'Englishness' and English National Identity

Englishness and Britishness

'English, I mean British'—this familiar locution alerts us immediately to one of the enduring perplexities of English national identity. How to separate 'English' from 'British'? Note that the reverse problem is nowhere near as acute. Non-English members of the United Kingdom rarely say 'British' when they mean 'English', or 'English' when they mean 'British'. On the contrary, they are usually only too gratingly aware of what is peculiarly English, and are ultra-sensitive to the lordly English habit of subsuming British under English. For them it is a constant reminder of what they perceive to be—rightly, of course—England's hegemony over the rest of the British Isles.

So the confusion is a peculiarly English one, and is rich in historical and cultural resonances. It tells of the difficulty that most English people have in distinguishing themselves, in a collective sense, from the other inhabitants of the British Isles. They are of course perfectly well aware that there are Welsh, Scots, Irish, and even Manxmen and Jersey Islanders. They make jokes about them, imitate their accents, and call upon them for special effects, as when they lend colour to poverty by portraying it in a Glasgow slum, or intone passages from Dylan Thomas's Under Milk Wood in a mock-Welsh voice. But these are particular exceptions to the general rule, which is to see all the major events and achievements of national
life as English. Other ethnic groups are brought on in minor or
supporting roles.

Though when it is brought to their attention the English are
properly uneasy and even apologetic about this practice, they can
also on occasion offer a robust defence. Fowler’s celebrated view in
his Modern English Usage, is likely to strike a chord in the heart of
every native Englishman (if not all Englishwomen). It is natural,
says Fowler, to speak of the British Commonwealth or the British
navy or British trade, and to boast that Britain never never shall be
slaves.

But it must be remembered that no Englishman . . . calls himself a Briton
without a sneaking sense of the ludicrous, or hears himself referred to as a
Britisher without squirming. How should an Englishman utter the words
Great Britain with the glow of emotion that goes for him with England? His
sovereign may be Her Britannic Majesty to outsiders, but to him is Queen
of England. he calls the English language, he has been taught English history
as one continuous tale from Alfred to his own day; he has heard of the
word of an Englishman and aspires to be an English gentleman; and he
knows that England expects every man to do his duty . . . In the word
England, not in Britain, all these things are implicit. It is unreasonable to ask
forty millions of people to refrain from the use of the only name that is in
fashion with patriotic emotion, or to make them stop and think whether they
mean their country in a narrower or wider sense each time they say it.

This defence, from the heart as it were, certainly tells us something
important about Englishness, and its relation to Britishness. But it describes,
rather than explains. Why, given the objective situation of a multinational state, did ‘Britain’ and ‘Britishness’ not gain the ascendancy? Why does patriotic emotion attach itself so
fervently to ‘England’ and not to ‘Britain’? If ‘Britain’ sounds—as it
does—colourless and boring, why is that so and why on the contrary is ‘England’ so gloriously sonorous (and not, let it be said, just
to the English)? And if neither ‘Britain’ nor ‘England’ will do,
what else? The mystery is deepened, not diminished, by the accurate
observation that none of the available names for the United
Kingdom is really suitable, for various reasons and from the differing
points of view of the various inhabitants of the country. We
live, says Tom Nairn, in a state

As a remedy Nairn proposes, with calculated malice, ‘Ukania’, a
deliberate echo of the ‘Kakania’ of Robert Musil’s famous end-of-
empire novel The Man without Qualities (1930). This was Musil’s
notoriously satirical (and scatological) coinage for the Habsburg
Empire, a baggy, unwieldy domain that also suffered from a
plethora of names (Austria, Austria-Hungary, ‘the Empire’, etc.).
The allusion to Austria is helpful not just in the matter of
names. It recalls also the significance of empire, and the role it
plays in the development of national identities. Britain, like Austia,
was and to some extent still is an empire, at its height in the
early twentieth century the largest the world had ever known. It
ruled over a vast array of peoples of every conceivable ethnicity.
Its identity had to be related to its imperial character. It could not
afford to be too closely identified with any one ethnic group, however
influential and powerful (cf: Crick 1991: 92). The British state is
the classic example of the ‘state-nation’, the state identified not
by ethnicity but by state institutions such as Parliament and the
monarchy.

