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CPR
Memo Assignment
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| Hardin (1968) argues that: “ruin is the destination
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” The CPR simulation creates a set of conditions similar to
commons Hardin speaks of. Initially,
you had an incentive to add cattle without limit to increase your profits.
This may have worked well at first, but eventually you may exceed
the commons carrying capacity as it can only support a fixed amount of
grazing. As a result,
individually rational actions produce collectively irrational outcomes.
After this simulation, do you agree with Hardin’s pessimistic
conclusions? |
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| The objective of this assignment is to write a memo
reflecting upon and describing your experience in the CPR simulation.
reserve
reading entitled “Tragedy of the Commons” (Reserve #5) to support
your answers. |
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| You should begin by describing how you did in comparison to
the other ranchers in the group. Why
do you think you did better or worse than the other ranchers?
Did you have a strategy when you began round 1?
Did your strategy develop as you moved to subsequent rounds?
In retrospect, were the strategies of the other ranchers on your
commons evident? Did they
appear to be more or less successful than your strategy?
Now consider the rancher with the highest gross worth in your
commons. What appeared to be
the winning strategy? Would
this strategy have worked if the tactics of the other group members
changed or do you think the winning rancher just “lucky”?
Now consider the commons carrying capacity.
How did the carrying capacity influence how you played the game?
If the thresholds were higher or lower, would that alter the way
you played the game? |
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| Hardin (1968) notes that the solutions to the commons
problems tend to be social rather than technical in nature.
In the simulation, there were no technical solutions available to
you. However, you were
allowed to communicate with your fellow ranchers and develop strategies to
manage the commons and avoid exceeding your carrying capacity.
No doubt, some groups were more effective in this regard than
others. What strategies
or rules, if any, did the group develop collectively to manage buying,
selling, or breeding? If your
group did not develop any effective strategies, what strategies would you
try to employ if you were allowed to play the game again? If rules were developed, did you follow the rules?
Did others follow these rudimentary rules?
If they did, why did folks follow the rules?
If they didn’t how did you enforce your rules or punish the
defectors? If you were
allowed to participate in this CPR simulation again, what changes in your
strategy would you make? |
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| Finally, Hardin (1968) suggests that the only way to avoid
the commons problem is either by allocating property rights or through
government regulation. Based
on your experience in this simulation, do you agree with Hardin’s (1968)
conclusion? Do the results of
the simulation suggest that there are other options for managing the
commons? Does the reserve
reading offer evidence that other approaches to managing the commons may
be effective? |
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