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Chapter 1

Immigrant policies and the education of immigrants in Britain

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Introduction

This chapter shows how Britain's imperial past powerfully affected the country's response to post-Second World War immigration. It charts the development of anti-discrimination legislation, culminating in the Race Relations Act 1976, and argues that this process has to be seen as a quid pro quo for the series of discriminatory and increasingly draconian immigration Acts which have followed the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962. It briefly rehearses the political debate that began with the arrival of the ship *Empire Windrush*, carrying migrants from the West Indies, and suggests that the key theme established then – the need to control the numbers of immigrants to make some form of integration achievable – has remained essentially unaltered. It then looks at the current situation for ethnic minorities in four key areas – employment, education, schools, and teacher education – and concludes that ignorance and prejudice have conspired to continue to discriminate against them.

The British historical context and political response

This section briefly outlines the legislation relating to immigration and immigrants from 1948 to 1968. It was during this period that the political approach to the issues was developed, an approach that largely survives to this day.

Britain's long history as a trading nation resulted in an empire whose growth accelerated during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, reaching its peak in the middle of the twentieth century at the outbreak of the Second World War. Under the Imperial Act 1914, every person born in a British colony or dominion was deemed to be a British subject. Thus people of the countries that made up the Empire were entitled to move to Britain and live there with their families. This right was again enshrined in the Nationality Act 1948, which effectively conferred British citizenship,

with free rights of entry to the 'mother country', on members of the Empire and Commonwealth. The Act created the new term 'Commonwealth citizen', effectively identical with 'British subject'. British citizens were formally 'citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies', thereby sharing equivalent rights with colonial citizens in the UK. Because citizens of independent Commonwealth countries were not aliens, they were not subject to immigration control and were able to pass without hindrance. As late as 1954, in answer to a question by Mr Erroll MP, the then Colonial Secretary, Mr Hopkinson, replied:

My Honourable Friend is certainly aware of the old tradition that British subjects from any Colonial Territory can come freely to this country. To change from that would be a very drastic step, but I assure him that we are well aware of the public concern that this matter is causing and that it is receiving very careful attention.

(Hansard, 1954)

The legal position of Commonwealth immigrants explains the virtual absence of reliable data on the numbers and origins of immigrants before the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962. Such provisions, applying to so many potential immigrants, were unique to Britain. Most Western European countries defined citizens of former colonies as 'foreigners', and they were enumerated through immigration control.

The end of the Second World War left Britain with a severe labour shortage and an economic boom, particularly in manufacturing industry. This problem was well advertised in the West Indies, where there was a surplus of labour and widespread unemployment. Local response to it was rapid. In Jamaica, for example, a network of travel agencies came into being across the island which even offered credit facilities for those unable to pay for their passage. Organisations such as London Transport sent out recruiting teams. The Barbadian authorities provided loans and assistance to make the journey possible. The result of all this was that by a strange coincidence, 1948 saw not only the passage of the Nationality Act but also the arrival in Britain of the *Empire Windrush* with 492 people from the Caribbean, signalling the first wave of black immigrants. They were followed in the 1950s and 1960s by settlers from South Asia – India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as well as from other countries of the New Commonwealth.

While those who came from the West Indies shared a common religion and language with the wider British community, most of the other groups followed different religious beliefs, had different mother tongues, and had different cultural imperatives. Settlers from Pakistan and Bangladesh, in particular, had frequently received little in the way of formal education and were in no position to give help to their children when they started to

attend British schools. A common factor for most of the post-war immigrants was that they did not intend to remain in Britain. They left their homelands in order to travel to Britain, where they hoped to make their fortunes so that one day they could return. Of course, for most of them this did not happen.

Two days after the arrival of the *Empire Windrush*, 11 Labour MPs wrote to Prime Minister Attlee calling for control of black immigration: 'An influx of coloured people domiciled here is likely to impair the harmony, strength and cohesion of our public and social life and to cause discord and unhappiness among all concerned' (J. Murray *et al.*, 22 June 1948). There followed a political struggle between those who believed that Britain should remain open to its colonial peoples and those who sought to exclude black people. Considerable efforts were made to provide reasons for doing so, and, at the same time, covert attempts were made to use administrative measures to discourage black people (Carter *et al.*, 1987). In May 1961, a Gallup poll found that 73 per cent of the electorate were in favour of immigration control. At the Conservative Party conference of that year, there were 39 resolutions in favour of immigration control (Bonham-Carter, 1987).

Carter *et al.* (1987) argue that the whole of this period saw the development of a clear policy towards black immigration. Though the process was covert, it amounted to

the construction of an ideological framework in which Black people were seen to be threatening, alien and unassimilable and to the development of policies to discourage and control Black immigration. The racism elaborated by the state in the post-war period was not simply a legacy of imperialism. Black immigration raised the prospect of a permanent Black presence in British society.

The outcome was the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962, which was designed to prevent the entry of black people from the West Indies into Britain. Its passage was strongly opposed by the Labour Party, which was then in opposition, but was not repealed when Labour came to power. It must be concluded that the Labour Party in office adopted the same position as the Conservatives: the immigration of black people must be curtailed in conjunction with a policy of equality of treatment for those already resident. This led in 1965 to the passing of the first Race Relations Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in public places but did not apply to issues such as employment or the provision of housing.

The 1965 Act required the establishment of a Race Relations Board (RRB), the purpose of which was to function through conciliation committees to secure compliance with the new law. Bonham-Carter, who chaired

the RRB, persuaded the Rowntree Trust to fund research into the extent of discrimination against black people. In his words, the report

revealed substantial, some would say massive discrimination against coloured people in employment, housing, and the provision of public services. The differential treatment of coloured immigrants as against that of other minority groups, such as Cypriots and Hungarians, left no doubt that discrimination was largely based on colour.

(Bonham-Carter, 1987)

His findings led Bonham-Carter to advocate the extension of the existing law against discrimination, a position accepted by the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins. The proposal was opposed, however, by employers through the Confederation of British Industry and by organised labour through the Trades Union Congress (TUC). In the middle of the negotiation between government and those two bodies, the Kenyan government embarked on its 'Africanisation' project, and the Kenyan Asians, who were British passport holders and therefore were not covered by the 1962 Act, began arriving in significant numbers. This resulted in the passage of the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968.

The passage of this Act was a notable event because the arguments in its favour encapsulated the simplicity of the thinking at the time and have affected the political approach to the issue of immigration as well as the public's attitudes to this day. The debate focused on two aspects: the importance of *assimilating* immigrants into the mainstream of British society and, *therefore*, the need to reduce their numbers so as to make assimilation easier. It should be added that the undefined but evident meaning of 'assimilation' as used by its proponents was that immigrant people should be encouraged to reject every aspect of their cultures – their languages, their religions, their social and domestic structures – and adopt those of their (preferably) middle-class, white fellow citizens. If the argument went, the numbers of immigrants could be minimised, this form of assimilation would be facilitated. During the course of the debate, Enoch Powell MP made an infamous speech in which he likened the consequences of (black) immigration to the Roman Tiber 'running with much blood' and advocated repatriation as the logical course of action. Many others, less memorably, attempted to make similar points. The debate was obsessed by a concern with the numbers of immigrants and the resultant harm they would bring to British society – an obsession which continues to shape much of both popular and official thinking to this day.