But the British state was imperial in a double sense. There was
the British Empire, in the well-known sense of a state with far-flung
colonies. There was also Great Britain or the United Kingdom, a
political entity that from several points of view could also be
regarded as an empire—an ‘internal empire’, the result of ‘internal
colonialism’ (Hechter 1975). England in this view was the imperial
nation that had annexed the territories and subjected the
populations of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland.

The question of English national identity is bound up with this
double identification. England and Englishness have to be seen
within the framework of this imperial history, in all its complexity.
This means that we should abandon, at least initially, conventional
methods of delineating national characteristics or the national culture
‘from the inside’, as it were. Works such as J. B. Priestley’s
English Journey (1934), George Orwell’s The Lion and the Unicorn
(1941), and, most gloriously, W. C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman’s
England and All That (1930) are instructive, entertaining, and, in the end,
indispensable. But they cannot be the starting point. They attempt
to trace the contours of Englishness through a discerning and
imaginative exploration of some of the principal features of the
national culture—its manners and morals, its landscape and
townscape, the key episodes of its history. Of such stuff are works on
national character' generally made.

But there is a prior task—or, to put it differently, one has to begin
from a different direction. One has to work from the outside in.
One has to see English national identity as a kind of residue; the response to and the result of England's engagement with its imperial venture, and of its perception of its mission in the world. Probably this approach is necessary in the examination of any case of national identity. Nations are formed by a combination of attractions and repulsions, by a fusion of what they wish to be with what the like aspirations of other nations allow them to be. Certainly in the case of England it is impossible to understand its self-perception and its sense of identity without taking into account this wider picture.

The Protestant Nation

The very idea of English nationalism is problematic. For many people there is no such thing (see e.g. Newman 1987: pp. xvii–xviii). England, they say, has had patriotism, royalism, even imperialism, but not nationalism as that came to be known from its nineteenth-century development on the Continent.

Certainly announcements of a flourishing English nationalism before the nineteenth century are suspect. Attempts have been made to show that the English were nationalistic, indeed that they invented nationalism, in Elizabethan times (Greenfeld 1992: 29–87), in the seventeenth century, especially during the Civil War (Kohn 1940), and in the latter half of the eighteenth century, as a result of the growing rivalry with France (Newman 1987). Clearly these cannot all be right, which suggests that they are looking at different things. In one important sense they must all be wrong, at least if they want to make their accounts consistent with what is generally known and agreed about nationalism.

In all its varieties, one thing is clear about nationalism: it is a populist doctrine, in the sense that it asserts a natural bond between all the members of a nation (however defined). If blood, or language, or religion, or history, defines the quality of belonging, then all who share in it must be admitted as members of the nation, and must on that account be participant members of any state—'national-state'—formed by the nation. It is for this reason that most theorists date the rise of nationalism to the aftermath of the French Revolution, with its fundamental doctrine of the equality of all citizens (see e.g. Alter 1994: 39–43; Kuhbakker 1992: 35–49).

England before the late nineteenth century—if not later—was not populist in this sense. It could not therefore know nationalism. The English nation, the political nation, was a class—or more accurately perhaps an estate—concept, and remained so for at least a century after the French Revolution. There were moments of patriotic fervour at the time of the Spanish Armada, and on several other occasions during Elizabeth's reign. There were claims for equality during the English Civil War, though quickly stifled and in any case couched mostly in religious terms. There was a popular mobilization against the French during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. But none of these amounts to an instance of nationalism proper, and certainly generated nothing like a persisting national consciousness. Monarchs and statesmen might invoke the nation when occasion called, but English society throughout the time was highly resistant to the notion that 'the people' constituted an equal body of citizens with equal rights (and duties) of participation in civic life. A good part—perhaps as much as two-thirds or three-quarters—of the English people did not belong in this sense to the English nation, which remained largely the preserve of the upper and middle classes (the latter notoriously for much of the time in the cultural embrace of the former).

English national consciousness did, I shall argue, develop at some point towards the end of the nineteenth century. But what kinds of identity were available to the English before that time? Thanks especially to the work of Linda Colley (1992) we can offer a better answer to that question than previously. Colley's argument is that for much of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries, the inhabitants of the newly formed Great Britain (through the parliamentary accession of Scotland in 1707 to the already existing union of England and Wales) saw themselves primarily as Britons and their country as Britain. This did not entail the suppression of other identities based on the previously existing English, Welsh, and Scottish lands, with their various histories, nor of course identities based on region or class. But it meant that on all occasions which called for a mass collective response—the Jacobite threat, the struggles with France, the conflict with the American colonies—the overriding identity was likely to be British rather than any of the other available alternatives.

