the elevation of the continent and in so doing manifest their African allegiance" (Gueye, Les intellectuels africains en France, 233). As we shall see in chapter 6 when the focus shifts to La *sape,* the characterization of "expatriates as role models" (235) is problematic given the harsh realities of immigrant circumstances in France.[129] The fact nevertheless remains that the dialogue between "expatriated intellectuals" and "Africans on the inside" (237) is not a closed entity, but rather one that, as Mbembe has shown, is "deployed from a foreign center, a third space, that is France" (quoted in Gueye, 237); accordingly, this "detour emerges as a structuring element in this relational discourse" (238). Mamadou Diouf summarizes this identi-

africaine d'expression *française,* vol. 1, Le *roman* et la *nouvelle* (Paris: Hatier, 1981).

89. Furthermore, I should add, the importance accorded to the aesthetic component of the literary project is certainly not a new feature of African literature. See for example Bernard Geniès' article on Sony Labou Tansi, "Africain d'accord, écrivain d'abord," Le nouvel *observateur,* August 19–25, 1988, 58–61.

90. As Boniface Mongo-Mboussa has argued, "This passage from memory to history is not unique to writers addressing the colonial problematic, it can also be found in the 'novel of emigration.'" "Les méandres de la mémoire dans la littérature africaine," *Hommes* et migrations, no. 1228 (November–December 2000): 76.

91. The 1997 edition of his book Voices from the *North* African *Immigrant* Community in France, for example, includes a new chapter devoted to developments during the 1990s, and he has continued to redefine the parameters of that identity, theorizing both its usefulness and its limitations. Laronde's own book on the Beurs underlined this problem and this was implicit in its title, *Autour* du *roman beur* (*Around* the *Beur* Novel).

92. Mamadou Diouf, "Africain, citoyen du monde du XXIe siècle," in Etudiants africains en France, 1951–2001, ed. Michel Sot (Paris: Karthala, 2002), 173.

93. Etienne Balibar, "De la préférence nationale à l'invention de la politique," in Droit de cité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), 98–99; and Fatou Diome, La *préférence* nationale (Paris: Présence Africaine, 2001).

94. "In fact," as Gérard Noiriel has argued, "history shows that by altering the criteria employed to define immigration from the juridical domain to the 'cultural' or 'ethnic' domain, one arrives upon a fundamental problem that has profoundly affected French political life since the nineteenth century." Le creuset *français:* Histoire de *l'immigration, XIXe–XXe siècles* (Paris: Seuil, 1988), 9–10. See also Diane Béranger, "Les chiffres de l'imrnigration en France," Regards sur *l'actualité,* no. 299 (March 2004): 6–9; Michèle Tribalat, ed., Cent ans d'immigration: Etrangers *d'hier, Français d'aujourd'hui* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), and De l'immigration a *l'assimilation;* and Patrick Weil, La France et ses étrangers: *L'aventure d'une* politique de l'immigration, 1938–1991 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991).

95. Michel Wieviorka, "Culture, société et démocratie," in Une société fragmentée? Le *multiculturalisme* en débat, ed. Michel Wieviorka (Paris: La Découverte and Syros, 1996), 15–16, *L'espace du* racisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991), and Le racisme, une *introduction* (Paris: La Découverte et Syros, 1998).

96. Rey Chow, *The Protestant* Ethnic and the *Spirit* of Capitalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 127. See also Maxim Silverman's distinction between *indigènes* and nationals in Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France (London: Routledge, 1992), 30.

97. Haut conseil à l'intégration, "La connaissance de Pimmigration et de l'intégration" (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 1992), 14.

98. André Lebon, Immigration et présence *étrangère* en France en 1999: *Premiers enseignements du* recencement (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2001), 9.

99. In *L'immigration* (Paris: La Découverte, 1990), 94, Ezzedine Mestiri cited a poll conducted in France in 1990, in which 30 percent of respondents said there were "too many" Blacks in France, and 16 percent said there were "far too many." The corresponding numbers for Arabs were 35 percent ("too many") and 41 percent ("far too many"), and for Muslims, 34 percent ("too many") and 37 percent ("far too many").

100. Todd's figures are slightly higher. Of significance are the figures he provides for Tunisians, who he says numbered 206,336 by 1990. Le destin des *immigrés,* 338.

101. Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, "Race," and *Ethnicity in Contemporary* France (London: Routledge, 1995), 8. See also the Haut conseil à L'intégration's report to the prime minister, "La connaissance de l'immigration" (Paris: La Documentation Franqaise, 1992), 20.

102. Philippe Dewitte, Les mouvements *nègres* en France, *1919–1939* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985), 25.

103. Michelle Guillon, "La mosaïque des migrations africaines," Vues d'Afrique, Esprit, no. 317 (August–September 2005): 174.