In the same year, the second Race Relations Act was also passed. Like its predecessor, it emphasised conciliation rather than enforcement. However, acting on advice offered by the old RRB, housing, employment and the provision of goods and services now fell within its remit. In spite

of these improvements, the powers of the new RRB were feeble and it soon became apparent that the legislation was badly flawed. Chief among its weaknesses was the narrowness of the definition by which discrimination became illegal. The law recognised acts as discriminatory only where they were deliberate or intentional. It became evident that a major problem lay in the fact that discrimination was systemic and institutional. That is to say, many traditional practices may well not have had discriminatory intent but nevertheless were discriminatory in effect. What was also apparent was reluctance on the part of both major parties to include provisions that could be seen as positively discriminatory in favour of immigrant communities.

In the meantime, by 1966 the reunification of families from South Asia was well under way, stimulated not least by awareness on the part of the male immigrants of the political determination to reduce their numbers. Wives and children were joining their husbands, with the result that schools were increasingly faced with children who had little or no English. The Home Office was preparing a bill to update various measures relating to local government. With characteristic pragmatism, section 11 of the Act made it possible for local education authorities (LEAs) to claim 75 per cent of the staffing costs of teachers appointed to help these pupils to overcome the language barrier, thus giving them access to the curriculum. Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966 was one of the few legislative provisions designed to help the children of immigrants. It enabled LEAs to set up language centres to which the children of new arrivals were assigned as soon as possible after settling. The express purpose of these centres, as their name implies, was to provide South Asian children with a basic competence in English. Once they were able to demonstrate this, they were sent to mainstream schools, where they were expected to follow the normal curriculum. It was hoped and expected that exposure to a British education and mixing with pupils from the dominant community would facilitate and hasten their integration into British society generally.

The Race Relations Act 1976

The 1976 Act benefited from the lessons learned from previous legislation. It was broadly framed so that it covered not only direct discrimination – that is to say, the less favourable treatment of persons on the grounds of their race, colour, ethnic identity or nationality – but also indirect discrimination. Indirect discrimination was held to take place where there was equal treatment which resulted in an unfair outcome.¹ It also permitted positive action to be taken to overcome the effects of past discrimination. This allowed, for example, the provision of special training schemes for ethnic minority people to prepare them for work in occupations from which they had been traditionally excluded or were self-evidently

under-represented. It is notable, however, that this was only an enabling clause: it was permissive, not mandatory. As with the previous Act, positive discrimination remained illegal.

The development of an educational response

As noted above, the political response to post-war immigration was heavily conditioned by Britain's imperial past. Between the Imperial Act 1914 and the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962, all British citizens were deemed to be citizens of Britain and the Commonwealth, and no control was exercised over their free movement between the various countries. There were, indeed, various Aliens Orders (from 1920 on), but by definition these did not apply to members of the British Empire and Commonwealth.

As Coleman and Salt (1992) observe, a consequence of this has been that analysis and policy have been confused by the relative poverty of information on immigrants. They also make the often overlooked point that in the popular perception, the word 'immigrant' has come to be synonymous with 'coloured', even though the majority of foreign-born people in Britain are white and during most years since the Second World War, Britain has been a net exporter of people.

From the Nationality Act 1948, various benefits and disbenefits flowed. The fact that immigrants from the Commonwealth were British citizens meant they were (in theory at any rate) automatically entitled to the same rights and privileges in the United Kingdom as British-born citizens. On the other hand, this meant that there was no designated arm of government responsible for policy development and implementation, to ensure that they were given particular help or consideration, either on arrival or thereafter, in the education of their children, adult training, housing, access to services, or in any other respect. This lack of a central arm of government with responsibilities for immigrant peoples may, in retrospect, be seen as very unfortunate, since in its absence, each department of government developed, or failed to develop, appropriate policies within its area of responsibility.

This may go far in explaining the policies adopted by governments between 1948 and 1968, and beyond. We refer again to the nature of the debate preceding the passage of the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968, particularly to the insistence on the part of the government that immigrants must be *assimilated* into British society at large. As a consequence of that insistence, it was argued that the numbers of immigrants had to be brought under control. The confusion of mind surrounding the idea of assimilation is neatly illustrated by the fact that no strategies to achieve this end were proposed for the adult settlers. The main thrust was to be seen through the schools. Tactics such as 'dilution' – the bussing of

ethnic minority children to ensure that no school had more than a third on roll – was one of them. The Department of Education and Science (DES) issued a number of circulars to schools (Circular no. 7 (1965), for example) which resulted in the perception that the presence of ethnic minority children constituted a 'problem'. Indeed, the Swann Report (DES, 1985) was of the opinion that the Department had at that time adopted a problem-centred approach and had retained it.

For a variety of reasons – not least its manifest failure – the assimilationist approach was dropped by the government and replaced with one of *integration*. This term, which lacked any clear definition, resulted in a series of measures which sought to reduce immigration and provide minimal protection from discrimination. The measures assumed that, given time, ethnic minority groups would lose their distinctiveness and merge with mainstream British society.

While government thinking remained locked into this mindset, academics in the social sciences and education were looking at alternative ways of meeting the needs of immigrants and, in the case of the educationists, their children. Educationists in universities and schools developed theories of cultural pluralism which implied that each group had the right to develop its distinctive characteristics within the framework of the wider society. Built into such a model were assumptions about equality, including equality of access to power, because the model assumes the existence of a continuous dialogue between the majority and minority groups. Clearly, such a dialogue can have meaning only if it is between equals.

In schools with ethnic minority students and with the active encouragement of many LEAs, theories of *multicultural education* were developed and put into practice. This sought to take notice of cultural diversity and use it as a tool in the education of all children. As such, it was an aspect of the child-centred approach to education that formed the basis of pedagogy particularly, but not exclusively, in primary education. Alongside multicultural education, theories of *anti-racist education* were developed, the purpose of which is inherent in the name.

A significant and contentious issue that divided academics and government was that of mother-tongue teaching. Rex (1986), for example, mounted a strong argument, well received by those active in the field, in favour of non-English speaking children receiving their education in the medium of their mother tongue, with English being introduced in stages as they became more competent in it. In this way, language acquisition would take place within the learning process.

Allied to this issue was the demand during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly from Pakistani parents, for schools to assist in mother-tongue maintenance. The debate on this issue centred on the effect that bilingualism might have on learning. The common-sense view, and the one adopted by government, was that learning would be retarded. Research in the area

conducted at the time in Britain (Rees and Fitzpatrick, 1981), as well as the experience of other countries such as Sweden, suggested that the opposite was true: that children's learning actually benefited from bilingualism. There were practical reasons why both mother-tongue teaching and mother-tongue maintenance presented problems. These included the cost of employing additional teachers and also (since teaching qualifications obtained from South Asian universities were not recognised in Britain) the availability of teachers with the necessary linguistic skills. These difficulties formed part of the debate, but the main objection, voiced at the time, had to do with the perceived danger of resentment by the white community at what could be seen as special provision for ethnic minority children. This, together with fears about the effect that mother-tongue teaching/maintenance would have on the reinforcement of ethnic identity and the damage that would do to the government's avowed policy of integration, was much more potent in policy-making. Equality of treatment became a government slogan, though, as Rex (1986) observed, the effect mocked the very notion of equality of opportunity.

Thus the theories and practices proposed by academics were not well received by the Thatcher administration, which increasingly accused both teachers in schools and educationists in universities of being more concerned with social engineering than with their proper concerns. In spite of government resentment, the British education system was such that its powers to influence matters either in schools or in the training of teachers were extremely limited. It would scarcely be overstating the case to say that there was a complete breakdown of mutual understanding and sympathy between government and academia on the issues relating to the education of children from ethnic minorities and the place of schools in providing it. Ultimately this breakdown was to lead to the passage of the Education Reform Act 1988.