This then was a national identity of a kind. But it was not a national identity, an identity framed in terms of common membership of an ethnic community. Its attachment was primarily institutional—to Church, to Parliament, and, above all, to the Crown, in the shape of the decedent un-English Ravenstein dynasty that had only recently, amidst much controversy, succeeded to the throne. 'For King and country' was the watchword of this type of national belonging—nationalism of the state rather than of the

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'Englishness'
people. The other crucial ingredient was religion. The British nation was the Protestant nation. It portrayed itself as the defender of the Protestant faith everywhere, ready to stand against the armed might of Catholic Europe. Formerly represented by Spain, in this period it was France that emerged as the formidable Catholic threat. English, Welsh, and Scottish Protestants—Catholic Ireland as usual being the odd man out—could unite in common denunciation of the reactionary French monarchy and in common plunder of its empire.

So ‘Britishness’ before ‘Englishness’, or at least before English nationalism. The English (like the Scots and Welsh) certainly had a sense of their distinctiveness during this period. John Bull was invented (in 1712) for this purpose, and in his successive elaborations his bluff English virtues were contrasted with the mean and treacherous ways of his enemies, especially the French. Englishness was always a handy tool to use against foreigners, including on occasion those, such as the Scots and the Irish, who lived among the English themselves.

But there were limits to this practice and dangers in going too far beyond them. Englishness in this sense did not require the further definition of an exclusive national identity. The circumstances of the time indeed called for quite the opposite. The new Hanoverians faced with the Jacobite movement, had to do all they could to win Scottish allegiance. Any stress on an English identity would have been counter-productive. The same was true of their position as rulers of an increasingly far-flung overseas empire. It was as British, not English, kings, ruling over British subjects, that they asserted their authority over their colonies in North America and the West Indies.

But the inadequacy of a purely English national identity stood out most clearly in their role—enthusiastically endorsed by the mass of the people—as the protectors and promoters of Protestantism. England might be thought by many, at least among the English, to be the heart of this mission. But to claim this, to emphasize the contribution of a particular partner in the Protestant coalition, would have diminished the grandeur of the task and diluted its missionary quality. England’s glory shone the brighter for being reflected in a cause far loftier than the advancement of national self-interest. Like Spain at the time of the Counter-Reformation, or Russia in its conception of itself as ‘the third Rome’, England’s national identity was willingly buried in the service of a missionary cause that was in the fullest sense global. World civilizations do not require anything so puny as national identities. Nationalism is for lesser nations. It is this conviction that underlies the long-standing English disdain for nationalism.

The Moment of ‘Englishness’

Sometime towards the end of the nineteenth century, there did begin to emerge something like an English national identity. Why was this? What made it then seem necessary, if not to displace Britishness, at least to develop a firmer sense of Englishness alongside it?

We have to note a marked paradox here. This was the time when Britain reached the height of its influence as a world power—indeed as the world power. Its Industrial Revolution—which was a truly British, not simply English, accomplishment—had for the time being given it, as the pioneer, unchallenged pre-eminence. Having lost one empire it had acquired another which, on the eve of the First World War, covered one fifth of the world’s land surface and incorporated a quarter of its population. All this was done under British, not English, auspices. One would surely expect a heightened Britishness, not a newly found Englishness, to thrive under these conditions.

No doubt this occurred as well. Given the prominent role of Scots, Irish, and (to a lesser extent) Welsh in the British Empire, it would have been impossible for it not to do so—though, as Kathryn Tidrick remarks, ‘the ideas by which they were consciously guided as imperialists were English in origin’, specifically and principally English evangelicalism (Tidrick 1990: 1). Nevertheless, one has simply to record that, whether in tandem or in opposition, there arose at the same time a movement to define more closely what was meant by Englishness—and, with unmistakable intent, to celebrate it.