104. The nurnber of Asians from former French colonies (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) rose frorn 11,368 in 1968 to 112,915 in 1990. Todd, Le destin des immigrés, 406.

105. Hargreaves, Immigration, "Race," and Ethnicity, 1–2. *Jus sanguinis* was privileged initially over *jus solis.* "The 1993 reform," Hargreaves explains, "which ended the automatic acquisition of French nationality by the children of immigrants at the age of majority, was the first under a republican regime to move in an exclusionary direction" (161). See in particular Alec G. Hargreaves, "National Identity, Nationality, and Citizenship," in Immigration, "Race," and Ethnicity, 149–176; and Patrick Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un *Français?* Histoire de la *nationalité française* depuis la *Révolution* (Paris: Grasset, 2002).

106. Lorenzo Prencipe, "Médias et immigration: Un rapport difficile," *Migrations* société 14, nos. 81–82 (May–August 2002): 140.

107. Etienne Balibar, "Racism and Crisis," in Race, Nation, Class: *Ambiguous* Identities, ed. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 220.

108. See Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, "Eliminating Race, Eliminating Difference: Blacks, Jews, and the Abbé Grégoire," in Peabody and Stovall, *The* Color of Liberty, 28-41; Roger Little, "Seeds of Postcolonialism: Black Slavery and Cultural Difference to 1800," in Francophone Postcolonial Studies: A Critical *Introduction,* ed. Charles Forsdick and David Murphy (London: Arnold, 2003), 17–26; and Annette Smith, Gobineau et *l'histoire naturelle* (Geneva: Droz, 1984).

109. Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire, eds., La fracture coloniale: La société *française* au *prisme* de l'héritage colonial (Paris: La Découverte, 2005).

110. Pascal Blanchard and Nicolas Bancel, "Les origines républicaines de la fracture coloniale," in Blanchard, Bancel, and Lemaire, La fracture *coloniale,* 38, 37.

111. See Pierre-André Taguieff, La République enlisée: *Pluralisme,* communautarisme et citoyenneté (Paris: Editions des Syrtes, 2005). To designate what he sees as a limitless pluralism that ends up being self-defeating since it eliminates or voids tolerance of difference, Taguieff uses the terms "hyperpluralism" (23) and "multicommunitarianism" (24). See also Michel Wieviorka, "Un débat nécéssaire," in Wieviorka, Une société fragmentée? 5.

112. Etienne Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," in Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, 43.

113. Etienne Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" in Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, 21.

114. For further discussion of these questions, see Mireille Rosello, "Tactical Universalism and New Multiculturalist Claims in Postcolonial France," in Forsdick and Murphy, Francophone Postcolonial Studies, 135–143.

115. David Blatt, "Irnmigrant Politics in a Republican Nation," in Post-colonial *Cultures* in France, ed. Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark McKinney (London: Routledge, 1997), 40–41.

116. Most notably, one might rnention the 1980–1981 Rock against the Police; the 1983 Marche pour l'égalité et contre le racisme (March for Equality and against Racism), also known as La marche des Beurs (The March of the Beurs); Convergence 84; and the launching of SOS Racisme's yellow-hand symbol expressing solidarity: "Touche pas à rnon pote" ("Hands off my buddy"). See Harlem Désir, "Pour l'intégration: Conditions et instruments," in Taguieff, Face au racisme (Paris: La Découveae, 1991), 1:106–119. Africans make contributions in all realms of French society, including ethnic solidarity, music (including world music, rap, and hip-hop, by such artists as NTM, IAM, MC Solaar, Khaled, Cheb Mami, Zebda, Salif Keita, Alpha Blondy, Papa Wernba, and Angélique Kidjo, among others), tagging, and of course sport, while simultaneously intersecting with urban housing policies. See "La prison pour NTM: L'insulte faite aux jeunes," *L'événement du Jeudi*, no. 629 (November 21–27, 1996); "Les chanteurs de NTM condamnés à la prison ferme pour outrage à la police," Le monde, November 16, 1996; Chris Warne, "The Impact of World Music in France," in Hargreaves and McKinney, Post-colonial *Cultures* in France, 133–149; Steve Cannon, "Paname City Rapping: B-Boys in the Banlieues and Beyond," in Hargreaves and McKinney, Post-colonial *Cultures* in France, 150–166; and Christian Mousset, "La musique africaine et la France," in Sot, Etudiants africains en France, 163–167. On housing policy, from the bidonvilles (shantytowns), cité de transit (temporary housing), and habitation à loyer modéré (rent-controlled housing, H.L.M.) to the housing projects of La Courneuve, Nanterre, and Sartrouville (to the north and west of Paris), Vaulx-en-Velin and Vénissieux (in Lyon), and les quartiers du nord (in Marseilles), and Clignancourt, la Goutte-d'Or, and Château-Rouge in Paris itself, see for example Alec G. Hargreaves, "Socio-economic Structures," in Immigration, "Race," and Ethnicity, 38–84. See also Loic Wacquant, "Banlieues franqaises et ghetto noir américain: De l'amalgame à la comparaison," French Politics and *Society* 10, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 81–103.