The nature of the response by the then Department of Education to the arrival of ethnic minority children in schools was conditioned by the nature and structure of the school system in Britain. Under the Education Act 1945, the provision of schools, together with their teachers and necessary equipment, was the responsibility of local education authorities (LEAs). It was their responsibility to make appropriate provision for the education of children; in the words of the Act, 'according to their age ability and aptitude'. Interestingly, it was the *parents*, not the state or any of its organs, who were responsible for ensuring that their children were educated.

Before the Education Reform Act 1988, there was no nationally prescribed curriculum. Schools were free within the law to teach pretty much what they wanted, constrained mainly by the demands of the public examination system, the purpose of which was essentially to determine a student's fitness to enter a university. There were various mechanisms

which, it might be supposed, were in place to oversee the work of schools and ensure their efficiency, though closer examination reveals their inadequacy in this respect.

All schools had governing bodies to which the head teachers reported, but their functions were limited and they had no power to instruct the head teachers on the curriculum or methods of teaching. In the years following 1945, LEAs built up substantial teams of subject specialists to advise head teachers and teachers on developments in the teaching of the various subjects within the curriculum. However, although in some LEAs they were called 'local inspectors', it was emphatically *not* their function to inspect teachers and make judgements on their effectiveness, nor did they have significant power to initiate the removal of teachers from schools on the grounds of inefficiency. Finally, there was Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI). This was composed of a relatively small group of people, recruited from practising teachers. Although it was not their sole function, HMI carried out inspections of schools and made judgements on their effectiveness. These inspections were very significant events but they were very rare. A teacher might well go through his or her whole career without ever experiencing one of them. Again, it must be emphasised, in the absence of anything like a nationally agreed, legally enforceable curriculum, HMI were able to proceed only on the basis of a professional consensus about what was appropriate subject matter for the students. The same consensus also applied to student performance.

Such a loosely supervised system for the education of children undoubtedly had its weaknesses, but one of its strengths was that it allowed – indeed, positively encouraged – schools and teachers to address the needs of the particular children for whom they were responsible. Thus, the content, methods and objectives of teaching adopted by a teacher in an inner-city school in, say, 1975, three-quarters of whose class was of South Asian origin, could be – indeed, almost certainly were – markedly different from those of a colleague in another school teaching children of white British, middle-class parents.

The above indicates the weakness of the Department of Education's position in the late 1950s and 1960s. There was no enforceable curriculum which it could control, there were no officially recognised standards of performance, it was not responsible for the provision of schools and it did not appoint teachers. It could exercise some control over LEAs, however, and it was through them that its limited powers were exercised.

The Education Reform Act 1988

The significance of the Education Reform Act 1988 to schools and the training of teachers cannot easily be exaggerated: it radically changed the relationship between government and the schools service. For the first time,

The impact of these directions is best perceived when they are taken together. First, the history to be taught *must* be the history that has been prescribed. Failure to teach it on the part of the school and the teacher will result in the failure of the pupils and, since the prescription is backed by the 1988 Education Reform Act, it must be supposed that legal action could be taken against the teacher or the school, or both. Second, the study of history is clearly and overtly justified by its power to develop a sense of identity in the students. Third, the core study units cited and the clear general sense of the rest of the document make it evident that the students were expected to form identities that were constructed from England's development as a parliamentary democracy, its rise to head a great and glorious empire, and its relations with Europe.

Had all this been intended for a homogeneous white audience, some doubts might be expressed about its suitability in terms of the world picture it presents to the children. What seems not to have occurred to those who framed it is the fact that the perspectives of many of the children who were, by law, obliged to follow it were very different from those of their white British peers. For them it was the story of the subjugation of their ancestors and their countries by the triumphant British. For some it was the story of their forefathers' enslavement. This history that they were obliged to learn was a statement of their historical inferiority. The impact of this on the development of the personal identities of black and Asian children needs no stressing. As Parekh (1989) wrote,

All of us in our traditional settings take lots of things about ourselves for granted. We are constantly growing and changing without being aware of it. The immigrant's position is different especially for someone easily distinguishable by their colour or culture. Partly because of the conscious or unconscious pressure of an inhospitable society, partly because of their own sense of unease, they feel forced to define themselves, to say to others and even to themselves, who they are, and what constitutes their identity or claim to distinction.

More generally, leaving aside the particular instance of the teaching of history, the Act severely circumscribed the ability of teachers to respond to the particular needs of ethnic minority pupils. From a situation where teachers, as professionals, could seek to achieve equality for the students for whom they were responsible by teaching them appropriately, they now had to treat them all the same. The consequences of this are noted later.

Teacher education: initial teacher training

For much of the period from the 1960s to 1988, initial teacher training (ITT) was the responsibility of two groups of organisations: universities,

which offered the Postgraduate Certificate of Education (PGCE); and polytechnics and colleges of education, which provided courses leading to the Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) qualification. PGCE courses, which lasted for one year, were for those who had already graduated, and were designed to provide teaching skills and understanding for students who had demonstrated their subject mastery to degree level. Courses leading to a B.Ed. were a combination of subject discipline and teacher training, and lasted for three or four years. Generally, though not invariably, students wishing to teach in primary education took courses leading to a B.Ed., while those intending to work in the secondary sector took a first degree followed by a PGCE. The universities, as degree awarding institutions, were each responsible for the content and methods of teaching of their PGCE students under the general oversight of the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (CATE). Polytechnics and colleges could award degrees only under the aegis of, and validated by, either a university or the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA).

Few data are available on the extent to which the universities as a whole responded in their PGCE courses to the needs of teachers preparing for work in multiracial classrooms. CATE applied criteria for the accreditation of new courses which required that all students should be equipped to respond effectively to the demands of ethnic diversity in the classroom. While the thinking underlying this requirement was welcomed by many, it has to be said that in practice it was largely ineffective in terms of delivery. All that can be said with any confidence is that given the brevity of the PGCE course and the demands placed on it, the time that could be given to that aspect of the work was, at best, inevitably limited. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that many student teachers were completely unprepared.

It should be added, however, that the DES actively began to encourage the development of teacher training courses in universities that were specially designed to increase the numbers of teachers drawn from ethnic minority communities. It also approved four new PGCE courses for students with community languages. These were mounted by the University of Manchester and by Birmingham, Leeds and Thames Polytechnics. They were, however, short-lived.

CNAA, with its very different history and function, allied to the fact that, as has already been noted, it was validating courses that were three or four years in duration, took a strong line on the need to prepare student teachers to respond appropriately to the demands of teaching in multiracial, multi-ethnic classrooms. As part of its validation procedure, it required colleges and polytechnics to submit, in advance, detailed documentation setting out the content and methods of teaching to be employed in the courses they proposed to mount. It then visited the institution for a period of up to three days to satisfy itself that the institution was competent to

deliver its proposed course. Only then could the course be mounted. Crucially, a fundamental requirement placed on all courses leading to a B.Ed. was that graduates would be given, as part of their course, an understanding of multiracial Britain and the demands it made on the teacher, as well as being given basic competence in responding to those demands.

Teacher training: in-service training

From the 1960s, LEAs had supported, out of their own funds, in-service courses for teachers who wished to acquire appropriate skills and understanding to enable them to teach effectively in multiracial schools, or to update existing skills. Following the publication of the Swann Report (Department of Education and Science, 1985), additional funding was made available by the DES for the in-service training of teachers on teaching and the curriculum in a multi-ethnic community.

Britain's principal ethnic minority groups

To do justice to the variety and complexity of Britain's ethnic minority groups would require a chapter on each one. What follows are thumbnail sketches of seven groups. They have been drawn with two purposes in mind. First, they seek to justify the use of words like 'complex' and 'diverse' when discussing Britain's post-war multiracial communities and, in so doing, to dispose of beliefs and expectations that a harmonious society can easily be achieved. Second, these sketches show how religious and other cultural imperatives that settlers brought with them have powerfully affected the ways in which the different groups have responded to traditional white British society. We begin by looking at five communities originating from the Indian subcontinent.