Of the various possible reasons for this, one was negative. Nineteenth-century developments gradually loosened one of the central planks of Britishness, the idea of the Protestant nation. Partly this was the result of a general European secularization. More particularly, with the rise of Germany and the United States to world prominence, the Catholic threat, especially as represented by France, receded (a development helped by the accession of Ireland to the Union in 1801). Britain’s main rivals were now more them selves predominantly Protestant. If Britain were still to proclaim its mission in the world, it would increasingly have to do so in secular, not religious, terms.
But probably the most important reason for the rise of Englishness was ideological. The nineteenth century was the age of nationalism, and the latter part of the century saw the new doctrine developed to its most intensive point. Italy and Germany had united around it: the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires were being pulled apart by it. Everywhere on the Continent, and increasingly in the rest of the world, nationalist movements were on the rise. In the United Kingdom itself, Welsh and Scottish nationalism dates from this period, while in the form of the Irish question Irish nationalism threatened, as it still does, to tear the political fabric of the nation apart.

Nationalism at this time had come to be predominantly of the cultural or Herderian kind. As opposed to the older kind, emphasizing common citizenship, cultural nationalism emphasized common ethnicity. The hallmarks of this ethnicity were held to be language, religion, history, and blood or ‘race’. These expressed the ‘soul’ of the nation and every nation, it was felt, must have a soul.

English intellectuals—and it is really only of them we can speak, popular nationalism being as always something of a mystery—responded energetically to this felt need. In language and literary studies, in historiography, fiction, and folklore, there arose what can best be described as a cultural movement to define and, consistent with nationalist practice, celebrate Englishness. England too, the movement seemed to declare, had a soul; and it was a soul different from that of the rest of the kingdom in which for so long it had so unselfconsciously and promiscuously lain.

The lineaments of this movement have from recent studies become reasonably clear, and we can sketch them briefly (see Burrow 1988; Collin 1985; Duffy 1989; Collin 1991; Lucas 1991). Of central importance was the cleaning up of the English language, and the establishment of a ‘received’, that is, authoritative, manner of spelling and speaking English. In the philological studies of the period the English language was purified and purged of its ‘regional dialects’, and the pronunciation and speech-patterns of the metropolitan south were deemed the national speech model. The great monument to this activity was the Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles—begun, characteristically, by a Scot, James Murray, in 1879. Murray’s declared object was to capture the ‘genius of the English language’, and he presented his undertaking as ‘a great national project’. In his Dictionary the English language was, for the first time in its history, thoroughly nationalized and standardized.

Literature too was nationalized, in the sense that this period saw the elaboration of a national tradition of literature. Put in more recent terms, this was when the ‘canon’ of English literature was established. Given the importance of literature, as compared with, say, music, in the national culture, this provided one of the most influential and long-lasting definitions of Englishness. English culture, at its deepest level, is seen as created by a series of great ‘national’ poets, dramatists, and novelists. Their writing embodies values, whole ways of life, which express the aspirations of the national culture at its best and highest. It is hardly too much to say that English literature came to take on a religious function, far exceeding in importance the rapid Anglicanism that passed for the national religion. Its study and dissemination was conceived in missionary terms (see Hallick 1983).

The definition of a canon of English literature—a celebratory account of English literary distinctiveness—has been called by Stefan Collin ‘the Whig interpretation of English literature’ (Collin 1991: 342–73). It parallels the Whig interpretation of history that celebrates England’s political and historical distinctiveness. The markers are, in this case, certain texts, many of the most important of which appeared in the late nineteenth century. Palgrave’s Golden Treasury of English Verse, whose object was to produce ‘a true national anthology’, first appeared in 1861, and for long held the field. A somewhat similar function was later fulfilled by Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch’s Oxford Book of English Verse (1900), which by 1939 had been reprinted twenty times and sold nearly half a million copies. Then there was the ‘English Men of Letters’ series launched by Macmillan’s under the general editorship of John Morley in 1877. The series, wrote Collin, bore all the marks of a consciously designed national movement (1991: 355). The selection of writers, from Chaucer to the great Victorian poets and novelists, was meant to illustrate not only the greatness of English literature but its distinctive national qualities. These included sincerity, individuality, concreteness, and a sense of the richness and diversity of life. The implicit contrast was with the formalism and classicism of much continental literature, especially that of France.