117. Christopher L. Miller, Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African *Literature* and Culture (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), 54.

118. Pascal Blanchard and Eric Deroo, "Contrôler: Paris, capitale coloniale," in *Culture* impériale: Les *colonies* au *cœur* de la République, 1931–1961, ed. Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2004), 120.

119. See for example Pascal Blanchard and Eric Deroo, Le Paris Asie: *Du rêve d'Asie* a Chinatown, 1854–2004 (Paris: La Découverte, 2004); and Pascal Blanchard, Eric Deroo, Driis El-Yazami, Pierre Fournié, and Gilles Manceron, Le Paris *arabe:* Deux *siècles* de *présence* des Orientaux et des *Maghrébins,* 1830–2003 (Paris: La Découverte, 2003).

120. On these newspapers, see Miller, *Nationalists* and Nomads, 28–48. See also Jean-Claude Michel, *The* Black Surrealists (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), on *Légitime Défense.* According to Midiohouan, "the distribution of all these newspapers was regularly interrupted by government decrees." Midiohouan, L'idéolo*gie, 36.*

121. See Dewitte, Les mouvements *nègres en* France, 126–170.

122. Philippe Dewitte, Deux *siècles* d'immigration en France (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2003), 29. See also John Horne, "Immigrant Workers in France during World War I," French Historical Studies 14 (1985): 57–88; Tyler Stovall, "Colour-blind France? Colonial Workers during the First World War," Race and Class 35, no. 2 (October–December 1993): 35–55; and Marc Michel, Les *Africains et* la Grande Guerre: *L'appel à l'Afrique, 1914–1*918 (Paris: Karthala, 2003).

123. Midiohouan has talked of 211,000 *tirailleurs* in Africa in 1918. L'idéologie, 68.

124. See Bernard Mouralis, République et colonies: Entre histoire *et* mémoire; La République *française et l'Afrique* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1999), 33. On the tirailleurs sénégalais, see Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960 (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1991); Ousmane Sembene's 1987 film Camp de Thiaroye; János Riesz, "The Tirailleur sénégalais Who Did Not Want to Be a 'Grand Enfant': Bakary Diallo's Force-Bonté (1926) Reconsidered," Research *in* African Literatures 27, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 157–179; János Riesz, "La folie des tirailleurs sénégalais: Fait historique et thème littéraire de la littérature coloniale à la littérature africaine de langue française," in Black Accents: *Writing* in *French* from Africa, *Mauritius,* and the Caribbean, ed. J. P. Little and Roger Little (London: Grant and Cutler, 1997), 139–156; Charles Onama, La France et ses tirailleurs: *Enquête* sur les *combattants* de la République (Paris: Duboiris, 2003); Mar Fall, Des Africains noirs en France: Des *tirailleurs* sénégalais *aux* Blacks (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1986); and János Riesz and Joachim Schultz, eds., Tirailleurs sénégalais (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1989).

125. The votes were 471,000 for Yes and 1,120,000 for No. See Marc Ferro, *Histoire* des colonisations des *conquêtes aux* indépendances, *XIIIème–XXème siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 478.

126. David E. Gardinier, "Historical Origins of Francophone Africa," in *Political Reform* in Francophone Africa, ed. John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), 13. See also Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Colonisation, coopération, partenariat: Les différentes étapes (1950–2000)," in Sot, *Etudiants africains* en France, 29–48.

127. Fabienne Guimont, Les étudiants africains en France, *1950–1*965 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), 13.

128. Abdoulaye Gueye, Les intellectuels africains en France (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 49.

129. See also Hélène d'Almeida-Topor, "Le nombre d'étudiants africains en France (1951–2000)," in Sot, *Etudiants* africains en France, 109–115. A number of factors account for the drop in African students in France: development of African universities, reduction in bursaries for international education, and stricter guidelines for issuing student visas. D'Almeida-Topor, "Le nombre d'étudiants," 110–111.

130. Mamadou Diouf, "Postface," in Gueye, Les *intellectuels* africains *en France,* 246.

131. See Sekou Traoré, La Fédération des étudiants *d'Afrique* noire en France (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985); and Guimont, Les étudiants africains, 107–124.

132. J.-P. N'Diaye, *Enquête* sur les étudiants noirs en France (Paris: Editions Réalités Africaines, 1962), 83, 84, 285. See also Achille Mbernbe, Les *jeunes* et *l'ordre politique* en Afrique *noire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985).