Indians

Present-day India is the product of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The intention was to create Pakistan as an independent Muslim state, and most, though not all, Muslims moved from what is now India into Pakistan. Of those who remained, by far the majority were Hindus, though Muslims remained the second largest religious group. There were also Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains, Parsecs, Christians and Jews.

The word 'Hindu' originates from the Persian and originally referred to a person who lived near the River Indus and had not become a Muslim (Wheeler, 1966, 1968). The use of the word in connection with religion probably came with the Muslim invasions of India, when the Arabic name for India was Hindustan, which means Land of the Hindu People (Verma and Mallick, 1981). Unlike most religions, Hinduism has no prophet or

founder, but has grown and developed over thousands of years, taking in new ideas from the various peoples who inhabited the country. Basham (1959) defined a Hindu as 'a man who chiefly bases his beliefs and way of life on the complex system of faiths and practices which has grown up organically in the Indian sub-continent over a period of at least three millennia'.

What makes Hinduism so difficult to describe is its variety and flexibility. It has no creed, and its adherents can and do vary in their beliefs and practices. Behind all its variety there lies a belief in one supreme being. Among all its fluidity there are elements, such as the caste system, that are extraordinarily rigid. Indeed, a central feature of Hindu societies is that they have been built on a rigid system of castes for centuries. As Hinnells and Sharp (1972) write,

A Hindu is a Hindu, not because he accepts certain doctrines or philosophies but because he is a member of a caste. Hence it is, strictly speaking, impossible to become a Hindu other than by being born into a caste.

Marriage partners are normally found by parents for their children from within their own caste if they are Brahmins, and the same is still usual, though not invariable, for members of other castes.

Most Indians in Britain are from the Punjab or Gujarat, and are Hindus. Hindus did not, by and large, see emigration from India as a method of escape from poverty; rather, it was a legitimate mode of advancement for certain groups who already had a certain social identity. For them, emigration was a viable option when the opportunity arose. Structural opportunities and changes – war, partition, famine, land-loss – may have been the stimuli for many, but not the ultimate cause.

This was a crucial factor in the lives of many of the Indian immigrants, and substantially affected their attitudes towards their futures. Whereas, as we shall see, other groups, particularly, but not exclusively, those from Pakistan and Bangladesh, saw their time in Britain as a temporary sojourn – an opportunity to 'make their fortunes' before returning to their families and homelands – many of the Indians moved to Britain as part of a life plan which did not include a return to India as a necessary part of it.

Punjabi Sikhs

The majority of the Sikhs now living in Britain are from the Jullundur district (Ballard, 1989). The earliest of them pioneered migration from the subcontinent between the wars as itinerant pedlars, and during the post-war boom in Britain they acted as magnets which drew their more adventurous kinsmen and started the process of chain migration.

While the intention of these early migrants may have been to work hard, save and return home, most found it necessary to remain longer than they had intended. The rapid decay of the textile and allied industries then made even a delayed return difficult. For a variety of reasons, including changes in the immigration laws, by the mid-1960s it became the norm for wives and families to join their husbands relatively quickly after their arrival. New arrivals would work hard to pay off any debts and buy a house that would be ready for their families. It must be stressed that this early reunification resulted in a rapid development of normal social life within the Sikh communities and the recreation of family and kinship networks, which helped to provide mutual support systems – both social and financial.

The ways in which minority groups are able to respond to the challenge of migration are powerfully affected by their social customs and family structures. We shall return to this theme when we discuss the other main minority groups in Britain. In the Punjab, a family unit is perceived as a man plus his sons, their sons, wives and unmarried daughters, who all live together under the same roof and work to the common good. Marriage to members of the family on either the father or mother's side is prohibited. After marriage, the bridegroom's primary loyalty remains to his own extended family, though the bride brings her own network of kinsmen, who may become valuable allies. Once the marriage was well established and had produced children, it was common – though not exactly encouraged – for the new unit to obtain some measure of autonomy. Thus, while there were pressures against men sending for their wives and families to join them in Britain, there were customs which made it possible for them to do so. Once the decision was made, the Sikh community in Britain was able to create a viable society, and was one of the earliest South Asian groups to do so.

Thus, Sikhs were in as good a position as any of the minority groups to face the problems brought on by the economic depression of the 1970s and early 1980s with the collapse of the manufacturing industries in which many of them worked. What appears to have happened is that many of those made redundant looked to become self-employed. Inevitably, for most, the enterprise had to be one which required little in the way of initial capital but which could be built up by hard work (Ballard, 1989). The attraction of market stalls, small shops, restaurants and motor repairs is, then, readily understandable.

Their success has been made evident by their movement away from the low-cost housing they originally acquired, to better locations in desirable suburbia and the adoption of what is a recognisably British middle-class lifestyle. The children of this generation have done well in schools and university (Tomlinson, 1990), but still have problems in finding employment commensurate with their qualifications. Those with qualifications that are

not in shortage areas or cannot easily be exploited outside an institutional context have turned to business enterprises of one kind or another, and will probably do well.

Their probable success is not least because of a combination of characteristics of Sikh families and societies identified by many researchers (e.g. Bachu, 1985; Ballard, 1989; Macleod, 1976; Pettigrew, 1972). Within the family, males are at once highly supportive of and in competition with each other. Between families there is strong competition for success. This is partly a result of the teachings of the Gurus, the founders of the Sikh religion, who advocated an egalitarian society, and partly the result of the abolition of the hierarchical caste system found in Hindu societies, which makes social and economic upward migration so difficult. 'Thus, if an individual works hard and makes money and skilfully creates a set of links, he can become a person of importance. Achieved status is what is important' (Pettigrew, 1972). Thus, while the religious, cultural and personal forces acting on the Sikhs in Britain may not be well understood by many in the white community, their outward behaviour and responses to the challenges of making their way in British society are easily recognised and understood by the more successful of their white peers.

As we shall see, Sikhism contrasts sharply with Islam in the relationship that is encouraged between men and women, and the place of women in society. There is no system of *purdah*. Men and women are able to talk quite freely in public and there is no disapproval of women engaging in paid employment. On the contrary, both men and women are encouraged to become as well educated as their abilities permit and engage in careers and enjoy success in them.

East African Asians

The East African Asians are unique among the South Asian groups in that they did not come directly from the subcontinent. They arrived by way of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The cause of their first migration was the construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway. They were mainly Sikhs of the Ramgharia (artisan) caste, though there were some Hindus and Muslims, and they remained in Africa for over seventy years, during which time many rose to occupy essentially middle-class positions in African society. Ghai (1965) suggests that 36 per cent were in executive, administrative and managerial positions, about 25 per cent were skilled workers, another 25 per cent were in secretarial/clerical occupations, and 15 per cent were in professional or technical posts. The turmoil of emergent independent African states in the 1950s, followed in the 1960s by the development of Africanisation policies, made it impossible for them to remain, and many, particularly those who had been employed in the public sector and were therefore most powerfully affected, migrated to Britain in the mid-1960s.

The experience of being twice migrants had a number of significant effects on their social and economic trajectory following their arrival (Bachu, 1985). She summarises these as follows:

- They were already part of an established community in East Africa, where they had developed considerable community skills prior to migration.
- They moved from urban East Africa to urban Britain, having been concentrated in a handful of towns in East Africa.
- They were mainly public-sector workers.
- They were technically skilled because of early recruitment policies in Africa.
- Despite their absence from India for over seventy years and the lack of home orientation, they had maintained many of the values and traditions they held when they first migrated in the early twentieth century.
- They arrived in Britain with a considerable command of mainstream skills (i.e. language, education, and familiarity with urban institutions and bureaucratic processes), and also a certain amount of capital, which made them relatively prosperous.