As these qualities imply, Romanticism, especially in the form of the Romantic poets, has always ranked high in the national estimation. It indicates the English preference for feeling over intellect, poetry over philosophy, literature and history over social and political thought. It also refers to certain qualities of landscape—not just the rugged mountains of the Lake District associated with the Romantic poets but also the limber downlands of the south. This was, Alun Howkins (1986) reminds us, the period in which the
'south country' moved into the centre of the national imagination, to some extent displacing the wilder landscape of the earlier part of the century. Centrified it might be, and ordered to suit the townsman's taste, but still it testified to the enduring hold of the countryside in English life and a persistent anti-urban and even anti-industrial strand in its culture (Wiener 1981). In works such as William Morris's News from Nowhere (1890) the southern English countryside was accorded literally utopian status, not simply the locus but the very heart and soul of the good society.

These qualities of the imagination might suggest a certain unworldliness, a poetic flight from the sordid realities of everyday life. While there is an undeniable strain of whimsy in English culture—captured at its best by the Ealing film comedies of the latter 1940s—this is matched by an off-reckoned pragmatism and hardheadedness. It was in this period that a certain style of intellectual culture came to be defined as peculiarly and gratifyingly English. English thought, it was claimed, is empirical, utilitarian, concrete, individualist. It is exemplified in its best by such thinkers as Francis Bacon, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Charles Darwin. It is hostile to the metaphysical and metaphysical cast of continental thought—which, it was further argued, is largely responsible both for its impracticity and for the regrettable extreme and ideological forms of continental politics. It should be noted that this contrast between English and continental thought would have been difficult to draw earlier than the late-seventeenth century (despite Bacon), and it remains suspect thereafter as well. Bernard Crick once remarked that though the English like to think of themselves as a nation of shopkeepers, they are really a nation of metaphysical shoplifters. But in questions of national identity, self-perception is the thing.

In one other area the late nineteenth century produced a powerful current of Englishness. This was in historical consciousness. Effectively this meant the elaboration and intensification of 'the Whig interpretation' of English history, a self-congratulatory myth that portrayed English national development in glowing tones. The elements of this, as described by Herbert Butterfield, were already firmly in place by the end of the seventeenth century. They included the idea of the antiquity and independence of the House of Commons; the 'myth of Magna Carta', as the foundation of the liberties of all free-born Englishmen; the belief in a tradition of constitutional rule, limiting monarchy, stretching unbroken from the Middle Ages through to the seventeenth century; and the theory of primitive 'Teutonic freedom and of the

'Norman Yoke' that had attempted, unsuccessfully, to stifle it (Butterfield 1944: 69).

This classic version of the Whig interpretation of English history represented all these things as having been there, so to speak, all the time. It was a story of ancient and immemorial English freedom that, though it had at times to be defended against attempts to usurp it, had been a constant of English history. What the nineteenth century—building on Burke and the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment—did was to temporalize or historicize this myth. It gave it the form in which it entered the school textbooks and turned into a key element of the English tradition, part of the landscape of English life, like our country lanes or our November mist or our historic sites' (Butterfield 1944: 2). In the historical writings of Macaulay, Stubbs, Freeman, Green, and Seeley, English liberties were seen, not as a once-and-for-all achievement or inheritance, but as a story of steady, continuous, and cumulative growth and expansion, broadening out from precedent to precedent. English history was 'a single progressive drama' (Burrow 1981: 295), capable therefore of showing change and improvement. The face of the nation was turned from the past to the future. England was seen as having had a blessed inheritance, allowing it to avoid the fanaticism and bitterness born of countless revolutions and civil wars, that had disfigured the politics of its continental neighbours. This fortunate legacy had enabled it to become the richest and most powerful country in the world. So she would continue to grow and prosper, the envy and exemplar of other nations.

English Nationalism?

The moment of Englishness at the end of the nineteenth century is not simply a historical marker. It defines, in many ways, the essence of Englishness as this has come to be conceived in the high culture of the nation. Many of the later accounts of 'the English character' or 'the English tradition' drew heavily on it, even while they sought to broaden its base and make it less inward-looking (see, for an example, Stapleton 1994; see also Giles and Middleton 1997).