Other significant variations from the norms of the settlement process were that they arrived as complete families, while their time in Africa had effectively insulated them from India so that, for them, there was no question of return to their first homeland. Their arrival in Britain was never perceived by them as a transient episode in their lives: they had come to stay.

Another feature of ethnic minority settlement common to most other new arrivals is the tendency for them to form concentrations in particular areas. This was not shared by the East African Asians. They did not go through the phase of living in inner-city areas and then dispersing with increasing affluence. They tended to disperse on arrival and, though large numbers of them are to be found in London, they are also found in most of the larger British cities.

Nor do they feel the need to live close to relatives. On the contrary, as Bachu (1985) points out, 'They say that they prefer to maintain a distance because they are in this way not involved in the petty quarrels of related families and can therefore lead their own individual lives without their behaviour being monitored by kinsmen.'

Pakistanis

Many, probably the majority, of the Pakistanis now living in Britain originated from Mirpur in Pakistani-held Kashmir. Like many other migrants, they were drawn by the possibility of work in British industry

following the Second World War. Their initial aim was to work hard, acquire capital and return to Pakistan. However, their collective experiences have been markedly different from those of the Hindus, Sikhs and East African Asians.

This is partly explicable by the relative poverty of their homeland and the low level of skills that they brought with them, but an array of other factors – social, religious and cultural – have affected their past experience, their present position and their future prospects in British society. It will be notably different from the groups already described from the subcontinent. The Pakistani immigrants took on unskilled or semi-skilled work in the heavy engineering or textiles industries, mainly in the north of England or Midlands, but, since they arrived later than the Hindus and Sikhs, they were still in their original occupations when the industries in which they were working collapsed. By comparison with the settlers from India, they have remained in highly concentrated communities, largely in inner-city locations. The process of family reunification started later and they have been economically less successful.

In order to understand the nature of Pakistani communities in Britain, it is necessary to understand the nature of the society they left behind in Pakistan. Pakistani Muslim marriage customs differ from Sikh and Hindu practice in that endogamy is encouraged and marriage between first cousins is common. Ballard (1990), recording his observations in Mirpur, suggests that well over half the marriages were between first cousins. The bride is thus a member of the family almost as much before as after her marriage, and the *biraderi* (brotherhood – a complex of relationships both of blood and by marriage) is powerfully strengthened by the fact of its members being often related by a complex network of liaisons. Also, because the bride does not bring her own external network of family relationships with her, the marriage intensifies the unity of the extended family and makes it all the more difficult for younger couples to form autonomous units within the extended family. Taken together, all this makes for a much more inward-looking family.

Why, it might be asked, did they not follow the example of the Sikhs and Hindus and start to bring their families over to Britain earlier? There were a number of reasons.

First, and most obvious to Western eyes, was the economic factor. A man and his wife and children could not live as cheaply as the man could alone. Since the object of their time spent working in Britain was to increase the wealth of the extended family, the *biraderi*, and not the economic advancement of one unit within it, the logic of their situation was for the men's wives and children to remain in Pakistan. Second, the complex relationship that bound the extended families together made the move of wives and families to Britain much more of a wrench than was the case with Hindu and Sikh families. Third, and closely connected with

this, was the concept of a family as an extended interrelated group spanning generations as well as widely encompassing a range of relationships such as uncles, cousins and the like. A man, his wife and their children were emphatically not perceived as a family unit – they were merely part of a greater whole. Fourth, while the intention to return to Pakistan might be as powerful as ever, the reunification between husbands and their wives and children would be a tacit admission that the return was to be long delayed. Finally, it has to be said that while the men were impressed with the material advantages of working in Britain, they saw much in its society which they perceived as morally corrupt, nowhere more so than in the behaviour of Western women and the relationships generally between the sexes.

Against these forces acting on the men to persist in their single state in Britain were others that ultimately became more compelling. There were, of course, the emotional relationships and the strain that they imposed on both sides, but ultimately it was the increasingly stringent legislation governing immigration and the less publicised but even more oppressive regulations and procedures adopted by the immigration service to enforce it.

Bangladeshis

The Bangladeshis, like the Pakistanis, were the products of the partition of India in 1947. Not surprisingly, therefore, they share many cultural and social characteristics resulting from a common belief in Islam. The majority of Bangladeshis in Britain originate from Sylhet. Alam (1988) argues that the reason why that is so can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century when workers from Sylhet were employed to carry tea down to Calcutta, where their contracts were terminated. Some were then employed on board ships bound for England, where a proportion jumped ship to seek their fortunes. It was these pioneers who set in motion the process of chain migration. However, the level of migration remained very modest until the 1960s, when Pakistan was encouraged to supply workers in British heavy industries and textiles, which were unable to attract sufficient numbers of indigenous British people. The motives of these migrants were essentially economic, and the most impoverished men of Sylhet were most attracted by the possibility of making their fortunes in a few years, after which they intended to return to East Pakistan (Bangladesh) to purchase property and businesses.

The strategy they adopted was identical with that of the Pakistanis. Men came to Britain first and family reunion was delayed, essentially for the same reasons, until legislative and other pressures made it inescapable.

Both the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities are essentially 'collectivist'. That is to say, its members perceive themselves not only as individuals but also as members of a group: the family. Nor does it end there;

the family honour requires that the family and its members enjoy the respect of the wider community. Weinreich and Kelly (1990) made the point that notions of personal conscience and responsibility are particularly powerful in those parts of Western Europe that have been exposed to the Protestant Christian faith. In such societies, interpersonal relations (and even relationships between members of the same family) are seen as a matter for negotiation between the individuals concerned. Although individuals remain dependent in varying degrees on others, government and the law, as well as others in their society, regard them as responsible for their own affairs. Such notions contrast sharply with a collectivist type of society, in which there is a much greater emphasis on the responsibility of the individual to the extended family, which in turn is monitored and regulated by the wider community.

Before we review the other major immigrant populations in Britain, it is perhaps timely to summarise the circumstances of the groups from the Indian subcontinent.

First, there is the matter of the timing of their arrival. The Indians were the first to arrive in substantial numbers. While all the groups may be said to have had an economic motivation, the Indians were, on the whole, less likely to be refugees from poverty than the others, and in general terms were better qualified and more able to take advantage of the post-war boom in Britain. The Sikhs were not far behind, so again were able to get a good start. They were also like the Indians in that their family customs made family reunification, with all the advantages it brought with it of mutual emotional and economic support, possible at an early date. The Pakistanis arrived next and so had less time to establish an economic base before the collapse of the industries in which they were employed. The Bangladeshis were last to arrive and, like the Pakistanis, but even more quickly, soon found themselves unemployed. The East African Asians were a special case, as has already been noted.

The geographical locations in Britain that the various immigrant groups settled in were determined at the macro level by the work that they were fitted to do and the industries they were to do the work in. Thus the early Sikh settlers, the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis arrived to meet the need for unskilled or semi-skilled workers in the heavy engineering, steel and textile industries. As a result, they were originally concentrated in the West Midlands (for the engineering), Yorkshire and Humberside (for the steel industry and woollen textiles), and the North West (for cotton textiles), though London soon became a magnetic attraction for many.

Within those general areas there were major concentrations in inner-city locations. This came about for a variety of reasons – chiefly economic. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups had particular problems, so they will be dealt with first. They were among the poorest of the settlers and had least

in the way of resources on landing. They came as single men and, by pooling what they had, a group from the same village could manage to buy a large, cheap old house. Islam prohibits the borrowing or lending of money at interest, so they had no access to the sort of house-buying facilities open to non-Muslims. Over time, members of the original group would be able to buy their way out of the first house and acquire another, similar one as the process of family reunification began. The sort of housing they needed was to be found in the older central areas of the industrial cities where their work was. Typically they dated from the nineteenth century and had been built to house the large families of Victorian England. They were too old and too big and in the wrong places to be attractive to the white population, so were progressively acquired by the new settlers. Since the original groups of men had often come from the same village, it could be recreated in Birmingham or Bradford, thousands of miles away from the original in Mirpur. It was this process that led to the very high concentrations of Bangladeshi or Pakistani families in certain inner-city areas.

Together with the early collapse of their employment prospects, finding a type of housing which met their immediate needs added to the geographical immobility of these groups. While the houses were relatively easy to buy, they were also difficult to sell except to other Pakistanis or Bangladeshis. Thus opportunities for alternative employment elsewhere in the UK, even if they existed, could not be readily pursued. Other factors – particularly the ‘collectivist’ nature of their social structures – leading to lack of mobility have been identified already.

Chinese

The majority of people of Chinese descent now living in Britain are Cantonese from the New Territories. Chinese immigration began in the nineteenth century when single males travelled to the United Kingdom and settled in the major ports – chiefly London and Liverpool. The numbers involved were small. The 1901 census suggested that there were only 545 Chinese people in the country. Until the late 1960s most of the migrants were still men, and Ng (1968) found that, like most immigrants from South Asia, they intended to return to their homeland. However, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act, which required that children were accompanied by their mothers, meant that families were rapidly being reunited, and the Swann Report (*Education for All*, 1985) suggested that 80 per cent of all Chinese living in Britain had arrived in the previous twenty years.

Unlike most other Asian groups, the Chinese do not identify themselves, nor do others identify them, by their religious belief. Confucius was a philosopher rather than a prophet and based his teachings on the concept

of *li* – a respect for one’s ancestors and fellow men. His followers developed an increasingly refined sense of family through a carefully worked out hierarchy of family relationships.

Most important was the father–son relationship, the son being expected to serve, to respect, and at all times defer to the father. . . . Ancestor worship was the religion which gave strength and supernatural sanction to the family. . . . In this way, everyone’s position in the life and the afterlife was rigidly circumscribed and made subject to the greater welfare of the family unit.

(Baker, 1981)

Thus, the family is central to the Chinese culture, more important than either the individual or the community.

The nineteenth-century settlers established Chinese laundries, which provided a useful service and one that the native British did not want to engage in. Thus these settlers had found a niche industry in which they could operate independently without competing with indigenous workers for either jobs or capital. With the collapse of the laundry business in the 1950s, they found another solution in their search for social and economic independence in the restaurant trade, later to diversify into the ‘takeaway’ business. This development had important consequences for the distribution of Chinese families. No ‘takeaway’ owner wanted his shop to be too close to another, so that families were dispersed through cities and towns and into surrounding villages, wherever there were suitable locations to set up a business.

It is this geographical dispersal which is often cited as the reason for the ‘invisibility’ of the Chinese presence on Britain. Other recent settlers formed dense local concentrations, so that even though they were not significantly more numerous than the Chinese, they have been much more visible. To the invisibility brought about by dispersal can be added their natural independence and their wish to avoid trouble as factors leading to the general low level of awareness of the Chinese community on the part of the indigenous British.

West Indians

The pattern of West Indians’ migration to Britain is complex and of long duration. According to Walvin (1984), *The Gentleman’s Magazine* of 1764 asserted that there were 20,000 black people in London alone. Their numbers probably increased until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when they declined as a result of the ending of the slave trade and Britain’s loss of interest in the West Indies.

Until 1944, the great majority of immigrants from the West Indies had

been men. In the immediate post-war period, men were accompanied by wives and children. Britain was an obvious destination for those wishing to improve their economic future. They had legal right of entry until the 1962 Immigrants Act, and Britain's need for people to work in its factories was well advertised. In Jamaica, a network of travel agencies came into being across the island which even offered credit facilities for those unable to find the cash for their passage. Organisations such as London Transport sent out recruiting teams. The Barbadian authorities provided loans and assistance to make the journey possible.

More than half the West Indians in Britain live in the Greater London area and most of the remainder live in the Midland cities of Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Leicester and Nottingham. In spite of the wide range of occupational skills they brought with them, the labour demands of post-war Britain were for people to work in factories, transport, hospitals and other service industries. Regardless of their previous occupations, it was those sorts of jobs that the West Indians largely filled.

Unlike most of the later settlers from South Asia, those from the Caribbean had the advantage of understanding and being understood in English. To that might be added that many were Christian. They were far closer in language and culture to the indigenous population than the later settlers. In spite of these advantages, all the evidence shows that the high hopes they brought with them of social acceptance and economic advancement were disappointed. Rex and Tomlinson (1979) concluded that the black population had not been absorbed into the British working class and seemed unlikely to be absorbed in the foreseeable future. In fact, they thought, they formed an underclass, disadvantaged by comparison with the white working class in housing, education and employment. All the evidence suggests that they were remarkably percipient in their forecast.

For convenience, Table 1.1 sets out the key post-war immigration-related legislation and its impact on issues of equality and cultural diversity, education and schools.

The current situation: demography

Table 1.2, taken from the results of the most recent census for which the results are available (1991), provides a breakdown by country and statistical region of the ethnic origins of residents in Great Britain. It can be seen that of a total population of 54,888,844, some 94.5 per cent were classified as 'White British' and 5.5 per cent were identified by their skin colour as being members of one or another minority ethnic group. It is unfortunate that the data supplied are now ten years old and that so far statistics from the 2001 census have not been released. However, any changes that have occurred since 1991 will be almost exclusively due to natural increase

and mortality, since the various Immigration Acts since 1962 have ensured that the numbers of new arrivals have been minimised.

In percentage terms, ethnic minority groups form a small minority of the total population, though taken together they amount to over 3,000,000 people. Their distribution is far from uniform. Thus people living in rural Scotland, for example, will be unlikely to meet anyone other than a white Scotsman, while those living in London or the West Midlands will be much more conscious of living in a multiracial community. To this it should be added that some of the minority groups, usually of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent, have formed communities which, at the local level – that of a local government ward, for example – may well approach 100 per cent.

Another factor revealed by the census, and with particular relevance to this study, was the family structures of the various groups. While about 40 per cent of white married couples had dependent children (which might reasonably be taken as a proxy for those of pre-school or of school age), this proportion rose to 65 per cent for Indian, 70 per cent for black African, 79 per cent for Pakistani and 88 per cent for Bangladeshi couples. This, together with the tendency for many ethnic minority groups, particularly those from South Asia, to form local concentrations, meant that there were many schools, usually in inner-city locations, where ethnic minority pupils were in the majority.

In addition to the main groups of settlers from the Commonwealth, figures from the Home Office and Refugee Council provide an estimate of some 257,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Great Britain, including about 65,000 children. The majority, approximately 218,000, live in Greater London (DfEE Briefing Paper, 1999). This group share a number of common problems. Particular barriers for adults and children arise from language and cultural differences, and from the fact that a number of the adults are very well qualified – doctors and teachers – but with qualifications that are not recognised by professional bodies in Britain.

In policy terms, Britain's general approach to refugees can be gauged from the passage of the Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act 1987. This provided for a fine of £1,000 to be imposed on transport companies for each passenger carried without the necessary documents for entry. The legislation is clearly designed to keep would-be refugees away from Britain until a right of entry has been established at a consulate overseas (Coleman and Salt, 1992). The problems faced by a genuine refugee seeker in obtaining such documents leave little to the imagination.