But the Englishness of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was mostly a cultural definition. It was an affair of poets, novelists, literary critics, philologists, folklorists, and historians. At the level of national politics it was played down, surfacing mainly in occasional pieces and after-dinner speeches (e.g. Stanley Baldwin's
On England, 1926). This was a natural and necessary response to Britain as a world power and the ruler of a world empire.

Other developments in the first half of the twentieth century also muted the political effects of Englishness. Of particular importance was the new labour movement and the rise of the Labour Party. Quite apart from the fact that it was technically international in outlook, the national labour movement was quite unmistakably British, not English. It got its greatest impetus not from England but from its Welsh and Scottish heartlands. It was from industrial Lancashire and the steel and mining towns of south Wales, not from London and Manchester, that its greatest leaders came, and where it found its strongest support. The Labour Party and the labour movement arguably linked the parts of the United Kingdom together more comprehensively than any other party or movement and, as with the monarchy, their continued strength depended on maintaining their appeal across ethnic and national lines. This dammed not just English but, perhaps even more, Welsh and Scottish nationalism.

All this began to change in the period after the 1960s. The empire was gone, as was Britain's position as an industrial world power. Lacking the stimulus and the bracing influence—nor to mention the profits—of a world role, Britishness capitulated in the face of an assertion, with varying degrees of force, of Scottish, Welsh, and Irish nationalism. England, the core nation, stood exposed, no longer protected by a surrounding cape of Britishness. The other nations of the United Kingdom began to envisage a future as separate members of the new European Community. England too was forced to consider this prospect and, in the process, reassess itself and its future identity.

One consequence of the decline of Britishness was a renewed emphasis on Englishness. But now it moved from culture to politics. One might say—cautiously—that something like an English nationalism came into being. There was a new stridency in the utterances. 'New Right' Conservative politicians, starting with Enoch Powell and continuing, in a different vein, with Margaret Thatcher, Norman Tebbit, Michael Portillo, and others, were among the most vocal opponents. They were joined by a group of right wing historians and publicists such as John Vincent, Jonathan Clarke, Norman Stone, and the 'Bretons Group', opposed to British membership of the European Union. While often they spoke of 'Britain', it was not usually very difficult to read this, as in the past, as a code for 'England'. The former Conservative Prime Minister John Major once memorably evoked the nation in an image composed mainly of village cricket and warm beer— an echo of Baldwin that seemed to exclude not just Welsh, Scots, and Irish but most women, the bulk of the English working class, and the vast majority of the non-white population. He followed this up with the announcement that 'this British nation has a monarchy founded by the Kings of Wessex over eleven hundred years ago' (The Times, 4 May 1994)—a view of British history that had the Scots, at the very least, spluttering in their porridge.

It has to be said that such 'Little Englander' views have found an echo among considerable sections of the English population at least if we are to believe their newspapers, or observe their behaviour at football matches. But it has always been clear, at least to outsiders, that Englishness embodied the aspirations and self-images of a particular section of society—for much of the time, those of the dominant upper and upper middle classes. It was their politics, their church, their sports, their manners and ways of speaking, their schools and universities, their view of history, that provided much of the content of 'the national character'. In recent years such a conception has been under assault from a variety of sources—women, workers (or their spokesmen), blacks, gays, and other groups supposedly 'hidden from history'.

The force of the criticism is evident. What is less clear, or less credible, is what are proposed as alternatives. Englishness may be an ideology, but as is well known ideologies tend to diffuse themselves widely in society, touching groups which may be very distant from the centres of power. Monarchy, in so far as it has come to be associated with Britishness rather than Englishness, is one example of this effect. What can compete with such long-standing symbols and sentiments? 'Multiculturalism'? Federalism? 'Europe'? Merely to name them is to be aware of the problems. People may not consciously seek a national identity or even know that they have one, but there are moments in their lives, both individually and collectively, when they seem to need one and to reach for it. Englishness, as it has been handed down and celebrated, is today an embedded concept and practice. It is out of touch with many of the ideas and much of the reality of contemporary British society. But it would be foolish to think that it cannot still generate enthusiasm and mobilise considerable support, at all levels of society.

Mrs Thatcher's popularity was one expression of this. That in itself indicates the urgency of the task, but also the difficulty of it.
Further Reading


Cock, B. (ed.) (1994), National Identities, Oxford: Blackwell. Examines important questions about the political identities of the various parts of the United Kingdom, and their relationship to each other.


References