An important element missing from the census statistics is the large, and increasing, number of children of mixed ethnicity. Estimates have been advanced which suggest that at least a quarter of African-Caribbean and an even higher proportion of Indian marriages are with members of the white indigenous population. The needs of these children, who are

Table 1.1 Key legislation etc. relating to post-war immigration and its impact on schools in Britain, 1948–1999

	1948–1961	1962–1975	1976–1987	1988–1999
A Immigration-related legislation	Nationality Act 1948	1 Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962 2 Race Relations Act 1965 3 Local Government Act 1966 4 Immigration Act 1968	1 Race Relations Act 1976 2 Rampton/Swann Committee of Inquiry (1977–1985)	Education Reform Act 1988
B Equality and cultural diversity	Established all Commonwealth citizens' entitlement to equal rights of abode in Britain	1 Restriction of immigration rights for West Indians 2 Provided limited protection against racial discrimination 3 Provided special funding to LEAs with substantial immigrant communities 4 Set restrictions on immigrants from East Africa	1 Provided more extensive protection against racial discrimination in the provisions of goods and services 2 Committee of Inquiry into the education of ethnic minority children	Established government control over the curriculum in schools
C Consequences for Education	As British citizens, immigrants and their children were entitled to no special treatment	3 Recognised that English-language needs of South Asian children had to be addressed by LEAs	2 Rampton/Swann recommendations largely rejected by government	Emphasis on subject teaching rather than child-centred learning
D Schools	The beginnings of multicultural education	3 Creation of language centres for children of South Asian origin	Concern about ethnic minority children's achievement in schools Demands by parents for mother-tongue teaching in schools rejected	Established a highly prescriptive curriculum which took virtually no account of ethnic diversity OFSTED inspections concerned exclusively with academic subjects

Note LEA = local education authority, OFSTED = Office for Standards in Education (the body concerned with the inspection of schools).

Table 1.2 Ethnic groups of residents in Britain

Region	Total population	Ethnic group %		Other groups								
		White	Black Carb.	Black Afr.	Black other	Ind.	Pak.	Bang.	Chi.	Asian	Other	
GREAT BRITAIN	54,888,844	94.5	0.9	0.4	0.3	1.5	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	
England and Wales	49,890,277	94.1	1.0	0.4	0.4	1.7	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	
England	47,055,204	93.8	1.1	0.4	0.4	1.8	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	
REGIONS OF ENGLAND												
<i>North</i>												
Tyne and Wear Metropolitan County	3,026,732	98.7	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	
Remainder	1,095,152	98.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	
<i>Yorks and Humberside</i>												
S. Yorkshire Metropolitan County	4,836,524	95.6	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	
Remainder	1,262,630	97.1	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	
W. Yorkshire Metropolitan County	1,262,630	97.1	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	
Remainder	2,013,693	91.8	0.7	0.1	0.3	1.7	4.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.7	
<i>East Midlands</i>												
East Midlands	1,560,201	99.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	
<i>East Anglia</i>												
East Anglia	3,953,372	95.2	0.6	0.1	0.3	2.5	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	
<i>South East</i>												
Greater London	2,027,004	97.9	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	
Inner London	17,208,264	90.1	1.9	1.0	0.6	2.6	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.8	1.1	
Outer London	6,679,699	79.8	4.4	2.4	1.2	5.2	1.3	1.3	0.8	1.7	1.9	
Outer Metropolitan Area	2,504,451	74.4	7.1	4.4	2.0	3.0	1.2	2.8	1.1	1.8	2.2	
Outer South East	4,175,248	83.1	2.7	1.3	0.7	6.5	1.4	0.4	0.7	1.6	1.6	
Remainder	5,544,607	95.7	0.5	0.1	0.2	1.3	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	
<i>South West</i>												
South West	4,938,958	97.8	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	
<i>West Midlands</i>												
West Midlands Metropolitan County	4,609,424	98.6	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	
Remainder	5,150,187	91.8	1.5	0.1	0.4	3.1	1.9	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.4	
Remainder	2,551,671	85.4	2.6	0.2	0.6	5.5	3.5	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.8	
<i>North West</i>												
Greater Manchester Met. County	2,598,516	98.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.7	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	
Merseyside Metropolitan County	6,243,697	96.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.9	1.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.5	
Remainder	2,499,441	94.1	0.7	0.2	0.4	1.2	2.0	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.5	
Remainder	1,403,642	98.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.2	
WALES												
Wales	2,340,614	97.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	1.0	1.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	
SCOTLAND												
Scotland	2,835,073	98.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	
Scotland	4,998,567	98.7	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2	

Source: Office of Population, Census and Surveys (OPCS), 1992.

frequently bilingual and inherit the traditions of two cultures, have been largely disregarded by educationists and social scientists. This might be thought a serious omission since, at an intuitive level, it could be argued that they are likely to be doubly disadvantaged since their appearance denies them full membership of either the white or the minority community concerned.

One cause for optimism about these marriages is that they denote a substantial willingness on the part of the different ethnic groups to overcome cultural differences and come together in the most committed way possible. It is therefore the more unfortunate that marriage between the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups and members of the white British community is virtually unknown. Religion, social structures and marriage customs, briefly outlined above, make such alliances virtually impossible. The 'inward-lookingness' of the extended family systems of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis precludes anything but formal relationships between them and their British peers. The impenetrable society they form within white British society at large helps to create the ignorant hostility – fostered by a right-wing tabloid press – expressed by a minority of the white working class in attacks on, particularly, Pakistani people, their houses and mosques. Not surprisingly, this, in turn, provokes young Pakistanis to the sort of violent response that in 2001 led to the rioting and destruction of property in Bradford and elsewhere.

The current situation: employment

The following statistics have been taken from Labour Force Surveys data. They are, therefore, coarse grained, since the size of the sample is too small to emphasise employment differences except those between white and the major ethnic minority groups. British employers in the private sector are encouraged, but not required, to maintain records of the ethnic origin of their employees. The Department of Trade and Industry's Workforce Employee Relations Survey found that 64 per cent of workplaces were covered by a formal equal opportunities policy, but of those, only 48 per cent kept employee statistics which identified their ethnic origin – that is to say, fewer than one-third of all employers were able to supply information (DfEE, 1999b). Similarly, the CBI Employment Trends Survey (1998) found that 86 per cent of companies had written equal opportunities policies. However, while their general awareness of equal opportunities practice was fairly high, there was a widespread failure to generate codes of practice in line with the recommendations of the Commission for Racial Equality. This leads one to conjecture that in many cases, the equal opportunities policies were little more than window dressing.

In 1997, there were some 2.2 million people of working age in Great Britain who were members of various ethnic minority groups, accounting

for 6.4 per cent of the labour force. Of these, only 57 per cent were employed (Labour Force Survey, average 1997, Great Britain). This overall figure conceals wide disparities between the ethnic groups. West Indians, for example, were twice as likely as white British to be unemployed; Indians were similar to white British; Pakistanis were twice as likely; and Bangladeshis more than three times as likely. Moreover, of those groups who were in employment, West Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were less likely to be in managerial or administrative positions than white British or Indian workers.

Unemployment figures also mask gender differences. For example, black African (24 per cent) and Pakistani (22 per cent) women have unemployment rates that are more than four times that of white women (5 per cent). However, these differences may be attributable to cultural differences relating to the role of women as much as to any other factors.

Figure 1.1 shows how race and unemployment have interacted between 1984 and 1998. Again, since the data are from Labour Force Surveys, the ethnic minority groups shown are simplified. However, the message is clear, consistent and unequivocal. At each downturn in the economy, its effect on ethnic unemployment is multiplied by anything up to three and a half times, dependent on the minority group concerned.

It has to be said that a greater concern over access to the labour market by ethnic minority groups has been more evident since the Blair administration came to power in 1997 than was the case in the previous 18 years




Figure 1.1 Race-related unemployment as a percentage of population, 16 and over, not seasonally adjusted

Source: Labour Force Survey

under Thatcher and Major. Even so, *Influencing Small and Medium Sized Employers* (DfEE, 1999b) summarises the government's broad lines of approach as follows:

There are two broad lines of approach available to government to influence employers to secure more extensive practice of equal opportunities: *compulsion* and *persuasion*.

Compulsion

The government can and will put in place the necessary legislative framework to secure a flexible labour market underpinned by minimum standards for all with maximum flexibility consistent with proper protection. However, it is also concerned not to undermine competitiveness by placing undue burdens on businesses.

Persuasion

Moreover, while anti-discrimination legislation including legal redress is essential, it would appear to be generally only a necessary but not sufficient condition for general progress and systemic change on equal opportunities. Attitudinal and cultural changes – not amenable to compulsion – are also necessary.

The current situation: education

The most recent figures available from the Department for Education and Employment's (DfEE) Analytical Services of the Department for Education and Employment (now the Department for Education and Skills) reinforce the findings of innumerable academic studies. They show that students of black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin suffer from a range of difficulties. Key points noted by the Sex and Race Equality Division include:

- A significant gap in attainment levels at the end of compulsory education (age 16), which has widened since 1988.
- High proportions of black students are entering higher education later than other groups and are gaining first degrees at age 25 or later.
- Among 16-year-olds, Bangladeshis have the highest rates of non-participation in education, training or employment.
- Black pupils are much more likely to be excluded from school than their white peers are. The exclusion rates for black Caribbean (0.76 per cent) and black African (0.70 per cent) students are the highest for all groups and compare badly with that for white students (0.18 per cent).

- Black graduates appear twice as likely as white graduates to be unemployed on leaving university.
- In the academic year 1994–5, only 23 per cent of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and black students gained at least five passes in the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) at grade A*–C (grades reckoned to denote passes at four levels of excellence) compared to 46 per cent of whites and 48 per cent of Indians (Youth Cohort Study, 1996, cohort 8, England).
- Black and Pakistani students are also less likely than whites to achieve even lower-grade GCSEs (D–G), and more likely to leave with no qualifications at all at the end of compulsory schooling. Indian students are less likely than whites to achieve low or no qualifications (Youth Cohort Study, 1996, cohort 8, England).
- Pakistani and black 18-year-olds are half as likely as young white and Indian people to obtain two or more passes in the General Certificate of Education (GCE) (13 per cent and 11 per cent respectively, compared to 31 per cent of both whites and Indians) (Youth Cohort Study, 1996, cohort 8, England).

Schools

As Table 1.2 indicates, the effect of legislation governing the position of Commonwealth immigrants since 1948 has been to define them as British citizens. Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968 and 1976) were designed to safeguard their rights under the law but, except in certain carefully defined conditions, these Acts gave them no additional benefits. This general approach was reflected in the Education Reform Act 1988, which profoundly affected every aspect of the schools service and the relationship between schools and government. For the purposes of this study, one of its most important effects was to seek to change the pedagogical approach in schools from one that was essentially student centred to one that was subject oriented. As noted above, the DfEE's analysis suggests that one of the effects of the Act appears to have been to widen the gap in achievement, at age 16, between white students and that of certain of their ethnic minority peer groups. Given the curricular, pedagogical and other fundamental changes to the schools service effected, this should come as little surprise.

Teacher education

The Swann Report (DES, 1985) identified a widespread failure on the part of schools to engage with cultural diversity, and argued for the permeation of all aspects of the initial training and professional development of teachers with intercultural perspectives. Research in the early 1990s

(e.g. Verma *et al.*, 1994) revealed that little progress had been made with that ideal. The Teacher Training Agency was strongly affected in its expectations of what teachers should be able to do by the nature of the National Curriculum which they were to teach. In its publication (Circular 4/98 DfEE 1998) it 'Sets out the Secretary of State's criteria which all courses of initial training must meet'. The document makes no reference to teaching in a multi-racial society. As a result, the inclusion in initial teacher training of cross-curricular and whole school issues such as equality of opportunity or education for a plural society has increasingly been left to the discretion of individual programme providers.

Joint initiatives by the Teacher Training Agency (TTA) and the Commission for Racial Equality during 1988 to explore ways of recruiting members of ethnic minorities into the teaching profession may have stimulated renewed interest in the wider ideas about pluralism, though it has to be said that the TTA's commitment to improve minority recruitment has not been matched by a similar interest in ensuring that initial teacher training addresses the issue of racial equality. A joint report, *Teaching in Multi-ethnic Britain*, lists 14 points for action planned by the TTA to encourage minority ethnic recruitment. Only two are related to the training of all teachers for teaching in a multi-ethnic society.

The Department for Education and Employment's Circular 4/98 to teacher training institutions provides careful guidance on subject-specific matters, but there are only three references to the necessity for students to function effectively in a multiracial classroom:

- 'Students must demonstrate that ... they use teaching methods which sustain the momentum of pupils' work and keep all pupils engaged through exploiting opportunities to contribute to the quality of pupils' wider educational development, including their personal, spiritual, moral, social and cultural development.' (p. 13)
- 'Students must demonstrate that ... they use teaching methods that sustain the momentum of pupils' work and keep all pupils engaged through setting high expectations for all pupils, notwithstanding individual differences including gender and cultural and linguistic backgrounds.' (p. 14)
- 'Students should have a working knowledge and understanding of teachers' legal liabilities and responsibilities relating to ... the Race Relations Act, 1976.' (p. 16)

Conclusions

Given Britain's imperial past and the primary legislation which identified British citizenship, the arrival of immigrants to meet Britain's post-Second World War economic needs was perhaps inevitable. What was not

inevitable was the way that those of them from the West Indies and South Asia were treated. Bold and decisive action enshrined in effective legislation by government with enlightened leadership by organisations such as the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industry might have enabled a fairly painless transition from a mono-ethnic to a multi-ethnic society to proceed. Unfortunately, politicians gave way to the worst instincts of a right-wing press which fostered working-class prejudice. Black people were identified as a 'problem' and, in the climate that had been created, the only popular legislation was that designed to limit their numbers. Furthermore, and for much the same reasons, neither legislative nor administrative action was taken to meet their needs lest they were seen by working-class whites to be receiving preferential treatment. Racism remains deeply entrenched in British society and the workplace, with black people less likely to be employed at levels appropriate to their ability and skills and up to three times more likely to be out of work than their white peers.

Schools and teachers faced with the realities of multi-ethnic classrooms – and it must be remembered that they were successive governments' instruments to achieve 'integration' – struggled, with some success, though with little support, to devise curricula and methods of teaching appropriate to their pupils. Social scientists and educationists in universities became involved, to the increasing irritation of government. Largely as a consequence, the Education Reform Act 1988 was passed. It introduced a centrally defined curriculum and determined that pupils were at school to be taught conventional subjects and that they were all to be treated the same. The result has been, as the Department for Education and Employment's own statistics have demonstrated, to the detriment of the education and life chances of most members of Britain's ethnic minority groups.

Note

- 1 Under section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976, indirect discrimination occurs when 'A person discriminates against another in any circumstances relevant to this act if ... (b) he applies to that other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to persons not of the same racial group as that other but (i) which is such that the proportion of persons of the same racial group as that other who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who can comply with it; and (ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the colour, race, nationality or ethnic origins of the persons to whom it is applied; and (iii) which is to the detriment of that other because he cannot comply with it.'

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